Journal of Eurasian Studies - EPA
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Journal of Eurasian Studies - EPA
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JOURNAL OF<br />
EURASIAN STUDIES<br />
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<strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> the Gábor Bálint de Szentkatolna Society<br />
Founded: 2009.<br />
Internet: www.federatio.org/joes.html<br />
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Volume II., Issue 3. / July — September 2010<br />
____________________<br />
ISSN 1877‐4199
July‐September 2010 JOURNAL OF EURASIAN STUDIES Volume II., Issue 3.<br />
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Publisher<br />
Foundation ʹStichting MIKES INTERNATIONALʹ, established in The Hague, Holland.<br />
Account: Postbank rek.nr. 7528240<br />
Registered: Stichtingenregister: S 41158447 Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken Den Haag<br />
Distribution<br />
The periodical can be downloaded from the following Internet‐address:<br />
http://www.federatio.org/joes.html<br />
If you wish to subscribe to the email mailing list, you can do it by sending an email to the<br />
following address:<br />
mikes_int‐subscribe@yahoogroups.com<br />
The publisher has no financial sources. It is supported by many in the form <strong>of</strong> voluntary work<br />
and gifts. We kindly appreciate your gifts.<br />
Address<br />
The Editors and the Publisher can be contacted at the following addresses:<br />
Email: mikes_int@federatio.org<br />
Postal address: P.O. Box 10249, 2501 HE, Den Haag, Holland<br />
Individual authors are responsible for facts included and views expressed in their articles.<br />
_____________________________________<br />
ISSN 1877‐4199<br />
© Mikes International, 2001‐2010, All Rights Reserved<br />
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CALL FOR PAPERS<br />
We encourage everybody to submit to the Editorial Board (joes_cfp@federatio.org)<br />
papers in the fields covered by the <strong>Journal</strong>. The papers will be assessed solely on their<br />
academic merits, and these are the few prerequisites the authors and their papers<br />
should adhere to:<br />
Can be written in any language. However, if written in a language other than<br />
English, please provide an English summary <strong>of</strong> at least A4 length.<br />
A brief (max. 10 sentences long) pr<strong>of</strong>essional CV in English.<br />
NEWS BRIEF<br />
The news brief section features the latest news from the past three months prior to<br />
publication <strong>of</strong> each <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Eurasian</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> issue in the areas <strong>of</strong> anthropology,<br />
archaeology, ethnology, folklore, genetics, and linguistics with a special focus on Asia<br />
and the interaction between various European and Asian peoples. News pieces outside<br />
the three‐month period or our scope <strong>of</strong> focus may also be included if they are found to<br />
be <strong>of</strong> great value and relevance by our editorial board. Please submit a short summary<br />
<strong>of</strong> those newsbytes (max. 100 words) in English to the following email‐address:<br />
joes_newsbrief@federatio.org, indicating the source as well (also URL if applicable).<br />
The column is edited by Andor Zombori. If the original news is only available in<br />
hardcopy, please send us a copy to the following address: <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Eurasian</strong> <strong>Studies</strong>,<br />
P.O. Box 10249, 2501 HE, Den Haag, Holland. The names <strong>of</strong> the contributors will be<br />
published in the journal unless they ask otherwise.<br />
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Editor‐in‐Chief<br />
EDITORIAL BOARD<br />
FARKAS, Flórián The Hague, Holland<br />
Deputy Editor‐in‐Chief<br />
Editors<br />
OBRUSÁNSZKY, Borbála Budapest, Hungary<br />
ALIMBAY, Nursan Almaty, Kazakhstan<br />
ARADI, Éva Budapest, Hungary<br />
BÉRCZI, Szaniszló Budapest, Hungary<br />
BÍRÓ, András Budapest, Hungary<br />
CSORNAI, Katalin Budapest, Hungary<br />
CZEGLÉDI, Katalin Pécs, Hungary<br />
ERDÉLYI, István Göd, Hungary<br />
HORVÁTH, Izabella Hangzhou, China<br />
KARATAY, Osman İzmir, Turkey<br />
MAHAPATRA, Debidatta Aurobinda Mumbai, India<br />
MARÁCZ, László Amsterdam, Holland<br />
MARCANTONIO, Angela Rome, Italy<br />
MURAKEÖZY, Éva Patrícia The Hague, Holland<br />
SECHENBAATAR Hohhot, China<br />
UCHIRALTU Hohhot, China<br />
ZOMBORI, Andor Nagoya, Japan<br />
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CONTENTS<br />
Dear Reader,.............................................................................................................................................7<br />
Our Authors .............................................................................................................................................8<br />
NEWS BRIEF.................................................................................................. 13<br />
HISTORY ........................................................................................................ 22<br />
BENCZE, Mihály<br />
Katyn Seen with Hungarian Eyes...................................................................................................23<br />
MARÁCZ, László<br />
Multilingualism in the Hungarian Kingdom (1867‐1918): Language Policy and Practice .27<br />
OBRUSÁNSZKY, Borbála<br />
Silk Road – Then and Now..............................................................................................................62<br />
LINGUISTICS................................................................................................ 69<br />
WINTERS, Clyde<br />
Greek Influence on Sanskrit Language.........................................................................................70<br />
LANGUAGE TEACHING METHODOLOGIES ....................................... 78<br />
MOLNÁR, Zsolt & MOLNÁRNÉ CZEGLÉDI, Cecília<br />
The Creative Hungarian Language and Its Special Teaching Method<br />
Part 5.: Relators in the Structure <strong>of</strong> Sentences..............................................................................79<br />
ANCIENT WRITING SYSTEM RESEARCH ............................................. 84<br />
MELLÁR, Mihály<br />
From a Kafkania Pebble to the Staff <strong>of</strong> Asclepios.......................................................................85<br />
ETHNOGRAPHY........................................................................................... 90<br />
TODORIKI, Masahiko<br />
Tuwa‐Ren: The Emerging Ethnic Identity <strong>of</strong> the Altai‐Tuvans in Xinjiang..........................91<br />
GEOSTRATEGY .......................................................................................... 104<br />
ABILOV, Shamkhal<br />
Historical Development <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijan Oil Industry and the Role <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan<br />
in Todayʹs European Energy Security..........................................................................................105<br />
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MAHAPATRA, Debidatta Aurobinda<br />
Post‐Cold War World Order and Ideal Human Unity: A Perspective from<br />
Sri Aurobindo’s Philosophy ..........................................................................................................142<br />
LITERATURE & ARTS............................................................................... 153<br />
EKUKLU, Bülent<br />
Zeki Demirkubuz ve “Kader” .......................................................................................................154<br />
EKUKLU, Bülent : Zeki Demirkubuz ........................................................................................................................... 158<br />
MURAKEÖZY, Éva Patrícia<br />
A propos d’une exposition: Hans Bellmer — Louise Bourgeois Double Sexus .................159<br />
TRAVELOGUE ............................................................................................ 163<br />
TAPON, Francis<br />
The Hidden Europe: What Eastern Europeans Can Teach Us ................................................164<br />
BOOK (P)REVIEW...................................................................................... 175<br />
BÉRCZI, Szaniszló<br />
Etruscan, Roman and Toscan Art..................................................................................................176<br />
CLASSICAL WRITINGS ON EURASIA.................................................. 183<br />
HIRTH, Friedrich<br />
Die chinesischen annalen als Quelle zur Geschichte asiatischer Völker.............................184<br />
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DEAR READER,<br />
PALIMPSEST<br />
This is the title <strong>of</strong> Gore Vidal´s famous memoir. The author identifies its way <strong>of</strong> writing his memoir<br />
with the definition <strong>of</strong> the word, which is: “1. Paper, parchment, etc., prepared for writing on and wiping<br />
out again, like a slate. 2. A parchment, etc., which has been written upon twice; the original writing<br />
having been rubbed out.” Thinking <strong>of</strong> the history and heritage <strong>of</strong> Eurasia (and <strong>of</strong> the world in general), it<br />
is probably the best term to use.<br />
This beautiful and exciting nature <strong>of</strong> mankind´s history and cultural heritage was oversimplified and<br />
shadowed during the Cold War in the 20 th century. In the battle <strong>of</strong> good versus evil (depending on where<br />
you stood or where you were placed) there was not too much room left for subtle nuances, at least in the<br />
open public space. With the end <strong>of</strong> it the situation changed dramatically. Since the 1990s more and more<br />
people are searching for their roots. History does not show any sign <strong>of</strong> ending, neither in a Marxist nor in<br />
a Fukuyama manner; in fact never did. History, culture, race, language, heritage and alike are all aspects<br />
<strong>of</strong> human existence that count heavily again. Not for nothing can we witness a real identity renaissance<br />
throughout Euarasia and beyond.<br />
When we launched our <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Eurasian</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> in March 2009 we envisioned a free journal that<br />
would cater to a wide intelligent audience that expects a combination <strong>of</strong> scientific articles <strong>of</strong> high quality<br />
and other material, which is topical, interesting and readable. Both our readers´ and the volunteer<br />
authors´ reactions surpassed our wildest expectations. The journal, after almost two years, contains more<br />
material from newcomers than from its original founders. It could not be better!<br />
There is another fact that proves that we were right in launching our journal: Elsevier, the publishing<br />
powerhouse, launched in January this year, one year after our journal´s launch, a periodical with exactly<br />
the same name as ours. Despite the differences in scope, frequency <strong>of</strong> publication (theirs is published<br />
twice a year) and the way it is edited and marketed, Elsevier´s journal too shows the changing <strong>of</strong> times.<br />
And this can not be by accident. It is Zeitgeist.<br />
Flórián Farkas<br />
Editor‐in‐Chief<br />
The Hague, November 28, 2010<br />
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OUR AUTHORS<br />
ABILOV, Shamkhal<br />
Born in Yardimli, Republic <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan in 1985. Received a BA degree in International<br />
Relations from Qafqaz University (Baku, Azerbaijan) in 2008. Currently he is studying for a<br />
MA‐Double Degree in the field <strong>of</strong> Global <strong>Studies</strong>. He already completed the first year in 2009 at<br />
the University <strong>of</strong> Lepizig. At present he is completing the second year at the University <strong>of</strong> Vienna.<br />
Mr. Abilov´s main research areas are: Azerbaijan‐Conflict <strong>Studies</strong>, Caucasus, European Union,<br />
International Relations Theories & Globalization; in these fields he authored several articles. He is<br />
native speaker <strong>of</strong> Azeri and Turkish, fluent in English and has a reasonable working knowledge<br />
<strong>of</strong> German.<br />
BENCZE, Mihály<br />
Mathematician, teacher, poet. Born in Négyfalu in Transylvania in 1954. Graduated from the<br />
Babeş‐Bolyai University, Kolozsvár/Cluj/Klausenburg (Transylvania), Faculty <strong>of</strong> Mathematics in<br />
1978. Since his graduation he is teaching mathematics in high schools, currently in the Áprily<br />
Lajos High‐School in Brassó/Braşov/Kronstadt (Transylvania). Next to teaching his activities<br />
cover the following fields: he was involved in the establishment <strong>of</strong> a Hungarian high‐school<br />
system in Brassó/Braşov/Kronstadt; founded the Hungarian Mathematics Competition in<br />
Transylvania; founded the József Wildt International Mathematical Competition; mentor <strong>of</strong> students<br />
who create student periodicals; editor‐in‐chief <strong>of</strong> the international mathematical journal<br />
OCTOGON MATHEMATICAL MAGAZINE; founder <strong>of</strong> the publishing house Fulgur (1993),<br />
which specializes in publishing Hungarian books. He is author <strong>of</strong> several books including poetry<br />
and mathematics and several hundreds mathematical papers.<br />
BÉRCZI, Szaniszló<br />
Physicist‐astronomer who made a new synthesis <strong>of</strong> evolution <strong>of</strong> matter according to the<br />
material hierarchy versus great structure building periods. This model is a part <strong>of</strong> his Lecture<br />
Note Series Book on the Eötvös University. He also organized a research group on evolution <strong>of</strong><br />
matter in the Geonomy Scientific Committee <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian Academy <strong>of</strong> Scince (with Béla<br />
Lukács). He wrote the first book in Hungary about planetary science From Crystals to Planetary<br />
Bodies (also he was the first candidate <strong>of</strong> earth sciences in topics planetology). He built with<br />
colleagues on the Eötvös University the Hungarian University Surveyor (Hunveyor)<br />
experimental space probe model for teachers for training purposes and development <strong>of</strong> new<br />
constructions in measuring technologies.<br />
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EKUKLU, Bülent<br />
Was born in 1973 and graduated from the Middle East Technical University, Computer<br />
Engineering Department. In 1998 he started his MA studies at the Cinema‐TV Department at<br />
Yeditepe University; he did further research in cinema in 2001 in Italy. In 2003 he successfully<br />
completed his master degree education with the thesis ʺChange <strong>of</strong> Cultural Society <strong>of</strong> Turkey in<br />
post‐1980 and Cultural Construction <strong>of</strong> Yavuz Turgul Cinemaʺ. Since then he has been working<br />
in various TV series, short films, radio programs, documentary films as script writer and<br />
consultant. Starting from 2005, he attended a master class called ʺPlaywriting Workshopʺ for a<br />
period <strong>of</strong> one year at Mehmet Ergen management. After that class, he finished his first play<br />
entitled ʺAmber‐eyed womanʺ. Since 2006, he is giving lectures called “Dramatic Writing and<br />
Script Writing Workshop” at Sinematek Association. Since 1998 he has been working in different<br />
roles in the IT sector and currently is working as IT consultant.<br />
HIRTH, Friedrich (1845‐1927)<br />
German‐American sinologist who was born at Gräfentonna, Saxe‐Gotha. He was educated at<br />
the universities <strong>of</strong> Leipzig, Berlin, and Greifswald. He was in the Chinese maritime customs<br />
service from 1870 to 1897. In 1902, Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Hirth was appointed to the pr<strong>of</strong>essorship <strong>of</strong> Chinese<br />
in Columbia University, New York. He is the author <strong>of</strong> numerous books and articles.<br />
MAHAPATRA, Debidatta Aurobinda<br />
Received a Ph.D. degree from the School <strong>of</strong> International <strong>Studies</strong>, Jawaharlal Nehru<br />
University, New Delhi. He is currently part <strong>of</strong> research faculty at Centre for Central <strong>Eurasian</strong><br />
<strong>Studies</strong>, University <strong>of</strong> Mumbai, India. He is also associated with the Institute for Conflict<br />
Research, Belfast, International Mediating and Negotiating Operational Agency, Rome, Human<br />
Dignity and Humiliation <strong>Studies</strong> Network, and <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Alternative Perspectives in Social<br />
Sciences, Florida. Mr. Mahapatra was a research fellow at Moscow University in 2003‐2004. He<br />
has written two books, co‐authored two and co‐edited one. He has contributed over hundred<br />
papers to various national and international journals and magazines. His prominent works<br />
include India Russia Partnership: Kashmir, Chechnya and Issues <strong>of</strong> Convergence (2006), Central Eurasia:<br />
Geopolitics, Compulsions and Connections (2008) and “The Peace Process and Prospects for<br />
Economic Reconstruction in Kashmir,” Peace & Conflict Review (United Nations University <strong>of</strong><br />
Peace, Fall 2008). His areas <strong>of</strong> expertise are conflict and peace building, Kashmir, terrorism and<br />
strategic aspects <strong>of</strong> Central Eurasia.<br />
MARÁCZ, László<br />
Born in 1960 in Utrecht, the Netherlands. Received his degree from the University <strong>of</strong><br />
Groningen. Between 1984 and 1990 he was with the University <strong>of</strong> Groningen as assistant<br />
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pr<strong>of</strong>essor. Between 1990 and 1992 as a Niels Stensen scholar he was with MTI, MTA and CNRS as<br />
a guest researcher. Since 1992 Mr. Marácz is lecturer <strong>of</strong> the East‐European Institute <strong>of</strong> the<br />
University <strong>of</strong> Amsterdam. His areas <strong>of</strong> research cover general syntax, Hungarian grammar, the<br />
relationship <strong>of</strong> Hungarians and the West. Author <strong>of</strong> numerous scientific publications and books.<br />
MELLÁR, Mihály<br />
Mathematician, Academia <strong>of</strong> Sciences, Belgrade. Since 1980 he is living in Australia, working<br />
as Australian Aboriginal and Papua New Guinean art and craft dealer, researching organic and<br />
endogen cultures.<br />
MOLNÁR, Zsolt<br />
Received a doctor univ. degree in Management and Organization from the Budapest<br />
University <strong>of</strong> Technology, Faculty <strong>of</strong> Social and Natural Sciences in the field <strong>of</strong> “Cognitive<br />
Modeling <strong>of</strong> Organizations”. Currently he is working in the field <strong>of</strong> cognitive sciences focusing on<br />
the research <strong>of</strong> creation <strong>of</strong> meaning. His special interest is the investigation <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian<br />
language based on the meaning principle. In line with his research he is also working on new<br />
language teaching methods based on theoretical findings.<br />
MOLNÁRNÉ CZEGLÉDI, Cecília<br />
Ms. Molnárné Czeglédi is working as teacher and teaching methodology developer. Currently<br />
she is working in an elementary school, does applied research, practical adaptation and effective<br />
introductions in the field <strong>of</strong> teaching methodology development. At present her main area <strong>of</strong><br />
interest is the developmnet <strong>of</strong> a new Hungarian language teaching method, based on the<br />
theoretical findings <strong>of</strong> the meaning principle.<br />
MURAKEÖZY, Éva Patrícia<br />
Born in 1971, Budapest, Hungary. Received her diploma (M.Sc.) in Agricultural Sciences and<br />
her Doctorate (Ph.D.) in Plant Physiology, in 1995 and 2001, respectively, both from the Szent<br />
István University <strong>of</strong> Gödöllő, Hungary. In 2003 she graduated as an engineer in Plant Protection<br />
at the University <strong>of</strong> Veszprém, Hungary and worked for the Hungarian Plant and Soil Protection<br />
Service. Between 2004 and 2005 she worked as a postdoctoral student at the Technopôle<br />
Brest‐Iroise in Brest, France. She is specialized in the physiology and molecular biology <strong>of</strong><br />
halophyte plants. From 2007 she studies fine arts at the Academy <strong>of</strong> Fine Arts <strong>of</strong> The Hague, The<br />
Netherlands. Her special field <strong>of</strong> interest is the artistic depiction <strong>of</strong> organic growth processes.<br />
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OBRUSÁNSZKY, Borbála<br />
Historian, orientalist. She completed her studies at the University Eötvös Loránd in Budapest<br />
between 1992 and 1997 in history and Mongol civilization. This is followed by a postgradual<br />
study at the Mongol State University, where she is awarded a Ph.D. degree in 1999. Between 2000<br />
and 2002 she worked as external consultant <strong>of</strong> the Asia Center at the University <strong>of</strong> Pécs, and<br />
organized the Mongol programs <strong>of</strong> the Shambala Tibet Center. During this period she<br />
participated in several expeditions in Mongolia and China. Ms. Obrusánszky is member and/or<br />
founder <strong>of</strong> several Hungarian scientific associations and she is author <strong>of</strong> numerous books and<br />
articles, and regularly provides analyses on Central‐Asia in the scientific press. Next to that she is<br />
the editor‐in‐chief <strong>of</strong> an educational journal.<br />
TAPON, Francis<br />
Author <strong>of</strong> The Hidden Europe: What Eastern Europeans Can Teach Us, which comes<br />
out August 21, 2011.<br />
Author <strong>of</strong> Hike Your Own Hike: 7 Life Lessons from Backpacking Across America.<br />
Has visited all 25 Eastern European countries at least twice and has traveled there<br />
nonstop for 3 years.<br />
Has traveled to over 80 countries, walked across America 4 times, backpacked over<br />
12,500 miles in the mountains, and was a finalist in the California Outdoors Hall <strong>of</strong><br />
Fame.<br />
He’s been covered in The New York Times Magazine, San Francisco Chronicle, San Jose<br />
Mercury News, Backpacker Magazine, TGO (The Great Outdoors) Magazine in the UK,<br />
New Mexico Magazine, and others. He’s been interviewed on radio stations and<br />
podcasts.<br />
Amazon.com & Lincoln Mercury selected him as the best example <strong>of</strong> someone who is<br />
fulfilling the dream <strong>of</strong> traveling the world, and produced a video pr<strong>of</strong>ile on him.<br />
His dad is French, his mom is Chilean, and he was born in San Francisco. Speaks<br />
several languages. He has never owned a TV, chair, table, couch, bed, or rocket ship.<br />
Has a BA in Religion from Amherst College and an MBA from Harvard Business<br />
School.<br />
TODORIKI, Masahiko<br />
Born in 1965, Nagano Prefecture. Received PhD <strong>of</strong> Biotechnology from Osaka University in<br />
2007. Besides his musical career, he has been a researcher at the National Museum <strong>of</strong> Ethnology<br />
Osaka (2007‐2010), the National Agricultural Research Center Tsukuba (2007‐2008), and a lecturer<br />
in the Institute <strong>of</strong> Oriental Culture at the University <strong>of</strong> Tokyo (2008‐2009) in the fields <strong>of</strong> biology<br />
and ethnology. Since 2009, he assumed his present post in the Department <strong>of</strong> Economics at the<br />
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Osaka University. Latest publications: Old maps <strong>of</strong> Tuva 1—The detailed map <strong>of</strong> the nomadic grazing<br />
patterns <strong>of</strong> total area <strong>of</strong> the Tannu‐Uriankhai— (2008); Old maps <strong>of</strong> Tuva 2—Tannu‐ Uriankhai Maps in<br />
18th Century China — (2009); “The dynamics <strong>of</strong> symbiosis: an essay on evolution from the<br />
endogenous point <strong>of</strong> view” (2009).<br />
WINTERS, Clyde<br />
Dr. Winters is the Director <strong>of</strong> the Uthman dan Fodio Institute’s Afro‐Asian Research Project.<br />
He is a Curriculum Specialist and Linguist. Dr. Winters has taught Applied Linguistics at Saint<br />
Xavier University in Chicago and Curriculum <strong>Studies</strong> at Governors State University, University<br />
Park Illinois. He is especially interested in Archaeogenetics, Indian languages and the Indus<br />
Valley writing. Articles by Dr. Winters, have appeared in Science, Papers in Japanese Linguistics,<br />
International <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Dravidian Linguistics, <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Central Asia and the Central Asiatic<br />
<strong>Journal</strong>.<br />
ZOMBORI, Andor<br />
Born in Budapest, Hungary. Acquired a B.A. degree in Japanese language and international<br />
relations in 2003 at the California State University, Long Beach in the United States. Also studied<br />
Japanese language, culture, and international affairs for one year at the Osaka Gakuin University<br />
in Japan and Korean language and culture for another year at the Kyungbuk National University<br />
in Korea. Mr. Zombori has been living in Japan since 2004 and working at a Japanese automotive<br />
industry consulting company as the department head <strong>of</strong> English‐language publications. His<br />
primary area <strong>of</strong> specialization is the Asian automotive industry and market.<br />
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NEWS BRIEF<br />
COPYRIGHT INFORMATION: Please note that the copyright <strong>of</strong> these news briefs belongs to<br />
each website as indicated at the bottom <strong>of</strong> each story.<br />
______________<br />
This News Brief was compiled and edited by Andor Zombori.<br />
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ARCHAEOLOGY<br />
Afghanistan: Archaeologists seek protection for Afghan treasures<br />
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jf‐EWqmhK3CiG7XGyGyVtOsNWZ8g<br />
AFP (Jun. 21, 2010)<br />
Armenia: Researchers find worldʹs oldest leather shoe and more<br />
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2010‐06/plos‐rfw060710.php<br />
EurekAlert! (Jun. 09, 2010)<br />
Armenia: Archaeological excavations <strong>of</strong> the city <strong>of</strong> Tigranakert in Artsakh get under way<br />
http://www.panorama.am/en/society/2010/06/21/tigranakert/<br />
Panorama.am (Jun. 21, 2010)<br />
China: Researchers may know identity <strong>of</strong> ancient town in Xinjiang<br />
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90782/7019250.html<br />
People’s Daily Online (Jun. 09, 2010)<br />
China: Buddha remains unveiled in east China temple<br />
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010‐06/12/c_13346882.htm<br />
Xinhua (Jun. 12, 2010)<br />
China: Rare emerald pearl inserted in Cao Caoʹs mouth found<br />
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90782/90873/7023898.html<br />
Peopleʹs Daily Online (Jun. 12, 2010)<br />
China: Human Sacrifices Found at Ancient China Complex<br />
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2010/06/photogalleries/100615‐human‐sacrifice‐china‐tombs‐science‐archaeology‐<br />
pictures/#/china‐western‐zhou‐era‐skeletons_21478_600x450.jpg<br />
National Geographic (Jun. 15, 2010)<br />
China: Ancient voyagers tomb found in E China<br />
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90782/90873/7041564.html<br />
People’s Daily Online (Jun. 26, 2010)<br />
China: Revealing the Ancient Chinese Secret <strong>of</strong> Sticky Rice Mortar<br />
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/05/100530093704.htm<br />
Science Daily (Jun. 01, 2010)<br />
Cyprus: Ancient figurine ‘factory’ uncovered<br />
http://www.cyprus‐mail.com/cyprus/ancient‐figurine‐factory‐uncovered/20100610?<br />
Cyprus Mail (Jun. 10, 2010)<br />
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Cyprus: Diggers discover Phoenician army complex<br />
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE65H2W520100618<br />
Reuters (Jun. 18, 2010)<br />
Cyprus: Dig reveals ancient palace<br />
http://famagusta‐gazette.com/cyprus‐dig‐reveals‐ancient‐palace‐p10650‐69.htm<br />
Famagusta Gazette (Jun. 19, 2010)<br />
Cyprus: Rich finds at Bronze Age settlement<br />
http://www.cyprus‐mail.com/cyprus/rich‐finds‐bronze‐age‐settlement/20100704<br />
Cyprus Mail (Jul. 04, 2010)<br />
Cyprus: An archaeological window on ancient farming<br />
http://www.cyprus‐mail.com/archaeology/archaeological‐window‐ancient‐farming/20100722<br />
Cyprus Mail (Jul. 22, 2010)<br />
Georgia: Unique archaeological discovery in Adjara<br />
http://www.geotimes.ge/index.php?m=home&newsid=21977<br />
The Georgian Times (Jun. 21, 2010)<br />
Indonesia: Chinese Ancient Earthenware Found in Dieng<br />
http://en.vivanews.com/news/read/157453‐chinese‐ancient‐earthenware‐found‐in‐dieng<br />
VIVAnews (Jun. 14, 2010)<br />
Israel: Dig reveals 3,500 yr old relics<br />
http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Article.aspx?id=177711<br />
The Jerusalem Post (Jun. 07, 2010)<br />
Israel: Ancient bees found in Israel hailed from Turkey<br />
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/08/science/la‐sci‐ancient‐bees‐20100608<br />
Los Angeles Times (Jun. 8, 2010)<br />
Israel: Pagan Antiquities Unearthed in Israel<br />
http://news.discovery.com/archaeology/pagan‐antiquities‐unearthed‐in‐israel.html<br />
Discovery News (Jun. 09, 2010)<br />
Israel: Oldest written document ever found in Jerusalem by Hebrew University<br />
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2010‐07/thuo‐owd071210.php<br />
EurekAlert! (Jul. 11, 2010)<br />
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Israel: Philistine Temple Ruins Uncovered in Goliaths Hometown<br />
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/138843<br />
Arutz Sheva (Jul. 29, 2010)<br />
India: Remains <strong>of</strong> another ancient varsity found<br />
http://times<strong>of</strong>india.indiatimes.com/city/patna/Remains‐<strong>of</strong>‐another‐ancient‐varsity‐found/articleshow/6018165.cms<br />
The Times <strong>of</strong> India (Jun. 07, 2010)<br />
India: Archaeologists confirm Megalithic find<br />
http://www.hindu.com/2010/06/11/stories/2010061153330600.htm<br />
The Hindu (Jun. 11, 2010)<br />
India: Buddhist structures found in Simhachalam hill range<br />
http://www.hindu.com/2010/07/11/stories/2010071163040600.htm<br />
The Hindu (Jul. 11, 2010)<br />
India: Archaeological Findings Point to Ancient Indo‐Roman Trade<br />
http://www.indiajournal.com/pages/event.php?id=11753<br />
India <strong>Journal</strong> (Jul. 15, 2010)<br />
Iran: Alamut yields decorative tiles<br />
http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/128647.html<br />
Press TV (Jun. 01, 2010)<br />
Iran: Alamut yields ancient water reservoirs<br />
http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/131837.html<br />
Press TV (Jun. 24, 2010)<br />
Iran: Sassanid fire temple discovered in central Iran<br />
http://www.payvand.com/news/10/jul/1043.html<br />
Payvand Iran News (Jul. 05, 2010)<br />
Iran: Ancient Subterranean Secret Complex Discovered in Hamadan Province<br />
http://www.cais‐soas.com/news/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=122:an‐ancient‐subterranean‐secret‐complex‐<br />
discovered‐in‐hamadan‐province&catid=42<br />
CAIS (Jul. 27, 2010)<br />
Jordan: 6,000‐year‐old statue discovered in Jordanian desert<br />
http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/middleeast/news/article_1572260.php/6‐000‐year‐old‐statue‐discovered‐in‐Jordanian‐<br />
desert<br />
M&C (Jul. 21, 2010)<br />
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Jordan: Ancient City <strong>of</strong> Petra Tombs Reveal 61 Burials and Islamic Gold Medallion<br />
http://heritage‐key.com/blogs/owenjarus/ancient‐city‐petra‐tombs‐reveal‐61‐burials‐and‐islamic‐gold‐medallion<br />
Heritage Key (Jul. 23, 2010)<br />
Japan: Ancient site suggests meat diet<br />
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201006180433.html<br />
The Asahi Shimbun (Jun. 19, 2010)<br />
Japan: Remains <strong>of</strong> oldest palace for emperors accession ceremony found<br />
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9GM6QFO0&show_article=1<br />
Breitbart (Jul. 01, 2010)<br />
Kenya: Chinese archaeologists African quest for sunken ship <strong>of</strong> Ming admiral<br />
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/25/kenya‐china<br />
Guardian (Jul. 25, 2010)<br />
Korea, South: 12th century dike discovered in Nakdong River<br />
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/culturesports/2010/06/21/17/0701000000AEN20100621000900315F.HTML<br />
Yonhap News Agency (Jun. 21, 2010)<br />
Kazakhstan: Kazakh Archeologists Discover Ancient Scythian “Sun Lord”<br />
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61549<br />
<strong>Eurasian</strong>et.org (Jul. 19, 2010)<br />
Lebanon: Life in Bronze Age Levant is rediscovered<br />
http://www.archaeologydaily.com/news/201007194519/Life‐in‐Bronze‐Age‐Levant‐is‐rediscovered.html<br />
The Daily Star (Jul. 19, 2010)<br />
Lebanon: Dig unearths 5000 year old artefact in Sidon<br />
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=1&article_id=117518#axzz0uzhgs17S<br />
The Daily Star (Jul. 28, 2010)<br />
Myanmar: Archaeological research to prove origin <strong>of</strong> Myanmar<br />
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/sci/2010‐07/07/c_13388000.htm<br />
Xinhuanet (Jul. 07, 2010)<br />
Malaysia: First Century Iron Industry Site Found In Jeniang<br />
http://www.archaeologydaily.com/news/201007034494/First‐Century‐Iron‐Industry‐Site‐Found‐In‐Jeniang.html<br />
Bernama (Jul. 03, 2010)<br />
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Near East: The Phoenician archaeology a common Euro Mediterranean heritage<br />
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201006206291/Travel/the‐phoenician‐archaeology‐a‐common‐euro‐mediterranean‐<br />
heritage.html<br />
Global Arab Network (Jun. 20, 2010)<br />
Philippines: B<strong>of</strong>fins find mystery seafaring ancestor in the Philippines<br />
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/health/b<strong>of</strong>fins‐find‐mystery‐seafaring‐ancestor‐in‐the‐philippines_100375049.html<br />
Thaindian News (Jun. 04, 2010)<br />
Pakistan: Peshawar Is the “ Oldest Living City” in South Asia<br />
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn‐content‐library/dawn/news/pakistan/metropolitan/03‐peshawar‐oldest‐living‐<br />
city‐in‐south‐asia‐ss‐09<br />
Dawn (Jul. 03, 2010)<br />
Pakistan: Ancient Civilization Remains Shrouded in Mystery<br />
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Mystery‐Shrouds‐Ancient‐Civilization‐in‐Pakistan‐‐98967839.html<br />
VOA News (Jul. 21, 2010)<br />
Russia: Two Birch Bark Manuscripts Found<br />
http://www.russia‐ic.com/news/show/10306/<br />
Russia IC (Jun. 21, 2010)<br />
Russia: Archeologists Discover 4000‐Year‐Old Tombs<br />
http://www.russia‐ic.com/news/show/10462/<br />
Russia IC (Jul. 28, 2010)<br />
Syria: Clay pieces and bathtubs unearthed<br />
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201006086138/Related‐news‐from‐Syria/belgian‐archaeologists‐unearthed‐clay‐<br />
pieces‐and‐bathtubs‐in‐syria.html<br />
Global Arab Network (Jun. 08, 2010)<br />
Syria: Mosaic, pillars and inscriptions unearthed<br />
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201006136195/Related‐news‐from‐Syria/french‐archaeologists‐unearthed‐mosaic‐<br />
pillars‐and‐inscriptions‐in‐syria.html<br />
Global Arab Network (Jun. 13, 2010)<br />
Syria: Temple dating back to Hellenistic and Roman eras unearthed<br />
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201006296398/Related‐news‐from‐Syria/syria‐archaeologists‐unearthed‐a‐temple‐<br />
dating‐back‐to‐hellenistic‐and‐roman‐eras.html<br />
Global Arab Network (Jun. 29, 2010)<br />
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Syria: Jars Dating Back to the Bronze Age Unearthed<br />
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201007066470/Culture/canadian‐archaeologists‐jars‐dating‐back‐to‐the‐bronze‐age‐<br />
unearthed‐in‐syria.html<br />
Global Arab Network (Jul. 06, 2010)<br />
Syria: 5th Century Monastery Unearthed<br />
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201007226640/Related‐news‐from‐Syria/archaeologists‐5th‐century‐monastery‐<br />
unearthed‐in‐syria.html<br />
Global Arab Network (Jul. 22, 2010)<br />
Syria: Archaeological Tombs Dating Back to Bronze Age discovered<br />
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201007236645/Related‐news‐from‐Syria/archaeological‐tombs‐dating‐back‐to‐bronze‐<br />
age‐discovered‐in‐northern‐syria.html<br />
Global Arab Network (Jul. 23, 2010)<br />
Syria: 5,000‐Year‐ Old Archaeological Pottery Craft Unearthed<br />
http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/201007246659/Related‐news‐from‐Syria/5000‐years‐old‐archaeological‐pottery‐craft‐<br />
unearthed‐in‐syria.html<br />
Global Arab Network (Jul. 25, 2010)<br />
Turkmenistan: Turkmen capital is 8 thousand years old, archeologists say<br />
http://www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3&lang_id=en&elem_id=17115&type=event&sort=date_desc<br />
Turkmenistan.ru (Jun. 07, 2010)<br />
Turkey: Ruins <strong>of</strong> four ancient castles discovered in western Turkey<br />
http://www.todayszaman.com/tz‐web/news‐213071‐100‐american‐archaeologists‐find‐ruins‐<strong>of</strong>‐four‐ancient‐castles‐in‐western‐<br />
turkey.html<br />
Today’s Zaman (Jun. 14, 2010)<br />
Turkey: Warrior Sarcophagus at Parion Unearthed<br />
http://www.balkantravellers.com/en/read/article/2118<br />
Balkan Travellers (Jul. 14, 2010)<br />
Turkey: 900‐year‐old Byzantine church unearthed in S Turkey<br />
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=900‐year‐old‐byzantine‐church‐unearthed‐in‐mediterranean‐‐province‐2010‐07‐15<br />
Hurriyet Daily News (Jul. 15, 2010)<br />
Turkey: 1,800‐year‐old care set found in southern Turkey<br />
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=1800‐years‐old‐care‐set‐was‐found‐2010‐07‐28<br />
Hurriyet Daily News (Jul. 28, 2010)<br />
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United States: Computer automatically deciphers ancient language<br />
http://web.mit.edu/news<strong>of</strong>fice/2010/ugaritic‐barzilay‐0630.html<br />
MIT News (Jun. 30, 2010)<br />
United States: Pottery find leads to recreation <strong>of</strong> 9,000‐year‐old beer<br />
http://www.theage.com.au/world/pottery‐find‐leads‐to‐recreation‐<strong>of</strong>‐9000yearold‐beer‐20100720‐10jfh.html<br />
The Age (Jul. 21, 2010)<br />
Vietnam: 18th century tomb excavated in Nha Trang school<br />
http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/Pages/20100618115006.aspx<br />
Thanh Nien News (Jun. 17, 2010)<br />
Vietnam: Ancient tomb site uncovered<br />
http://vietnamnews.vnagency.com.vn/Life‐Style/Antiques‐Relics/201226/Ancient‐tomb‐site‐uncovered.html<br />
VietNamNews (Jul. 06, 2010)<br />
DEMOGRAPHICS<br />
China: Demographics Indian workers are not ready to seize the baton<br />
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/573033de‐bec6‐11df‐a755‐00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=9bee261a‐bec7‐11df‐a755‐00144feab49a.html<br />
Financial Times (Sep. 13, 2010)<br />
Japan: Long‐term incentives needed to counter population decline<br />
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a844c8a0‐b94b‐11df‐99be‐00144feabdc0,dwp_uuid=9507aeb2‐b94e‐11df‐99be‐00144feabdc0.html<br />
Financial Times (Sep. 07, 2010)<br />
Korea, South: The challenge <strong>of</strong> becoming a ‘multiethnic Korea’ in the 21st century<br />
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/18/the‐challenge‐<strong>of</strong>‐becoming‐a‐multiethnic‐korea‐in‐the‐21st‐century/<br />
East Asia Forum (Mar. 18, 2010)<br />
ECONOMICS<br />
China: Passes Japan as Second Largest Economy<br />
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/16/business/global/16yuan.html?pagewanted=1<br />
The New York Times (Aug. 16, 2010)<br />
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GENETICS<br />
Americas: Skulls show New World was settled twice study<br />
http://www.physorg.com/news195759989.html<br />
PhysOrg.com (Jun. 14, 2010)<br />
Americas: Ancient woman suggests diverse migration<br />
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9188095<br />
Guardian (Jul. 14, 2010)<br />
China: Tibetans adapted to altitude in under 3,000 years<br />
http://www.intellasia.net/news/articles/society/111298321.shtml<br />
IntellAsia.net (Jul. 03, 2010)<br />
Russia: Russians restore face to 30,000 plus‐year‐old Kostenki cave man<br />
http://www.allvoices.com/contributed‐news/6113665‐russians‐restore‐face‐to‐30000‐yearold‐kostenki‐russia‐cave‐man<br />
All Voices (Jun. 19, 2010)<br />
GEOGRAPHY<br />
China: Yangtze River’s Ancient Origins Revealed<br />
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/06/100603091831.htm<br />
ScienceDaily (Jun. 06, 2010)<br />
China: China’s Wars Driven by Climate<br />
http://news.discovery.com/history/china‐climate‐wars.html<br />
Discovery News (Jul. 14, 2010)<br />
NATURAL RESOURCES<br />
Afghanistan: US Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan<br />
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/world/asia/14minerals.html?_r=1&no_interstitial<br />
The New York Times (Jun. 13, 2010)<br />
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HISTORY<br />
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BENCZE, Mihály<br />
Katyn Seen with Hungarian Eyes<br />
Half <strong>of</strong> the lads from Hétfalu ran to Northern Transylvania, fighting through World War II as<br />
Hungarian soldiers, the other half as Romanian soldiers. Many <strong>of</strong> them stayed at the bend <strong>of</strong> the river<br />
Don, the ones who survived ran to Csíkszereda (Miercurea Ciuc) or Kolozsvár (Cluj). After the great<br />
fights, a big part <strong>of</strong> the ones who survived went home to their families. At gatherings they would tell<br />
stories about their life as soldiers and the war, remembering the ones who died. I heard from them for the<br />
first time about the tragedy in Katyn. After this came the Radio Free Europe’s report about the event.<br />
After the fall <strong>of</strong> socialism and communism everyone was expecting the solution <strong>of</strong> this delicate issue, but<br />
the Russian leadership stayed hidden. Finally Gorbachev broke the silence.<br />
Andrzej Wajda’s movie Katyn drew the attention <strong>of</strong> the world again to this historical issue, which<br />
follows exactly, from the beginning, the story <strong>of</strong> the deported Polish <strong>of</strong>ficers and intellectuals,<br />
approaching the historical reality and lies from the point <strong>of</strong> view <strong>of</strong> the women left behind. After all <strong>of</strong><br />
this, exactly after seventy years the second tragedy happened in Katyn, in which almost 100 members <strong>of</strong><br />
the Polish state and church leadership lost their lives.<br />
The Soviet Union attacked Poland, which was fighting the German army, on September 17, 1939 and<br />
occupied its Eastern region, which was made possible by the secret clause <strong>of</strong> the Molotov‐Ribbentrop<br />
pact. During this campaign almost 15 thousand Polish <strong>of</strong>ficers were captured, together with many<br />
policemen and frontier‐guards as well, and were brought to three huge concentration camps in Kozelsk,<br />
Starobielsk and Ostaskov. These are the places where those few Hungarian men lost their lives who were<br />
willing to fight in the Polish army as a token <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian‐Polish friendship.<br />
Stalin always looked at the Polish people suspiciously, primarily at its <strong>of</strong>ficers, because most <strong>of</strong> them<br />
were part <strong>of</strong> the Polish aristocracy and were heated by a strong patriotic feeling and anti‐Russian<br />
emotions after the Tsarist repression. The reservists were mostly intellectuals, and Stalin thought that this<br />
layer would be in the future the core and engone <strong>of</strong> every anti‐Soviet organization. The first wave <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Polish prisoners was transported on April 3, 1940 by the Soviet political police; the last group was taken<br />
on May 12 to the terminal in the woodland near Katyn, Harkov and Kalinyin. The exterminations were<br />
held in turns <strong>of</strong> 300, and the executioners <strong>of</strong> the NKVD used Walther pistols <strong>of</strong> German manufacture. A<br />
great part <strong>of</strong> the Polish citizens who were held hostage, more than 6000 people, were executed in<br />
Dergachev near Harkov in the same way. Such civilians, mostly intellectuals, died, because the Soviets<br />
expected them to fight against the Soviet occupation. The details <strong>of</strong> tragedy <strong>of</strong> many hundred Polish<br />
prisoners and civilians, who were transported by the Soviets to the Black See and put on two enormous<br />
fishing boats which were then sunk, are still not clear. Supposedly here was one <strong>of</strong> the two Hungarian<br />
civilians. Nearly 500 <strong>of</strong>ficers survived the execution; no one survived the sinking <strong>of</strong> the ships.<br />
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The news <strong>of</strong> these executions was first presented to the world by Germany in the spring <strong>of</strong> 1943, but<br />
the Red Cross was not willing to examine the situation, so the Germans set up an international<br />
commission for the clarification <strong>of</strong> the events. The famous Hungarian pathologist pr<strong>of</strong>essor, dr. Ferenc<br />
Orsós was a member <strong>of</strong> this commission, and he was declared later a war criminal. Moscow put the guilt<br />
<strong>of</strong> the executions in Katyn on the Germans, but the event was not part <strong>of</strong> the trial in Nürnberg. The Soviet<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial statements tried to falsify the events that happened in Katyn during the war. After 1945, in Poland<br />
it was prohibited to talk about the executions that happened in Katyn. Only in 1956, at the time <strong>of</strong> the<br />
so‐called meltdown, seemed possible that the Polish community can find out something about the stories<br />
<strong>of</strong> the victims, but Wladyslaw Gomulka, the leader <strong>of</strong> the party, was afraid <strong>of</strong> Moscow’s revenge, and<br />
backed down. The silence was broken finally by Mihail Gorbachev in 1990. He made an announcement in<br />
which he said that the Soviet Union was responsible for the executions that happened in the woods <strong>of</strong><br />
Katyn. Two years later Boris Yeltsin gave to Lech Walensa copies <strong>of</strong> many important documents about<br />
Katyn, one <strong>of</strong> them <strong>of</strong> the decision <strong>of</strong> the party dated March 5, 1940 in which Stalin agreed to the<br />
executions <strong>of</strong> the Polish <strong>of</strong>ficers.<br />
Things are not in their right place even in our days. 1 Vladimir Putin, in spite <strong>of</strong> the documents and<br />
evidence that were presented, is doubtful that the Soviets killed Polish prisoners in Katyn in the spring <strong>of</strong><br />
1940. Hearing about the Wajda movie, some papers in Moscow say the same thing. The Russian military<br />
prosecutor’s <strong>of</strong>fice started an investigation <strong>of</strong> this matter at the beginning <strong>of</strong> the 1990’s, and this<br />
investigation was closed only in 2004. The documents <strong>of</strong> the prosecutor’s <strong>of</strong>fice – in spite <strong>of</strong> Putin’s<br />
opinion – do not question the fact that the Soviets executed the Polish <strong>of</strong>ficers and the civilians in Katyn,<br />
but they claim that that was not a crime <strong>of</strong> war and against humanity, but an ordinary crime. The exact<br />
number <strong>of</strong> the victims will be never known, and there is strong evidence that Moscow destroyed many<br />
documents related to this event in 1959. According to the research up until now 14,736 Polish <strong>of</strong>ficers and<br />
more than 10,600 Polish civilians were executed by the NKVD in Katyn.<br />
This execution had two Hungarian victims as well. One <strong>of</strong> them was born in Poland in 1897, he was<br />
Hungarian‐born, Oskar Rudolf Kuehnel. He fought against the Nazis as senior captain <strong>of</strong> the Polish<br />
army. He was imprisoned by the Soviets and sent to a camp in Koselski by the NKVD. He was murdered<br />
in April 1940 in the woods <strong>of</strong> Katyn. His body was exhumed in 1943. In his uniform they found his<br />
personal belongings and his journal, and the last date registered was April 7, 1940. The other Hungarian<br />
victim was Emánuel Aladár Korompay, born in Budapest in 1890, captain <strong>of</strong> the Polish army, who fought<br />
in Galicia during World War I. After the war he did not return to Hungary, but he joined Jozef Pilsudski’s<br />
legion and defended the Polish homeland from the Red Army in 1920. He graduated from the Reformed<br />
School; got a degree in philosophy from the University <strong>of</strong> Budapest; then he settled in Warsaw. He is<br />
considered as a pioneer <strong>of</strong> Hungarology in Poland and he was the editor <strong>of</strong> the first Hungarian‐Polish<br />
dictionary. He worked at the University <strong>of</strong> Warsaw as a lecturer and in the same time he was the cultural<br />
attaché <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian Embassy. He was mobilized in September 1939. He could have asked for his<br />
acquittal for having double citizenship and being an employee <strong>of</strong> the embassy. However, he did not do<br />
such thing. He was imprisoned and taken by the NKVD to a camp in Starobelski. Although the body <strong>of</strong><br />
1 Very recently, on November 26, 2010 the Russian Duma, Russiaʹs lower house <strong>of</strong> parliament has condemned Joseph Stalin by<br />
name for the mass execution <strong>of</strong> Polish <strong>of</strong>ficers and civilians at Katyn during World War II. The Duma declared that the Soviet<br />
dictator and other Soviet <strong>of</strong>ficials had ordered the ʺKatyn crimeʺ in 1940. — Ed. <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Eurasian</strong> <strong>Studies</strong>.<br />
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Emánuel Aladár Korompay was never identified, his name can be found amongst the ones executed in<br />
Harkov. On the wall <strong>of</strong> his home in Warsaw a plaque was placed in 1992; in 2002 the University <strong>of</strong><br />
Warsaw also commemorated him by placing his name on a plaque. From his family, only his eldest<br />
daughter Ilona survived World War II. His daughter Márta was killed in September 1939 in Warsaw by a<br />
German bomb, Elzbieta, as a prisoner <strong>of</strong> the Gestapo, in 1943 committed suicide; his wife, Mieczyslawa<br />
lost her life in a concentration camp.<br />
Emánuel Aladár Korompay<br />
As a third victim <strong>of</strong> Katyn we can refer to Ferenc Orsós, who was born on August 22, 1879 in<br />
Temesvár. He graduated from the Medical University <strong>of</strong> Budapest in 1903; then during World War I he<br />
was imprisoned by the Russians. After his captivity, starting from 1918 he was an employee <strong>of</strong> the<br />
University <strong>of</strong> Debrecen, wher he showed a great interest towards pathology. From 1921 he was the head<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Institute for Forensic Medicine, where he made an active and scientific contribution, so in 1928 he<br />
became a corresponding member <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian Academy <strong>of</strong> Sciences and from 1940 until his<br />
exclusion a full member. In 1935 he became pr<strong>of</strong>essor at the Medical University <strong>of</strong> Budapest and the head<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Forensic Institute, too. As a delegate <strong>of</strong> the Medical Chamber he was a member <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian<br />
Parliament’s Upper House. In December 1944 he left for Germany. Until his retirement he worked as a<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essor at the University <strong>of</strong> Mainz, where he on July 25, 1962.<br />
Dr. Orsós was a well‐known pathologist, the Germans asked him to examine the bodies <strong>of</strong> the victims<br />
from Katyn in April 1943. The German leadership knew very well that the murders were committed by<br />
the Soviets, so they asked for pr<strong>of</strong>essional studies from different people. They asked the presence <strong>of</strong> their<br />
immediate allies, the neutral countries and the representatives <strong>of</strong> the Polish and International Red Cross.<br />
With a little pressure they also took the imprisoned Anglo‐Saxon <strong>of</strong>ficers to the scene, and they asked the<br />
Polish resistance and the exiled Polish government in London, too. The commitee which made the<br />
examination chose dr. Orsós as the leader <strong>of</strong> the group. The exhumation lasted from the April 29, 1943<br />
until July 4; they revealed eight mass graves, and identified 2730 bodies. Dr. Orsós examined 150 bodies<br />
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himself. The graves were filled up during the retreat <strong>of</strong> the Germans. At Stalins’s command, after the<br />
recapture <strong>of</strong> the land, the Soviets also asked for examination, asking some ´outstanding experts´. Aleksei<br />
Tolstoi, the writer and many metropolitans came to the conclusion that the Nazis are responsible for the<br />
murders.<br />
The story <strong>of</strong> Katyn after that is known, the relationship between the Polish government in London and<br />
the Soviets went from bad to worse and came to an end. The allies supported the lies <strong>of</strong> Stalin; kept the<br />
silence about the affair, and made sure that those who conducted the examinations disappear. After the<br />
war the Polish lawyer Roman Martini, who urged an inquiry, was murdered. The murder was<br />
well‐known to George VI and Churchill as well, via the Britisch <strong>of</strong>ficers who participated in the<br />
examination, but these leaders only admitted it at the start <strong>of</strong> the Cold War.<br />
Ferenc Orsós was a very important scientist for the NKVD so he had to escape to the West in December<br />
1944 where he got American protection, but he had to stay quiet. A dedicated Soviet group is looking for<br />
him in Budapest. They impound, confiscate his files and test results, and the occupiers take everything.<br />
Ferenc Orsós diagnosed the exact time <strong>of</strong> the murders with his pollen study, by the lime deposition<br />
thickness in the skull and by the size and breed <strong>of</strong> the corpse insects. The time is certified by the<br />
witnesses, the found documents, the papers and the trees which were planted on top <strong>of</strong> the mass graves.<br />
Orsós was excluded from the Hungarian Academy <strong>of</strong> Sciences at the same time as Bálint Hóman. Ferenc<br />
Orsós’ rehabilitation is still waiting to happen. By presenting his work to the world would not only mean<br />
his recognition as an important scientist, but would also help the recognition <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian science.<br />
Dr. Ferenc Orsós<br />
Translated by Andrea Muerth<br />
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Abstract<br />
MARÁCZ, László<br />
Multilingualism in the Hungarian Kingdom (1867‐1918):<br />
Language Policy and Practice<br />
With the Compromis <strong>of</strong> 1867, the Hungarian kingdom received an equal status within the Austrian<br />
part <strong>of</strong> the Austro‐Hungarian Dual Monarchy. Hungary became a sovereign entity within the<br />
Hapsburg Monarchy. Next to a common monarch from the House <strong>of</strong> Hapsburg who had the title <strong>of</strong><br />
‘emperor’ in Austria and that <strong>of</strong> ‘king’ in Hungary, three ministries were in common, including the<br />
Ministries <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs, Finances and Defence. The Compromis marking the autonomous<br />
position <strong>of</strong> Hungary in the Double Monarchy ended in 1918 with the dissolution <strong>of</strong> the Hapsburg<br />
Empire. Hence, the time framing from 1867 until 1918 <strong>of</strong> this study.<br />
The Austro‐Hungarian Monarchy was a clear multilingual state in which fourteen languages were<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficially recognized, including Croatian, Czech, German, Hungarian, Italian, Lithuanian, Polish,<br />
Romanian, Ruthanian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovene, Ukrainian and Turkish. Although not all the<br />
languages were spoken throughout the empire and sometimes very much restricted to certain regions<br />
and local areas multilingualism was regulated by law.<br />
In this paper, I will concentrate on the Hungarian, i.e. the Transleithanian part <strong>of</strong> the Dual<br />
Monarchy paying credit to the pioneering studies <strong>of</strong> Goebl (1994) and especially Rindler‐Schjerve<br />
(2003) who insightfully analysed multilingualism in the Cisleithanian part, i.e. Austria adopting a<br />
sociolinguistic framework. 1 I will break with post World War I tradition in historiography claiming<br />
that multilingualism was severely restricted in the Hungarian kingdom and that the non‐Hungarian<br />
state languages were suppressed being the only reason for causing harsh language and ethnic<br />
conflicts. 2 Rather the analysis <strong>of</strong> multilingualism in the Hungarian kingdom is more complex than<br />
1 This paper appeared in Jolán Róka (ed). 2010. Concepts & Consequences <strong>of</strong> Multilingualism in Europe. Budapest: Századvég<br />
Kiadó. 55‐96. It is my conviction that the phenomenon <strong>of</strong> multilingualism and the phenomena related to it in both parts <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Austro‐Hungarian Empire, i.e. Cisleithania and Transleithania cannot be studied separately. It is obvious that the relation<br />
between Vienna, Budapest and the regions in both parts are a kind <strong>of</strong> power triangle that was inherently connected. In the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Bosnia or Croatia, Vienna and Budapest were even in competition. Here I am indebted to Nikola Rasic for bringing this to my<br />
attention. To get deeper insight into Cisleithania and Transleithania and their mutual relation these cases must be studied in a<br />
comparative framework. Also comparing separate case studies, like the multilingual cities <strong>of</strong> Trieste and Fiume in both parts <strong>of</strong><br />
the empire would <strong>of</strong>fer an interesting insight into the policy and practice <strong>of</strong> multilingualism in the whole empire.<br />
2 It is not easy to find unbiased historic studies <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom under dualism. The reason for this is that<br />
historiography <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian successor states <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary has been dominated by the nationalist paradigm. This<br />
favors a bipolar analysis <strong>of</strong> all the nationality conflicts in the Hungarian kingdom in terms <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian versus non‐<br />
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setting up a simple, bipolar opposition in terms <strong>of</strong> ‘Hungarian’ versus ‘non‐Hungarian’. In fact, it will<br />
be argued that the language and ethnic conflicts in the Hungarian kingdom can be studied more<br />
insightfully by employing a layered and overlapping model as the ‘flower configuration <strong>of</strong> languages’<br />
that has been developed in De Swaan (2001). The relation between languages and their speakers in the<br />
Hungarian kingdom did not display a bipolar structure but rather an intersecting one.<br />
The language policy <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom stipulated in ‘Nationality Law’ XLIV (1868),<br />
although declaring Hungarian the language <strong>of</strong> the state did allow the use <strong>of</strong> any other <strong>of</strong>ficial<br />
language than Hungarian at the local level, both in government, judiciary, church organizations and<br />
schools. In present‐day terminology, we may say that language use was organized in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
subsidiarity in the Hungarian kingdom. It must be admitted that even the application <strong>of</strong> this principle<br />
did not prevent however the outbreak <strong>of</strong> language and ethnic conflicts in the period under study. Our<br />
analysis incorporates this fact. The paper concentrates on the school system in Transylvania where<br />
next to Hungarian, Romanian and German was being spoken and taught (see, Bíró 1992). We will<br />
conclude our efforts by making some comparisons with the Cisleithanian case and referring to lessons<br />
to be learned from the experiences <strong>of</strong> the Hapsburg Empire for present‐day language policy within the<br />
European Union.<br />
1. The Hungarian kingdom in the Dual Monarchy<br />
During the Hapsburg domination <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom lasting from the roll back <strong>of</strong> the Ottoman<br />
Empire from Central Europe by the end <strong>of</strong> the eighteenth century and the dissolution <strong>of</strong> the Hapsburg<br />
Empire at the end <strong>of</strong> the World War I, the Hungarian kingdom enjoyed a specific position in the<br />
framework <strong>of</strong> the Hapsburg Empire. Although this specific position, including the Lands <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Hungarian Holy Crown <strong>of</strong> Saint Stephen, named after the first king <strong>of</strong> Hungary was not always respected<br />
by the ruling Hapburgs it was clear that the Hungarian kingdom had its own legal system, its own<br />
territorial division based on the Hungarian county system and had its own social stratification and ethnic<br />
distribution. The Lands <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian Holy Crown <strong>of</strong> Saint Stephen included Hungary Proper, the<br />
Principality <strong>of</strong> Transylvania, Croatia‐Slavonia and the free royal city <strong>of</strong> Fiume (present‐day’s Rijeka in<br />
Croatia). This peculiar structure also formed a territorial unity displaying a peculiar geographically and<br />
social‐cultural entity in the centre <strong>of</strong> Europe. 3 In the age <strong>of</strong> Enlightenment it was the Austrian Emperor<br />
Joseph II (1780‐1790), the son <strong>of</strong> Empress Maria Theresa, Queen <strong>of</strong> Hungary (1740‐1780) who tried to<br />
conduct an ambitious centralization policy to modernize the Hapsburg Empire. Consequently, the<br />
Hungarian kingdom was governed from Vienna and next to Latin that was the traditional state language<br />
the so‐called ‘patria lingua’ <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom, German received the status <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficial language in<br />
Hungary.<br />
Hungarian nationalities involved. An additional problem is the fact that Marxist historiography in Hungary is biased towards<br />
the Hungarian kingdom under dualism for ideological reasons as well. In some cases, the position <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian Marxist<br />
tradition matches with those <strong>of</strong> nationalist historiography in the non‐Hungarian successor states.<br />
3 See Count Teleki (1923).<br />
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The Hungarian kingdom under Hapsburg rule was a feudal society in which the social stratification <strong>of</strong><br />
the empire played an important role in the struggle for power. At the core <strong>of</strong> this power struggle stood<br />
the Hungarian king, an Austrian Hapsburg and the Hungarian nobility. 4 The Hungarian nobility enjoyed<br />
traditionally a strong position in the Hungarian kingdom because it controlled the main sources <strong>of</strong><br />
economic activities, i.e. the agricultural sector. 5 The different nationalities <strong>of</strong> Hungary, including most <strong>of</strong><br />
the ethnic Hungarians, were subordinated as villeins to the Hungarian nobility. The Hungarian king tried<br />
to restrict the power <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian nobility by forming a coalition with the upper ranks <strong>of</strong> the nobility,<br />
the magnates and the lower echelons <strong>of</strong> the society, i.e. the villeins. With the slow disappearance <strong>of</strong> the<br />
feudal society and the awakening <strong>of</strong> modern nationalism in the beginning <strong>of</strong> the nineteenth century, this<br />
constellation <strong>of</strong> social power in the Hungarian kingdom started to change. 6 The Hungarian nobility,<br />
especially the members <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian Royal Noble Guard that was established by Empress and Queen<br />
Maria Theresa opposing the centralization and Germanization efforts <strong>of</strong> Joseph II launched a program <strong>of</strong><br />
Hungarian Renewal. The catalyst <strong>of</strong> this program became Count István Széchenyi who initiated a number<br />
<strong>of</strong> modernization projects in the first half <strong>of</strong> the nineteenth century. One <strong>of</strong> his projects was to make the<br />
Hungarian language suitable for the country’s administration. For this purpose, the Hungarian Diet <strong>of</strong><br />
Pozsony (today’s Bratislava) honored a proposal <strong>of</strong> Count Széchenyi to establish the Hungarian Academy<br />
<strong>of</strong> Sciences in 1825. One <strong>of</strong> the goals <strong>of</strong> the movement <strong>of</strong> National Renewal was to replace Latin and<br />
German as <strong>of</strong>ficial state languages by Hungarian. 7 In a series <strong>of</strong> language acts the Hungarian Diet ordered<br />
step‐by‐step the Hungarian language as the <strong>of</strong>ficial language <strong>of</strong> administration.<br />
The Diet communicated with the king in the forms <strong>of</strong> addresses. The language <strong>of</strong> these addresses was<br />
Latin until 1805. From 1805, the Diet ordered that both Latin and Hungarian could be used (compare, act<br />
IV. 1805 § 1). Civil servants and act‐student’s final examination before being called to the Bar had to be<br />
done in Hungarian (see act VIII. 1830 § 4 and 5). The language <strong>of</strong> the registry had to be Hungarian and<br />
priests had to know the Hungarian language (compare act VI. 1840 § 7 and 8). From 1840, the Estates <strong>of</strong><br />
the Realm could only address the king “in accordance with the will <strong>of</strong> his Majesty” in Hungarian<br />
(compare, act VI. 1840 § 1). The same act specified that the municipalities could address the Diet only in<br />
Hungarian (see, act VI. 1840 § 2). The acts itself were phrased in Latin and Hungarian but the Diet<br />
ordered in 1836 that the Hungarian language version (act III. 1836 § 1) was to be considered as the<br />
original. Act II. 1844 § 1 stated that the king had to communicate with the Diet in the Hungarian language.<br />
With the language act <strong>of</strong> 1840 and the one <strong>of</strong> 1844 the language <strong>of</strong> communication between the king and<br />
the Diet became <strong>of</strong>ficially the Hungarian language. From 1844 onwards, (see act II. 1844 § 2) the language<br />
<strong>of</strong> legislation was Hungarian exclusively because Hungarian served already as the language <strong>of</strong> legislation.<br />
In fact, act II. 1844 made the language <strong>of</strong> communication <strong>of</strong> the Diet only Hungarian. However, the<br />
members <strong>of</strong> the Diet from the other Lands <strong>of</strong> the Crown <strong>of</strong> Saint Stephen were exempted from this act for<br />
another six years. These members were allowed to address the Diet in Latin (see act II. 1844 § 3). The Diet<br />
ordered that the language <strong>of</strong> instruction in Hungarian schools became Hungarian (compare act II. 1844 §<br />
9). However, this act was only operative in Hungary proper, the other Lands <strong>of</strong> Saint Stephen’s Crown<br />
4 See Cadzow, John, F. et all. (1983).<br />
5 See Rady (2000).<br />
6 Bogdan (1989, 88‐93).<br />
7 Mikó (1944, 20‐28).<br />
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were exempted from this act. The Hungarian language became a compulsory subject <strong>of</strong> instruction in<br />
1792 (see act VII. 1792). But in primary and secondary education <strong>of</strong> the other Lands <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian<br />
Holy Crown <strong>of</strong> Saint Stephen this happened only 52 years later (see, act II. 1844 § 8). The municipal<br />
authorities were still allowed to correspond in Latin six years after the Hungarian language had become<br />
the <strong>of</strong>ficial state language in 1844. However the series <strong>of</strong> language laws declaring the Hungarian language<br />
the <strong>of</strong>ficial language <strong>of</strong> the state were only a few years operative. After the crushing <strong>of</strong> the anti‐Hapsburg<br />
Hungarian Revolution and War <strong>of</strong> Independence <strong>of</strong> 1848/1849 Hungarian legislation and the Diet itself<br />
were abolished.<br />
In the first half <strong>of</strong> the nineteenth century the traditional social stratification <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom<br />
became less relevant and the concept <strong>of</strong> the nation was embraced by the different ethnic groups <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Hungarian kingdom. Instead <strong>of</strong> manipulating the social classes the Hapsburg rulers <strong>of</strong> Hungary started<br />
now to play <strong>of</strong>f the different ethnic “nationalities” against each other in order to maintain control over the<br />
Hungarian kingdom. The Hapsburgs had employed this strategy with much success already in the<br />
Austrian parts <strong>of</strong> the Empire. In the Hungarian part, one <strong>of</strong> the first successful cases <strong>of</strong> Austrian “ethnic<br />
divide and rule” was the Hungarian Revolution and War <strong>of</strong> Independence <strong>of</strong> 1848‐1849. 8 Vienna<br />
organized the Serb, Croat and Romanian forces in order to crush the Hungarian ambitions for a more<br />
democratic and independent Hungary. These engineered antagonisms between Hungarians and non‐<br />
Hungarians formed the roots <strong>of</strong> the ethnic conflicts between these groups. The hierarchies between the<br />
ethnic groups were sometimes reversed. In the period <strong>of</strong> dualism after the Compromise <strong>of</strong> 1867, for<br />
example, the Hungarians became the primus inter pares when the Viennese Court and the representatives<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Hungarian nobility divided power in the framework <strong>of</strong> the Dual Monarchy. The non‐Hungarian<br />
nationalities <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom had to accept Hungarian supremacy in the Transleithanian<br />
parts. 9<br />
After the crushing <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian Revolution and War <strong>of</strong> Independence <strong>of</strong> 1848‐1849 by the<br />
Austrian forces with help <strong>of</strong> the Tsarist army the ambitions for a restoration <strong>of</strong> Hungarian autonomy<br />
within the Austrian empire were frustrated for a few decades. The Hungarians were harshly punished by<br />
the Austrian government for their rebellion. Thirteen <strong>of</strong> their leading generals were executed at Arad and<br />
martial act was imposed on the country. Vienna appointed an Austrian governor, Alexander Bach<br />
representing the king whot ruled and Germanized the country with a rod <strong>of</strong> iron. Bach had even the<br />
intention to Germanize the language <strong>of</strong> communication <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian Academy <strong>of</strong> Sciences. A<br />
desperate Count Széchenyi wrote even a letter <strong>of</strong> protest in exile in 1858 against the plans to Germanize<br />
the Hungarian Academy <strong>of</strong> Sciences. 10 During the so‐called Bach‐era the Hungarians moved into passive<br />
resistance. Both camps, the House <strong>of</strong> Hapsburg and the Hungarians led by the aristocracy were willing to<br />
conclude a compromise in 1867, however. For Austria a compromise with Hungary became urgent<br />
because Prussia had defeated Austria in 1866 and because Austria was excluded from the German<br />
Customs Union that was dominated by Prussia. The Hapsburgs were looking to the East <strong>of</strong> their Empire<br />
for compensating the loss <strong>of</strong> power in the West.<br />
8 Bideleux, Robert and Ian Jeffries (1998).<br />
9 Bogdan (1989, 113‐126).<br />
10 See Marácz (1996, 67).<br />
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The Ausgleich <strong>of</strong> 1867 turned the Empire into a dual structure. The Austro‐Hungarian Dual Monarchy<br />
consisted <strong>of</strong> two parts, i.e. Austria the so‐called Cisleithanian parts <strong>of</strong> the empire and Hungary, the so‐<br />
called Transleithanian part <strong>of</strong> the empire, i.e. the Hungarian kingdom. The Dual Monarchy was headed<br />
by one and the same monarch, Franz Joseph Emperor <strong>of</strong> Austria and king <strong>of</strong> Hungary, abbreviated as K.<br />
und k. The Ministries <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs, Defense and Finance were incorporated, but apart from that<br />
Hungary’s status remained equal to Austria’s. Consequently, the kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hungary became a<br />
sovereign state within the framework <strong>of</strong> the Dual Monarchy. Transylvania and Vojvodina were integrated<br />
into Hungary proper. Croatia‐Slavonia enjoyed a separate status that was confirmed by the Ausgleich<br />
between Hungary and Croatia‐Slavonia in 1868. The third equal constituting part <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian<br />
kingdom was the free royal city <strong>of</strong> Fiume.<br />
We will restrict our study <strong>of</strong> multilingualism in the Hungarian kingdom to the period between the<br />
Ausgleich and the dissolution <strong>of</strong> the Austro‐Hungarian Empire in 1920. Hence, the restriction in time, i.e.<br />
the era <strong>of</strong> dualism has a well‐defined starting‐point and an end point. In space, the Hungarian kingdom is<br />
defined during dualism as the Transleithanian parts <strong>of</strong> the Austro‐Hungarian Empire. However highly<br />
relevant is that dualism brought long term stability in the Central European area which in turn stimulated<br />
economic growth. This was a pre‐condition for the modernization <strong>of</strong> the whole Austro‐Hungarian Empire<br />
but also in particular <strong>of</strong> the kingdom <strong>of</strong> Hungary. The Hungarian kingdom though it perpetuated the<br />
conservative, semi‐feudal structure <strong>of</strong> the Austro‐Hungarian Empire, such as the lack <strong>of</strong> universal<br />
suffrage developed during dualism into a modern Hungarian state. Thanks to dualism legislation and<br />
institutions to set up education, health care, infrastructure, the development <strong>of</strong> urban dwellings,<br />
industries, mechanization <strong>of</strong> agriculture and the development <strong>of</strong> the army improved enormously. The<br />
development <strong>of</strong> the modern state caused also new types <strong>of</strong> social stratifications in the Hungarian<br />
kingdom. A new class consisted <strong>of</strong> more educated, literary civilians that had enjoyed education and could<br />
send their children to school. In this multinational, multi‐ethnic and multi‐lingual state the legislation <strong>of</strong><br />
multilingualism, the institutions for which multilingualism is relevant, like the school system can be<br />
studied insightfully. The results can be compared with the case <strong>of</strong> the Cisleithanian parts <strong>of</strong> the Austro‐<br />
Hungarian Empire but also with contempory cases <strong>of</strong> multilingualism in the area itself or with those in<br />
the present‐day European Union.<br />
2. Multilingualism in the Hungarian Kingdom<br />
The Austro‐Hungarian Monarchy was a multi‐ethnic, multilingual state in which multilingualism was<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficially recognized by law. In the Transleithanian part <strong>of</strong> the Empire the following thirteen languages<br />
were <strong>of</strong>ficially recognized and used as vehicular languages, including Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian,<br />
Ruthenian, Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian, Bunjevac (Stokavian dialect <strong>of</strong> Serbian or Croatian), Bulgarian,<br />
Czech, Polish, Roma and Italian. 11 As we can observe from the diagrams 1 and 2 all these languages were<br />
11 Lökkös (2000, 28).<br />
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spoken in the three constituent parts <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom, i.e. Hungary proper, Croatia‐Slavonia<br />
and in the free royal city <strong>of</strong> Fiume, although the distributions are different: 12<br />
Diagram 1: The distribution according to mother tongue in the Hungarian kingdom in the 1910<br />
census<br />
Mother tongue Hungary proper Fiume Croatia‐Slavonia Total<br />
Hungarian 9.938.134 6.493 105.948 10.050.575<br />
German 1.901.042 2.315 134.078 2.037.435<br />
Slovak 1.946.165 192 21.613 1.967.970<br />
Romanian 2.948.049 137 846 2.949.032<br />
Ruthenian 464.259 11 8.317 472.587<br />
Croatian 181.882 12.926 1.638.354 1.833.162<br />
Serbian 461.091 425 644.955 1.106.471<br />
Slovenian 75.062 2.336 15.776 93.174<br />
Bunjevac 88.204 5 0 88.209<br />
Bulgarian 22.945 1 321 23.267<br />
Czech 31.198 238 32.376 63.812<br />
Polish 38.179 46 2.312 40.537<br />
Roma 108.825 0 108.825 121.097<br />
Italian 5.037 24.212 4.138 33.387<br />
Other 4.655 496 648 5.772<br />
Non Hungarian total 8.276.593 43.313 2.516.006 10.835.912<br />
Total population 18.214.727 49.806 2.621.954 20.886.487<br />
12 Lökkös (2000, 197)<br />
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Diagram 2: The distribution according to mother tongue in the Hungarian kingdom in the 1910<br />
census in percentages<br />
Mother tongue Hungary proper Fiume Croatia‐Slavonia Total<br />
Hungarian 54.56 13.04 4.04 48.12<br />
German 10.44 4.65 5.11 9.75<br />
Slovak 10.68 0.39 0.82 9.42<br />
Romanian 16.18 0.28 0.03 14.12<br />
Ruthenian 2.55 0.02 0.32 2.26<br />
Croatian 1.00 25.95 62.49 8.78<br />
Serbian 2.53 0.85 24.60 5.30<br />
Slovenian 0.41 4.69 0.60 0.45<br />
Bunjevac 0.48 0.01 0 0.42<br />
Bulgarian 0.13 0 0.01 0.11<br />
Czech 0.17 0.48 1.24 0.31<br />
Polish 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.19<br />
Roma 0.60 0 0.47 0.58<br />
Italian 0.03 48.61 0.16 0.16<br />
Other 0.03 0.94 0.02 0.03<br />
Non Hungarian total 45.44 86.96 95.96 51.88<br />
Total population 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00<br />
Before we comment on these statistical data it is important to clarify the notions like ‘nation’,<br />
‘nationality’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘language’ and their mutual relations in the Hungarian kingdom.<br />
The Hungarian kingdom recognized one nation, the political Hungarian nation. Consider the<br />
introductory part <strong>of</strong> Law on the Equality <strong>of</strong> Nationalities Act XLIV. 1868: 13<br />
13 See for the English version <strong>of</strong> act 1868: XLIV in Seton‐Watson (1972, 429‐433), for the German version Faluhelyi (1946, 5‐12)<br />
and for the Hungarian version the <strong>of</strong>ficial website <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian Parliament (www.1000ev.hu). The provisions <strong>of</strong> this law<br />
were only valid for Hungary proper (compare § 29).<br />
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Since all citizens <strong>of</strong> Hungary, according to the principles <strong>of</strong> the constitution, form from a political point<br />
<strong>of</strong> view one nation – the indivisible unitary Hungarian nation – <strong>of</strong> which every citizen <strong>of</strong> the fatherland is<br />
a member, no matter to what nationality he belongs: since, moreover, this equality <strong>of</strong> right can only exist<br />
with reference to the <strong>of</strong>ficial use <strong>of</strong> various languages <strong>of</strong> the country, and only under special provisions, in<br />
so far as is rendered necessary by the unity <strong>of</strong> the country and the practical possibility <strong>of</strong> government and<br />
administration; the following rules will serve as standard regarding the <strong>of</strong>ficial use <strong>of</strong> the various<br />
languages, while in all other matters the complete equality <strong>of</strong> the citizens remained untouched.<br />
The nationality law <strong>of</strong> 1868 tried to combine a ‘civic’, i.e. a Western European interpretation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
nation and an ‘ethnic’, i.e. Central and Eastern European interpretation <strong>of</strong> the nation. 14 Consequently, the<br />
Law on the Equality <strong>of</strong> Nationalities not only distinguishes a ‘political civic nation’ but also the concept <strong>of</strong><br />
nationality, i.e. ethnicity. This latter originates from the view characteristic for nineteenth century’s<br />
Central and Eastern European nationalism that the ‘nation’ is first and foremost a community <strong>of</strong> common<br />
descent and a member is organically connected to it. 15 Note further that this law introduces a special<br />
relation between ethnicity, nationality and language. The most important marker <strong>of</strong> ethnicity, nationality<br />
is in fact one’s mother tongue. This has to do with the fact that in early nineteenth century’s Central and<br />
Eastern European nationalism the place <strong>of</strong> law in the Western civic model is taken by vernacular culture,<br />
usually languages and customs in the ethnic model. Following Smith (1991, 11‐13, 20), we will adopt the<br />
generalization that in Central and Eastern Europe there is a strong correlation between vernacular<br />
language and culture on the one hand and ethnicity, nationality on the other hand. Observe that Smith’s<br />
generalization for Central and Eastern Europe stipulates the following correlation between ethnicity and<br />
language:<br />
Smith’s generalization for Central and Eastern Europe:<br />
If you are <strong>of</strong> X ethnicity, then language X is X’s mother tongue<br />
This expresses the fact that nationality in this area <strong>of</strong> Europe was determined quite <strong>of</strong>ten on the basis <strong>of</strong><br />
mother tongue. 16 The five censuses that were hold in the Hungarian kingdom during dualism, i.e. 1869,<br />
1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910 only inquired about the mother tongue <strong>of</strong> the persons interviewed and not<br />
about their nationality. 17 Although Smith’s generalization is always true when it goes from left‐to‐right it<br />
is not always the case vice versa. There are a number <strong>of</strong> exceptional cases due to the fact that there is no‐<br />
one‐to‐one matching between ethnicity and mother tongue language or sometimes this matching is not<br />
relevant for determining ethnicity. Bi‐ or multilingual speakers can have more than one mother tongue.<br />
This was true in the Hungarian kingdom as well. In case <strong>of</strong> the Serbs and Croats it was hard to decide on<br />
the basis <strong>of</strong> the language criterion only Serbian or Croatian ethnicity for the languages are quite similar. In<br />
14 Compare Smith (1991, 11‐13).<br />
15 See Smith (1991, 11).<br />
16 See Faluhelyi (1946, XLV).<br />
17 See Lökkös (2000, 27)<br />
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those cases also religious criteria were employed. Serbs having a Greek Orthodox faith and Croats being<br />
Roman Catholics. 18 Sometimes there is no strong connection between ethnicity and language as in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Roma. Although these cases exist, I will consider them as an exception to Smith’s generalization<br />
for Central and Eastern Europe. Hence, with respect to the diagrams 1 and 2 the data on mother tongue<br />
reflect the ethnicity, nationality <strong>of</strong> the speakers. Let us consider these diagrams again.<br />
Firstly, note that the total population <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom was 20.886.487 persons and that the<br />
biggest group, the Hungarians with 10.050.575 had an absolute majority in Hungary proper <strong>of</strong> 54.56<br />
percent and only had a relative majority <strong>of</strong> 48.12 percent compared to the other nationalities in the<br />
Hungarian kingdom. The non‐Hungarian nationalities together had an absolute majority <strong>of</strong> 51.88 percent<br />
in the Hungarian kingdom. In the remainder <strong>of</strong> this paper, we will concentrate on the case <strong>of</strong> Hungary<br />
proper only. The absolute majority <strong>of</strong> Croatian within Croatia with 62.49 percent was much clearer than<br />
the absolute majority <strong>of</strong> Hungarian in Hungary proper. Furthermore, Croatia had its own jurisdiction in<br />
agreement with the Compromise <strong>of</strong> 1868 with Hungary. The free city <strong>of</strong> Fiume (today’s Rijeka) is also an<br />
interesting case for the study <strong>of</strong> a multilingual city. The following five languages, including Italian,<br />
Croatian, Hungarian, German and Slovene were vehicular languages in Fiume but the language <strong>of</strong><br />
business and trade was Italian. I will leave the linguistic situation in the city <strong>of</strong> Fiume as a case for further<br />
research.<br />
Secondly, let us discuss the distribution <strong>of</strong> the languages. The ethnic map <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom<br />
displayed a heterogeneous picture. Although there were a number <strong>of</strong> mixed regions it was clear that in<br />
biggest part <strong>of</strong> the country there was an absolute or relative majority <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> the nationalities. From the<br />
data it can be observed that in 34 and 36 percent, i.e. 70 percent in total, <strong>of</strong> the territory <strong>of</strong> historic<br />
Hungary there was a bigger than two‐third majority <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian nationality and the non‐Hungarian<br />
nationalities respectively. 19<br />
The Hungarian kingdom was divided in eight regions:<br />
1) Transdanubia<br />
2) Western Upper Hungary<br />
3) Between the rivers Danube and Tisza<br />
4) Eastern Upper‐Hungary<br />
5) East <strong>of</strong> the river Tisza<br />
6) Between the Rivers Tisza and Maros<br />
7) Transylvania<br />
8) Croatia and Slavonia<br />
18 See Lökkös (2000, 29).<br />
19 Lökkös (2000, 57).<br />
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In these regions, the Hungarians dominated the central areas <strong>of</strong> Hungary proper, i.e. (1), (3) and (5).<br />
The Germans lived mostly in the Western part <strong>of</strong> (1) and the southeastern part <strong>of</strong> (7). The Slovaks lived in<br />
(2) and (4). The Romanians lived mainly in (6) and (7), i.e. historic Transylvania. The Ruthenians in the<br />
eastern parts <strong>of</strong> (5). The Croats dominated (8). The Serbs lived mainly in (3), (6) (in the areas <strong>of</strong> the Banat<br />
and Vojvodina) and (8). The Slovenes in the southern parts <strong>of</strong> (1). 20 The Hungarians had an absolute<br />
majority in (1), (3), (4) and (5). The Slovaks had an absolute majority in (2). The Romanians had an<br />
absolute majority in (7) and a relative majority (6). The Croats had an absolute majority in (8), Croatia‐<br />
Slavonia.<br />
The regional division <strong>of</strong> the nationalities can be made more specific by looking into the counties and<br />
the cities with jurisdiction. From the 71 counties in the Hungarian kingdom 31 had a Hungarian majority,<br />
while in 28 counties there was a non‐Hungarian majority. In 4 <strong>of</strong> the counties there was a Hungarian<br />
relative majority and in 8 a non‐Hungarian relative majority. The Romanians had in 11, the Slovaks in 9,<br />
the Croats in 6, and the Germans and the Serbs each in 1 county an absolute majority. The Ruthenians had<br />
in two counties a relative majority. In 18 <strong>of</strong> the 31 cities with jurisdiction the Hungarians were in an<br />
absolute majority, while the Germans in 1 (Sopron), the Slovaks also in 1 (Selmecbanya) and the Croats in<br />
2 cities (Zagreb and Varasd) respectively. Only nine towns with jurisdiction had a relative majority,<br />
including 1 Hungarian (Ujvidék), 4 German (Pozsony, Temesvár, Versec and Zimony), 1 Croatian (Eszék),<br />
2 Serbian (Pancsova and Zombor) and 1 Italian (Fiume). 21<br />
Thirdly, Act XLIV. 1868 § 1 on the Equality <strong>of</strong> the Nationalities declared the Hungarian language as the<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial language <strong>of</strong> the state in Hungary proper. This decision was supported by the fact that the<br />
Hungarian nationality, i.e. the mother tongue speaker <strong>of</strong> Hungarian were in the majority with 54.56<br />
(10.050.575) percent <strong>of</strong> the total population. Although the other nationalities constituted together 45.44<br />
percent <strong>of</strong> the total population, the individual languages, including Romanian 16.18 percent, Slovak 10.68<br />
percent and German 10.44 percent were much smaller than Hungarian. Furthermore, these minority<br />
languages were concentrated in specific area <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom, while Hungarian was the<br />
dominating language spoken throughout Hungary proper by more than 20 percent <strong>of</strong> the population in<br />
the seven regions <strong>of</strong> Hungary proper. Hungarian had an absolute majority in 31 <strong>of</strong> the 63 counties and in<br />
18 <strong>of</strong> the 31 cities with jurisdiction. Finally, the number <strong>of</strong> Hungarian speakers was actually higher<br />
because Hungarian had also the largest number <strong>of</strong> L2 speakers, i.e. 9.29 percent, 1.939.987 in the 1910<br />
census. This was more than the L2 speakers <strong>of</strong> German, i.e. 8.08 percent, that is 1.687.388. 22 It is striking<br />
that almost one‐third <strong>of</strong> the population could not speak the <strong>of</strong>ficial language <strong>of</strong> Hungary proper, i.e.<br />
Hungarian. Nevertheless, Hungarian was in fact the only candidate for becoming the lingua franca in the<br />
20 Lökkös (2000, 238‐239).<br />
21 The study <strong>of</strong> multilingualism in the cities <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom requires a different approach than multilingualism in the<br />
periphery <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom. The cities in the Hungarian kingdom displayed more aspects <strong>of</strong> a modern multicultural<br />
society due to the fact that they were the points <strong>of</strong> modernization in dualist Hungary than the peripheral regions. The ethnic<br />
separatist movements in dualist Hungarian, like the one <strong>of</strong> the Romanians or Serbs in Transylvania or the Banat were actually<br />
anti‐modernity movements. For the languages involved this means that the relation between let us say Hungarian and German<br />
in multicultural cities was completely different than the one between Romanian and Hungarian in a peripheral region like<br />
Transylvania or Banat. Here I am indebted to Rosita Rindler‐Schjerve for raising this issue. See also Mintzel (1998) for discussion<br />
<strong>of</strong> these cases in a wider perspective.<br />
22 Lökkös (2000, 214‐215).<br />
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Hungarian kingdom. 23 It was spoken by 57.41 percent <strong>of</strong> the total population, that is 11.990.562 speakers.<br />
The other candidate, German although enjoying a high status as the dominating language in the Austrian<br />
parts <strong>of</strong> the Empire was spoken by 3.724.823 persons, that is by only 17.83 percent <strong>of</strong> the total population<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom. This position <strong>of</strong> Hungarian was strengthened by the fact that country‐wide<br />
organizations and companies, like the Hungarian army (honvéd) and the Hungarian state railway<br />
companies used Hungarian as the language <strong>of</strong> command or communication. 24<br />
Fourthly, although the Hungarian kingdom acknowledged a state <strong>of</strong> multilingualism in which 12<br />
minority languages had an <strong>of</strong>ficial status next to the Hungarian state language, multilingualism was in<br />
fact a state <strong>of</strong> ‘separate’ monolingualism practiced in the different national communities. True<br />
multilingual speakers were actual a very small minority. 77 percent <strong>of</strong> the inhabitants <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian<br />
kingdom were monolingual only knowing their own mother tongue being unable to communicate with<br />
people outside <strong>of</strong> their ethnic group. The percentage <strong>of</strong> speakers not able to communicate with other<br />
ethnic speakers was even higher because the pairs, triples, etc. <strong>of</strong> languages among the bi‐ or multilingual<br />
speakers did not always match restricting the options for communication. Only 23 percent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
inhabitants, that is 4.880.000 inhabitants were bi‐ or multilingual. The rata for Hungary proper were<br />
somewhat better than the rata for Croatia‐Slavonia: 75 percent only spoke its mother tongue in Hungary<br />
proper and this was true for 85 percent <strong>of</strong> the inhabitants <strong>of</strong> Croatia‐Slavonia. Consequently, 25 percent <strong>of</strong><br />
the inhabitants <strong>of</strong> Hungary were bi‐ or multilingual and only 15 percent in Croatia‐Slavonia. Among the<br />
nationalities the percentages <strong>of</strong> bi‐ or multilingual speakers were rather different. A large majority <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Hungarians, the Slovaks, the Romanians, the Ruthenians, the Serbs and the Croats, i.e. 79, 46, 75, 86, 82<br />
and 88 percent respectively did not speak any other language than their mother tongue. 25 The only ethnic<br />
group having a majority <strong>of</strong> bi‐ or multilingual speakers were the Germans with 54.26 percent, i.e.<br />
1.105.429 <strong>of</strong> the 2.037.436. It is fair to conclude that hardly any direct communication between the ethnic<br />
groups in the Hungarian kingdom was possible. Only 12.69 percent <strong>of</strong> the Romanians could speak<br />
Hungarian, i.e. 374.106 persons, while only 3.99 percent <strong>of</strong> the Hungarians spoke Romanian, i.e. 400.674<br />
persons. Only 21.28 percent <strong>of</strong> the Slovaks, i.e. 418.724 could speak also Hungarian, while only 5.45<br />
percent <strong>of</strong> the Hungarians, i.e. 547.802 people could speak Slovak. This state <strong>of</strong> separate<br />
23 Nikola Rasic (personal communication) is <strong>of</strong> the opinion that German was the lingua franca <strong>of</strong> the Austro‐Hungarian Empire.<br />
True German had a strong position in the Austro‐Hungarian Empire but it was functioning only as a lingua franca among the<br />
Austrian and Hungarian elites. In Hungary proper, a general introduction <strong>of</strong> German already failed under Emperor Joseph II<br />
(1780‐1790) and in the period <strong>of</strong> neo‐absolutism (1848/1849‐1860) under Emperor Franz Joseph I. In both periods, the<br />
Hungarians and large parts <strong>of</strong> their elites resisted the introduction <strong>of</strong> German as an <strong>of</strong>ficial lingua franca. The introduction <strong>of</strong><br />
German during dualism would have run counter to the spirit <strong>of</strong> the Ausgleich. If an ethnically bound language as Hungarian<br />
during dualism was unacceptable for the non‐Hungarian nationalities was unacceptable, then Latin as a neutral language<br />
would have been an option. But Latin as the <strong>of</strong>ficial language in the Hungarian kingdom was changed for Hungarian in the age<br />
<strong>of</strong> Hungarian Renewal in 1844. Hence the only option left was Hungarian, the best possibility which turned out to be not good<br />
enough.<br />
24 The Hungarian language was first stipulated as the language <strong>of</strong> business and command in Law V. 1890 on the Honvéd<br />
(Hungarian army). Consider § 18. See Faluhelyi (1946, XXVI), Rothenberg (1972) and Goebl (1994) for a discussion <strong>of</strong> the status<br />
<strong>of</strong> languages in the Austro‐Hungarian army and the Hungarian army (honvéd) during dualism. See Law XLIX. 1907 on the Rules<br />
<strong>of</strong> Railway Service. §1 <strong>of</strong> this law specifies that only those people can be employed by a Hungarian railroad company that have<br />
a Hungarian citizenship and have a control <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian language.<br />
25 See Lökkös (2000, 71‐72.<br />
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“multilingualism” was conserved by the strict organization <strong>of</strong> society. Firstly, most <strong>of</strong> the inhabitants <strong>of</strong><br />
the Hungarian kingdom, i.e. 81 percent 16.923.000 lived in the country‐side in small agricultural<br />
settlements. Only the Hungarians and the Germans remained with 71 percent and 81 percent under or at<br />
this average respectively. Almost all the other nationalities lived in the country‐side, including Slovaks,<br />
Romanians, Croats and Serbs with 92, 95, 91, 90 percent respectively. Almost all the Ruthenians, i.e. 99<br />
percent lived in the country‐side. 26 Further, the nationalities were <strong>of</strong>ten organized in terms <strong>of</strong> church<br />
denominations. The Hungarian state recognized the Roman Catholic church, the Greek Catholic church,<br />
the Greek Orthodox church, the Calvinist church, the Lutheran church, the Unitarian church and the<br />
Jewish faith. These denominations enjoyed ecclesiastical autonomy. 27 Although the relation between<br />
ethnicity and church denominations was not a strict one‐to‐one matching in the Hungarian kingdom<br />
some churches were represented more dominantly than others among the different nationalities. Almost<br />
all the Croats, i.e. 99 percent were Roman Catholic. An equally high number <strong>of</strong> Serbs belonged to the<br />
Greek Orthodox Church. Almost all the Ruthenians, i.e. 98 percent were Greek Catholic. Most <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Hungarians were either Roman Catholic or Calvinist, i.e. 59 and 26 percent respectively. Most Romanians<br />
were either Greek Orthodox, i.e. 61 percent or Greek Catholic, i.e. 38 percent. 28 These church<br />
denominations were active in fostering the identity and language <strong>of</strong> the ethnic groups they were attached<br />
to. One <strong>of</strong> their effective vehicles to do this was by being an active player in the educational system.<br />
Finally, one <strong>of</strong> the main reasons why separate “multilingualism” existed in the Hungarian kingdom was<br />
due to the liberal Law on the Equality <strong>of</strong> the Nationalities in the Hungarian kingdom, i.e. Act XLIV. 1868.<br />
The law assigned the nationalities the right to establish their own schools and choose their own language<br />
<strong>of</strong> instruction in these schools.<br />
Fifthly, the legal situation <strong>of</strong> the nationalities was regulated in the Law on the Equality <strong>of</strong> Nationalities<br />
Act XLV. 1868. The Law counted 29 paragraphs stipulating individual and collective nationality rights<br />
referring foremost – in accordance with Smith’s generalization ‐ to the use <strong>of</strong> the languages <strong>of</strong> the<br />
nationalities. This law next to specifying the Hungarian language as the language <strong>of</strong> the state to be used in<br />
all branches <strong>of</strong> government and administration (compare § 1) recognized individual and collective rights<br />
for the nationalities, i.e. the Slovaks, Romanians, Serbs and so on to use all registers <strong>of</strong> their own mother<br />
tongue in <strong>of</strong>fices, schools, at courts and in county and communal assemblies. During the whole period <strong>of</strong><br />
dualism the Law on the Equality <strong>of</strong> Nationalities and their provisions were almost unchanged and<br />
remained into force. It was an effective tool for protecting the identity <strong>of</strong> nationalities, also against<br />
homogenization policies <strong>of</strong> Hungarian nationalism. Consider section 3 below for more discussion.<br />
The individual rights included the following rights among others. In county and communal<br />
assemblies, everyone had the right to speak its own mother tongue (compare § 3, §24) and to use the non‐<br />
state languages <strong>of</strong> the nationalities for the minutes <strong>of</strong> the county and communal assemblies, if more than<br />
twenty percent <strong>of</strong> the deputies asked for it (compare §2, § 20). The assemblies had the right to<br />
communicate internally (compare § 5) and with higher instances <strong>of</strong> the state and each other in the<br />
language(s) <strong>of</strong> the nationalities (compare §4) in agreement with § 2 and § 20. Further every citizen had the<br />
right to use its own mother tongue before court (compare § 7), to use his own mother tongue in church<br />
26 Compare Lökkös (2000, 63).<br />
27 See the study <strong>of</strong> Hévizi (1996).<br />
28 See Lökkös (2000, 65).<br />
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assemblies (compare § 24) and to correspond with the state and ecclesiastical authorities in his own<br />
mother (compare § 23).<br />
Churches as the main non‐governmental organizations in society played a central role. This is also<br />
expressed in the Nationality Law. The churches and importantly the churches <strong>of</strong> the nationalities enjoyed<br />
full autonomy in the determining the language <strong>of</strong> their church affairs. They could freely use their<br />
language in administration, to draw up registers in their language and to use the language <strong>of</strong> instruction<br />
they wished in their schools within the limits <strong>of</strong> the Education Act (compare § 14) and to prescribe their<br />
language <strong>of</strong> business in church courts (compare § 10). Churches and congregations had the right to<br />
establish their own primary and secondary schools and choose their own language <strong>of</strong> instruction<br />
(compare § 26).<br />
Interestingly, the provisions <strong>of</strong> the law do not only specify the linguistic rights <strong>of</strong> individual citizens<br />
and non‐ governmental organizations but also refer to the obligation <strong>of</strong> state servants to use languages<br />
other than the Hungarian state language. The <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> the counties and communal authorities had to<br />
employ the language <strong>of</strong> those state authorities, non‐governmental organizations or private individuals<br />
(compare § 6, § 21 respectively) that used another language than Hungarian . In this case, not only the<br />
right <strong>of</strong> the individual citizen to use his own language in communication with the authorities was<br />
guaranteed but in fact real communication with the non‐Hungarian speaking nationalities because the<br />
authorities had to answer in the language they were addressed in. This was also the duty <strong>of</strong> judges when<br />
pronouncing the verdicts (compare § 8). Further, the Law also explicitly refers to the non‐discrimination<br />
<strong>of</strong> members <strong>of</strong> the nationalities in the judicial and administrative <strong>of</strong>fices <strong>of</strong> the state, especially in the<br />
<strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the governor <strong>of</strong> the county, the highest <strong>of</strong>ficial <strong>of</strong> the state in the county system (§ 27). 29 The Law<br />
wanted to guarantee in this way that in each state <strong>of</strong>fice the languages <strong>of</strong> the nationalities were<br />
represented.<br />
The establishment <strong>of</strong> schools was <strong>of</strong> course in the fundamental interest <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian state and the<br />
nationalities. The state, the Minister <strong>of</strong> Education had the right to prescribe the language <strong>of</strong> instruction in<br />
schools erected by the state but the state had to ensure that citizens <strong>of</strong> whichever nationality had to obtain<br />
primary and secondary instruction in their mother tongue, if living together in considerable numbers.<br />
This provision guaranteed that the language <strong>of</strong> instruction in state schools in territories where the<br />
nationalities lived was in their language (compare § 17). Apart from this, the nationalities, individual<br />
citizens, communes and congregations had the right to establish their own educational institutions at their<br />
own expenses. The language <strong>of</strong> instruction and administration in these private institutions was prescribed<br />
by the founders. In practice, the right <strong>of</strong> the nationalities to establish private schools allowed them to<br />
stress their cultural and linguistic autonomy against the state. During the period <strong>of</strong> dualism cultural and<br />
linguistic autonomy in non‐state, non‐Hungarian schools was guaranteed by law. The Hungarian state<br />
language was only compulsory as a subject <strong>of</strong> instruction in elementary schools from 1879 specified in the<br />
Education Act XVIII. 1879. The introduction <strong>of</strong> this law hardly affected however the linguistic autonomy<br />
<strong>of</strong> the non‐state, non‐Hungarian nationality schools. 30<br />
29 The county governor, in Hungarian föispán, was appointed by the Hungarian king acting upon the advice <strong>of</strong> the minister <strong>of</strong><br />
Interior.<br />
30 See Faluhelyi (1946, 121‐124) for Education Act XVIII. 1879.<br />
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3. Primary Education in the Hungarian Kingdom<br />
Although the Hungarian legislation on the equality <strong>of</strong> the nationalities was certainly a liberal law<br />
designed by the Hungarian founding fathers <strong>of</strong> the Ausgleich <strong>of</strong> 1867, i.e. Ferenc Deák and Baron József<br />
von Eötvös to protect the nationalities the Hungarians and the non‐Hungarian nationalities were not<br />
satisfied with it. The Hungarians could not introduce their language being the <strong>of</strong>ficial language <strong>of</strong> the<br />
state in the whole country for the church schools <strong>of</strong> the nationalities had the right to choose their own<br />
language. By tradition the educational system was in Hungary until 1867 mainly in the hands <strong>of</strong> non‐state<br />
agencies like religious denominations. 31 The non‐Hungarians on their turn feared interference from the<br />
Hungarian state in what they saw as their autonomous right, the establishment <strong>of</strong> their own schools. In<br />
order to understand this conflicting situation we will discuss the case <strong>of</strong> primary education in the<br />
Hungarian kingdom during dualism in this section.<br />
According to the <strong>of</strong>ficial data <strong>of</strong> 1905‐1906, the total number <strong>of</strong> primary schools belonging to the state<br />
in Hungary proper was 2.045. 32 This proportion was 12.34 percent <strong>of</strong> the total number counting 16.561<br />
schools. In all the state schools the language <strong>of</strong> instruction was Hungarian, except for one in which the<br />
language <strong>of</strong> instruction was Slovak. The number <strong>of</strong> private schools mainly managed by the several church<br />
denominations was 14.516, that is 87.66 percent <strong>of</strong> all the primary schools. In 21,73 percent, i.e. 3.154 <strong>of</strong><br />
these schools the language <strong>of</strong> instruction was non‐Hungarian and in ten percent, i.e. 1.665 <strong>of</strong> these school<br />
the language <strong>of</strong> instruction was mixed, Hungarian and one <strong>of</strong> the languages <strong>of</strong> the other nationalities.<br />
These schools were not ‘utraquist’ or bilingual schools however. 33 There were separate classes for pupils<br />
with a Hungarian mother tongue and for pupils with non‐Hungarian mother tongues. Consequently, in<br />
31.73 percent <strong>of</strong> the cases, the language <strong>of</strong> instruction was non‐Hungarian. For two reasons, it was<br />
understandable that the nationalities <strong>of</strong> Hungary constituting 48.6 percent <strong>of</strong> the population felt<br />
discriminated. First <strong>of</strong> all, the Hungarian state did not establish state primary schools, except for one,<br />
where the language <strong>of</strong> instruction was the language <strong>of</strong> a non‐Hungarian nationality. According to § 17 <strong>of</strong><br />
the Law on Nationalities (see, Law XXXVIII. 1868) the Hungarian state should have established much<br />
more state primary schools with the language <strong>of</strong> instruction being the languages <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian<br />
nationalities in territorities inhabited by them and should have taken care <strong>of</strong> their implementation in a<br />
consistent way, at least confirming to the system <strong>of</strong> parallel classes in mixed schools. Because <strong>of</strong> this<br />
neglect it is fair to criticize Hungarian educational policy during dualism.<br />
Note however that the number <strong>of</strong> Hungarian primary schools managed by church denominations to<br />
the total number <strong>of</strong> primary schools was 9.698, that is 58.5 percent in 1905‐1906. In these schools, the state<br />
could not interfere because <strong>of</strong> church autonomy. Hence, the state even if it had fulfilled its duties in the<br />
existing state primary schools and introducing the languages <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities as the<br />
language <strong>of</strong> instruction as well would have increased the number <strong>of</strong> cases <strong>of</strong> non‐Hungarian language<br />
instruction with 12.34 percent maximally. This would have resulted into 44.07 percent <strong>of</strong> all the primary<br />
schools with a non‐Hungarian language <strong>of</strong> instruction at most remaining behind the proportion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
31 Teleki (1923, 157).<br />
32 See for these data Seton‐Watson (1907, 439).<br />
33 See Rindler‐Schjerve (this volume) for utraquist schools in Cisleithania.<br />
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non‐Hungarian nationalities to the total population <strong>of</strong> 48.6 percent. Second, the 31.73 percent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
primary schools teaching in the languages <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities remained under the<br />
proportion <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities to the total population <strong>of</strong> 48.6 percent. 34 This was even<br />
more striking in the case <strong>of</strong> primary schools in which the language <strong>of</strong> instruction was Slovak and<br />
Romanian alone. 35 These schools numbered 241, i.e. 1.4 percent and 2.440, i.e. 14.7 percent respectively <strong>of</strong><br />
the total primary schools in 1905‐1906. We observe a discrepancy at the expense <strong>of</strong> these nationalities<br />
indeed, if we compare these figures with the distribution <strong>of</strong> the population <strong>of</strong> the 1910 census where the<br />
Slovaks constituted 10.68 percent and the Romanians 16.18 percent <strong>of</strong> the total population. We hasten to<br />
add however that the discrimination <strong>of</strong> the Slovaks was much more serious than in the case <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Romanians. 36 This asymmetry between the Slovaks and the Romanians is also demonstrated by the fact<br />
that the number <strong>of</strong> primary schools with Slovak language instruction dropped dramatically during<br />
dualism: from 1822 in 1869, 1716 in 1880, 1115 in 1890, 500 in 1900 to 241 in 1905‐1906, while the number<br />
<strong>of</strong> Romanian language primary schools remained almost unchanged: 2569 in 1869, 2756 in 1880, 2582 in<br />
1890, 2309 in 1900 and 2440 in 1905‐1906. 37 Probably this asymmetry is due to the fact that the Hungarians<br />
traditionally had a better relation with the Slovaks than with the Romanians not rendered difficult by<br />
religious difference. 38 As a consequence, the Slovaks were earlier willing to send their children to mixed<br />
Hungarian‐Slovak state or denominational schools, like the Roman Catholic primary schools, whereas the<br />
Romanians clung to their exclusive Greek Orthodox or Greek Catholic primary schools where the<br />
language <strong>of</strong> instruction was Romanian only.<br />
The Hungarian educational policy was criticized in due course for being an important means <strong>of</strong><br />
Magyarization <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities living in the Hungarian state. Let us discuss the<br />
arguments <strong>of</strong> the most important critic <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary, the British author Robert Seton‐Watson<br />
presented in his book ‘Racial Problems in Hungary’ that appeared in 1907. A whole chapter <strong>of</strong> the book is<br />
devoted to the policy and practice <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian educational system. 39 We get the impression from<br />
this chapter that Seton‐Watson means by ‘Magyarization’ the establishment <strong>of</strong> state schools with<br />
Hungarian as the language <strong>of</strong> instruction only in territorities inhabited by non‐Hungarian nationalities<br />
and the introduction <strong>of</strong> Hungarian as a subject <strong>of</strong> instruction in the private schools with non‐Hungarian<br />
language <strong>of</strong> instruction. According to Seton‐Watson, the whole focus <strong>of</strong> educational policy during dualist<br />
Hungary was on Magyarization “where they [i.e. state primary school, LM] serve to develop Magyar<br />
patriotism and to extend by artificial means the boundaries <strong>of</strong> the Magyar race.” 40 The British author even<br />
claimed that the extreme focus on the Magyarization policy <strong>of</strong> the successive Hungarian governments<br />
34 Note that Seton‐Watson (1907, 438‐439) adds the primary schools <strong>of</strong> the mixed type to the Magyar language instruction only. I<br />
do not think that is a correct interpretation <strong>of</strong> the data. Consequently, his percentage <strong>of</strong> non‐Magyar language instruction is only<br />
19.0 percent against the 31.3 percent if we do otherwise.<br />
35 See Seton‐Watson (1907, 437).<br />
36 Seton‐Watson (1907, 438) does only present the Slovak figures and is neglecting the cases where there was hardly any<br />
discrimation <strong>of</strong> the nationalities, like in the case <strong>of</strong> the Romanians.<br />
37 See Seton‐Watson (1907, 437).<br />
38 See Teleki (1923, 152).<br />
39 Compare Seton Watson (1907, 205‐233).<br />
40 Compare Seton‐Watson (1907, 218).<br />
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resulted in a bad school system neglecting the state schools in the territories inhabited mainly by the<br />
Hungarians. 41 We agree with Seton‐Watson, as we spelled out above, that the Hungarian state should<br />
have done more to erect state schools with the languages <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities as one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
languages <strong>of</strong> instruction or as the only language <strong>of</strong> instruction in mixed Hungarian‐non‐Hungarian<br />
territories and in territories where the nationalities lived, even if the state would have violated § 17 <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Law on Nationalities Act XLV. <strong>of</strong> 1868. Above we pointed out that in the educational system <strong>of</strong> dualist<br />
Hungary most <strong>of</strong> the schools were run by private non‐state agencies, like church dominations leading in<br />
fact to a marginal influence <strong>of</strong> the state in these schools. This was made possible by § 26 <strong>of</strong> the same law<br />
stipulating that private organization, like church congregations had the right to establish schools and to<br />
choose the language <strong>of</strong> instructions in these schools. The non‐Hungarian nationalities, especially the<br />
Romanians and the Serbs extensively made use <strong>of</strong> this right. This is also acknowledged by Seton‐Watson<br />
stating that the Serbs and the Romanians are more favorably placed than the Slovaks. 42 In conclusion, the<br />
Nationalities Law which was liberal in intent and content led to inconsistencies in the educational system<br />
at the disadvantage <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian languages as language <strong>of</strong> instruction. The state should have<br />
supported the teaching in and <strong>of</strong> the languages <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities in state schools but<br />
because <strong>of</strong> the liberal Law <strong>of</strong> Nationalities the state only controlled 12.34 percent <strong>of</strong> the primary schools.<br />
True in these schools the state could have done more to support the languages <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian<br />
nationalities as language <strong>of</strong> instruction.<br />
Another asymmetrical development between the Hungarian versus non‐Hungarian primary schools<br />
set in with the Law on the Education <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian Language XVIII. 1879 that made the teaching <strong>of</strong><br />
Hungarian a compulsory subject in all primary schools (compare § 1 and § 4). The reason for this was to<br />
<strong>of</strong>fer all citizens the opportunity to learn the state language, i.e. Hungarian. 43 Furthermore, the law also<br />
specified that schoolteachers had to have a sufficient knowledge <strong>of</strong> Hungarian to be capable <strong>of</strong> teaching in<br />
the primary school (compare § 2‐3). Although this were reasonable provisions from the point <strong>of</strong> view <strong>of</strong><br />
the state the introduction <strong>of</strong> this law violated §17 <strong>of</strong> the Nationalities Law and did violate the autonomy<br />
<strong>of</strong> the churches. Consequently, I do not agree with Seton‐Watson that the introduction <strong>of</strong> the teaching <strong>of</strong><br />
Hungarian, the <strong>of</strong>ficial language as a compulsory subject a few hours a week was a grave mistake the<br />
Hungarian state made, for in this way the non‐Hungarian citizens could have been included in the<br />
communicational networks <strong>of</strong> the state. 44 This would have served their interest as well. Rather the neglect<br />
<strong>of</strong> the parallel introduction <strong>of</strong> the languages <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities as a language <strong>of</strong><br />
instruction in the territories inhabited by them should have been a serious point <strong>of</strong> criticism.<br />
However, the Education Law XVIII. 1879 did not fulfill its expectations, as Seton‐Watson correctly<br />
points out admitting that Magyarization was not effective. 45 In 1890, eleven years after the introduction <strong>of</strong><br />
the law Hungarian as an obligatory subject was either not taught at all or was taught entirely without<br />
success in 34 percent <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungary schools. The source <strong>of</strong> Seton‐Watson, departmental order nr.<br />
41 Compare Seton‐Watson (1907, 209).<br />
42 See Seton‐Watson (1907, 214).<br />
43 See Faluhelyi (1946, 121‐124) for Law XVIII. 1879.<br />
44 Departmental order nr. 72.000 <strong>of</strong> 1905 specified that in non‐Magyar primary schools with one teacher nine hours a week must<br />
be reserved for the teaching <strong>of</strong> the mother tongue and 8 hours for Hungarian.<br />
45 See Seton‐Watson (1907, 219).<br />
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72.000 <strong>of</strong> 1905 speaks <strong>of</strong> a percentage <strong>of</strong> failures even higher than 34 percent. According to this<br />
departmental order, the teaching <strong>of</strong> Hungarian as a subject was unsuccessful in 1340 <strong>of</strong> the 3343 non‐<br />
Magyar schools, i.e. 40 percent. 46 In 1890, 1600 <strong>of</strong> the 2600 teachers in 1879 who had no sufficient<br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> Hungarian or did not know the language in the non‐Hungarian schools had still no control<br />
over the Hungarian language. In 1906, 27 years after the introduction <strong>of</strong> the Law XVIII. 1879 this was true<br />
for still 957 <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian teachers. Finally, in 1905 the minister <strong>of</strong> Culture and Education had to<br />
admit that still 40 percent <strong>of</strong> the population <strong>of</strong> Hungary was completely ignorant <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian<br />
language and that 83.2 percent <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarians did not speak the <strong>of</strong>ficial state language. 47<br />
The successive Hungarian governments during dualism strengthened the asymmetrical developments<br />
between Hungarian and non‐Hungarian schools by not introducing the compulsory teaching in the<br />
languages <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities as well, at least in the state schools in mixed territories or<br />
territories inhabited by them. However, it would have been better to make the language <strong>of</strong> the non‐<br />
Hungarian nationality compulsory language <strong>of</strong> instruction as well in all the Hungarian schools in mixed<br />
territorities and in territories inhabited by the non‐Hungarian nationalities. Further, the Hungarian<br />
governments intensived their efforts to introduce Hungarian as a compulsory subject <strong>of</strong> instruction after<br />
finding out that this had been unsuccessful. This educational policy suffered from inconsistencies and<br />
violated the Nationality Law <strong>of</strong> 1868. As a consequence, the introduction <strong>of</strong> Hungarian as a subject <strong>of</strong><br />
instruction was boycotted and sabotaged in the non‐Hungarian schools, mainly private schools, leading<br />
to the escalation <strong>of</strong> the conflicts in the mixed territorities and the territorities inhabited by the non‐<br />
Hungarian nationalities. The result <strong>of</strong> this policy was that the separatist model <strong>of</strong> education was<br />
maintained and strengthened leading in the end to unbridgeable point <strong>of</strong> views between the Hungarian<br />
government and the non‐Hungarian nationalities.<br />
In this vein, act XVII. 1907 on the legal status <strong>of</strong> the non‐state primary schools and the appointment <strong>of</strong><br />
teachers in communal and denominational schools restated the introduction <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian language<br />
as a compulsory subject <strong>of</strong> instruction in non‐Hungarian schools. Note that the language <strong>of</strong> instruction in<br />
the non‐Hungarian schools, i.e. the languages <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities remained unchanged. 48<br />
The law that was promulgated by the minister <strong>of</strong> Culture and Education, Count Albert Apponyi further<br />
implied a stricter control <strong>of</strong> the policy he wanted to implement hereby violating the Nationality Law <strong>of</strong><br />
1868 and the autonomy <strong>of</strong> the church denominations in the Hungarian kingdom. This led to a rising <strong>of</strong> the<br />
tension between the Hungarian government and the non‐Hungarian nationalities. Let us consider the<br />
criticism <strong>of</strong> Seton‐Watson concerning ‘Lex Apponyi’.<br />
Seton‐Watson criticizes the linguistic provisions <strong>of</strong> the law, for the children must be taught Magyar in<br />
a manner and for the time prescribed by the minister, “so that the child <strong>of</strong> non‐Magyar tongue on the<br />
completion <strong>of</strong> its fourth school year can express its thoughts intelligibly in the Magyar language in word<br />
and writing.” (compare § 19). According to Seton‐Watson, this provision “opens the door to all kinds <strong>of</strong><br />
wild linguistic experiments, such as are bound to prove fatal to the general culture <strong>of</strong> the victims.” 49 Here<br />
46 See Faluhelyi (1946, 166).<br />
47 See Seton‐Watson (1907, 219) and departmental order nr. 72.000 <strong>of</strong> 1905 in Faluhelyi (1946, 219).<br />
48 See for this law Faluhelyi (1946, 187‐190).<br />
49 See Seton‐Watson (1907, 230).<br />
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Seton‐Watson is simply exaggerating or he is consciously misreading the law because the law does not<br />
speak about the introduction <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian language as the language <strong>of</strong> instruction but as a subject <strong>of</strong><br />
instruction. Hence, the language <strong>of</strong> instruction in non‐Hungarian schools remained the mother tongue <strong>of</strong><br />
the children. His point about violating §14 <strong>of</strong> the Law <strong>of</strong> Nationalities <strong>of</strong> 1868, i.e. the provision <strong>of</strong> freely<br />
choosing the language <strong>of</strong> instruction in private schools is more substantial, as we have pointed out above.<br />
Paragraph §1 <strong>of</strong> Education Act XXVII. 1907 specifies that all teachers in communal and denominational<br />
schools are state servants. In §2 their salaries are regulated bounding the salaries <strong>of</strong> these teachers to a<br />
minimum. In this case Seton‐Watson, does not credit the Hungarian state for the improvement <strong>of</strong> the<br />
social position <strong>of</strong> teachers being state <strong>of</strong>ficials who enjoy a fixed salary. For Seton‐Watson these provisions<br />
are only meant as instances <strong>of</strong> “Magyarization” making teachers dependent on the state and giving the<br />
state a plausible excuse for interference in the autonomy <strong>of</strong> private schools. 50 So, he rejects the provisions<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Education Act <strong>of</strong> Apponyi, including that teachers must have a control <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian language<br />
(§15), that all Magyar instruction in arithmetic, geography, history, civil rights and duties must be<br />
sanctioned by the minister (compare §20); that all books <strong>of</strong> instruction must be approved by the minister<br />
(§20); that no books hostile to the state may be used in instruction; that the minister is allowed to make<br />
inquires in the schools that neglect the instruction <strong>of</strong> Hungarian and follow a policy or using books hostile<br />
to the state or incite against confessions or social classes (compare §22 and 24). According to Seton‐<br />
Watson, the right <strong>of</strong> the minister if there is a second dismissal in connection with the violation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
provisions under §22 to dissolve the school (compare §25) is an arbitrary way <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian<br />
government to put pressure on the non‐Hungarian nationalities in dualist Hungary. 51<br />
An interesting provision <strong>of</strong> Lex Apponyi that is not discussed in Seton‐Watson (1907) is §18. This<br />
paragraph specifies what to do when there is no Hungarian language school in a place where there is a<br />
non‐Hungarian language primary church school with Hungarian children or non‐Hungarian children<br />
whose parents wants their children to be instructed in Hungarian. According to §18, for these [italics are<br />
mine, LM] children Hungarian is to be used as a language <strong>of</strong> instruction. Education in Hungarian for these<br />
[italics are mine, LM] children is compulsory, when their proportion to the total pupils <strong>of</strong> the school is at<br />
least 20 percent. Again in this case, the Hungarian state violated autonomy <strong>of</strong> the denominational school<br />
but even in this case we cannot speak about enforced Magyarization because the Hungarian language<br />
instruction is compulsory for Hungarian children or children who want to be instructed in Hungarian.<br />
Rather what is at stake here is that in this case again, the Hungarian state respected and even<br />
strengthened the separatist education <strong>of</strong> Hungarian and non‐Hungarian pupils.<br />
In conclusion, indeed some <strong>of</strong> the provisions <strong>of</strong> the Lex Apponyi were restricting the autonomy <strong>of</strong><br />
church schools, violating the Nationality Law and demonstrated that the Hungarian state wanted to<br />
control matters in non‐Hungarian schools as well. To suggest however that these provisions were<br />
effective tools <strong>of</strong> Magyarization as done in the work <strong>of</strong> Seton‐Watson (1907) is not convincing at all. The<br />
supposed Magyarization is neither supported by a more detailed analysis <strong>of</strong> the population data <strong>of</strong><br />
dualist Hungary.<br />
50 See Seton‐Watson (1907, 228).<br />
51 See Seton‐Watson (1907, 229).<br />
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From the census data it appears that in a period <strong>of</strong> forty years beginning from 1869 until 1910, the<br />
population in the Hungarian kingdom increased by 35 percent, i.e. by 5.375.000 persons from 15.512.000<br />
to 20.887.000. 52 In a period <strong>of</strong> thirty years between 1880 and 1910, the percentage <strong>of</strong> Hungarian mother<br />
tongue speakers grew by 7.17 percent, from 40.95 percent to 48.12 percent, while in the same period the<br />
non‐Hungarian mother tongue speakers dropped by 6.55 percent, from 58.43 percent to 51.88 percent. In<br />
actual numbers, the Hungarian mother tongue speakers increased by 3.605.088, that is 55.9 percent. The<br />
non‐Hungarian mother tongue speakers decreased only in percentages but not in absolute numbers. In<br />
absolute figures there was an increase <strong>of</strong> non‐Hungarian mother speakers as well. This group grew by 17<br />
percent, i.e. 1.582.000 persons. Consider the following diagrams: 53<br />
Diagram 3: population growth in the Hungarian kingdom on the basis <strong>of</strong> mother tongue from 1880<br />
until 1910<br />
Mother tongue 1880 1890 1900 1910<br />
Hungarian 6.445.487 7.477.334 8.742.301 10.050.575<br />
Non‐Hungarian total 9.196.615 9.986.457 10.512.258 10.835.912<br />
Slovak 1.864.529 1.921.599 2.019.641 1.967.970<br />
Romanian 2.405.085 2.604.027 2.799.479 2.949.032<br />
Diagram 4: population growth in the Hungarian kingdom in percentages <strong>of</strong> the total population on<br />
the basis <strong>of</strong> mother tongue from 1880 until 1910<br />
Mother tongue 1880 1890 1900 1910<br />
Hungarian 40.95 42.82 45.41 48. 48.12<br />
Non‐Hungarian total 58.43 57.18 54.59 51.88<br />
From these diagrams it appears that in the period between 1880 and 1910 not only the Hungarians<br />
grew in absolute numbers but also the Slovaks and the Romanians, although the proportion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Romanians to the total population grew harder than that <strong>of</strong> the Slovaks who suffered a minor fall back in<br />
the last ten years <strong>of</strong> this period. In any case, we can conclude that there was no substantial population<br />
drop among the larger nationalities. Hence, the growth <strong>of</strong> population among the larger nationalities does<br />
not support the accusation <strong>of</strong> Magyarization <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian nationalities by the Hungarian state during<br />
dualist Hungary. Neither does the growth <strong>of</strong> the number <strong>of</strong> nationalities speaking their mother tongue<br />
52 See Lökkös (2000, 79).<br />
53 See Lökkös (2000, 222) for the data <strong>of</strong> the 1910 census.<br />
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only and the marginal growth <strong>of</strong> Hungarian L2‐speakers during dualist Hungary. During dualist<br />
Hungary most speakers, but especially the non‐Hungarian nationality speakers remained mainly<br />
monolingual, while the group <strong>of</strong> bi‐ or multilingual L2‐speakers <strong>of</strong> Hungarian only increased marginally.<br />
From the 1910 census, it appears that 77 percent <strong>of</strong> the total population <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary spoke<br />
his/her mother tongue only. Note that during dualism the actual number <strong>of</strong> most <strong>of</strong> the nationalities who<br />
could only speak their mother tongue had increased as well. This was especially the case with the<br />
Romanians and the Serbs. 54 The Germans and the Slovaks formed an exception to this due to the fact that<br />
they lived scattered on the territory <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom. Between 1880 and 1910, among all<br />
nationalities the percentage <strong>of</strong> the mother tongue speakers knowing only their mother tongue decreased,<br />
including the Germans from 62.48 percent in 1880 to 5.74 percent in 1910, Slovaks from 85.89 percent in<br />
1880 to 75.01 percent in 1910 and Romanians from 92.36 percent in 1880 to 85.69 percent in 1910. The<br />
absolute figures however give another picture. The number <strong>of</strong> Germans and Slovaks speaking only their<br />
mother tongue decreased from 1.220.769 in 1880 to 932.006 in 1910 and from 1.601.367 in 1880 to 1.476.100<br />
in 1910, respectively. The actual number <strong>of</strong> Romanians however only speaking their mother tongue raised<br />
from 2.221.302 in 1880 to 2.527.014 in 1910. 55 So in 1910, among the nationalities only the Slovaks and the<br />
Germans were becoming rather slowly bi‐ and multilingual but the other nationalities remained mainly<br />
monolingual.<br />
From the 1910 census, it appears that 65 percent <strong>of</strong> the population <strong>of</strong> Hungary proper could speak<br />
Hungarian and that 35 percent did not master Hungarian at all. So, in 1910, 7.310.270 persons could not<br />
speak Hungarian. 56 The percentages become even more dramatic, if we consider the numbers <strong>of</strong><br />
Hungarian L2‐speakers among the non‐Hungarian nationalities only. In 1910, averagely 82 percent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
non‐Hungarians could not speak Hungarian. The percentages for the Germans, Slovaks and Romanians<br />
were 60, 78 and 81 percent respectively. 57<br />
In 1880, from the non‐Hungarian speakers only ten percent, i.e. 1.597.000 persons spoke next to their<br />
mother tongue another language. By 1910, this proportion increased to 2.765.000 persons, i.e. thirteen<br />
percent <strong>of</strong> the total population. Hungarian functioned for 1.940.000 <strong>of</strong> these persons as an L2. 58<br />
In conclusion, above we have discussed the primary school system <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary in more depth.<br />
The educational system <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary can be characterized best as a separatist model. This model<br />
was in line with a general feature <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian society respecting the existence <strong>of</strong> different<br />
nationalities and their languages. This was also the basis <strong>of</strong> the liberal Law on the Equality <strong>of</strong><br />
Nationalities <strong>of</strong> 1868. Because <strong>of</strong> this, the educational system was especially controlled by private<br />
organizations based on nationality, such as the church denominations. The state was in fact a minor<br />
player in the educational field possessing only 12.34 percent <strong>of</strong> the primary schools at the end <strong>of</strong> dualist<br />
era. Hence, the Hungarian state even if it had wanted could not have changed the separatist model due to<br />
customs and Hungarian legislation. The Hungarian educational policy led to inconsistencies,<br />
54 See Lökkös (2000, 88‐89, 230‐232).<br />
55 See Lökkös (2000, 232).<br />
56 See Lökkös ((2000, 68).<br />
57 See Lökkös (2000, 208).<br />
58 See Lökkös (2000, 88, 230).<br />
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asymmetrical developments and in some cases to the discrimination <strong>of</strong> the educational options <strong>of</strong> the non‐<br />
Hungarian nationalities. This contributed to the escalations <strong>of</strong> the nationality conflicts. These conflicts<br />
have been referred to by critics <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary, like Seton‐Watson as the intentional Magyarization <strong>of</strong><br />
the non‐Hungarian nationalities. Although it cannot be denied that the educational system and the<br />
implications <strong>of</strong> the educational legislation contributed to the escalation <strong>of</strong> conflicts instead <strong>of</strong> appeasing<br />
them the claim that the primary school system <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom favored Magyarization <strong>of</strong> the<br />
non‐Hungarian nationalities is unmotivated. If some Hungarian policy makers thought that by<br />
establishing Hungarian language state schools in mixed territories and the territorities inhabited by the<br />
non‐Hungarian nationalities and that by the compulsory introduction <strong>of</strong> Hungarian as a subject <strong>of</strong><br />
instruction in non‐Hungarian language schools the non‐Hungarian nationalities <strong>of</strong> Hungary could be<br />
Magyarized then this has turned out to be a fatal misconception. In Central and Eastern Europe there is<br />
indeed a specific relation between language and nationality but this language factor is ‘mother tongue’<br />
and not ‘L2’. With the same force however one can argue that the resistance against the introduction <strong>of</strong><br />
Hungarian as an L2 in the non‐Hungarian primary schools was motivated by the same conceptual<br />
misinterpretation. Rather this false conceptual relation between L2 and nationality has been misused for<br />
power political motivations from both sides. 59 Furthermore, from the population statistics and the data on<br />
mother tongue speakers, including the high proportion <strong>of</strong> monolingual speakers among the non‐<br />
Hungarian nationalities and the marginal growth <strong>of</strong> L2‐speakers <strong>of</strong> Hungarian during dualism it clearly<br />
appears that the non‐Hungarian nationalities were not affected by Magyarization, i.e. the Hungarian<br />
educational policy had no serious consequences for the identity <strong>of</strong> Hungary’s non‐Hungarians.<br />
4. Studying the practice <strong>of</strong> multilingualism in dualist Hungary<br />
In the previous chapter, I have discussed the educational policy in the Hungarian kingdom by focusing<br />
on primary education as a case study. We have concluded that this policy had discriminative aspects<br />
restricting the options <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities but at the same time it cannot be characterized<br />
as Magyarization. Consequently, sweeping statement like the one <strong>of</strong> Seton‐Watson “so today the<br />
non‐Magyars <strong>of</strong> Hungary are breeding‐machines whose children must be taught Magyar from their<br />
earliest age, in the hope that they may become renegades to the tradition <strong>of</strong> their ancestors” are<br />
unmotivated. 60 It is true however that dualist educational policy contributed to the escalation <strong>of</strong> conflicts<br />
between the Hungarian and non‐Hungarian nationalities.<br />
Note that we observed above that the national communities during dualism had separate institutions<br />
respected by the Hungarian state and that the proportion <strong>of</strong> the bi‐ and multilingual speakers to the total<br />
population was rather low. In this climate lacking reliable “bridges”, stereotypes, images and self‐images<br />
played an important role for fuelling further escalations between Hungarians and non‐Hungarians.<br />
59 I agree with Seton‐Watson (1907, 233) that language and nationality are not related necessarily but in Central and Eastern<br />
Europe there is an implicational relation between nationality and mother tongue as we discussed above. .<br />
60 See Seton‐Watson (1907, 222)<br />
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Among the Hungarians, negative qualifications, images and stereotypes <strong>of</strong> the nationalities were<br />
singing around in the kingdom, like ‘the Germans are pranky’, ‘the Romanians have a hairy sole’, ‘the<br />
Serbs are wild’, ‘the Slovaks are not men’ and ‘the Jews are stinking.’ 61 Note that some <strong>of</strong> the nationalities<br />
were referred to in these exclusive, derogatory stereotypes by names they only had in the Hungarian<br />
language, like oláh for Romanians that means in fact “someone originating from Wallachia”, tót “Slovak”<br />
and rác “Serb.”<br />
On the other hand, negative stereotypes <strong>of</strong> the Hungarians were also to be found in the world view <strong>of</strong><br />
the leading intellectuals <strong>of</strong> the nationalities, like in the work <strong>of</strong> Ioan Slavici (1848‐1925), the editor‐in‐chief<br />
<strong>of</strong> the nationalist newspaper Tribuna that appeared from 1882 in the Transylvanian town Nagyszeben<br />
(today’s Romanian Sibiu). 62 Already in Slavici’s early work ‘<strong>Studies</strong> on the Hungarians’ written as a<br />
young student in Vienna at the young age <strong>of</strong> 24 between 1871‐1873, just four years after the Ausgleich we<br />
can find a collection <strong>of</strong> the traditional anti‐Hungarian stereotypes. 63 According to Slavici, the Hungarians<br />
were unable to integrate into Europe and European culture because <strong>of</strong> their Asian origin and culture. As a<br />
consequence, they were not part <strong>of</strong> the European civilization; their state <strong>of</strong> mind was characterized by rich<br />
phantasy and emotional extremes; the Hungarians were arrogant and looking down upon the other<br />
nationalities living in the Hungarian kingdom; they did not achieved anything in the field <strong>of</strong> sciences;<br />
they were unable to spread culture, literature or arts and the Hungarians used all their energy to do<br />
politics which was dominated by their strive to Magyarize all their nationalities. Slavici concluded his<br />
studies on the Hungarians by stating that the Hungarians were unfit to play a role in the civilization <strong>of</strong><br />
Central and Eastern Europe. Instead Slavici assigned this role to the Romanians due to the fact that they<br />
were a European nation with Latin roots; their Latin language was more beautiful than Hungarian and<br />
the Romanians were more tolerant than the Hungarian. The anti‐Hungarian stereotypes and images <strong>of</strong><br />
Slavici were not an incidental case among Romanian and other non‐Hungarian intellectuals during<br />
dualism. These traditional anti‐Hungarian stereotypes, ‘Hungarians as Asian intruders into Europe’ and<br />
‘oppressors <strong>of</strong> their nationalities who did nothing for civilization’ are also reflected in poem read by the<br />
Romanian member <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian Parliament Alexandru Vaida‐Voevod (1872‐1950). The<br />
representative <strong>of</strong> the Romanian National Party read this poem during a session <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian<br />
Parliament in 1907: 64<br />
Everything is in vain, in vain… you will perish/scum from Asia that tramples on all rights… /For ten<br />
cursed centuries you lived like parasites/bloodthirsty bedbugs feeding on this country./ And it has put up<br />
with a lot, but forgotten nothing/because the Romanian is cine mintye<br />
61 In Hungarian: a német huncut, szöröstalpú oláh, a rác vad, a tót nem ember, a zsidó büdös. See for discussion Köpeczi (1995, 178).<br />
62 See Köpeczi (11995, 161‐203) for a discussion <strong>of</strong> Slavici’s stereotypes and images <strong>of</strong> the Hungarians in his <strong>Studies</strong> on the<br />
Hungarians (In Rumanian: Studii asupra Maghiarilor).<br />
63 See for a discussion and analysis <strong>of</strong> the set <strong>of</strong> traditional anti‐Hungarian stereotypes Marácz (1995, 25‐41; 1996).<br />
64 The poem that is published in Bíró (1989, 262) sounded in Hungarian: Hiába minden, minden… el fogsz veszni, Jogtipró ázsiai<br />
söpredék…, Tíz átkos század óta élösködtök, Mint vérszomjas poloskák e hazán, És sokat türt, de semmit sem felejtett, Mert<br />
cine mintye a román.” The original Romanian expression “tine minte” written according to Hungarian prononciation as “cine<br />
mintye” means “one who harbors a grudge”, but literally it means “keep in mind.” Note that Vaida‐Voevod did not read this<br />
poem in Hungarian Parliament in 1908 as Bíró states but on April, 8 2007. This fact does not affect our analysis.<br />
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In fact, the nationality conflicts during dualism became gradually political power conflicts about<br />
national superiority in the Hungarian kingdom. In these conflicts nationalism and feelings <strong>of</strong> superiority<br />
run high strengthened by society structure consisting <strong>of</strong> separate ethnic groups and their institutions and<br />
the exclusive, negative stereotyping <strong>of</strong> other nationalities. 65<br />
Illustrative <strong>of</strong> this political power struggle was the so‐called Memorandum <strong>of</strong> 1892. 66 The<br />
Memorandum was a petition addressed to the Emperor Franz Joseph in which the Romanians <strong>of</strong><br />
Transylvania and Banat complained about their bad treatment in the Hungarian kingdom. According to<br />
them, this included persecutions and the Magyarization <strong>of</strong> the educational system. The Hungarian<br />
Romanians requested his Majesty to interfere politically in the Hungarian kingdom on behalf <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Romanians. A committee <strong>of</strong> 25 Romanian leaders from Transylvania and Banat, including dr. Ioan Ratiu<br />
who was the chairman <strong>of</strong> the committee, Gheoghe Pop de Basesti, Eugen Brote, Aurel Popovici, Albini<br />
Septimius and Vasile Lucaciu signed the petition.<br />
The Memorandum did not only contain a list <strong>of</strong> Romanian complaints about their situation in the<br />
Hungarian kingdom but the petition itself and the activities <strong>of</strong> the petitioners made clear that Hungarian<br />
Romanians questioned the legitimacy <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian state and its constitution. Firstly, the petitioners<br />
addressed Franz Joseph as the Emperor <strong>of</strong> Austria and not as the king <strong>of</strong> Hungary. In order to hand over<br />
the petition to the Emperor they traveled to Vienna and neglected Budapest as the seat <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian<br />
king and the seat <strong>of</strong> their own government. Franz Joseph was brought into a difficult position by this<br />
move <strong>of</strong> the Memorandum petitioners being forced to take sides in this affair. The Emperor skillfully<br />
managed to get out <strong>of</strong> this by forwarding the Memorandum to the Hungarian government in Budapest.<br />
Second, the Memorandum rejected the Hungarian constitution and legislation. The liberal intent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
1868 Law <strong>of</strong> Nationalities was denied criticizing the “unitary Hungarian political nation” and the fact that<br />
the Hungarian language was introduced as the <strong>of</strong>ficial language <strong>of</strong> the state. The Memorandum was<br />
however silent about the rights assigned to the nationalities in the same law. Further, the Memorandum<br />
wanted to undo the introduction <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian language as a subject <strong>of</strong> instruction <strong>of</strong> eighteen hours a<br />
week in non‐Hungarian primary schools calling this an instance <strong>of</strong> Magyarization.<br />
In May 1894, the petitioners were tried by the Kolozsvár Court on the basis <strong>of</strong> paragraphs 171 and 173<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Criminal Law Code. 67 This implied that they were accused <strong>of</strong> ‘agitation against the law through the<br />
medium <strong>of</strong> the press.’ In this ensuing press trial the petitioners were sentenced to prison. Vasile Lucaciu<br />
was punished hardest, condemned for five years <strong>of</strong> prison; the other leaders to each two years. The<br />
condemned persons did not have to sit out their sentences however, since they were to benefit from<br />
amnesty after a year and a half. 68<br />
The Romanians gave the condemned petitioners a martyr status. This was also supported by the<br />
political and cultural institutions <strong>of</strong> the Old kingdom <strong>of</strong> Romania, like the Liga Culturala. This prestigious<br />
organization published an occasional pamphlet called Golgota with a highly suggestive picture on the<br />
65 See Turda (2003) for further discussion.<br />
66 Jáncso (2004, 131‐132; 135‐152) for discussion <strong>of</strong> the content <strong>of</strong> the Memorandum.<br />
67 See Jancsó (1992, 187‐197) for discussion <strong>of</strong> the Memorandum trial.<br />
68 See Bíró (1992, 17).<br />
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cover depicting five <strong>of</strong> the Memorandum petitioners as being crucified. 69 On the cross in the middle,<br />
Ratiu is crucified, to his right Lucaciu and to his left Pop de Basesti. A Hungarian wearing spurs being<br />
dressed in braided heyduck‐clothes, i.e. a Hungarian military uniform used in the 17 th century anti‐<br />
Hapsburg uprising under the leadership <strong>of</strong> István Bocskai nails the feet <strong>of</strong> Ratiu onto the cross. Four other<br />
Hungarians in similar clothes hit the martyrs on the cross with a whip. The message <strong>of</strong> this publication<br />
referred to as Golgota with the picture <strong>of</strong> the crucified Memorandum petitioners is clear. The petitioners<br />
who are considered the personifications <strong>of</strong> the Romanians suffer as much as Jesus Christ did at the<br />
mountain Golgota where he was crucified. For their sufferings the Hungarians are responsible being<br />
personified by the Hungarian soldiers on the picture. The Liga Culturala distributed 100.000 copies <strong>of</strong> this<br />
political pamphlet in the Romanian kingdom and also among Hungarian Romanians in secret. It did not<br />
come as a surprise that in this political climate, anyone who pr<strong>of</strong>essed friendship with Hungarians and<br />
showing loyalty to the Hungarian state was considered a renegate.<br />
The Hungarians as harsh Magyarizers subjugating their nationalities was in fact a case <strong>of</strong> anti‐<br />
Hungarian stereotyping, already present in the work <strong>of</strong> Slavici only four years after the Ausgleich and the<br />
Memorandum <strong>of</strong> 1892. Above we have argued that the educational policy <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom was<br />
indeed discriminating the non‐Hungarian nationalities but had not the effect <strong>of</strong> Magyarizing them.<br />
Magyarization during dualism was not a consequence <strong>of</strong> the educational policy but rather <strong>of</strong> the geo‐<br />
ethnic distribution <strong>of</strong> the nationalities and economic factors as the Hungarian geographer Count Teleki<br />
correctly pointed out: 70<br />
“The density in the highlands is less numerous than the lowlands. From the highlands there is a<br />
constant emigration into the central lowlands, the lowlands are practically magyar, so there is an absolute<br />
“Magyarization” <strong>of</strong> these people who come down to the plain. The towns also have a “Magyarizing”<br />
influence. The towns themselves, which in former times were German, later became Hungarian owing to<br />
their surroundings. The Germans changed their nationality the most quickly and in towns have become<br />
Hungarian. These towns, when absorbing population “Magyarize”. These show an increase from 1869 to<br />
1910 <strong>of</strong> nearly 43 percent, whereas in the whole land the increase <strong>of</strong> population was only 19 percent.”<br />
The geo‐ethnic distribution was mainly responsible for the spontaneous Magyarization in the<br />
Hungarian kingdom when after the Comprise economy was starting to boom and industrial and<br />
commercial centers were developing in the central lowlands and the towns. Note that especially the<br />
Germans and Slovaks were affected mostly by this spontaneous Magyarization because the Slovaks lived<br />
in the highlands neighbouring the central lowlands and the Germans mainly lived in the towns. This<br />
explains also why especially the Germans and Slovaks became gradually bi‐ and multilingual during<br />
dualism. The Romanians however were hardly affected by this type <strong>of</strong> Magyarization because they lived<br />
mainly in the Transylvanian area that was not continuous with the central lowlands. Furthermore, 95<br />
percent <strong>of</strong> the Romanians lived in the villages immune to the Magyarizing effects <strong>of</strong> the towns. 71<br />
The political conflict between Hungarians and non‐Hungarians had a bipolar structure which led to<br />
asymmetrical developments in the educational system. These developments triggered more tensions and<br />
69 Compare Jancsó (2004, 197).<br />
70 See Teleki (1923, 163).<br />
71 See Lökkös (200, 63).<br />
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were reinforced by the negative stereotypes and images <strong>of</strong> the other. However, the postulation <strong>of</strong> bipolar<br />
opposition useful for a study <strong>of</strong> the dynamics <strong>of</strong> the political conflict is not fitted for studying the<br />
phenomenon <strong>of</strong> multilingualism in the Hungarian kingdom and its power political implications.<br />
Although a bipolar theory tells us something about the political intentions and the goals <strong>of</strong> the different<br />
nationalities and the character <strong>of</strong> the political antagonisms between them it obscures the analysis <strong>of</strong><br />
linguistic diversity in the Hungarian kingdom. A bipolar approach will not provide sufficient insight into<br />
the complicated relations between the communication networks <strong>of</strong> groups <strong>of</strong> monolingual and those <strong>of</strong><br />
groups <strong>of</strong> bi‐ and multi‐lingual speakers. Not the languages used are in a bipolar opposition but social<br />
groups attempting to maintain and improve their position against each other. A bipolar approach<br />
restricting the political and linguistic conflicts <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary to a Hungarian versus non‐Hungarian<br />
opposition only completely neglects the fact <strong>of</strong> bi‐ and multilingual speakers and the political role they<br />
played in society.<br />
Recall that in the Hungarian kingdom 23 percent <strong>of</strong> the population, i.e. 4.880.000 persons were bi‐ and<br />
multilingual controlling one or more languages next to their mother tongue. A bipolar model does not tell<br />
us anything about how and when these languages in communicational networks are used in daily<br />
practice. A bipolar model <strong>of</strong> study does not explain why members <strong>of</strong> regional non‐Hungarian elites were<br />
against the introduction <strong>of</strong> Hungarian as a subject in primary education, although by preventing this,<br />
their peers were excluded from the Hungarian communicational networks <strong>of</strong> the state weakening the<br />
power and legal position <strong>of</strong> their clientage. A good example <strong>of</strong> this anti‐Hungarian attitude violating the<br />
interests <strong>of</strong> his own peers is provided by Miron Roman, the metropolitan bishop <strong>of</strong> the Transylvanian<br />
Orthodox Church.<br />
In 1904, an Educational Committee under the presidency <strong>of</strong> Albert Berzeviczy reporting to the<br />
Hungarian Parliament upon the reform <strong>of</strong> primary education and the teaching <strong>of</strong> Hungarian in primary<br />
schools argued for the inclusion <strong>of</strong> non‐Hungarian nationalities in the Hungarian communicational<br />
networks <strong>of</strong> the state, since “without knowledge <strong>of</strong> the language <strong>of</strong> the state the citizen is not in a position<br />
to assert himself in all circumstances with equal right and equal power.” 72 The Committee wanted to<br />
achieve this by proposing Hungarian to be a compulsory subject in primary schools education. However,<br />
the Romanian metropolitan bishop, Miron Roman argued that the proposed bill violated the principles <strong>of</strong><br />
pedagogy in establishing as the chief aim <strong>of</strong> primary education not general culture, but the acquisition <strong>of</strong><br />
a particular language, in this instance the Magyar.” 73 So, a bipolar approach to these conflicts does not<br />
explain why the Romanian Orthodox Church in Transylvania clung to a strict separatist educational<br />
model excluding their Romanian peers from the communicational networks <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian state.<br />
Neither is a bipolar approach to dualist Hungary’s ethnic and linguistic conflicts very helpful to<br />
understand the generalization Seton‐Watson made ”… foremost champions <strong>of</strong> the nationalities have<br />
received a Magyar Education and have a complete mastery <strong>of</strong> the Magyar Language.” 74 To put otherwise:<br />
why was it that nationality activists like Slavici and the Memorandum petitioners were fighting against<br />
the introduction <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian language as a subject <strong>of</strong> instruction in non‐Hungarian schools, while<br />
they themselves had enjoyed instruction in Hungarian schools and had received a perfect control <strong>of</strong> the<br />
72 See Seton‐Watson (1907, 226).<br />
73 See Seton Watson (1907, 226).<br />
74 See Seton‐Watson (1907, 233).<br />
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Hungarian language? In fact, they were the living example that L2‐instruction <strong>of</strong> Hungarian had not<br />
threatened their nationality. Rather because <strong>of</strong> this L2‐instruction they had created more changes for<br />
upward mobilization in society, something they intended to deny their peers with their political activities.<br />
It is my assumption that the so‐called floral figuration model defended in the work <strong>of</strong> the Dutch<br />
sociologist De Swaan referring to the language competence <strong>of</strong> social groups that are struggling for power<br />
can give good insights in above and related questions. 75 Let us briefly introduce this model here.<br />
Consider the following figure:<br />
Figure 1: The Floral Figuration <strong>of</strong> Languages<br />
In the floral figuration model, the outer circles represent the speakers <strong>of</strong> the regional languages; the<br />
shaded area represents speakers <strong>of</strong> the standard language, i.e. the lingua franca <strong>of</strong> the national<br />
communication network. Those in the unshaded part <strong>of</strong> the outer circle speak only the regional language,<br />
i.e. those are the mother tongue speakers <strong>of</strong> the regional language. Those in the core star, the<br />
metropolitans speak only the standard language. Note that local or regional speech communities hardly<br />
intersecting with one another but all <strong>of</strong> them are linked to one central or national language community<br />
through the mediation <strong>of</strong> bilingual and literate local elites. The bilingual mediation elites are to be found<br />
in the overlapping areas <strong>of</strong> the shaded central circle with the outer circles. The shaded area may also be<br />
interpreted as representing all literates, the outer circles as regional communities <strong>of</strong> oral<br />
communication. 76<br />
In the case <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary, we will use this model in order to analyze the sociological aspects <strong>of</strong><br />
linguistic diversity in a more insightful manner. Our analysis in terms <strong>of</strong> this model is to be considered as<br />
a first approximation <strong>of</strong> the various interest involved in the use and learning <strong>of</strong> language and the learning<br />
<strong>of</strong> alphabetization in the Hungarian kingdom. Observe that this model allows an analysis in which not<br />
only the dynamics <strong>of</strong> the conflict in terms <strong>of</strong> class is accounted for but also in terms <strong>of</strong> religion and region.<br />
In some cases, these categories are intersecting.<br />
75 See De Swaan (1988, 60‐76).<br />
76 De Swaan (1988, 65).<br />
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First, the Hungarian state tried to promote the lingua franca, i.e. Hungarian on its entire territory in<br />
order to have direct communication with their citizens, i.e. to increase the power basis <strong>of</strong> the state. This<br />
served the interest <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian metropolitan elites in the capital <strong>of</strong> the kingdom, i.e. Budapest. The<br />
regional elites consisting <strong>of</strong> local gentry, church <strong>of</strong>ficials and notables were against the extension <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Hungarian lingua franca in their region for two reasons. First, they feared to loose the monopolistic<br />
mediation position which made them pr<strong>of</strong>it from the state communicational network. Secondly, at the<br />
same time this mediation position gave them power over their clientage. These were in the Hungarian<br />
kingdom quite <strong>of</strong>ten the monolingual peasants, especially in the case <strong>of</strong> the Romanians, Serbs, Slovaks<br />
and Ruthenians. Note that the state operated quite <strong>of</strong>ten in mixed territories, like Transylvania through<br />
regional Hungarian agents that had to deal with bi‐ and multilingual members <strong>of</strong> the local non‐<br />
Hungarian elites.<br />
Second, let us interpret the conflict over the introduction <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian language as a subject <strong>of</strong><br />
instruction in non‐Hungarian private schools in terms <strong>of</strong> the strive for power between the social groups in<br />
the floral figuration. The state, i.e. the metropolitans and their local agents saw the introduction <strong>of</strong><br />
Hungarian as a subject in primary schools as the first step to gain control <strong>of</strong> these schools. This was<br />
opposed however by the regional non‐Hungarian elites because they did not want state involvement in<br />
matters considered to be controlled by them. As a consequence, the presence <strong>of</strong> linguistic diversity within<br />
the school building was seen as a reflection <strong>of</strong> the power relations between the Hungarian metropolitans<br />
and the non‐Hungarian regional elites. The control <strong>of</strong> the schools was seen as fundamental because the<br />
struggle for power was attended with a different ideological transmission. This becomes especially clear<br />
from the different missions Slavici assigns to the nationalities in dualist Hungary.<br />
Third, we observe inconsistencies in attitude not only on the side <strong>of</strong> the State both also on the side <strong>of</strong><br />
the nationalities, when taking into account the floral figuration model instead <strong>of</strong> a bipolar approach. The<br />
bipolar model predicts that the non‐Hungarian nationalities were the subjugated party who could only<br />
practice marginally their rights. However, local elites but certainly the local mediation elites, although<br />
opposing or completely rejecting the law in order to be on an equal footing with the metropolitans refer to<br />
the same law in order to accentuate their own position in the system and to mobilize support from their<br />
peers. For example, local elites rejecting the Law <strong>of</strong> Nationalities <strong>of</strong> 1868 refer to this law when they want<br />
to use their own language in the administrative and the judicial domain.<br />
The Hungarian historian Bíró (1992) reports an incident on a meeting <strong>of</strong> the assembly in the county <strong>of</strong><br />
Krassó‐Szörény in 1884. The meeting was held in Lugos, the capital <strong>of</strong> Krassó‐Szörény. 77 At the meeting,<br />
the Hungarian delegates were in the majority but according to the 1910 census the Romanians had a clear<br />
majority <strong>of</strong> 72.10 percent <strong>of</strong> the population in this county in the southern parts <strong>of</strong> Hungary. 78 During the<br />
meeting a discussion arose on the filling <strong>of</strong> two vacant positions in a selection committee <strong>of</strong> the assembly.<br />
The Romanian delegates demanded that their candidate was taken. This was opposed however by the<br />
Hungarian members <strong>of</strong> the assembly. One <strong>of</strong> the Romanian members <strong>of</strong> the assembly, Popovici who<br />
could not understand Hungarian wanted the Hungarian county governor to speak in Romanian. The<br />
Romanian delegate argued that Romanian is one <strong>of</strong> the languages <strong>of</strong> the registry implying that the<br />
77 See Bíró (1992, 102‐103).<br />
78 See Lökkös (2000, 252).<br />
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language <strong>of</strong> communication in the assembly must be in Romanian as well. In the end, the county<br />
governor had to give in and also accepted the Romanian candidate as a member <strong>of</strong> the selection<br />
committee. According to the then account <strong>of</strong> the meeting in the Romanian press the Romanian members<br />
<strong>of</strong> the county assembly in Lugos did not only speak in their Romanian mother tongue at the meeting<br />
referring to § 2 <strong>of</strong> Law XLIV. 1868 but could afford an aggressive tone, when speaking to the county<br />
governor when referring to the law.<br />
Another instance <strong>of</strong> inconsistence in attitude among the non‐Hungarian nationalities was the case <strong>of</strong><br />
the Memorandum trial before the Kolozsvár Court in May, 1894. At the trial in which the condemned<br />
Romanians were complaining about their rights being trampled down by the Hungarian state they<br />
exclusively spoke in the Romanian language throughout the trial. Hereby they were making use <strong>of</strong> the<br />
right to speak one’s own mother tongue before court (compare, § 7 <strong>of</strong> Law XLIV. 1868).” 79<br />
Fourth, recall that in 1910 only 23 percent <strong>of</strong> the inhabitants <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary, i.e. 4.880.000 were bi‐<br />
and multilingual. In the case <strong>of</strong> the nationalities, these figures were even more negative. Only 15.67<br />
percent <strong>of</strong> the Romanians were bi‐ and multilingual, i.e. 465.000 persons. Most <strong>of</strong> the Romanian bi‐ and<br />
multilingual speakers had control over the Hungarian language, i.e. 12.69 percent, 374.106 persons <strong>of</strong> the<br />
total number <strong>of</strong> the Romanians. The second biggest L2 among the Romanians was German with 2.05<br />
percent <strong>of</strong> the total <strong>of</strong> Romanians, i.e. 60.587 persons. 80 In the early decades <strong>of</strong> dualism the situation was<br />
even more dramatic. Hence, the Hungarian state had hardly the possibility <strong>of</strong> direct communication with<br />
the Romanians. This was only possible through the mediation <strong>of</strong> bi‐ and multilingual speakers. Two<br />
groups were available, including Hungarians that could speak Romanian as an L2. Their number counted<br />
in 1910 400.674 persons. The second group consisted <strong>of</strong> Romanians having control over Hungarian as an<br />
L2. 81 The first group was not trusted by the Romanian commoners. Hence, the bi‐ and multilingual<br />
Romanians being a rather small group enjoyed a monopolistic position as mediators between the<br />
Hungarian state and their peer Romanians. Note that this group has hardly been studied because it does<br />
not fit into the bipolar approach <strong>of</strong> analyzing the nationality conflicts <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary. This category is<br />
however interesting between it <strong>of</strong>fers insight into the inconsistencies in attitude among the non‐<br />
Hungarian nationalities. These mediators argued against the interference <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian state in the<br />
matters <strong>of</strong> non‐Hungarian, mostly denominational schools and against the introduction <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian<br />
language as a subject <strong>of</strong> instruction to oppose the expansion <strong>of</strong> state power, similarly to the<br />
representatives <strong>of</strong> the private schools <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities. Note however that these<br />
mediators had benefited optimally from the Hungarian educational system and the instruction <strong>of</strong><br />
Hungarian as an L2. These mediators, although all the time campaigning against “Magyarization” <strong>of</strong><br />
non‐Hungarian schools were the living examples that by learning Hungarian as an L2 one’s nationality<br />
was not changed automatically. Let us here discuss two <strong>of</strong> these mediators, i.e. Ioan Slavici and<br />
Alexandru Vaida‐Voevod.<br />
Ioan Slavici (1848‐1925) was born in Világos, a multinational and multilingual village in the Banat area.<br />
This area was characterized by the Hungarian geographer Count Teleki as “… one <strong>of</strong> the most mixed<br />
79 See Bíró (1992, 110).<br />
80 Lökkös (2000, 214).<br />
81 Lökkös (2000, 214).<br />
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regions in the world.” 82 Világos and its surrounding were typical for the Banat. Four languages were used<br />
in daily communication, including Hungarian, Romanian, Serbian and Swabian‐German. Actually his<br />
mother learned Slavici as a child to respect people with another nationality:”…say good day to everyone<br />
in his own language, do not ridicule the people who belong to a different nation, rather treat the strangers<br />
as if they were your co‐nationals.” 83 Slavici attended relatively good schools in his home village Világos<br />
and in the cities <strong>of</strong> Arad and Temesvár (today’s Rumanian Timisoara) before he enrolled the University <strong>of</strong><br />
Vienna where he wrote his ‘<strong>Studies</strong> on the Hungarians’ in 1871‐1873 full <strong>of</strong> anti‐Hungarian stereotypes<br />
and images, discussed above.<br />
Alexandru Vaida‐Voevod (1872‐1950) being born in Alparét close to the city <strong>of</strong> Kolozsvár (today’s<br />
Romanian Cluj‐Napoca) also represents an illustrative case <strong>of</strong> a multilingual mediator. Vaida‐Voevod did<br />
not only come from a multinational and multilingual setting, i.e. Hungarian‐Romanian‐German, like<br />
Slavici but he was actually <strong>of</strong> a mixed Hungarian‐Romanian descendant. The latter fact one will search for<br />
in vain in <strong>of</strong>ficial Romanian bibliographies not meeting the bipolar model that acknowledges only an<br />
opposition between Hungarians and non‐Hungarians when analyzing the political and linguistic conflicts<br />
in the Hungarian kingdom during dualism. 84 In his memoirs, Vaida‐Voevod provides some information<br />
on the ethnic background <strong>of</strong> his family. 85 His grandmother named Rozália Boér was an <strong>of</strong>fspring from a<br />
well‐to‐do Hungarian Calvinist family. The mentor <strong>of</strong> his father Dionisie was a fine Hungarian<br />
intellectual from Kolozsvár, the scientist and Unitarian bishop <strong>of</strong> Kolozsvár, János Kriza. The father <strong>of</strong><br />
Alexandru, Dionisie was lyrical about the Hungarian culture. The young Alexandru visited the<br />
prestigious Unitarian primary school in Kolozsvár before he attended quality schools in Beszterce and<br />
Brassó. In the latter city having a German majority he learned German before he enrolled in medicine<br />
studies at the University <strong>of</strong> Vienna. In Vienna, at the age <strong>of</strong> twenty he became politically active being the<br />
mediator between the Memorandum petitioners and the Romanian authorities <strong>of</strong> the Old Romanian<br />
kingdom. Vaida‐Voevod became later member <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian Parliament for the Romanian National<br />
Party and in 1920 after the establishment <strong>of</strong> Greater Romania in 1920 he was appointed the first prime<br />
minister <strong>of</strong> the new state that was enlarged with his native country Transylvania.<br />
In sum, both Slavici and Vaida‐Voevod pr<strong>of</strong>ited optimally <strong>of</strong> the multilingual culture and educational<br />
opportunities the Hungarian kingdom <strong>of</strong>fered. However, in course <strong>of</strong> time they became the most fanatic<br />
anti‐Hungarian nationalists doing everything to prevent the Hungarian state from directly<br />
communicating with their Romanian citizens and preventing their Romanian peers from enjoying what<br />
they had enjoyed in dualist Hungary, i.e. full participation in the communicational networks <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Hungarian state. 86 In this way, Slavici and Vaida‐Voevod could maximally benefit from their position as<br />
being members <strong>of</strong> the Romanian bi‐ and multilingual mediation elite.<br />
82 See Teleki (1923, 221).<br />
83 Köpeczi (1995, 165).<br />
84 See Serban et al. (2003, 31‐34).<br />
85 See Vaida Voevod (2006, Vol. I, 13‐14).<br />
86 After World War I he moderated his struggle against the integrity <strong>of</strong> the Austro‐Hungarian Empire:”During the WW I<br />
Hungarian Romanians were loyal to Austro‐Hungarian Monarchy and to the House <strong>of</strong> Hapburg, …the political struggle<br />
between Magyars and Romanians can only be considered as a dissension among brothers…” See for this quotation Teleki (1923,<br />
153‐154).<br />
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Fifth, note also that the position <strong>of</strong> the bi‐ and multilingual mediation elites in dualist Hungary was<br />
strengthened further by the proportion and the distribution <strong>of</strong> illiteracy. This was highly similarly to the<br />
proportion and distribution <strong>of</strong> bi‐ and multilingual speakers among the nationalities. The proportion <strong>of</strong><br />
illiterates, the number <strong>of</strong> persons that could neither read nor write, to the total population steadily<br />
decreased in Hungary proper, from 63.11 percent in 1869, 57.14 percent in 1880, 51.98 percent in 1890,<br />
47.99 percent in 1900, to 43.62 in 1910. 87 However, in actual numbers this proportion was still 7.945.264<br />
persons. The proportion <strong>of</strong> the illiterates was lowest among the Hungarians, 32.99 percent and the<br />
Germans, 39.57 percent and somewhat higher among the Slovaks, 42 percent and much higher far above<br />
the 53.48 percent average <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities among the Serbs, 59.67 percent and the<br />
Romanians 71.82. 88<br />
From these data it is clear that the illiterates among the non‐Hungarian nationalities who are situated<br />
in the unshaded area <strong>of</strong> the floral figuration, similarly as the monolingual non‐Hungarian speakers were<br />
in need <strong>of</strong> the literate mediation elites, preferably non‐Hungarian in order to communicate in writing<br />
with the central area <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian lingua franca. The metropolitans in their turn could only<br />
communicate in writing with the non‐Hungarian regional illiterates through the mediation <strong>of</strong> the same bi‐<br />
and multilingual regional elites. Hence, the proportion and distribution <strong>of</strong> illiteracy among the non‐<br />
Hungarian nationalities strengthened the position <strong>of</strong> the same linguistic local mediation elites we already<br />
engaged in the case <strong>of</strong> oral communication.<br />
5. Conclusions<br />
In this paper, we have argued that in multilingual dualist Hungary ethnic groups being assigned the<br />
status <strong>of</strong> ‘nationalities’ played a dominant role. The nationalities and their languages were recognized as<br />
constitutional and legislative separate entities. Multilingualism in the Hungarian kingdom was in fact a<br />
set <strong>of</strong> separate languages. As a consequence, the number <strong>of</strong> bi‐ and multilingual speakers was relatively<br />
low. The educational system in the Hungarian kingdom was a reflection <strong>of</strong> this separate ethnic structure<br />
<strong>of</strong> society. Practically separatist schools alone existed. Only after 1879, Hungarian was introduced as a<br />
compulsory subject <strong>of</strong> instruction in the non‐Hungarian nationality schools without much success though.<br />
Educational policy that reinforced the separate ethnic structure <strong>of</strong> society suffered from inconsistencies<br />
and asymmetrical developments. Although Hungarian was declared the state language in the Law on the<br />
Equality <strong>of</strong> Nationalities <strong>of</strong> 1868, the same law allowed non‐state schools, mostly denominational schools<br />
to choose their own language <strong>of</strong> instruction. Further, the state tried to introduce Hungarian as a<br />
compulsory subject <strong>of</strong> instruction in non‐Hungarian schools but it failed to have an eye for the linguistic<br />
needs <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities in accordance with actual and local needs. Finally, in Hungarian<br />
schools languages other than Hungarian were being taught, especially German and Latin but not the<br />
languages <strong>of</strong> the nationalities. The Hungarian state should however have done more to stimulate the<br />
teaching <strong>of</strong> the languages <strong>of</strong> the nationalities among the Hungarians. Even in mixed schools the teaching<br />
87 See Seton‐Watson (1907, 436) and Lökkös (2000, 67, 201).<br />
88 See Lökkös 2000, 201.<br />
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<strong>of</strong> the Hungarians and the non‐Hungarian nationalities in their own mother tongues took place<br />
separately. In sum, the educational system hampered from the start <strong>of</strong> inherent weaknesses that could not<br />
be repaired by the educational policy. Educational policy containing liberal elements worsened the<br />
existing ethnic conflicts instead <strong>of</strong> pacifying them and stimulated embittered linguistic and political<br />
power struggles between the different nationalities and the state.<br />
Although the Hungarian educational policy during dualism had it deficiencies it is unmotivated to<br />
label it as the Magyarization <strong>of</strong> the non‐Hungarian nationalities. In this context, “Magyarization” is in fact<br />
an anti‐Hungarian stereotype that was and is used by critics <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary in order to justify the<br />
dissolution <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary at the Peace Conference in Paris ending the First World War. It is not only<br />
incorrect to analyze the ethnic and linguistic political power constellation in terms <strong>of</strong> “Magyarization” but<br />
this term also obscures the sociological patterns <strong>of</strong> bi‐ and multilingualism in the Hungarian kingdom.<br />
We have argued that the so‐called floral figuration model gives us more insight into the cases <strong>of</strong><br />
unspecified bi‐ and multilingualism that have not been studies in a systematic way so far. By making use<br />
<strong>of</strong> the floral figuration model we were able to track down the social groups that struggled for power using<br />
language and linguistic competence as instruments in the nationality conflicts. Furthermore, the floral<br />
figuration model provides also deeper insight into the linguistic attitudes <strong>of</strong> the social groups involved in<br />
the power struggles which are characterized, just like the state policy, by inconsistencies and<br />
asymmetries.<br />
In conclusion, not only the educational policy <strong>of</strong> dualist Hungary should have been critized but the<br />
complete system instead because it suffered from inherent weaknesses. The claims <strong>of</strong> the separate ethnic<br />
groups <strong>of</strong> Hungary were recognized which blocked their full integration into the state system. This state<br />
<strong>of</strong> affairs yielded the worsening <strong>of</strong> the ethnic antagonisms being one <strong>of</strong> the main causes for the collapse <strong>of</strong><br />
dualist Hungary. However, there was no rising social class strong enough that could have changed the<br />
system breaking through the fixed pattern <strong>of</strong> class, religion and regions. Hence, the educational system<br />
preserved the social and regional status quo. Although mixed schools with two or three languages<br />
possessed a separatist educational regime these schools could have been a starting point to build bridges<br />
between the different nationalities <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian kingdom. Hence, it was unfortunate that during<br />
dualism their number after a steady increase dropped radically between 1900 and 1905‐1906: 1632 in 1869,<br />
2437 in 1880, 2878 in 1890, 3251 in 1900 and 1665 in 1905‐1906. 89<br />
Multi‐ and bilingualism in Cisleithania, the Austrian part <strong>of</strong> the Dual Monarchy has been studied in<br />
detail in the work <strong>of</strong> Rindler‐Schjerve and others. On the basis <strong>of</strong> this, we are able to draw some<br />
preliminary comparisons between Cisleithania and Transleithania.<br />
Ethnic and linguistic diversity in Cisleithania was regulated by Constitutional Decree XIX. 1867. 90<br />
Three paragraphs specify that all nationalities are equal (compare § 1); all traditional languages are equal<br />
(compare § 2) and in the mixed Länder no other <strong>of</strong>ficial language may be enforced in education (compare §<br />
3). Although there are some differences between Hungarian and Austrian legislation in these domain<br />
these are however not conceptual ones.<br />
89 See Seton‐Watson (19707, 436).<br />
90 See Goebl (1994, 109), Rindler‐Schjerve (2003), Rindler‐Schjerve and Vetter (2007, 51) and Rindler‐Schjerve (this volume).<br />
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Observe that both the legislation <strong>of</strong> Cisleithania and Transleithania recognized the traditional<br />
nationalities and their languages as primitives <strong>of</strong> the system. True in the constituting parts <strong>of</strong><br />
Transleithania the Law <strong>of</strong> Nationalities <strong>of</strong> 1868 postulated a hierarchy among the languages, unlike in<br />
Cisleithania. In Hungary proper, the <strong>of</strong>ficial language was Hungarian and in Croatia‐Slavonia it was<br />
Croatian. 91 Note that all other traditional languages had an <strong>of</strong>ficial status in Transleithania during the<br />
whole period and were next to the state language the dominating languages in the separatist educational<br />
system.<br />
Note further that although Hungary proper specified a lingua franca <strong>of</strong>ficially, unlike the lands <strong>of</strong><br />
Cisleithania this was motivated by two reasons mainly. Firstly, the proportion <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian mother<br />
tongue speakers to the total population <strong>of</strong> Transleithania. In 1910, Hungarian mother tongue speakers<br />
numbering 48.22 percent had a bigger majority in Hungary than the German mother tongue speakers<br />
numbering 34.83 percent in Cisleithania. Further, the domination <strong>of</strong> Hungarian was more accentuated.<br />
The second and third ethnic group were bigger in Cisleithania than in Transleithania. Compare the<br />
proportions <strong>of</strong> Czechs (22.53 percent) and Poles (17.39 percent) in Cisleithania with the ones <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Romanians (14.15 percent) and Slovaks (9.44 percent) in Transleithania. 92 Secondly, the choice <strong>of</strong><br />
Hungarian as a lingua franca in Hungary proper was motivated by the fact that Hungary proper during<br />
dualism had an outspoken Hungarian character. In practice, however there was no real difference in the<br />
field <strong>of</strong> multilingualism between Cisleithania and Transleithania. This was due to the fact that in<br />
Cisleithania German was functioning as a lingua franca, although not specified by legislation, for reasons<br />
<strong>of</strong> tradition and the prestige it gained from the dominant status <strong>of</strong> German in Austria proper and the<br />
support it received from the ruling dynasty <strong>of</strong> Austro‐Hungary, the House <strong>of</strong> Hapsburg.<br />
The option <strong>of</strong> a separatist model characterizing the educational system in Hungary proper by allowing<br />
separatist linguistic education that remained dominant even after state interference appeared in the<br />
Cisleithanian educational system as well. This was due to the prohibition on the enforcement <strong>of</strong> any other<br />
language in education. With the rise <strong>of</strong> ethnic conflicts in Cisleithania even the utraquist model, i.e. the bi‐<br />
and multilingual schools in modern sense that had existed traditionally in some regions was left for the<br />
separatist model. In conclusion, separatist education was made possible in Transleithania by the freedom<br />
<strong>of</strong> choice, while in Cisleithania by the prohibition <strong>of</strong> language enforcement. In the prevailing nationalist<br />
context, this yielded a development into the same, separatist direction. The only difference was that in<br />
Hungary this development was inherent from the start.<br />
91 In this paper, I will not elaborate on the special relation between Hungary and Croatia‐Slavonia during dualism and the state<br />
<strong>of</strong> multilingualism in Croatia‐Slavonia putting these topics aside for further research. I am indebted to Nikola Rasic for bringing<br />
to my attention that Croatia is actually a complicated case, an “imaginary community”, including Croatia proper, Srem,<br />
Slavonia, Dalmatia, Rijeka (former Fiume), some parts <strong>of</strong> Istria with some islands (KrK, Cres, Rab) and two sections <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Military Frontier (Croatian ans Slavonian Militärgrenz), and in some periods even Medjimurje. So it is not easy to study the state<br />
<strong>of</strong> multilingualism in Croatia‐Slavonia. In the framework <strong>of</strong> this paper Hungary proper does not include Croatia‐Slavonia or<br />
Fiume.<br />
92 Goebl (1994).<br />
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To conclude this paper let us consider what lessons the European Union can learn from<br />
multilingualism in Transleithania. The question is justified because the European Union has a<br />
multilingual structure, comparable to Austro‐Hungary. 93<br />
First, in Transleithania the traditional, non‐state languages were recognized <strong>of</strong>ficially in the<br />
educational, judicial and administrative domains. We consider this as a positive value. Hence, linguistic<br />
diversity in society was not only proclaimed as a policy principle but effectively functioned in the<br />
practice. However, the Union although making linguistic diversity an <strong>of</strong>ficial policy the implementation<br />
<strong>of</strong> this principle is mainly effective concerning state languages only.<br />
Secondly, in Transleithania subsidiarity included also linguistic matters that enabled regional and<br />
communal groups to satisfy local needs. However, at present the Union’s languages and language policy<br />
do not fall under a subsidiarity principle. Hence, the Union is insensitive to the local needs <strong>of</strong> all sorts <strong>of</strong><br />
non‐state language speakers and let individual member‐states decide in these issues.<br />
Thirdly, the Transleithanian educational policy although recognizing the multilingual character <strong>of</strong> the<br />
state reinforced the separate ethnic structure <strong>of</strong> the society by favoring the separatist educational model.<br />
This policy was contra‐productive. Instead <strong>of</strong> strengthening cohesion and neutralizing the force <strong>of</strong><br />
stereotyping separatist education became more and more a tool in the hands <strong>of</strong> nationalists undermining<br />
cohesion. The European Union should learn from this that multilingual education if implemented in a<br />
separatist manner will be a fission fungus. Instead the Union should stimulate the introduction <strong>of</strong> bi‐ and<br />
multilingual schools in order to strengthen cohesion in the Union.<br />
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Népszövetségi osztály 5. Budapest: A magyar külügyi társaság kiadása.<br />
Maitz, Péter. 2005. Socialpsychologie des Sprachverhaltens. Der deutsch‐ungarische Sprachkonflikt<br />
in der Hapsburgermonarchie. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.<br />
Marácz, László. 1995. Western Images and Stereotypes <strong>of</strong> the Hungarians. In Gerrits, André<br />
and Nanci Adler. Eds. Vampires Unstaked. National images, Stereotypes and Myths in East<br />
Central Europe. European Cultural Foundation: Amsterdam. 25‐41.<br />
Marácz, László. 1996. Hungarian Revival. Political Reflections on Central Europe. Aspekt:<br />
Niewegein.<br />
Mamadouh, Virginie. 2002. Dealing with Multilingualism in the European Union: Cultural<br />
Theory Rationalities and Language Policies. In <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Comparative Policy Analysis: Research<br />
and Practice 4: 327‐345.<br />
Mikó, Imre. 1944. Nemzetiségi jog és nemzetiségi politika. Tanulmány a magyar közjog és politikai<br />
történet köréböl. Kolozsvár: Az államtudományi Intézet támogatásával a Minerva kiadása.<br />
Mintzel, Alf. 1997. Multikulturelle Gesellschaften in Europa und Nordamerika: Konzepte,<br />
Streitfragen, Analysen, Befunde. Passau: Wissenschaftsverlag Rothe.<br />
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Otruba, Gustav. 1983. Die Nationalitäten‐ und Sprachenfrage des höheren Schulwesens und<br />
der Universitäten als Integrationsproblem der Donaumonarchie (1863‐1910). In Plaschka,<br />
Richard Georg und Karlheinz Mack (eds). Wegenetz Europäischen Geistes: Wissenschaftszentren<br />
und geistige Wechselbeziehungen zwischen Mittel‐und Südosteuropa vom Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts bis<br />
zum Ersten Weltkrieg. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag. 88‐106<br />
Rady, Martin. 2000. Nobility, Land and Service in Medieval Hungary. New York: Palgrave.<br />
Rothenberg, Gunther E. 1972. Toward a National Hungarian Army: the Military Compromise<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1868 and Its Consequences. In Slavic Review vol 31. nr. 4. 805‐816.<br />
Rindler‐Schjerve, Rosita. Ed. 2003. Diglossia and Power. Language Policies and Practice in the<br />
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Ribdler‐Schjerve, Rosita and Eva Vetter. 2007. Linguistic diversity in Hapsburg Austria as a<br />
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Receptive Multilingualism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company. 49‐70.<br />
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Alexandru Serban. Cluj‐Napoca: Editura Dacia.<br />
Website: www.1000ev.hu<br />
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OBRUSÁNSZKY, Borbála<br />
Silk Road – Then and Now 1<br />
For a long period, the great Silk Road functioned as a link between Central‐ and Northern‐China,<br />
Central Asia, and the Caucasus. Some branches led to the eastern coast <strong>of</strong> the Black Sea, where some ports<br />
gained strategic importance for “Europe”, which meant the Hellenic world according to ancient historical<br />
sources. Another significant branch led along the the Caspian Plain, which connected Eastern Europe<br />
with the Middle East. From the 16 th century onwards the sea trading overtook land‐locked trade as<br />
Western‐Europeans started to search for new routes to reach directly the regions rich in raw material<br />
resources. The above mentioned international land routes lost their primacy in world trade and remained<br />
regional routes in Middle East and Eastern Europe. Moreover, during the Late Middle Ages, two big city<br />
states, Venice and Genoa freighted goods from those regions, but they lost their importance gradually.<br />
When Moscow conquered Central Asia in the middle <strong>of</strong> the 19 th century the <strong>of</strong>ficial trade routes were<br />
moved to the north crossing Siberia.<br />
Fortunately, the modern economic challenges required modernization <strong>of</strong> the ancient caravan routes, so<br />
it was time to build new routes to transport huge amounts <strong>of</strong> raw materials from land‐locked Asia to<br />
Western‐Europe, where the industrial capacity already existed but lacked sufficient raw material supplies.<br />
The bid to create a new Euro‐Asia link was spurred by the wish to unlock the vast oil and gas reserves <strong>of</strong><br />
the Caspian Sea. At the end <strong>of</strong> the 20 th century European decision‐makers realized that the European<br />
market required a stable supply <strong>of</strong> raw material for their own industries to process. Due to the permanent<br />
demand, the European countries tried to access landlocked territories like the Caucasus and the Central<br />
Asian region. In the 1990s more than 30 countries <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Eurasian</strong> region planned a new project, named<br />
TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe‐Caucasus‐Asia). Its aim was to solve the problems related to<br />
transporting energy, mining products and other raw materials to Europe. The participating nations<br />
decided to develop a modern transport corridor along the great international trading route that once<br />
linked Asia to Europe in order to ease the flow <strong>of</strong> goods across the vast region. One <strong>of</strong> the strategic points<br />
<strong>of</strong> the route is the corridor linking the Caspian Sea and Black Sea, where a new railway line was built.<br />
This is known as the Kars‐Tbilisi‐Baku railway project, also named as the “Iron Silk Road”, which is to<br />
provide direct connection between Turkey and Georgia, from where the line will also reach to Azerbaijan.<br />
From there the railway leads to Central Asia and far away, to the Far East to China. To understand the<br />
importance <strong>of</strong> this European initiative, we should take a look at the historical background <strong>of</strong> the Silk<br />
Road, and analyse the existing route in the region. In the past few years experts reassessed the history and<br />
importance <strong>of</strong> the Silk Road, despite the increasing commercial activities in the ports. They examined the<br />
role <strong>of</strong> logistics in a steppe region and the special knowledge <strong>of</strong> the inhabitants, namely the Scythians.<br />
1 Paper prepared for the international symposium ´Encounters between the Caucasus and the West: Image and Reality´ organized by<br />
the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 23‐24 April 2010.<br />
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Historical concepts<br />
As historical sources and archaeological findings present to us, for many centuries great trading routes<br />
between the Caucasus and Europe contributed to the development <strong>of</strong> both regions. In the ancient and<br />
medieval times the Silk Road was <strong>of</strong> great importance to the transport <strong>of</strong> peoples, goods and ideas<br />
between Europe and Asia. In both directions, technologies, ideologies (especially religions) were<br />
transmitted. 2<br />
As I mentioned above, the Silk Road was not only one big highway, but a vast network <strong>of</strong> more or less<br />
important trade routes with connecting branches from present‐day Central China to Western Europe. In<br />
the Caucasus region it crossed present‐day Azerbaijan and went on to Georgia, and reached the Black Sea.<br />
These places were inhabited since the earliest times, and early communities settled down in river valleys<br />
or at the shores <strong>of</strong> the Black Sea. 3 By the means <strong>of</strong> these roads, various kinds <strong>of</strong> goods (luxury goods,<br />
handicrafts, spices, etc.) were transported from China and Central‐Asia reaching the Caucasus. The main<br />
source <strong>of</strong> most raw materials was in the Caucasus Mountains, or Scythian Mountain, as enumerated by<br />
ancient Greek sources. 4 In some cases silk products, handicrafts were produced in the Caucasus region,<br />
too. 5<br />
Although the international literature <strong>of</strong>ten refers to this date, the great international trade routes and<br />
trading did not exist before the 2 nd century B.C., or the time <strong>of</strong> the Han‐dynasty. China was a closed<br />
territory for a long period, so they had no direct connection with the West; they had information about the<br />
Northern tribes belonging to the steppe civilisation who were related to the Scythians or Huns. As the<br />
Chinese scholars pointed out, the Chinese adopted many methods from them, such as metallurgy, horse‐<br />
breeding, etc. 6 They accessed western goods only through the steppe people. The first man, who<br />
reportedly reached the Western region, was Zhang Qian. He was captured by the Huns and was forced to<br />
live in their empire. He lived there for a decade. After returning to China he gave an account on his<br />
experiences and the Chinese <strong>of</strong>ficials, even the Chinese royal court realized that establishing trade<br />
relations with the West were <strong>of</strong> crucial importance. In order to gain control over the western territories,<br />
the Chinese waged a war against the Huns, who had ruled that territory for centuries. The above<br />
mentioned date or 2 nd century B.C. refers to that period, when the Chinese Han‐dynasty gained<br />
supremacy over some parts <strong>of</strong> the Silk Road along the Yellow‐River bend. During that period they were<br />
involved directly in the world trade and they drove out the Huns, who ruled that vast region before them.<br />
Some scholars support the idea that commercial activity between continents probably emerged during<br />
the Neolithic Age. As they claim, some parts <strong>of</strong> the Silk Road <strong>of</strong> that time have already functioned, and<br />
goods, mainly precious stones were transported. 7 Due to fragmentary historical sources, we do not know<br />
the exact beginning <strong>of</strong> transcontinental commercial activities in this vast steppe region (Central Asia,<br />
2<br />
Kuzmina, 2008. 3.<br />
3<br />
Christian, 1988. 82.<br />
4<br />
The great Greek authors as Hesiodus, Herodotus, Ptolemy, Strabon, etc.<br />
5<br />
Silk products appeared from only the Middle Ages, when a Christian monk stole the secret <strong>of</strong> silk‐manufacturing technology.<br />
6<br />
Chang, 1974.<br />
7<br />
The main products were on first trans‐continental trading was precious stones, lapis lazuli in Middle‐East, and nephrite in<br />
Inner Asia.<br />
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Southern Siberia, Mongolia, Northern and Western China, etc.). We can find cultural connections between<br />
the western and eastern territories from the Early Bronze Age onwards and there are lots <strong>of</strong> similarities in<br />
material culture as far as the Ordos plateau to the Carpathian‐Basin.<br />
Routes had been operated in Inner Asia during the Neolithic culture, and the main export article was a<br />
precious stone called jade or nephrite from the Tarim‐Basin. It reached the Transbaikal region and became<br />
one <strong>of</strong> the most sought‐after commodities <strong>of</strong> the Longshan‐culture in Eastern‐China. 8 The trend was<br />
similar in the Caucasus region, where other kinds <strong>of</strong> precious stones (lapis lazuli, ruby) were the main<br />
export articles <strong>of</strong> that period. Besides that, some Azerbaijan archaeologists found that the Caucasus was<br />
also a mining centre <strong>of</strong> copper from the 4 th millenium B.C. The archaeological findings prove that trading<br />
activity functioned in the Bronze Age, too. 9 It is likely that the first steppe tribes, the Hurrians broke<br />
through the Caspian Gate and invaded Mesopotamia. Their aim was to gain control over the branches <strong>of</strong><br />
the Silk Road in the Caucasus region in order to access the mining centres there. Written sources state that<br />
steppe tribes, such as the Scythians or related tribes, established a well‐organised “state” or tribe union<br />
and created an efficient logistics network all around the steppe belt for transporting goods from far away<br />
places. Concerning the Steppe logistical solutions, we have rather fragmentary information from the<br />
ancient period, based on Greek or Roman sources. We have detailed descriptions only from the late<br />
period, that means the Middle Ages, when external foreign sources reported how this logistic system<br />
operated. We have some archaeological evidence, and some rock painting, which preserved some special<br />
means <strong>of</strong> transport. Based on this we are more or less able to reconstruct their special communication and<br />
transport system. 10 They developed an efficient communication system, which was based on relay<br />
stations covering the whole steppe. The envoys received free services there, but travellers and merchants<br />
had to pay for the meals and accommodation and horses.<br />
In ancient times, and the Middle Ages the steppe tribes or as they called themselves “the bow<br />
stretching people” monopolized a great part <strong>of</strong> the known‐world trade in landlocked territories <strong>of</strong><br />
Eurasia. They contributed to the dissemination <strong>of</strong> the above mentioned technologies, arts and religions.<br />
Moreover, they helped to popularize significant inventions, such as equestrian warfare, horse kits, and<br />
trappings. They collected huge amounts <strong>of</strong> taxes from commercial duties. The steppe tribes <strong>of</strong>fered<br />
services to foreigners as armed guards along the trading routes, and protected men and goods from<br />
bandits. As the historical sources and archaeological findings show, they ruled the great raw material sites<br />
from the Altai Mountain to the Caucasus; they sold and processed the materials. The Caucasus was one <strong>of</strong><br />
the most important raw material centres in the region. From time to time, the world market required<br />
different kinds <strong>of</strong> raw materials. The Greeks recorded precious stones, metals as copper, silver, gold as the<br />
8<br />
Settlement around Onon‐river, which is the border between Russia and Mongolia, Russian archaeologists excavated some<br />
settlements, where they discovered products from present‐day Northern‐ or Central‐China. Grishin, 1985. 85. As the Chinese<br />
excavation presented, ancient trade routed were operated between present‐day Xinjiang and Ordos. In: Cosmo, 1996. 96.<br />
9<br />
Maisa, 2009. 91.<br />
10<br />
In the past few years huge amounts <strong>of</strong> rock paintings were discovered from Inner Asia to Caucasus, where the ancient artists<br />
carved waggons with animals, boats, and horses. The main significant ones are at Yin‐shan in Northern‐China, carvings at<br />
Mongolian Altay, southern part <strong>of</strong> Hovd country. The most famous such a place in Caucasus is Gobustan, Azerbaijan. The<br />
Greek authors (Hesiodus, Herodotus, Hippocrates gave report on Scythian manners and their waggons. We have remains <strong>of</strong><br />
wagons in various Scythian tombs. Besides those evidences, we find them on the coins <strong>of</strong> Scilurus struck in Olbia. (Minns, 1913.<br />
50)<br />
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most important raw materials. Next to these, salt and a special textile paint or minium were special export<br />
articles, too. During that period the above mentioned materials were as important as oil nowadays.<br />
The eastern part <strong>of</strong> the Black Sea was the main strategic point which belonged to Georgia, Turkey and<br />
Abhazia, which became independent with Russian help two years ago. This region was the meeting point<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Western or Greek and Eastern or Scythian world from the early period, where the Greeks got<br />
information about the vast <strong>Eurasian</strong> region and goods. The first expedition to this region was recorded in<br />
the Argonauts’ legend who reached the kingdom <strong>of</strong> Colchis searching for the Golden Fleece, i.e. they<br />
wanted to find gold there.<br />
Significant routes<br />
The development <strong>of</strong> the commercial routes was significantly determined by geographical conditions.<br />
The Caucasus region is a good example for that. There are restricted passes in high mountains, which are<br />
situated between two seas. It was rather difficult to travel along these routes due to lack <strong>of</strong> information.<br />
As Minns said, Greeks knew hardly anything <strong>of</strong> the inside <strong>of</strong> the Scythian country. 11 The mountainous<br />
places give some orientation points, but on plains, flat regions nothing helps to point out the directions.<br />
On the steppe, unregulated large rivers and marshy land caused problems for foreigners. Similar road<br />
conditions exist in some Central Asian countries, e.g. Mongolia, where it is very difficult to reach rural<br />
areas by car. Without road signs, the drivers must look at stars during night to determine their position.<br />
Daytime they always looked at the position <strong>of</strong> the Sun, at the branching paths, or rivers to identify any<br />
orientation points. This required a great routine from the drivers. Due to the difficult road conditions<br />
some peoples preferred to use only ships to reach new territories. That is why the easier transport method<br />
was shipping, and Greeks practiced that along the shores <strong>of</strong> the Black Sea and Caspian Sea. We have<br />
written records and rock carvings which prove this. Some parts <strong>of</strong> the Silk Road were not only a single<br />
path, but had several small junctions. Many people were involved in this large commercial network.<br />
Some parts are already well known, while others still wait to be explored. Let us investigate the most<br />
significant ones.<br />
1. Eastern shore <strong>of</strong> the Black Sea – Steppe section and the Classical Silk Road<br />
Regarding the history <strong>of</strong> Caucasus, the western region is relatively well documented from ancient<br />
times, since the first cuneiform texts. The ancient Greek and Roman authors made lots <strong>of</strong> records. The<br />
eastern Black Sea region had developed before the Greeks. The biblical texts mentioned the Japhethid (or<br />
Gog and Magog) tribes referring to the steppe tribes. 12<br />
The Black Sea region is significant for the Western‐Eastern connections, because <strong>of</strong> its strategic<br />
position. Changes happened after the Trojan War, when the first non‐Eastern peoples, the Greek sailors<br />
appeared on the Black Sea coast, crossed the Bosporus, and for the first time settled down onn the<br />
11 Minns, 1913. 10.<br />
12 The early expression for Gog and Magog is for the northern people, as Gimmeroi, or Cimmerians, or Scythians, or Askuzai.<br />
(Ez. 38‐39) Boe, 2001.<br />
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Crimean‐Peninsula, Olbia, and then Chersones and gradually moved eastwards, and they established a<br />
central port at Panticapaeuum (Kerch) and beyond Cimmerian Bosporus on Taman‐Penisula built<br />
Phanagoria. They started to trade with the Royal Scythians, whose headquarters were located close to this<br />
region. The exploration and trade activities were spearheaded by Miletos, a big Greek city in Asia Minor.<br />
Merchants from Miletos discovered raw materials or mineral sources for Greek industries, as well as food<br />
commodities. The Greek mythology preserved these journeys and discoveries. 13<br />
The Black Sea <strong>of</strong>fered a good chance for the Greeks, who were unable to access the markets along the<br />
Mediterranean Sea. This region was dominated by the Phoenicians, who monopolised the trading <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Eastern goods. The same situation emerged at the end <strong>of</strong> the 13 th century, when the crusader states <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Holy Land had been occupied by Muslims. Venice and Genoa built commercial bases on the remains <strong>of</strong><br />
ancient Greek cities around the Black Sea.<br />
The Greeks settled in ports and developed good relationship with the Scythians. Historians stressed<br />
the role <strong>of</strong> Greeks as culture middlemen, who introduced their civilisation to the Scythians. The early<br />
Greek sources and some scholars do not share this view. Some <strong>of</strong> them pointed out that the Scythians had<br />
already a special, independent civilisation and both nations influenced each other. 14 The Steppe people<br />
transported goods from faraway territories, built logistics systems, which were based on horses and carts,<br />
and occasionally transmitted skin hoses to the mineral resources and luxury goods as well. Their main<br />
export products were slaves, grain, gold, fur, salt, etc. Many researchers believe that some technologies or<br />
luxury products came from the Altai Mountains, which was the former residence <strong>of</strong> the Scythians.<br />
As already mentioned, one main route passed through present‐day Kerch. They transferred Scythians<br />
goods from Eastern Europe. The other route was the classic Silk Road, which connected the Caspian Sea<br />
to Black Sea. It started from the eastern Black Sea coast, went on to ancient Colchis, crossed Iberia, todayʹs<br />
Georgia and the Kür‐river valley and reached Azerbaijan, where the Caucasian Albanian state existed for<br />
a long time. Its capital was Gabala, which was located along the Silk Road. In addition, other cities are<br />
built along the way, which prospered from trade. This route was integrated in the TRACECA program.<br />
The other important regional route is less known in the western literature because it developed<br />
connections with western countries only in the Middle Ages.<br />
13 The first legend regarding Mount Caucasus is Prometheus, who stole fire from heaven. As Apollodorus reported, Prometheus<br />
moulded men out <strong>of</strong> water and earth and gave them also fire, which, unknown to Zeus, he had hidden in a stalk <strong>of</strong> fennel. But<br />
when Zeus learned <strong>of</strong> it, he ordered Hephaestus to nail his body to Mount Caucasus, which is a Scythian mountain. In:<br />
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0022:text=Library:book=1:chapter=7&highlight=scythian<br />
According to Zaur Hasanov, the story <strong>of</strong> Cyclops in Greek sources went back to Scythian origin. These kinds <strong>of</strong> peoples are well<br />
known along the <strong>Eurasian</strong> steppe regions, among present‐day Turkic and Mongolian folklore.<br />
Mythical griffins, which guarded gold, are found in Herodotus’ work.<br />
Iphigena’s story also regarded the Black Sea region, or Crimean‐Penisula, Tauris. Her. IV. 103.<br />
Regarding Odyssey’s journeys, Dubois de Montpéreux and K. E. Baer make the Black Sea coast the scene <strong>of</strong> the Odyssey. They<br />
identify it in a grove <strong>of</strong> poplars on the Sea <strong>of</strong> Azov. In Odyssey we find some references on Cimmerians, who lived only around<br />
the coast <strong>of</strong> the Black and Azovian Seas. In: Minns, 1913. 436‐437.<br />
14<br />
The ancient Greek sources reported their tight connections with Scythians. www.perseus.tufts.edu<br />
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2. Caspian Plain<br />
The west coast <strong>of</strong> the Caspian Sea also belonged to the major trade routes that joined the steppe tribes<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Eastern European Plain with Mesopotamia and beyond. It operated from the Early Bronze Age, as<br />
the archaeological findings and other direct sources (rock carvings) show. Sources <strong>of</strong>ten say that it was a<br />
military road because the northern or Pre‐Scythian peoples poured along this route into Asia. First the<br />
Hurrians arrived there, followed by northern or Scythian tribes breaking through the so‐called Iron Gate<br />
and reaching the Transcaucasus. They settled down on the northern part <strong>of</strong> Mesopotamia and established<br />
states there.<br />
Although the trading turnover was huge, there was no direct European connection, so the western<br />
literature scarcely recorded this aspect. The road was used by the Europeans since the Middle Ages<br />
during the Crusade. After this period merchants from Venice and Genoa appeared and began to trade<br />
with eastern goods from this region.<br />
The ancient Greek sources obtained mostly indirect information about territories beyond the Black Sea,<br />
such as the Caspian Plain. They acquired data probably from their commercial partners, who lived in that<br />
region. So, the Greek sources had already known the main important raw materials and other trading<br />
goods. 15 The best known legend <strong>of</strong> the Late Ancient Greeks was Iron Gate, which was built by Alexander<br />
the Great to protect the territory against the tribes <strong>of</strong> Gog and Magog. The legend refers one place along<br />
the Caspian Plain: Derbent, an ancient city located in present day Dagestan. If we check the meaning <strong>of</strong><br />
the legend, the Iron Gate (or Turkic Temir kapi or Mongolian Temür qagalga) was a widespread<br />
expression used by the <strong>Eurasian</strong> steppe tribes, from Ordos to Carpathian‐Basin, and the meaning <strong>of</strong> it was<br />
narrow passage. 16 Indeed, near the city there is a 3,5 km wide gap between the Caspian Sea and the<br />
mountain. As I have already mentioned, the legendary Iron Gate was an existing geographic location in<br />
ancient times. It was not true that Alexander built it, because the first foundations <strong>of</strong> fortress system had<br />
been constructed since the 5 th century AD, on behalf <strong>of</strong> the Sassanids. 17<br />
The legend mentioned that the commercial route was used for military purposes, but the sources <strong>of</strong><br />
that time provided evidence that it was a significant trading connection between regions, used by the<br />
road caravans travelling from Mesopotamia as far as the Middle East and Egypt. Western European<br />
literature dated from the Middle Ages mentions this legend several times and always refers to it as the<br />
Iron Gate. Some travellers call the road as “the route <strong>of</strong> the Muslims”.<br />
References:<br />
BECKWITH, Christopher I. 1987. The Tibetian Empire in Central Asia. Princeton University Press. Neew Jersey.<br />
Boe, Sverre. 2001. Gog and Magog. Ezekiel 38‐39 as pre‐text for Revelation. Tübingen, Mohr Siebek.<br />
BURNHAM, Philip. 1979. Spatial Mobility and Political Centralization in Pastoral Societies. In: Pastoral Production<br />
and society. L’Equipe écologie et anthropologie des societies pastorals. Cambridge University Press, New York‐<br />
Cambridge<br />
15<br />
I refer only some ancient authors, as Herodotus, Strabon, Ptolemy, etc. (www.perseus.tufts.edu)<br />
16<br />
Some examples: Demir‐kapi‐ in Turcic runic inscription (Kul Tegin), Temür qagalga‐ Mongolian sources<br />
17 See M. Gadjiyev’s investigation.<br />
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CHANG, Ch. 1974. Chinese civilization. Harvard University Press. London‐Massachusetts<br />
CHRISTIAN, David. 1988. A history <strong>of</strong> Russia, Central Asia and Mongolia. Vol. I. Inner Eurasia from Prehistory to<br />
the Mongol Empire. Blackwell, Oxford.<br />
COSMO, Nicola di. 1996. Ancient Xinjiang between Central Asia and China. The Nomadic Factor. In: Anthropology<br />
& Archaeology <strong>of</strong> Eurasia. 87‐100.<br />
DOMANSZKIJ, J. V. 1985. A Kaukázus a késő bronzkorban és a korai vaskorban. 11‐15. In: A szkíták aranya. A<br />
leningrádi Ermitázs vendégkiállítása. Katalógus. Szépművészeti Múzeum, Budapest<br />
DOWSETT, C. J. F. 1961. The History <strong>of</strong> the Caucasian Albanians by Movses Dasxuranci. Oxford University Press,<br />
London.<br />
GRAHAME, F. R. 1860. The archer and the steppe, or the empires <strong>of</strong> Scythians: a History <strong>of</strong> Russia and Tartary. Jack<br />
Blackwood, London.<br />
GROUSSET, René. 1979. The Empire <strong>of</strong> the Steppes. A History <strong>of</strong> Central Asia. Translated from the French by Naomi<br />
Walford. Rutgers University Press, New Jersey.<br />
GURIB, Na. Dalen. 2000. Inner Mongolian’s art <strong>of</strong> rock paintings. Nei Meng guo Wen Hua, Huhehaote<br />
HASZANOV, Zaur. 2006. A Fekete‐tenger feletti területek, Magyarország és Azerbajdzsán késő bronzkori régészeti<br />
kultúrájának közös elemei. In: Magyarország és Azerbajdzsán: a kultúrák közeledése. Az első magyar‐azerbajdzsáni<br />
tudományos szimpózium előadásai. Azerbajdzsáni Nagykövetség, Budapest. 35‐50.<br />
HULSEWE, A. F. P. 1979. China in Central Asia. The Early stage: 125 BC ‐ A.D 23.Leiden, E. J. Brill.<br />
JACOBSON, Esther. 1995. The Art <strong>of</strong> Scythian. The interpenetration <strong>of</strong> the cultures on the edge <strong>of</strong> the Hellenic<br />
World. Brill, Leiden.<br />
KHAZANOV, A. M. 1984. Nomads and the outside world. Translated by Julia Crookenden. Cambridge Universty<br />
Press. Cambridge.<br />
KRAGYIN, Nikolay N. 2002. Gift economy and structure <strong>of</strong> power in nomadic empires. In: The 8th International<br />
Congress <strong>of</strong> Mongolists. Summaries <strong>of</strong> Congress Papers. Secretaries IAMS, Ulaanbaatar, 195.<br />
MINNS, Ellis H. Scythians and Greeks. Cambridge University Press, 1913.<br />
MURAKÖZI Gyula (ford.) 2002 Hérodotosz: Görög‐perzsa háborúk. Budapest, Osiris Kiadó<br />
OBRUSÁNSZKY, Borbála. 2009. Hunok a Selyemúton. Masszi, Budapest.<br />
RAHIMOVA, Maisa. 2009. Az azerbajdzsáni régészet fejlődésének nemzetközi vonatkozásai. In: Magyarország és<br />
Azerbajdzsán: Kultúrák párbeszéde. III. Nemzetközi Tudományos Konferencia. I. kötet. Azerbajdzsán<br />
Nagykövetség, Budapest, 189‐193.<br />
NOVGORODA, Eleonora. 1980. Alte Kunst der Mongolei. E. A. Seemann Verlag, Leipzig.<br />
OKLADNYIKOV, A. P. 1994. Inner Asia at the dawn <strong>of</strong> history. In: Sinor Denis (Ed.) The Cambridge History <strong>of</strong> Early<br />
Inner Asia. Cambridge Universtiy Press, London 41‐96.<br />
SINOR, Denis (ed). 1994 The Cambridge History <strong>of</strong> Early Inner Asia. Cambridge Universtiy Press, London<br />
YU S. Grishin, Yu. S. 1985. Ancient relics at the upper part <strong>of</strong> Onon‐river. 75‐110. In: Archaeological expedition at the<br />
Onon‐river in Mongolia (Soviet Academy <strong>of</strong> Sciences, 1958‐1960)<br />
YUSIFOV, Y. B. 1982. On the Scythians in Mannea. Societies and Languages <strong>of</strong> the Ancient Near East. Aris& Phillips,<br />
Warminster.<br />
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LINGUISTICS<br />
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WINTERS, Clyde<br />
Greek Influence on Sanskrit Language<br />
Controversy surrounds the relationship between Greek and Sanskrit. Most researchers believe that<br />
Greek and Sanskrit are related because <strong>of</strong> their descent from a Proto‐Indo‐European language. Although<br />
this is traditional view explaining the relationship between Greek and Sanskrit, what if the affinities<br />
between Sanskrit and Greek/Latin resulted from: 1) the early contact between the Indic languages when<br />
the Greeks ruled India‐Pakistan; and 2) the Latin popularity and spread <strong>of</strong> Greek civilization and culture,<br />
when the Romans ruled the world?<br />
Dr. A. Marcantonio (2010) challenges the idea that Sanskrit is derived from Indo‐European (IE). She<br />
points out that there is an absence <strong>of</strong> archaeological and genetic evidence supporting an IE origin for<br />
Sanskrit or the former existence <strong>of</strong> an IE speech community.<br />
At the end <strong>of</strong> the 18 th century Sir William Jones suggested that Sanskrit was closely related to Western<br />
languages and that this could not be attributed purely to chance. Jones maintained that these Indic and<br />
European languages must be descended from a common ancestor. It was from this observation that Indo‐<br />
European linguistics was born. In Sir Jones times we knew little about the history <strong>of</strong> the Greeks in India.<br />
Today we know much more about the historical evidence relating to Greek influence in India. The Greek<br />
textual material makes it clear that when Sanskrit was codified Greek was spoken by many Indians. This<br />
view is supported by the Greek inscriptions from Old Kandahar or Shahr‐i Khona that predate the<br />
bilingual Greek‐Aramaic edicts <strong>of</strong> King Asoka (Helms, 1982; GmbH, 1984 Sherwin‐White & Kuhrt, 1993;<br />
Singh, 2008).<br />
The presence <strong>of</strong> Greeks in Ghandahar > Kandahar during Achaemenid times and after the conquest <strong>of</strong><br />
India by Alexander (Billions,1995; Mairs, 2008) suggest that, due to bilingualism, Greek elements probably<br />
used in the Pakrits and everyday speech became part <strong>of</strong> the link language: Sanskrit.<br />
The Dravidians formerly were the major linguistic group in Central Asia and India‐Pakistan. Many<br />
north Dravidian people are presently found in Central Asia. The cattle rearing Brahuis may represent<br />
descendants <strong>of</strong> the Dravidian pastoral element that roamed the steppes in ancient times. North Dravidian<br />
speaking Brahuis are found in Afghan Baluchistan, Persian Sistan and the Marwoasis in Soviet<br />
Turkmenistan (Elfenbein 1987: 229).<br />
There are islands <strong>of</strong> Dravidian speakers in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. There are over 300,000<br />
Brahui speakers in Qualat, Hairpur and Hyderabad districts <strong>of</strong> Pakistan. Other Dravidian speakers are<br />
found in Iran, Russia and Yugoslavia (ISDL 1983: 227). The distribution <strong>of</strong> Northern Dravidian speaking<br />
groups outlined above, corresponds to the former spread <strong>of</strong> Harappan cultures in the 3 rd millennium B.C.,<br />
in Central Asia (Winters, 1990).<br />
Many researchers have suggested that the Harappans spoke a Dravidian language (Winters, 1990).<br />
This view is supported by: 1) the numerous Dravidian place names they left in Iran (Nayar, 1977) and<br />
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Central Asia (Winters, 1986); 2) the Dravidian substratum in Indo‐Aryan languages (Emeneau & Burrow,<br />
1962) and: 3) the evidence <strong>of</strong> Dravidian influence on trade and animal domestication in Central Asia<br />
(Winters, 1991) supports the former presence <strong>of</strong> Dravidian speakers in the Indus Valley and Central Asia.<br />
The Harappans expanded from the Indus Valley into Central Asia. The Harappans made seals, mined<br />
minerals and used black‐and‐red ware (BRW). The BRW pottery style was common to Dravidian<br />
speaking groups in South India.<br />
The Harappan tradition precedes the Bactrian tradition (Fracefort, 1987). Trade was the motivation<br />
behind the rise <strong>of</strong> Dravido‐Harappan colonies in Central Asia. The major Harappan sites in Bactria were<br />
located near the Oxus River at Shortughai, and Altyn‐Depe (Winters, 1990a; Francefort, 1987).<br />
In Turkmenia at Altyn‐Depe Harappan seals have been found. This view is also supported by the<br />
Indus culture colonies in the luzurite regions <strong>of</strong> Badakhshan (Winters, 1990a). Henri‐Paul Francefort<br />
(1987) has discussed the Harappan site <strong>of</strong> Shorgtughai on the Oxus River.<br />
The presence <strong>of</strong> Indus culture settlements within the lazurite region <strong>of</strong> Badakhshan has led many<br />
archaeologists to suggest Harappan control <strong>of</strong> the lazurite and the route to the tin and copper fields <strong>of</strong><br />
Central Asia (Bremtjes, 1983).<br />
Due to the early Dravidian settlement <strong>of</strong> Central Asia the Dravidian speakers influenced many<br />
languages. There is a Dravidian substratum in Indo‐Aryan. There are Dravidian loans in Rg Veda, even<br />
though Aryan recorders <strong>of</strong> this work were situated in the Punjab, which was occupied around this time<br />
by Dravidians using BRW. Aryan speakers are believed to have made and used Grey ware.<br />
Emeneau and Burrow (1962) found 500 Dravidian loan words in Sanskrit. In addition, Indo‐Aryan<br />
illustrates widespread structural borrowing from Dravidian in addition to 700 lexical loans (Kuiper 1967;<br />
Southward 1977; Winters 1989).<br />
It is therefore not surprising that the Dravidian languages lie at the base <strong>of</strong> the Indo‐Aryan languages<br />
spoken in Pakistan and India. It is therefore not surprising that the Dravidian languages greatly<br />
influenced Sanskrit.<br />
Many researchers reject the idea that Sanskrit was influenced by the Dravidian languages. They<br />
dispute this theory because <strong>of</strong> the Greek relationship to Sanskrit. Although researchers have used the<br />
relationship between Greek and Sanskrit in support <strong>of</strong> an Indo‐European linguistic family, it is clear that<br />
the relationship between Sanskrit and Greek results from the long influence in India‐Pakistan <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Greeks.<br />
The first Greeks were deposited in Ghandahara (which was situated near the Indus River near<br />
Peshawar), Pakistan and Bactria in 494 BC (Mairs, 2008). These Greeks were descendants <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Branchidae guardians <strong>of</strong> the oracle <strong>of</strong> Apollo at Didyma near Miletos, situated on the coast <strong>of</strong> Asia Minor<br />
(Mairs, 2008).<br />
There was a massive emigration <strong>of</strong> Greeks and Macedonians following Alexander’s conquest <strong>of</strong> Asia<br />
between 335‐250 BC (Billons, 1995). These Greeks settled many areas already occupied by Greeks exiled to<br />
Afghanistan by the Persians like Shahr‐i Kohna (Old Kangahar) (Sherwin‐White & Kuhrt, 1993). Shahr‐i<br />
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Khona had been an Achaemenid fortified city before Alexander’s conquest (Sherwin‐White & Kuhrt,<br />
1993).<br />
The Greeks also built or successfully occupied many urban centres in India, especially Bactria<br />
including Ai Khanum, Begram and Arachosia (Kandahar) (Helms, 1982; Sagar, 1993; Singh, 2008).<br />
Consequently, there was a large Greek population in the area. Greek sources claim that Greek‐Bactrians<br />
ruled 1000 cities (Helms, 1982).<br />
Ancient Bactria was situated between the Middle Oxus (Amu Draya) River in the north, the Pamir<br />
mountains in the northeast, and the Hindu Kush in the south. After Alexander there was an increased<br />
number <strong>of</strong> Hellenistic sites between 3 rd ‐2 nd centuries especially Ai Khanoum maybe as a result <strong>of</strong> Greek<br />
immigration. Ai Khanoum had a Greek theatre that seated 6000 (Helms, 1993).<br />
The epigraphic evidence suggests a long tradition <strong>of</strong> Greeks in Afghanistan. This includes Akkadian<br />
and Aramaic texts recorded in Greek (Sherwin‐White & Kuhrt, 1993). The oldest monolingual Greek text<br />
found at Old Kandahar dates to the late 3 rd century BC (GmbH, 1984; Mairs, 2008).<br />
The best known Greek inscriptions were written by Asoka. There are two monolingual Asoka Edicts<br />
written in Greek, and one Greek‐Aramaic rock inscriptions (Mairs, 2008). One <strong>of</strong> the inscriptions, found in<br />
1964, was part <strong>of</strong> a public building where all <strong>of</strong> Asoka’s Edicts were probably located (Singh, 2008).<br />
The Asoka Edicts support the proposition that a large Greek population lived in Kandahar. Asoka<br />
noted the presence <strong>of</strong> Yonas (Greeks) and Kambojas (Iranians) in his Empire. It is clear from the Asokan<br />
Edicts that the Greeks were familiar with the words bramenai and scamenai – used to denote members <strong>of</strong><br />
the Hindu priestly class (Mairs, 2008). This shows that the Greeks were fully integrated and acculturated<br />
to life in Kandahar.<br />
The epigraphic evidence from Kandahar indicates that the Greco‐Bactrians were probably mostly<br />
bilingual. Bilingualism can be induced through two methods: 1) state coercion or: 2) its ability to <strong>of</strong>fer<br />
advantages to two or more populations in contact. The latter method <strong>of</strong> change usually accounts for<br />
bilingualism ‐ people use the new language to obtain better access to status, security, ritual or goods. The<br />
Greek emphasis on direct methods <strong>of</strong> political control in Bactria forced many non‐Greeks to become<br />
bilingual due to its advantage as a tool for greater upward mobility during Greek rule.<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Marcantonio (2010) makes a solid case that the relationship between Greek and Sanskrit is<br />
probably the result <strong>of</strong> the use <strong>of</strong> Sanskrit and Greek in the Indo‐Greek states. After detailed discussion <strong>of</strong><br />
the IE kinship terms and phonetic laws, Marcantonio (2010) demonstrates that Verner’s Law is invalid.<br />
This view is in line with the fact that a large number <strong>of</strong> Greek colonies formerly occupied the Indo‐<br />
Pakistan region.<br />
The Greek colonization <strong>of</strong> Bactria made the Greek language a link language between the non‐IE<br />
languages spoken in Central Asia about three thousand years ago. Many generations <strong>of</strong> bilingualism led<br />
to an inter‐language phenomena that became a permanent feature <strong>of</strong> the literate speech community in this<br />
region. We can define the institutionalization <strong>of</strong> an inter‐language as language recombination, i.e., the<br />
mixing <strong>of</strong> the vocabulary and structures <strong>of</strong> the substratum language (Dravidian) and the super‐stratum<br />
language (Greek and later Slavic speaking Saka people) to form a new mixed language: Tocharian.<br />
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In 1908 Sieg and Siegling (1931) published their findings that Tocharian was an IE language. This<br />
discovery was accepted without any challenge.<br />
Although Tocharian is accepted as an IE language there is disturbing linguistic evidence that makes it<br />
difficult to properly place Tocharian in the IE family. Ringe (1995) noted that “the Tocharian languages do<br />
not closely resemble any other IE languages”. In other words Tocharian is a separate ‘branch’ <strong>of</strong> the IE<br />
family, on a par with Germanic, Greek, Indo‐Iranian, etc.” (p.439).<br />
There is considerable influence on Tocharian from other languages, including Sanskrit and Iranian,<br />
due to Buddhism, but it is not closely related to the Indo‐Iranian languages. Tocharian also shares many<br />
phonological, word‐formation and lexical correspondences with Balto‐Slavic languages. Most researchers<br />
maintain that Tocharian is closely related to the western IE languages, especially Greek (Adams, 1984,<br />
1995; Mallory, 1989; Van Windekens, 1976).<br />
In relation to Sanskrit and Greek, Tocharian has preserved medio‐passive voice and the presence <strong>of</strong><br />
both subjunctive and optative mood. The most important evidence <strong>of</strong> Tocharian relationship with the IE<br />
family are the Greek and Tocharian cognates: Tocharian A natäk ‘lord’, nasi ‘lady’; Greek wanaki ‘King’,<br />
*wanakya ‘queen’. The Tochariaan lexicon has also been influenced by Tibetan, Chinese and Uighur<br />
(Blazek, 1988; Winters, 1991, 1998).<br />
The Greek culture was transplanted in Bactria by the army <strong>of</strong> Alexander the Great. It can be assumed<br />
that due to direct rule, the Greek language was well established in this region by the cultural matrix<br />
accompanying it. Possession <strong>of</strong> Greek culture and language played a major role in the upward mobility <strong>of</strong><br />
ʺcolonial subjectsʺ in Bactria.<br />
Eteo‐Tocharian is a good example <strong>of</strong> the influence <strong>of</strong> Greeks in Central Asia. Eteo‐Tocharian was<br />
written in a modified Greek alphabet (Maricq 1958:398). This script is a manifestation <strong>of</strong> the Greek<br />
influence in Bactria, even after the Kushana subjugation <strong>of</strong> this area.<br />
This latter point is evident in the Grand Inscription <strong>of</strong> Kaniska (Maricq 1958).<br />
An intruding community like the Greeks in Central Asia did not have to outnumber the colonized<br />
people in Bactria to impact on the language <strong>of</strong> the original Bactrians. The mere fact that the new speech<br />
community, although ethnically different, was now recognized as socially superior to the subject peoples<br />
<strong>of</strong> Bactria, made it useful for the Bactrians to become bilingual so they would be able to function both<br />
within their own culture and the new culture introduced by the conquering Greeks. This hypothesis is<br />
congruent with Ehretʹs (1988, 569) view that people make cultural choices on the basis <strong>of</strong> what appears to<br />
be most advantageous to the lives they live.<br />
The Greeks made a conscious effort to affect the underpinnings <strong>of</strong> the native Bactrianʹs material world<br />
and their relations with their spirits or gods. For example, Greek influence is evident in the Gandharan<br />
Buddhist style sculptures. This art style illustrates Hellenistic influences in the modeling <strong>of</strong> the hair and<br />
facial features.<br />
The relationship between Greek and Indic languages results from the early contact <strong>of</strong> the speakers <strong>of</strong><br />
these languages in Northwest India and beyond during a period in which the Greeks were a major power<br />
in Central Asia.<br />
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The Greeks also ruled Pakistan and India. The Greek rule <strong>of</strong> India is discussed in the following books:<br />
F.L. Holt, Thundering Zeus; W.W. Tarn, The Greeks <strong>of</strong> Bactria and India; A.K. Narain, The Indo‐Greeks; and<br />
H. Kulke & D. Rothermund, History <strong>of</strong> India.<br />
Many Pakistanis recognize Dravidian as the root language for many languages spoken in Pakistan<br />
(Rahman, 2004). They accept the fact that a Dravidian language was probably spoken by the people who<br />
formerly lived in the Indus Valley.<br />
The Greek language was probably incorporated into Sanskrit in Ghadahara (or Kandahar) which was a<br />
major settlement place for Greeks. Many <strong>of</strong> the rules for Sanskrit were codified by Panini, who was born<br />
in Salatura, in Ghandahara, which was located in Northwester Pakistan (Paniniʹs grammar contains 4000<br />
rules). This shows that when Panini wrote his grammar <strong>of</strong> Sanskrit, it was spoken by elites in the area.<br />
Greek was also popular when Panini wrote the Sanskrit grammar. The Greeks were called Yunani or<br />
Yavana. Thus we learn from Agrawala (1953) that the Yavanani lipi (edict) was well known in Gandahara,<br />
and even Panini mentions the Yavanāni in his grammar. The term Yauna meant Ionian (Woodcock, 1966).<br />
Panini mentions the word yavanāni (in 4.1.49). Yavanāni means ‘Greek script’. The presence <strong>of</strong> this<br />
term in Panini’s grammar indicates that Greeks were in Ghandahara when he wrote his grammar. When<br />
Alexander entered the HinduKush region in 327 B.C., Greek settlements were already in the area (Mairs,<br />
2008). By 180 BC, as the Mauryas fell into decline, the Greek Kings <strong>of</strong> Bactria took control <strong>of</strong> Western<br />
Punjab and Gandhara up to the Indus River. Under King Menander (d.130 B.C.) the Greeks had their<br />
capital at Taxila. The center <strong>of</strong> Greek culture in the area was Charsadda, near Peshawar (Woodcock, 1966).<br />
Many Greek terms were probably already incorporated in the Prakrits <strong>of</strong> Northern India‐Pakistan and<br />
Central Asia. Here the Greeks minted their coins with Kharoshthi, Brahmi and Greek inscriptions.<br />
Greek was used for commercial purposes and served as a patrician lingua franca <strong>of</strong> the Kabul valley<br />
and <strong>of</strong> Gandhara. During the rule <strong>of</strong> Pushyamitra many Greeks settled in India. Due to the long history <strong>of</strong><br />
Greeks in India, Ashoka had some <strong>of</strong> his edicts written in Greek and Aramaic bilinguals (GmbH, 1984;<br />
Singh, 2008). In 44 A.D., Appolonius <strong>of</strong> Tyana, when he visited Taxila, found that merchants and kings<br />
learned Greek ʺas a matter <strong>of</strong> courseʺ (Rahman, 2004; Woodcock, 1966). Panini’s mention <strong>of</strong> yavanāni<br />
‘greek writing’ suggests that he may have had a knowledge <strong>of</strong> Greek when he composed his Sanskrit<br />
grammar.<br />
Given the popularity <strong>of</strong> Greek in the Ghandahara region it is not surprising that Sanskrit would show<br />
such a strong relationship to the Indic languages, since it had been spoken throughout the area as early as<br />
494 BC (Mairs, 2008). Moreover, Greek was spoken throughout many parts <strong>of</strong> Europe after the worldwide<br />
conquests <strong>of</strong> Alexander the Great and the popularity <strong>of</strong> Greek among the Romans.<br />
Commenting on the Greek rulers <strong>of</strong> India, Kulke and Rothermund (1998) said that ʺThey are referred<br />
to as `Indo‐Greeksʹ, and there were about forty such kings and rulers who controlled large areas <strong>of</strong><br />
northwestern India and Afghanistan […]. They appear as Yavanas in stray references in Indian literature,<br />
and there are few but important references in European sources. In these distant outposts, the<br />
representatives <strong>of</strong> the Hellenic policy survived the defeat <strong>of</strong> their Western compatriots at the hands <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Parthians for more than a centuryʺ (p.70). The greatest <strong>of</strong> the Indo‐Greek rulers was Menander, who is<br />
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mentioned in the famous Milindapanho text (Sherwin‐White & Kuhrt, 1993). The Shakas adopted many<br />
elements <strong>of</strong> Indo‐Greek culture which they perpetuated in India for over 100 years (Rahman, 2004).<br />
A major IE language <strong>of</strong> Central Asia was Tocharian. It would appear that Tocharian may be a trade<br />
language (Winters, 1998). The large corpus <strong>of</strong> non‐IE words in Tocharian discussed by Blazek (1988) and<br />
Winters (1991, 1998) is congruent with the hypothesis that IE elements in Tocharian, especially Greek (and<br />
Slavic) were loanwords into Tocharian after the Greek conquest <strong>of</strong> Bactria. This borrowing pattern is<br />
consistent with the spread <strong>of</strong> the Greek language into Bactria by a small politically dominant minority <strong>of</strong><br />
Greek settlers into a far larger and previously long‐established non‐IE speaking majority population.<br />
The Greek‐Sanskrit relationship is probably due to the former presence <strong>of</strong> speakers <strong>of</strong> these languages<br />
in a Proto‐European homeland. It is impossible to argue for a genetic relationship between the Vedic and<br />
the Greek languages, given the fact that speakers <strong>of</strong> these languages formerly lived in intimate contact in<br />
Ghandahara.<br />
In conclusion, beginning with the Persians and especially after Alexander’s conquest <strong>of</strong> Asia due to the<br />
Greek influence in Bactria and India‐Pakistan, Indians and Bactrians had to acquire ʺGreek Cultureʺ to<br />
enhance their position and opportunity in North India and Bactria during Greek rule.<br />
In addition, we know that the Greek language was spoken by many Ghandarans and Bactrians. This is<br />
indicated by the Greek textual material from Ghanadara (Mairs, 2008).<br />
Greek rule placed prestige on status elements introduced into the region by the Greeks, especially the<br />
Greek language. Status acquired by Bactrians and Indian‐Pakistanis was thus centered around acquisition<br />
<strong>of</strong> Greek language and Greek culture. This is supported by the evidence that Indian elites used Greek in<br />
business and government (Rahman, 2004). This in turn added pressure onto the Bactrians to incorporate<br />
Greek terms into a lingua franca (i.e., Tocharian) (Winters, 1998).<br />
Given the fact that Greek administrators in Bactria and Northern India‐Pakistan refused to fully<br />
integrate Bactrians and Indians into the ruling elite, unless they were ʺwell versed” in Greek culture and<br />
language, led to subsequent generations <strong>of</strong> native Bactrians and Indian‐Pakistanis to progressively<br />
incorporate more Greek terms into their native language. This would explain why Tocharian has many<br />
features that relate to certain IE etymologies, and Paniniʹs Sanskrit grammar presents many terms that are<br />
associated with Greek, but illustrates little affinity to Indo‐Iranian languages which are geographically<br />
and temporally closer to Tocharian. Some researchers dispute the influence <strong>of</strong> the Greek language on<br />
Sanskrit because Paniniʹs grammar is supposed to have been written around 400 B.C. This date for the<br />
grammar might be too early, because Rahman (2004) and Agrawala (1953) maintains that Greek was<br />
spoken in Gandahara in Paniniʹs time — a fact supported by the mention <strong>of</strong> Greek writing (yavanāni ) in<br />
Panini’s grammar.<br />
The influence <strong>of</strong> colonial Greeks in Central Asia would explain why the most important evidence <strong>of</strong> an<br />
IE relationship with Sanskrit and Tocharian relations within the IE family are the Greek cognates (Mallory<br />
1989). The existence <strong>of</strong> a large Greek population in Ghandara leads to the conclusion that the IE theory<br />
can not be supported by the Sanskrit‐Greek relationship.<br />
The ʺelite dominance modelʺ hypothesis would have two basic consequences in relation to Tocharian<br />
linguistics. First, it would account for the correspondence in grammar (especially agglutination) and<br />
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vocabulary between Dravidian and Tocharian on the one hand, and Tocharian and Indo‐European on the<br />
other. Second, the settlement <strong>of</strong> the Sakas in Bactria after the Greeks would explain the great typological<br />
similarity between Tocharian and Balto‐Slavic. The evidence <strong>of</strong> Saka and Greek conquest <strong>of</strong> Bactria /<br />
Central Asia confirms Sherratt’s (1988) hypothesis that Tocharian may be a trade language, and <strong>of</strong>fers a<br />
plausible solution to the ʺTocharian Problemʺ.<br />
References:<br />
Agrawala, V.S. (1953). India as known to Panini: A study <strong>of</strong> the cultural material in the<br />
Ashtadhyayi. Lucknow: University <strong>of</strong> Lucknow.<br />
Billions, R. 1995. Kings and Colonists: Aspects <strong>of</strong> Macedonian Imperialism. Leiden.<br />
Blazac, V. 1988. Tocharian linguistics during the last 25 years. Archiv Orientalni, 56:76‐81.<br />
Brenjes,B. 1983. On Proto‐Elamite Iran, Current Anthropology, 24(2):240‐243.<br />
Elfenbein, J. 1987. A periplus <strong>of</strong> the Brahui Problem. Studia Iranica 16: 215‐233.<br />
Emeneau, M. and T. Burrow. 1962. Dravidian Borrowing from Indo Aryan. Berkeley:<br />
University <strong>of</strong> California Press.<br />
Francefort, H‐P. 1987. La civilization de l’Indus, Indus Aux Rives de l’Qxus. Archaelogia,<br />
122:77‐79.<br />
GmbH, R.H. 1984. The Temenoε <strong>of</strong> Alexander the Great at Alexandra in Aracoia (Old<br />
Kandahar). Zeitschrift fur Papyrologie und Epigraphik, p.145.<br />
Helms, S.W. 1982. “Excavations at the city and the famous fortress <strong>of</strong> Kandahar, the foremost<br />
place in all Asia”. Afghan <strong>Studies</strong>, 3/4: 1‐24.<br />
Holt, F.L. (1999). Thundering Zeus. Los Angeles: University <strong>of</strong> California Press.<br />
ISDL. 1983. Report on the Dravidian Languages. International <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Dravidian Linguistics<br />
12(1): 227.<br />
Kulke, H. & Rothermund, D. (1998). History <strong>of</strong> India. New York: Routledge.<br />
Mairs, R. 2008. The Settler community in Hellenistic Bactria and Arachoia. Migrations and<br />
Identities, 1(1):19‐43.<br />
Mallory, J.P. In Search <strong>of</strong> the Indo‐Europeans. London: Thames and Hudson.<br />
Marcantonio, A. 2010. Repudiating the linguistic evidence for the Aryan hypothesis. Retrieved<br />
8/28/2010 at: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/51826628/Marcantonio‐Salem‐Repudiating‐<br />
linguistic‐evidence‐Aryan‐hypothesis‐_1_html<br />
Maricq, A. 1958. La Grande inscription de Kaniska et Lʹ eteo‐ Tokharien lʹancienne langue de la<br />
Bactriane. <strong>Journal</strong> Asiatique 246: 345‐439.<br />
Narain, A.K. (1957). The Indo‐Greeks. Oxford: Clarendon Press.<br />
Rahman, T. (2004). Peoples and Languages in Pre‐Islamic Indus Valley. Retrieved on: 4‐21‐04<br />
http://asnic.utexas.edu/asnic/subject/peoplesandlanguages.html<br />
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Ringe, D.A. 1995. Tocharian in Xinjiang: The Linguistic Evidence. The <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Indo‐<br />
European Linguistics 23 (3/4):439‐444.<br />
Sagar, K.C. 1993. Foreign Influence on Ancient India. South Asia Books.<br />
Sherratt, Andrew and Susan. 1988. Archaeology <strong>of</strong> Indo‐European: An Alternative View.<br />
Antiquity 62: 584‐595.<br />
Sherwin‐White, S.M. and Kuht, A. 1993. From Samarkhand to Sardis: A new approach to<br />
Selucid Empire. Berkeley: University <strong>of</strong> California Press.<br />
Sieg, E., and W. Siegling. Tocharische Grammatik. Göttingen, 1931.<br />
Singh,U. 2008. A History <strong>of</strong> Ancient and Early Medieval India from the Stone Age to the 12th Century. Longman.<br />
Tarn, W.W. (1984). The Greeks <strong>of</strong> Bastria and India . Chicago: Ares Press.<br />
Van Windekens, A.J. 1976. Le Tokharien confronté avec les Autres Langues Indo‐Européenes.<br />
Louvain. Vol. 1<br />
Winters, C. A. 1989. Review on Dr. Asko Parpolaʹs ʺThe Coming <strong>of</strong> the Aryansʺ. International<br />
<strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Dravidian Linguistics 18 (2): 98‐127.<br />
Winters, C.A. 1990a. The Dravido‐Harappan colonization <strong>of</strong> Central Asia. Central Asiatic<br />
<strong>Journal</strong>, 34 (1‐2):120‐144.<br />
Winters, C.A. 1990b. The Dravidian language and the Harappan Script, Archiv Orientalni<br />
58:301‐309.<br />
Winters, C.A. 1991. Linguistic evidence for Dravidian influence on trade and animal<br />
domestication in Central and East Asia, International <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Dravidian Linguistics 20(2):91‐<br />
101.<br />
Winters, C.A. 1998. Is Tocharian a Dravidian Trade Language? PILC <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Dravidic<br />
<strong>Studies</strong> 8(1):1‐12.<br />
Woodcock, G. (1966). The Greeks in India. London: Faber & Faber.<br />
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LANGUAGE TEACHING<br />
METHODOLOGIES<br />
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MOLNÁR, Zsolt & MOLNÁRNÉ CZEGLÉDI, Cecília<br />
The Creative Hungarian Language and Its Special Teaching Method<br />
Part 5. : Relators in the Structure <strong>of</strong> Sentences 1<br />
In the former parts <strong>of</strong> this series we generally reviewed the deeper parts <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian language;<br />
the features <strong>of</strong> phonemes, system <strong>of</strong> roots, creators, the word‐creation (derivation) process, word‐bushes,<br />
the main differentiating features <strong>of</strong> Hungarian language. Now we turn to a higher level and firmly<br />
describe how our language builds sentences; this is mainly the role <strong>of</strong> relators in this process.<br />
This part <strong>of</strong> Hungarian grammar is much more discovered and better known by the public than the<br />
earlier parts <strong>of</strong> this series. Therefore we do not want to present detailed analysis here – if you are<br />
interested please turn to the generally available Hungarian language/grammar books. Here we only<br />
would like to give an overview <strong>of</strong> the topic and highlight some new viewpoints, methods. These are: that<br />
the explanation <strong>of</strong> the origin <strong>of</strong> relators, emphasizing the main parts <strong>of</strong> sentence building and – maybe<br />
more closely to language teaching – the modeling <strong>of</strong> sentence structures, relation diagrams. This latter<br />
topic leads to the question <strong>of</strong> how the knowledge in sentences is structured and could be modeled in an<br />
efficient and effective way.<br />
Relators in the Hungarian language<br />
The Hungarian language, as an agglutinating language, puts relators at the end <strong>of</strong> the words:<br />
Root + Creator + Creator + Creator + Creator + ... + „Sign” + Relator<br />
Set <strong>of</strong><br />
roots<br />
1 Authors´ homepage is: http://www.tisztamagyarnyelv.hu/<br />
1.<br />
2. 3. 4.<br />
Set <strong>of</strong><br />
creators<br />
5. ...<br />
Set <strong>of</strong><br />
Signs”<br />
Set <strong>of</strong><br />
relators<br />
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Relators express the relations between words and connect them to each other. Their function is to<br />
express the relations <strong>of</strong> the words in the sentence. In general only one relator can be appended to the very<br />
end <strong>of</strong> the word. (Which was created by creators from the root.) The number <strong>of</strong> relators is about 24‐26.<br />
(Some researchers count more, especially those who consider personal suffixes as relators. This group is<br />
devided into two groups, the first take only the base personal suffixes as different, but the other group<br />
distinguishes the slightly different phonological forms <strong>of</strong> personal postfixes relators, too. With that the<br />
number could go up to 70‐80, but according to us this does not mean different personal suffixes; only the<br />
use <strong>of</strong> the same personal suffix in slightly different phonological form. The question <strong>of</strong> personal suffixes<br />
will be discussed later.)<br />
Basic relators generally express the following relation types:<br />
subject,<br />
place,<br />
time,<br />
ownership,<br />
part,<br />
way,<br />
result,<br />
instrument,<br />
purpose,<br />
etc.<br />
These relations are not expressed only by relators (small particals postfixed to the words) but with<br />
postpositives, too. These postpositives carry the same meaning in expressing the relations, but are put<br />
after the word. Some examples:<br />
Relation type Expressed<br />
by relators<br />
English Expressed<br />
by<br />
postpositives<br />
English<br />
Place házban in the house ház mellett beside the house<br />
házon on the house ház alatt below the house<br />
házhoz to the house ház köré around the house<br />
háznál at the house ház előtt in front <strong>of</strong> the house<br />
Time ebédkor during lunch ebéd óta since lunch<br />
futáskor during running futás előtt before running<br />
Purpose/Reason házért for the house ház végett for the house<br />
házért because <strong>of</strong> the house ház miatt because <strong>of</strong> the house<br />
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According to CzF – as we could see illustrated above – most <strong>of</strong> relators originate from words used very<br />
frequently to express relations but they are now suffixed to the word. Example: ‐ben (in something)<br />
originated from bel, bél (inner <strong>of</strong> something); ‐kor (during something) from kor (time period); ‐képp<br />
(according to) from kép (form, shape, figure <strong>of</strong> something); ‐ért (for something) from ér (reach<br />
something); ‐hoz (to something) from hoz (carry something), etc. This is the biggest part <strong>of</strong> relators.<br />
Some relators are correlated with features <strong>of</strong> the phoneme, e.g. –t (as expressing the subject <strong>of</strong> one<br />
activity) from feature <strong>of</strong> T as expressing activity creation. This is smallest part <strong>of</strong> relators.<br />
Personal suffixes could be regarded as other group <strong>of</strong> relators. In this consideration their task is to<br />
express the personal connection to the words.<br />
In other consideration personal suffixes could be taken as substitutes <strong>of</strong> persons (e.g. subject <strong>of</strong> the<br />
sentence), in this sense they are not real relators but personal pronouns (or originate from them). This<br />
latter statement is closer to our viewpoint.<br />
Relation diagrams<br />
The task <strong>of</strong> relators in a sentence could be expressed very plastically in relation diagrams.<br />
Word 1<br />
Relation 12<br />
Relation 21<br />
Word 3<br />
Relation<br />
32<br />
Relation<br />
23<br />
Word 2<br />
Relation<br />
24<br />
Relation<br />
42<br />
Word 4<br />
Relation25<br />
Relation 52<br />
Word 5<br />
Relation 56<br />
Relation 65<br />
Word 6<br />
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A real example:<br />
Botond<br />
nak<br />
a<br />
közeli<br />
üzlet<br />
lány megy<br />
tej<br />
Note: In the above example you could see the word ‘lánya’ where the suffix ‘a’ expresses the relation <strong>of</strong><br />
property. This is considered as sign in the traditional grammatical categorization, but according to the<br />
new researches 2 it should be categorized into the group <strong>of</strong> relators.<br />
The relation diagrams show the structure <strong>of</strong> relations between words in the sentence; they express the<br />
relations between conceptions which build up the situation.<br />
Relation diagrams are very useful tools in language analysis and teaching.<br />
2 Mártonfi Attila: A magyar toldalékmorfémák rendszere. Doktori disszertáció, Eötvös Lóránd Tudományegyetem 2006.<br />
T. Somogyi Magda: Toldalékrendszerezésünk vitás kérdései. Tinta Könyvkiadó, 2000. Budapest<br />
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be<br />
val<br />
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Summary<br />
In this brief essay we discussed the relators especially focusing on their function in the Hungarian<br />
language.<br />
We have seen that there are the basic relators, which express basic relations and (according to some<br />
researchers) personal relators, which express relations to persons or this latter group could be considered<br />
as grammatical entities originated from personal pronouns. Basic relations could be expressed not only by<br />
suffixed basic relators, but with postpositives too. The function in both cases is the same.<br />
Relation diagrams are very useful tools in teaching; they show very plastically the relation structure <strong>of</strong><br />
concepts / words<br />
References:<br />
Czuczor Gergely – Fogarasi János: A magyar nyelv szótára, (The Dictionary <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian<br />
Language), 1862.<br />
Mártonfi Attila: A magyar toldalékmorfémák rendszere. (The system <strong>of</strong> Hungarian postfix<br />
morphemes). Doktori disszertáció, Eötvös Lóránd Tudományegyetem 2006.<br />
Molnár Zsolt – Molnárné Czeglédi Cecília: A tiszta magyar nyelv kincseinek megőrzése és<br />
tanítása (Preserving and Teaching the Treasures <strong>of</strong> the Pure Hungarian Language), Püski<br />
Kiadó, 2009.<br />
T. Somogyi Magda: Toldalékrendszerezésünk vitás kérdései. (Debated questions <strong>of</strong><br />
systematization <strong>of</strong> our postfixes), Tinta Könyvkiadó, 2000. Budapest.<br />
(To be continued)<br />
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ANCIENT WRITING SYSTEM<br />
RESEARCH<br />
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MELLÁR, Mihály<br />
From a Kafkania Pebble to the Staff <strong>of</strong> Asclepios<br />
The small pebble, excavated near Kafkania/Kavkonia, only 5 Km‐s away from the ancient Olympia,<br />
enjoys enormous popularity. As it is usual with celebrities, this small pebble is surrounded with<br />
immense attention and many contradictory opinions and statements (gossips). Some people even doubt<br />
its authenticity, while others read miracle into it. Let us look into its secrets more closely.<br />
Both faces <strong>of</strong> the only 4cm‐s x 5cm‐s big, 1.5cm thick flat pebble are chiseled with inscriptions. One <strong>of</strong> the<br />
paradoxes, surrounding the pebble, is its Linear B inscription which predates the oldest such known<br />
inscription with two centuries, as its origin is put to the 17 th century B.C.<br />
The b. side <strong>of</strong> pebble is filled with a Minoan double axe, surrounded<br />
with “unusual” rays, three on both sides, six in all. The details stressed<br />
one by one may seem really strange, better to proceed sequentially and<br />
make everything fall in line.<br />
Until now, all descriptions <strong>of</strong> side a. are telling that the six signs are<br />
nestled in two rows, three signs in each <strong>of</strong> the rows:<br />
1. a‐so‐na 08‐12‐06<br />
2. qo‐ro‐ka 37‐02‐77 or ka‐ro‐qo 77‐02‐37<br />
Since the sign on the left edge, the seventh sign is not fit any <strong>of</strong> the lines, most researchers – elegantly! –<br />
brush away this sign. This regard I keep the argumentation <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>essor Thomas G. Palaima 1<br />
(QVOVSQVE TANDEM?) the most definitive: it is as meaningless to hold this sign a later inscription as<br />
is assuming that it was marred with a graffito before the inscription took place. Therefore this ra (*60)<br />
sign is part <strong>of</strong> the inscription.<br />
The solution to the paradox is simple, as always: there are not two but three rows <strong>of</strong> text. The scribe put<br />
the repeating signs in such a way that they can be included in two rows<br />
at the same time. Consequently the text has these three rows:<br />
1. a‐so‐na<br />
2. ka‐na ra<br />
3. ka‐ro‐qa<br />
The na *06 sign thou doesn’t reach the middle line but it definitely<br />
reaches further down than the other two.<br />
Based on the evidence <strong>of</strong> the Cretan Hieroglyphic and the Linear A<br />
writing systems, these signs are not syllables, they merely denote<br />
consonants. The first sign being an exception: a denotes the generic vowel, any vowel. Transcribing the<br />
text with the corresponding letters, we get the following consonantal frame:<br />
A/E/O/U‐S/Z‐N K‐N R K‐R‐K<br />
We can refill this frame with vowels to the following legitimate wording:<br />
1 http://www.utexas.edu/research/pasp/publications/pdf/kafkania.pdf<br />
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ASSZoNy KéNe aRa KéRöK<br />
Woman (I) should (have) fiancée (I) ask (for)<br />
“Asszony kéne, ara, kérek!” (Woman I should have, fiancée, I ask for one) a legitimate proposition … today.<br />
However this pebble is 3700 years old and was found in a hilltop sanctuary, amongst other pebbles<br />
devoid <strong>of</strong> inscriptions. Not just here, in other locations as well, the archeologists has found and<br />
discarded an uncounted number <strong>of</strong> similar pebbles, coming from far away lands, most <strong>of</strong> the times<br />
without checking.<br />
We have a little collection <strong>of</strong> painted goodluck pebbles <strong>of</strong> the Australian Aborigines, which were given to<br />
their fellow before an impending long journey, to bring good luck (to the stay in people!). It is worth<br />
mentioning that on these painted pebbles the point is not on the painted picture, but on the act <strong>of</strong><br />
painting, which takes place in a fest (corrobory) as a community action. The painting/writing has<br />
meaning only in conjunction with the danced, played and told about things during the corrobory. The<br />
earth‐paint disappears quickly, but the experiences <strong>of</strong> the corrobory will stay engraved in the memory.<br />
This could be the case with the pebbles <strong>of</strong> Kafkania as well, the painted on writings disappeared from<br />
the rest <strong>of</strong> the pebbles, this one exceptionally was carved, yet even on this, the signs are rather damaged.<br />
All these pebbles did formulate whishes, expectations, therefore they were addressed to the person the<br />
fulfillment <strong>of</strong> the whishes were expected. We’ll find the addressee by putting the comma in the sentence<br />
to another place:<br />
Asszony, kéne ara, kérek! (Woman, I should have a fiancée, I ask for one!)<br />
Straight wording, without any evasion, feigned politesse; loutish or goopy would be its attribute today.<br />
On a small pebble there is no place or ground for unnecessary frills. If someone would find that na (*60)<br />
is not stretching sufficiently enough into the second row, than there is an even goopier version <strong>of</strong> the<br />
text:<br />
Asszony, kő’ ara, kérök! (Woman, I need a fiancée, I ask for one!)<br />
But who is the woman the text is addressed to? She is the ŐSaNYa (God‐mother, ancestress), the mother<br />
<strong>of</strong> the whole people, ÖSSZ‐aNYa (everybody’s mother), the Queen Mother (Nagy‐ASSZoNY) <strong>of</strong><br />
Kafkania, <strong>of</strong> Olympia.<br />
On the b. side, the six lines, arranged like rays around the axe, the hieroglyph equivalent to the a (*08),<br />
simply means:<br />
a ‘hat’‐ban (a in‐between six [lines])<br />
The experts are saying that, under the blades <strong>of</strong> the axe, there are two<br />
signs: qa and jo, not noticing that the handle <strong>of</strong> the axe reaches down<br />
between the two signs. The usually very short, next to no handle at all;<br />
here it is wedged for some length between the two signs. This way, the<br />
axe with the phonetic value <strong>of</strong> a is in (‐ban) six, in‐between (közé‐ben)<br />
the qa and jo signs, thus the brief description <strong>of</strong> the whole side is:<br />
a ‘hat’‐ban qa‐jo ‘közé’‐ben<br />
This, in the transcription used for the Hieroglyphics, looks as follows:<br />
AH_T‐B_N K_J K_Z_‐B_N<br />
This consonantal writing can be refilled with vowels to the following meaningful reading <strong>of</strong> the text:<br />
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ÁHíTó BűNe KéJ KöZBeN<br />
Áhító bűne: kéj közben. (The sin <strong>of</strong> the yearning: lust in the meantime.)<br />
Well yes, if a man badly desires a fiancée, he can fall into the sin <strong>of</strong> sexual pleasure. An explicit and<br />
sincere speech. The Queen Mother will forgive this sin for sure.<br />
The texts perfectly fit the carrier <strong>of</strong> the writing: wishing pebble (KíVánó KaVics), and the place: kite nest on<br />
stone (KöVi‐KáNYa fészek), a mountain‐top crest sanctuary, and from the goopy drafted request we did<br />
find out that the sanctuary belongs to the Queen Mather <strong>of</strong> Kafkania. Only 5 Km‐s from this sanctuary <strong>of</strong><br />
the God‐mather is the sanctuary <strong>of</strong> Zeus, the supreme (male) deity <strong>of</strong> the Greeks.<br />
Talking about gods and religion, let us deal in greater detail with the ka sign, starting with its<br />
circumscription: a circle (kör) divided (osztva) into four sections. Let us now lift out the part which<br />
divides the circle: +. Yes, this is the circle divider: KöR‐oSZTó, which becomes KöRöSZT (CRoSS, CRiST)<br />
due to the typical Hungarian vowel harmony or KeReSZT in Germanized form.<br />
There are a lot <strong>of</strong> words derived this way: rekesztő, malaszt, haraszt, választó, etc. The Hungarian<br />
intelligentsia is a strange animal; it can nose about for similar words in all the languages <strong>of</strong> the known<br />
and unknown worlds but its own. Comparative linguistics is their Bible, sine qua non.<br />
I’m reading with amusement the blog <strong>of</strong> Zeke András 2 about the Kafkania<br />
Pebble. While writing his blog, Zeke must have pronounced several times the<br />
word A‐SO‐NA, but he did not hear the word ASSZoNYa, pronounced ‘assona<br />
(the n as in New York). He goes even further; he finds the word on two<br />
epitaphs in the cemetery <strong>of</strong> Amathus on Cyprus. He almost solves its meaning<br />
by comparing it with Etruscan word aisuna (divine). (Note that aisuna is<br />
phonetically more remote from A‐SO‐NA than ASSZoNYa.) As we could see<br />
earlier aisuna‐asona is more than divine, she is the God‐Mother herself. The<br />
epitaph from Amathus is not about the divine Fortuna, but about someone’s<br />
Woman. I can say this extempore, that the two tombs hide the great women, the<br />
princesses <strong>of</strong> Amathus. As a matter <strong>of</strong> fact, in 311 B. C. a graffiti 3 was scratched<br />
over the glorifying marble tablet commemorating the conquering <strong>of</strong> Amathus by the Greek Aristonos:<br />
Annyi métely eméssze imígyül illősen, Arisztonosz arató/ártó főnök/fenék, szűkös karikára tétessék, töke nyárs‐sütő<br />
alá kitépető.( Let you be digested by a lot <strong>of</strong> rot as it fits rightly, head/arse exploiter/malefic Aristanos, be put on a<br />
tight‐fitting ring, your balls to be torn out under a spit‐roaster.)<br />
These are only accidental similarities; the Finn‐Ugrian intelligentsia will belittle any such supposition.<br />
Nevertheless, let us look into another <strong>of</strong> Zeke’s blogs: Goddess Eileithyia and her snakes. Here is a word for<br />
word quote from the blog: “Eileithyia ‐ the goddess <strong>of</strong> childbirth and labour ‐ is perhaps the best known<br />
Greek goddess <strong>of</strong> certainly Minoan origin.” In the linguistic twisting and turning Eileithyia is connected<br />
with freedom instead <strong>of</strong> the childbirth and labour: “PIE stem *h1leudh‐ = ʹfreeʹ: the same stem that<br />
underlies Greek eleutheros = ʹfreeʹ, Latin liber = ʹfreeʹ, … ”, although LiBeR has the same word‐frame as<br />
LaBouR. The English LiTTeR has the same word‐frame as the Hungarian LéTRe/éLeTRe hoz = bringing to<br />
life and in both languages the root‐frame <strong>of</strong> the word is that <strong>of</strong> goddess Eileithyia. What a coincidence!<br />
EiLeiThyia is ELLeTő (obstetrician), the goddess helping at birth. (ÉLeT = life!)<br />
2 http://minoablog.blogspot.com/2010_06_01_archive.html<br />
3 http://osmagyar.kisbiro.hu/modules.php?name=topics&file=olvas&cikk=linearis‐4a3ea00acf85d&elozo=linearis‐<br />
4a9bd40ac8e7f&koveto=edeserdely‐4a8e3f345d7d5<br />
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The ei > e is not a problem, Zeke himself comforts the doubters: “the lengthening <strong>of</strong> ‐e‐ poses no problem<br />
(remember: ‐ει‐ is not necessarily diphthongal!)”, the –ia ending is a Greek addenda. Curiously enough,<br />
both in English and in Hungarian the litter and ellik are not applied to women anymore.<br />
Here and now my intention wasn’t the pillorization <strong>of</strong> András Zeke, merely I would like to show that<br />
with some kind <strong>of</strong> a dreadfully effective training the Hungarian school‐leavers are capable <strong>of</strong> deriving<br />
the word hattyú (swan) from kotang, but cannot perceive the asszony in A‐SO‐NA, the ellető in eileithy<br />
[eletü], etc. It’s a real pity that this effective training is not used by our teachers for the elimination <strong>of</strong> the<br />
25% factual illiteracy instead <strong>of</strong> this useless, truthless, detrimental and anti‐national ethymologization.<br />
The Minoan literary corpus clearly demonstrates that there is not one Hungarian word <strong>of</strong> Finno‐Ugrian origin, on<br />
the contrary: there are a lot <strong>of</strong> Magyar words in the Finno‐Ugrian languages.<br />
Let us have a closer look at the statue <strong>of</strong> goddess Eileithyia for the sake <strong>of</strong> those who assume the before<br />
said as empty instigation. The goddess in both her hands holds out a snake. About<br />
the symbolic role <strong>of</strong> snakes in the different cultures one could stockpile enough<br />
material to fill a library. The keen reader could read about it in the mentioned<br />
Zeke’s blog as well, we shouldn’t avoid the subject either, so let us examine the<br />
statue more intimately:<br />
EiLeiThyia eLőTT KíGYó GYüN eLőReNYúʹToTT KaRoKBóL<br />
Before Eileithyia snake is coming from forward stretching arms<br />
It would be hard to dispute that the text in italics describes the exceptional and<br />
extraordinary on the statue by pursuing the essence very concisely. We would find<br />
probably similar – let us confess, inexpressive ‐ descriptions in many languages<br />
and places, and with such a sketch the topic is closed, but not for us. Since we<br />
apply to the above description the ancient Magyar vowel‐shifting, which alone can<br />
make the statue speak:<br />
ELLeTő eLLáT KiGYóGYú’Ni öLRe oNToTT KóRoKBóL<br />
Ellető ellát kigyógyulni ölre ontott kórokból.<br />
Ellető (obstetrician) provide cure on lap poured illnesses.<br />
Therefore Ellető provides for her patient, helps her recover from illnesses affecting the laps <strong>of</strong> women,<br />
namely from the illnesses <strong>of</strong> the lower part <strong>of</strong> the abdomen, coming with childbirth and labour. No one<br />
can expect a more explicit speech than this from a statue. Were the statue being only<br />
symbolics, than one would be able to read out <strong>of</strong> it a similarly figurative and all‐<br />
important message, without knowing the language, isn’t it?<br />
So far nobody was able to do so. Consequently, the statue speaks in picture‐signs<br />
(képjel) not in symbols (jelkép) … and in Hungarian.<br />
And what the snake is looking for on the staff <strong>of</strong> Asclepios? As we can see Asclepios<br />
leans on this, always typically gnarly staff, this is done purposely, to name the staff a<br />
stick for aid (bot‐gyám). The snake (kígyó) joins (egyít) the stick, in a brief:<br />
KíGYó eGYíT BoT‐GYáMMaʹ<br />
(the) snake joins (the) stick for aid<br />
By changing the vowels, using the ancient Magyar vowel‐shifting we will get the<br />
following unmistakable portrayal <strong>of</strong> the staff’s holder:<br />
Ki GYóGYíTi BeTeGeM’<br />
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Ki gyógyítja/kigyógyítja betegem’/betegségemet<br />
Who cures/reclaims from my illness<br />
Here the stick for aide could be even symbolic: the aide <strong>of</strong> the sick, but its essence is the talking picture‐<br />
sign. The picture conveyed a worded message to those who had spoken the language <strong>of</strong> Asclepios, to be<br />
more precise: the language <strong>of</strong> his sculptor. The Greek didn’t understand the message <strong>of</strong> the talking<br />
picture‐sign, for them this statue is only meaningless symbol. Unfortunately, even his followers who still<br />
speak his language cannot read their masters message, and to whom he clearly speaks about his mother‐<br />
tongue won’t even listen.<br />
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ETHNOGRAPHY<br />
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TODORIKI, Masahiko<br />
Tuwa‐Ren:<br />
The Emerging Ethnic Identity <strong>of</strong> the Altai‐Tuvans in Xinjiang<br />
ABSTRACT<br />
Tuvan settlements <strong>of</strong> the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUA) are located in the northern part<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Altai Prefecture, Ili Kazakh Autonomous District. In this area, the Chinese government plans to<br />
create the world’s largest national park, with an investment <strong>of</strong> RNB 3 billion. This park is the expanded<br />
version <strong>of</strong> the present‐day Xinjiang Khanas Travel Spot, and with a rating <strong>of</strong> 5A, it is one <strong>of</strong> the finest<br />
national tourist attractions in China (PRC). In a recent tourism development in this region, the local<br />
Tuvans have begun to redefine their ethnic identity as “Tuvan” rather than as “Mongolian.”<br />
Introduction<br />
SPEAKERS <strong>of</strong> the Tuvan (or Tyvan) language (note 1) and the cognate Taiga‐group dialects/languages<br />
(note 2), both <strong>of</strong> which belong to the South Siberian Turkic languages, are distributed in the Russian<br />
Federation (RF) (comprising Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva, Republic <strong>of</strong> Buryat, Irkutsk Oblast, and Krasnoyarsk Krai),<br />
the western and northern parts <strong>of</strong> Mongolia, the eastern region <strong>of</strong> Kazakhstan, and XUA. The total<br />
population <strong>of</strong> native Tuvan (and sister language(s)) speakers is more than 250,000 (note 3). This report<br />
focuses on the inhabitants <strong>of</strong> XUA and is based on the findings <strong>of</strong> my field trip to the region in August<br />
2007.<br />
Figure 1. Tuvan population around XUA and Kazakhstan (note 4)<br />
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Tuvans have attained worldwide fame for their rich musical heritage, including their famous vocalism<br />
called xöömey or throat‐singing (e.g., Aksyonov 1964:54–62; 171–187). However, only the forms <strong>of</strong> this<br />
music found in the Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva has achieved renown, while foreign enthusiasm for it emerged<br />
mainly after Perestroika. The literature on and the recordings <strong>of</strong> the Tuvan music <strong>of</strong> XUA are still limited<br />
(note 5).<br />
Tuvan or Mongolian?<br />
TUVANS on both sides <strong>of</strong> the Altai Mountains (“Altai‐Tuvans” hereafter (note 6)) were once members<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Altai‐Uriankhai, a heterolinguistic people comprised mainly <strong>of</strong> Altai‐Uriankhai Mongolians and<br />
Altai‐Tuvans during the latter half <strong>of</strong> the Qing dynasty (the mid‐18th century to 1911) (note 7). During<br />
this period, the Altai‐Uriankhai aymak or province was subdivided into seven gožuuns or banners. The<br />
Altai‐Tuvans were in the majority in three <strong>of</strong> the seven banners (Fig. 1 and note 4). The Altai‐Uriankhai<br />
aymak was situated in present‐day western Mongolia, northern XUA, and eastern Kazakhstan.<br />
Linguistically, the dialect <strong>of</strong> the Tuvans <strong>of</strong> Altai‐Uriankhai is identical throughout the area and can be<br />
freely used to communicate with the Tuvans <strong>of</strong> the Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva (note 2).<br />
According to the <strong>of</strong>ficial Chinese definition, the Tuvans (Tuwa‐Ren图瓦人 in Chinese) are classified as<br />
being Mongolians (Menggu‐Zu 蒙古族), despite the linguistic differences between the two (note 8).<br />
Interestingly, this statement is basically accepted by the local Tuvans, at least ostensibly. Their accord may<br />
be explained by the historical facts stated above. Moreover, it seems quite natural that Tuvans sympathize<br />
with the Mongolians, as both are Tibetan Buddhists, whereas the Kazakhs are Muslims. Moreover, the<br />
Tuvans resemble the Mongolians with regard to habits, customs, and clothing. The local Tuvans identify<br />
themselves ethnically Dïba, Dïwa, Tïba, Dïba Uraanxay, and so on. Terms such as Kök Mončak, Mončak and<br />
Mončog, which the local Kazakhs and Mongolians use to address them, are also accepted (note 9).<br />
Language and social status <strong>of</strong> the Altai‐Tuvans<br />
THE first field study <strong>of</strong> the Tuvan language in XUA was carried out in the 1950s as a collaborative<br />
research conducted by the Chinese Academy <strong>of</strong> Sciences, the Central Institute for Nationalities (now the<br />
Minzu University <strong>of</strong> China), and other researchers (Wu 1999:5; Geng 2000:47). More concrete inquiries<br />
were undertaken and published by Song in 1982 and 1985.<br />
There are reports that the Kazakhs have gained predominance over the Altai‐Uriankhais, including the<br />
Altai‐Tuvans, both in western Mongolia (Kamimura 1996:12; Tschinag 1993; Enwall 2005:106–109) and<br />
XUA (Matsubara 1993a:8). The Kazakhs’ negative views <strong>of</strong> the Tuvans have been reported since the early<br />
20th century at least (Kamimura 1996:12; Kamimura 1997:84–85). These Kazakhs have been accorded<br />
precedence over the local Altai‐Uriankhais, and the latter have had to yield property to the former. It is<br />
conceivable that the Altai‐Tuvans faced the same situation. According to the local people, Kazakhs are<br />
newcomers to the Altai Prefecture. Matsubara believes that the rise in the numbers <strong>of</strong> Kazakhs in this<br />
region led to the annexation <strong>of</strong> the Altai Prefecture by the Ili Kazakh Autonomous District in 1954<br />
(Matsubara 1993a:9).<br />
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The ethnic subordination <strong>of</strong> the Altai‐Tuvans is also apparent in their linguistic situation. Most Altai‐<br />
Tuvans are trilingual, speaking Mongolian and Kazakh along with their mother tongue, Tuvan (note 10).<br />
Thus far, no language school for Altai‐Tuvans has been established. Therefore, Tuvan is spoken only at<br />
home (Mongush 2002:40–41). Nevertheless, the language has been fairly well‐preserved, although it has<br />
undergone several changes in a multilingual context (Mawkanuli 2005:33–48). In contrast, local Kazakhs<br />
speak only the Kazakh language or are bilingual, speaking the Mongolian language as well—something<br />
akin to the Altai‐Uriankhai Mongolian’s monolingualism or the Mongolian‐Kazakh’s bilingualism. The<br />
Kazakhs and Mongolians seldom speak Tuvan. It appears common that a “minor” ethnicity has to speak<br />
a greater number <strong>of</strong> languages in order to survive, at least in this region (Matsubara 1993a:9).<br />
The Altai‐Tuvans are aware <strong>of</strong> the existence <strong>of</strong> the Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva, where their mother tongue is<br />
used as the first language. They learn about it from various sources, such as the radio programs and the<br />
visitors who arrive from there (Mongush 2002:41), as well as from the Internet. I even met a young man<br />
who actually visited the Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva.<br />
Tourism development and the ethnicity <strong>of</strong> local Tuvans<br />
THE northern part <strong>of</strong> XUA, which has Tuvan settlements, is situated around Lake Khanas (or Kanas,<br />
Ka‐na‐si喀纳斯, and so on) (Fig. 1 and note 4: toponym 7). This area is referred to as the Xinjiang Khanas<br />
Travel Spot or Khanas Nature Reserve (Wang et al. 2010), which is among the top 66 scenic places (a<br />
ranking <strong>of</strong> 5A) in the PRC, according to a China National Tourism Administration report <strong>of</strong> June 2007<br />
(China Hospitality News 2007a). Further, the Asia‐Pacific Tourism Organization designated this area as<br />
“China’s Top Scenic Spot” on July 31, 2006 (china.org.cn 2006).<br />
Between 2007 and 2010, the Chinese government plans to invest RNB 3 billion (ca. USD 430 million) on<br />
the infrastructure <strong>of</strong> the area (China Hospitality News 2007b). When the development activities are<br />
completed, this park will be about ten times as large it is at present, making it the world’s largest national<br />
park (Xinhua News Agency 2007). A new airport (Fig. 2) has been in service since August 2007, which<br />
provides considerably improved access to this remote area.<br />
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Figure 2. Khanas Airport, which is yet to open (August 2007)<br />
In line with this development, local Tuvans rely on their music, which is believed to be as rich as the<br />
music <strong>of</strong> the Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva, to promote tourism. Further, the “historical authenticity” <strong>of</strong> the ethnicity<br />
<strong>of</strong> Altai‐Tuvans has been repeatedly stressed in recent Chinese media reports (e.g., Zhong‐hua jin‐li wang‐<br />
luo she‐qu).<br />
Figure 3. The advertisement in Khanas village<br />
says, “A living fossil <strong>of</strong> the history <strong>of</strong> Tuvan music.<br />
This is the authentic Tuvan culture.” (August 2007).<br />
As shown in this picture, šoor is one <strong>of</strong> the main<br />
instruments used in music performances by the<br />
Altai‐Tuvans.<br />
Figure 4. Solongo (born in 1952) plays šoor.<br />
Under such circumstances, the Altai‐Tuvans seek to foster their identity as Tuvans rather than as<br />
Mongolians. As matter <strong>of</strong> fact, the Altai‐Tuvans in Khanas, the center <strong>of</strong> tourism, strongly distinguish<br />
themselves as Tuvans, unlike their peers in the early 1990s (Matsubara 1993b:12) and those in the present<br />
Khom village (Fig. 1 and note 4: toponym 13), who regard themselves as Mongolians. This attitude is also<br />
obvious among the dense Tuvan population <strong>of</strong> Ak‐Khaba village (Fig. 1; note 4: toponym 5).<br />
Despite the strong ethnic identity <strong>of</strong> the Altai‐Tuvans, the music heard at Khanas was performed by<br />
young Tuvans on an end‐blown flute šoor (Fig. 4)—an instrument that disappeared from the Republic <strong>of</strong><br />
Tuva almost half a century ago—played in the Altai‐Tuvan style in combination with the famous Altai‐<br />
Uriankhai Mongolian song “Altain Magtaal” (a song praising the Altai mountains) (Kamimura 2000;<br />
Schubert 2007). No authentic Altai‐Tuvan songs were performed. According to the Tuvans, these local<br />
songs are not suitable for stage performances. Instead, they used karaoke, microphones, and loud speakers<br />
to entertain Chinese tourists.<br />
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Conclusion<br />
ALTAI‐TUVANS, who once belonged to Altai‐Uriankhai aymak, have reasons to regard themselves as<br />
both Tuvans and Mongolians. Since the collapse <strong>of</strong> the Qing Dynasty, their ethnic identification has been<br />
ambiguous; this ambiguity has been further aggravated by their social weakness vis‐à‐vis the local<br />
Kazakhs. However, the recent development <strong>of</strong> tourism has led the Altai‐Tuvans to appreciate their<br />
culture, especially their music. This appreciation is partly an indirect effect <strong>of</strong> the worldwide fame<br />
enjoyed by the folk music <strong>of</strong> the Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva. Therefore, Altai‐Tuvans regard their ethnicity to be<br />
Tuvan and not Mongolian.<br />
Acknowledgements<br />
THIS study was partially supported by KAKEN (B) 19320094, and KAKEN (A) 18201051.<br />
NOTES<br />
1. This language is designated as Tïva dïl in the Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva. For more details about the language<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Altai‐Tuvans, see Song (1982, 1985), Wu (1999), Sugahara (1999), Geng (2000) and Mawkanuli<br />
(2005). Also, for standard Tuvan in the Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva, see Iskhakov & Pal’mbakh 1961 and Anderson<br />
& Harrison 2002. See also notes 2, 3, and 6.<br />
2. As part <strong>of</strong> his reexamination <strong>of</strong> Turkic languages, Schönig (1997) classified the Tuvan language as<br />
one <strong>of</strong> the Sayan Turkic languages, which are an <strong>of</strong>fshoot <strong>of</strong> the South Siberian Turkic languages (Schönig<br />
1997:125). He divided the Sayan Turkic into the T<strong>of</strong>a (Karagas) and the Tuvan languages. Zhukovskaya et<br />
al. (2002) provide greater detail and split the “Sayan sub‐group” (“Sayan Turkic” for Schönig) into two<br />
parts: (1) the Taiga‐group (T<strong>of</strong>a, Soyot, Dukha/Tsaatan, Tozhu dialect) and (2) Steppe‐group (Republic<br />
Tuvan dialects, Altai‐Tuvan dialects, Tuha/Uigur‐Uriankhai) [Zhukovskaya et al. 2002:165–166; Ragagnin<br />
2009]. It can be assumed that the Soyot dialect/language is possibly a Tuvan language creolized by the<br />
speakers <strong>of</strong> an extinct Southern Samoyedic language, called Mator (Helimski 1997:65–67; Shoji 1988–2001);<br />
the former has also now completely died out, a fact confirmed by my findings during the field trip to<br />
Okinskii District <strong>of</strong> Buryat Republic in 2007. The local Soyot people now speak a dialect <strong>of</strong> Buryat<br />
Mongolian, the Soyot dialect (Rassadin 1996:45), which is conceivably a re‐creolized Soyot<br />
dialect/language <strong>of</strong> Sayan Turkic. The Soyots have been shifting their language to those <strong>of</strong> their neighbors<br />
under the influence <strong>of</strong> commercial trade; however, they have retained their ethnic identity. The veracity <strong>of</strong><br />
this view is attested to by the Russian designation since 18th century <strong>of</strong> Tuvan as Soyon, Soyot, and so on,<br />
and as another ethnonym for Mator (Helimski 1997:66–67). The language environment <strong>of</strong> this kind <strong>of</strong><br />
Soyot may identical to that <strong>of</strong> other Taiga‐group dialects/languages, such as T<strong>of</strong>as and Duhas. See also<br />
notes 1, 3, and 6.<br />
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Figure 5. Distribution <strong>of</strong> the Sayan Turkic languages and dialects: the Taiga group <strong>of</strong><br />
languages/dialects (presented in clear boxes) and Steppe group (presented in black boxes), and the<br />
Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva (shown in gray).<br />
3. According the Russian census conducted in 2002, the population <strong>of</strong> Tuvan speakers is about 250,000 (Tuvan<br />
and Tozhu Tuvan) in the Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva and about 400 (mainly speakers <strong>of</strong> the T<strong>of</strong>a language) in the surrounding<br />
area <strong>of</strong> the republic (Peoples and Languages <strong>of</strong> Russian Federation Statistics). According to several recent<br />
reports, the Non-RF Tuvan population is anything from several thousand (Mongush 2002:17; Anderson &<br />
Harrison 2002:2; Enwall 2005:100) to 50,000 (Kamimura 1997:85) in Mongolia and several thousand in XUA<br />
(Wu 1999:1; Mongush 2002:22; Maukanuli 2005:1). The total Tuvan population is thus between 260 and 300<br />
thousand. See also notes 1, 2, and 6.<br />
4. Legends<br />
: International boundary (present‐day).<br />
: Boundary <strong>of</strong> the Altai Prefecture, XUA (present‐day).<br />
: Boundary <strong>of</strong> counties (present‐day)<br />
: The seven banners <strong>of</strong> Altai‐Uriankhai before 1907 (Hu & Yan 1863, North 3–6: West 6–7).<br />
: Tuvan population in XUA and Kazakhstan (present‐day).<br />
: The seven banners <strong>of</strong> Altai‐Uriankhai in 1907 (Zhong‐yang yan‐jiu‐yuan jin‐dai‐shi yan‐jiu‐suo et<br />
al. 1959: Fig. 2 A‐er‐tai ke‐bu‐duo jie tu 阿爾泰科布多界圖).<br />
: Tuvan banners.<br />
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: Altai‐Uriankhai Mongolian banners.<br />
: Administrative units where Tuvans locate (present‐day).<br />
: Administrative units where Tuvans do not locate (present‐day).<br />
: Khanas Airport (in service since August, 2007).<br />
① Chinese toponyms (pinyin) ② Mongolian toponyms ③ Tuvan toponyms ④ Kazakh toponyms<br />
⑥ Geographical features<br />
<br />
1. ① ‐‐ ② ‐‐ ③ Temir‐Xaba ④ ‐‐ ⑤ river<br />
2. ① ‐‐ ② ‐‐ ③ Narsïn‐Xaba ④ ‐‐ ⑤ river<br />
3. ① ‐‐ ② ‐‐ ③ Nariin‐Xaba ④ ‐‐ ⑤ river<br />
4. ① 阿克库勒湖 (A‐ke Ku‐le Hu) ② ‐‐ ③ Ak‐Köl ④ ‐‐ ⑤ lake<br />
5. ① 喀拉哈巴河 (Ka‐la Ha‐ba He) ② ‐‐ ③ Xara‐Xaba / Kara‐Kaba ④ ‐‐ ⑤ river<br />
6. ① 阿克哈巴南村 (A‐ke Ha‐ba Nan Cun) / 白哈巴村 (Bai Ha‐ba Cun) ② ‐‐ ③ Ak‐Xaba / Ak‐<br />
Kaba ④ ‐‐ ⑤ small village<br />
7. ① 喀纳斯湖 (Ka‐na‐si Hu) ② Xanas‐Nuur ③ Xanas‐Köl / Xanəs‐Köl / Kanas‐Köl / Kanəs‐Köl<br />
④ ‐‐ ⑤ lake<br />
8. ① ‐‐ ② ‐‐ ③ ‐‐ ④ Terek ⑤ river<br />
9. ① ‐‐ ② ‐‐ ③ Kurtï‐Xaba / Kurtï‐Kaba ④ ‐‐ ⑤ river<br />
10. ① 铁热克提乡 (Tie‐re‐ke‐ti Xiang) ② ‐‐ ③ Terekti Awїdїk (Mawkanuli 2005:11) / Ulaasta (old<br />
name) ④ Terek ⑤ village<br />
11. ① 贾登峪 (Jia‐deng‐yu) ② ‐‐ ③ Čal‐Ög / Čal‐Oi ? ④ Čal‐Öi ⑤ small village<br />
12. ① 也买盖堤 (Ye‐mai‐gai‐di) ② ‐‐ ③ ‐‐ ④ Yemeget ⑤ small village<br />
13. ① 禾木喀纳斯蒙古族乡 (He‐mu Ka‐na‐si Meng‐gu‐zu Xiang) ② ‐‐ ③ Xom Gïsta (Mawkanuli<br />
2005:17) / Kom ③ ‐‐ ④ ‐‐ ⑤ village<br />
14. ① 吉克普林 (Ji‐ke‐pu‐lin) ② ‐‐ ③ Čikbileŋ ③ ‐‐ ④ ‐‐ ⑤ small village<br />
15. ① 阿克齐镇 (A‐ke‐qi Zhen) ② ‐‐ ③ ‐‐ ③ Söl‐Xaba / Söl‐Kaba ④ ‐‐ ⑤ small city<br />
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16. ① 布尔津镇 (Bu‐er‐jin Zhen) ② ‐‐ ③ Buwuršïn Awdan (Mawkanuli 2005:17, 21) ④ ‐‐ ⑤<br />
small city<br />
17. ① 冲乎尔乡 (Chong‐hu‐er Xiang) ② ‐‐ ③ Šuŋkur Awїldїk (Mawkanuli 2005:20) ④ ‐‐ ⑤<br />
village<br />
18. ① 额尔齐斯河 (E‐er‐qi‐si He) ② Erčis‐Gol / Eeviin‐Gol ③ Eevi‐Xem / Eevi‐Kem ④ Irtiš ⑤<br />
river<br />
19. ① 阿拉哈克乡 (A‐la‐ha‐ke Xiang) ② ‐‐ ③ Alagak Awїdїk (Mawkanuli 2005:18) / Dört‐Sumun<br />
Mončok (Matsubara 1995:20, 23) / Dïwa Gožuun (Matsubara 1995:23) ④ ‐‐ ⑤ village<br />
20. ① 福海镇 (Fu‐hai Zhen) ② ‐‐ ③ ‐‐ ④ ‐‐ ⑤ small city<br />
21. ① 切木尔切克乡 (Qie‐mu‐er Qie‐ke Xiang) ② ‐‐ ③ ‐‐ ④ ‐‐ ⑤ village<br />
22. ① 阿苇滩镇 (A‐wei‐tan Zhen) ② ‐‐ ③ Aviten ? (or Awdan “county” (Mawkanuli 2005:230) ④ ‐‐<br />
⑤ small city<br />
23. ① 阿勒泰市 (A‐le‐tai Shi: Altai‐City) / 承化寺 (Cheng‐hua Si: Chenghua Temple) (old name) ② ‐‐<br />
③ Aldai Xala (Mawkanuli 2005:18) ④ ‐‐ ⑤ county‐level city<br />
24. ① 汗德尕特蒙古族乡 (Han‐de‐ga‐te Meng‐gu‐zu Xiang / 喇嘛召乡 (La‐ma‐zhao Xian) ② ‐‐ ③<br />
Xandagaitї Awїdїk (Mawkanuli 2005:18) ④ ‐‐ ⑤ village<br />
25. ① 库额尔齐斯镇 (Ku‐e‐erqi‐si Zhen) ② ‐‐ ③ ‐‐ ④ ‐‐ ⑤ small city<br />
26. ① 铁买克乡 (Tie‐mai‐ke Xiang) ② ‐‐ ③ Temeki Awїdїk (Mawkanuli 2005:19) ④ ‐‐ ⑤ village<br />
27. ① 可可托海镇 (Ke‐ke Tuo‐hai Zhen) ② ‐‐ ③ Gök‐Togai Awdan (Mawkanuli 2005:19) / Kök‐<br />
Dugai (Mongush 1997:5) ④ Kök‐Toγai ⑤ small city<br />
28. ① 吐尔洪乡 (Tu‐er‐hong Xiang) ② ‐‐ ③ Turgun Awїdїk (Mawkanuli 2005:19) ④ ‐‐ ⑤ small<br />
city<br />
29. ① 青河镇 (Qing‐he Zhen) ② Čingel ③ Šinŋgil Awdan (Mawkanuli 2005:21) ④ Činŋgil ⑤<br />
small city<br />
30. ① ‐‐ ② ‐‐ ③ Xovd ④ Xomdu ④ ‐‐ ⑤ city (Mongolia)<br />
<br />
L: Uriankhai left‐wing banners<br />
R: Uriankhai right‐wing banners<br />
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L1 . ① 烏梁海左翼公圖旗 (Wu‐liang‐hai zhuo‐yi‐gong Tu Qi) ② Cagaan (Ak) Soyony Xošuu<br />
(Kamimura 2000:22) ③ Ak‐Soyan Gožuun (Mawkanuli 2005:4–5) ④ ‐‐ ⑤ banner<br />
L2. ① 烏梁海左翼公桑旗 (Wu‐liang‐hai zhuo‐yi‐gong Sang Qi) ② Xar (Ulaan) Soyony Xošuu<br />
(Kamimura 2000:22) ③ Kara‐Soyan Gožuun (Mawkanuli 2005:4–5) ④ ‐‐ ⑤ banner<br />
L3. ① 烏梁海左翼公噶旗 (Wu‐liang‐hai zhuo‐yi‐gong Ga Qi) ② Züün Ambany Xošuu (Kamimura<br />
2000:22) ③ Taŋdï Ooršak Gožuun (Mawkanuli 2005:4–5) ④ ‐‐ ⑤ banner<br />
L4. ① 烏梁海左翼副都統旗 (Wu‐liang‐hai zhuo‐yi Fu‐dou‐tong Qi) ② Meerengiin Xošuu (Kamimura<br />
2000:22) ③ Meereŋ Gožuun (Mawkanuli 2005:4–5) ④ ‐‐ ⑤ banner<br />
R1. ① 烏梁海右翼公瓦旗 (Wu‐liang‐hai you‐yi‐gong Wa Qi) ② Xöx Mončogiin (Šar Dagiin) Xošuu<br />
(Kamimura 2000:22) ③ Mončak Gožuun (Mawkanuli 2005:4–5) ④ ‐‐ ⑤ banner<br />
R2. ① 烏梁海右翼公棍旗 (Wu‐liang‐hai you‐yi‐gong Gun Qi) ② Dönxör Xošuu (Kamimura 2000:22)<br />
③ Saruul Gožuun (Mawkanuli 2005:4–5) ④ ‐‐ ⑤ banner<br />
R3. ① 烏梁海右翼貝子旗 (Wu‐liang‐hai you‐yi Bei‐zi Qi) ② Baruun Ambany Xošuu (Kamimura<br />
2000:22) ③ Beesi Gožuun (Mawkanuli 2005:4–5) / Dört‐Sumon (Mongush 2002:20–22) ④ ‐‐ ⑤ banner<br />
5. Those examples are applicable: several song lyrics (Mongush 2002:122–123; Mawkanuli 2005:183–<br />
202); a two‐stringed plucking chordophone topšoor/topšuur (došpuluur/ došpulduur/topšuluur in Republic<br />
Tuvan, došpulduur in Tuvan <strong>of</strong> western Mongolia) and an end‐blown flute šoor (Dao‐er‐jia‐la & Zhou‐ji<br />
1985); a two‐stringed bow instrument ilgil/ilgiil/ilkiil (in both XUA and western Mongolia) (Dao‐er‐jia‐la &<br />
Zhou‐ji 1990), which known as igil in the Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva. Altai‐Tuvans and Altai‐Uriankhai Mongolians<br />
essentially share the same musical environment. In consequence, Dao‐er‐jia‐la & Zhou‐ji (1985 and 1990)<br />
treated Altai‐Tuvans and Altai‐Uriankhai Mongolians as “Oirat‐Mongolians,” and the statements on the<br />
books above mentioned are lumped the both all together. Video‐CDs <strong>of</strong> šoor performances are now<br />
available, but only at the local gift shops. The names <strong>of</strong> Altai‐Tuvan musical instrument in western<br />
Mongolia are based on my filed trip to the region conducted in May 2002.<br />
6. The name <strong>of</strong> Tuvans, once integrated in the Altai‐Uriankhai aymak, does not settle the question <strong>of</strong> a<br />
proper form <strong>of</strong> address. Here, I <strong>of</strong>fer the name “Altai‐Tuvans” tentatively. The territory where the Altai‐<br />
Tuvans settled ranged from the present‐day Kazakhstan (East Kazakhstan Province), Mongolia (Bayan‐<br />
Ölgii, Khovd, and Uvs Provinces), and XUA (Altai Prefecture). This appellation was basically borrowed<br />
from Taube (2008:280–281) and Mawkanuli (2005:4), but embraces a wider collective, whose members<br />
speak a Tuvan <strong>of</strong> the Altai Mountains dialect (note 2). Mawkanuli also names them “Jungar Tuvan,”<br />
though this is narrower representation <strong>of</strong> the Chinese side (Mawkanuli 2005:1–2). Furthermore, the<br />
exonym <strong>of</strong> Jungar Tuvan may mislead readers to connect with them with the Dzungarian Basin, which<br />
few hundred kilometers south from their territory. “Tsengel‐Tuvan” (Taube 2008:266) and “Khovd<br />
Tuvan” (Taube 2008:280), on the other hand, are the counterparts in Mongolia. The present situation <strong>of</strong><br />
the Altai Tuvans in Kazakhstan is not reported so far. See also notes 1, 2, 3, and 7.<br />
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7. After the conquest <strong>of</strong> the Dzungar Empire, the Qing dynasty reorganized Altai‐Uriankhai aymak or<br />
province under the Qing’s banner system in 1757 or sometime later (Todoriki 2008: 4–5; Todoriki<br />
2009:215–217; Todoriki 2010:264–273). There were two other “Uriankhai” aymaks: Tannu‐Uriankhai,<br />
roughly corresponding to the present‐day Republic <strong>of</strong> Tuva ((Todoriki 2008; 2009; 2010), and Altai‐Nuur<br />
Uriankhai (or Altan‐Nuur Uriankhai), roughly corresponding to the present‐day Republic <strong>of</strong> Altai, RF.<br />
8. Ren 人, literally “person, people,” is a rather conventional ethnic group compared to zu 族, which is<br />
an <strong>of</strong>ficial ethnicity in China.<br />
9. Dïba, Dïwa, and so on, are identical to Tïva, the self‐designation <strong>of</strong> locals <strong>of</strong> the Tuva Republic. The<br />
ethnonym <strong>of</strong> tïva, which suggests (Southern‐) Samoyedic origins (Hajdú 1950:76–78, 98–100; Joki 1952:28–<br />
29), is considered identical to Dou‐bo 都波 (in Old Chinese To‐pua) in Bei‐shi Tie‐le yun 北史・鐵勒伝 (659<br />
AD) and Sui‐shu Tie‐le yun 隋書・鐵勒伝 (629–636 AD), to Dou‐bo都播 (in Old Chinese To‐puat) in Jiu Tang‐<br />
shu Tie‐le yun 舊唐書・鐵勒伝 (945 AD) and Xin Tang‐shu Hui‐[gu/hu] yun 新唐書・回鶻伝 (1060 AD), and<br />
to Tuba 禿巴 in Yuan‐chao mi‐shi 元朝秘史 (13th–14th centuries), considering the locations and the<br />
neighboring ethnonyms <strong>of</strong> these terms. The Altai‐Tuvans in XUA widely accepted mončak as an exonym<br />
that originated from the Kazakh word monšaq or necklace (Krippes 1994:78), since they wore the kök<br />
monšaq or blue‐beaded necklace worn by Tibetan Buddhists (e.g., Matsubara 1993a:7). Although Monchak,<br />
Monchok, Monchog, and other similar words, are exonyms, one <strong>of</strong> the seven banners <strong>of</strong> Altai‐Uriankhai<br />
was called Mončak Gožuun (R1) (Fig. 1 and note 4) by the Tuvans themselves. In this regard, Enwall is<br />
critical <strong>of</strong> the Kazakh origin <strong>of</strong> mončak and <strong>of</strong>fers a long discussion on its etymology (Enwall 2005:100–<br />
101). However, the earliest report on Kök‐Monchak by Potanin in the late 19th century states that “the<br />
Kirgiz (meaning Kazakh) called it “Kok‐munchak” (which means “blue bead” in the Kirgiz language)”<br />
(Potanin 1881:9). According to this report, the Kazakh origin <strong>of</strong> the exonym is quite firmly established.<br />
Additionally, Mončak Gožuun was also known as Dïwa Gožuun (Tuvan Banner), and the ethnonym<br />
Monchak has been partially assimilated through self‐designation by the local Tuvans (Matsubara 1995:20).<br />
Therefore, Enwall’s surmise could not be accepted. See also notes 1, 2, and 3.<br />
10. There are even tetra‐/pentalinguals with Chinese and sometimes Uyghur.<br />
LITERATURE<br />
Aksyonov, Aleksei Nikolaevich: Tuvinskaya Narodnaya Muzyka, Muzyka, Moscow (1964).<br />
Anderson, Gregory D. S. & Harrison, K. David: A grammar <strong>of</strong> Tuvan. Scientific Consulting<br />
Services International, [s.l.], (2002).<br />
China Hospitality News (2007a). [2008, June 02].<br />
China Hospitality News (2007b). [2008, June 02].<br />
China.Org.Cn. (2006). [2008, June 02].<br />
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Dao‐er‐jia‐la 道尔加拉 & Zhou‐ji周吉: Zhe‐bu‐xiu‐er he chu‐wu‐er qu‐xuan.<br />
杔布秀尓和楚吾尓曲选. Xin‐jiang Ren‐min Chu‐ban‐she Chu‐ban, Urumqi (1985).<br />
Dao‐er‐jia‐la 道尔加拉 & Zhou‐ji周吉: Ye‐ke‐le qu‐xuan. 叶克勒曲选. Xin‐jiang Ren‐min Chu‐ban‐<br />
she Chu‐ban, Urumqi (1990).<br />
Enwall, Joakim: Tuvan or Mongol: A study <strong>of</strong> inter‐ethnic relations and ethnic definition<br />
strategie3s among Tuvans and Kazakhs in western Mongolia, Turkic Lanugages. 9: 93–115<br />
(2005).<br />
Geng, Shimin: Materials <strong>of</strong> the Tuvinian language in China. Acta Orientalia Academiae<br />
Scientiarum Hungaricae 53: 47‐63 (2000).<br />
Hajdú, Péter: Die Benennungen der Samojeden. <strong>Journal</strong> de la Société Finno‐ ougrienne 54: 1–112<br />
(1950).<br />
Helimski, Eugen: Die matorische Sprache – Wörterverzeichnis – Grundzüge der Grammatik –<br />
Sprachgeschichte, JATE Finnugor Tanszék, Szeged (1997).<br />
Hu, Lin‐yi胡林翼 & Yan, Shu‐lin嚴樹林: Huan‐chao zhong‐wai yi‐tong yu‐tu. 皇朝中外壹統輿圖. vol.<br />
1–32, [s.n.], [s.l.] (1863).<br />
Iskhakov, Fazyl Garifovich & Pal’mbakh, Aleksandr Adol’fovich: Grammatika tuvinskogo<br />
yazhyka. Izdatel’stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, Moscow (1961).<br />
Joki, Aulis Johannes: Die Lehnwörter des Sajansamojedischen. Suomalais‐Ugrilainen Seura,<br />
Helsinki (1952).<br />
Kamimura, Akira 上村明: 1930 nen ni okeru Arutai Orianhai no Shinkyō eno “shūdan‐tōbō” ni<br />
tsuite. 1930年におけるアルタイ・オリアンハイの新疆への「集団逃亡」について. (1996).<br />
[2008, June 02].<br />
Kamimura, Akira 上村明: Tokusū Ajia no gengo jijō: Mongoru. 特集 アジアの言語事情:<br />
モンゴル. Gekkan Gengo 26 (11): 82–85 (1997).<br />
Kamimura, Akira 上村明: (Shūsei‐ban) Kokumin‐geinou to shite no eiyū‐<br />
jyojishi(修正版)国民芸能としての英雄叙事詩Performing heroic epics and nationalism in<br />
Mongolia. (2000).<br />
[2008, June 02].<br />
Krippes, Karl A.: Kazakh (Qazaq)–English Dictionary. Dunwoody Press, Kensington (1994).<br />
Mawkanuli, Talant. Jungar Tuvan Texts. Indiana University Bloomington Research Institute for<br />
Inner Asian <strong>Studies</strong>, Bloomington (2005).<br />
Matsubara, Masatake 松原正毅: Sōgen no kaze : Arutai no Tuwa zoku. 草原の風 :<br />
アルタイのトゥワ族. Gekkan Hyakka 372: 4–9 (1993a).<br />
Matsubara, Masatake 松原正毅: Sōgen no kaze : Arutai no Tuwa zoku 2. 草原の風 :<br />
アルタイのトゥワ族 2. Gekkan Hyakka 373: 10–15 (1993b).<br />
Matsubara, Masatake 松原正毅: Sōgen no kaze : Dai‐ni‐bu Tuwa zoku no hirogari 1. 草原の風 :<br />
第二部 トゥワ族のひろがり 1. Gekkan Hyakka 387: 18–23 (1995).<br />
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Mongush, Marina Vasil’evna: Tuvintsy Mongolii i Kitaya. Nauka, Novosibirsk (2002).<br />
Peoples and Languages <strong>of</strong> Russian Federation Statistics:<br />
[2008, June 02].<br />
Potanin, Grigorii Nikolaevich: Ocherki Severo‐zapadnoi Mongolii : resul’taty puteshestviya,<br />
ispolnennago v” 1896–1877 godakh” po porucheniyu Imperatorskago Russkago<br />
geograficheskago obshchestva G.H. Potanym”. vol. 2, Tipografiya V. Bezobrazova i Kompanii,<br />
Saint Petersburg (1881).<br />
Ragagnin, Elisabetta: A rediscovered lowland T<strong>of</strong>an variety in northern Mongolia, Turkic<br />
Languages. 13: pp. 224–245 (2009).<br />
Rassadin, Valentin Ivanovich: Zhivotnovodcheskaya leksika v yazyke okinskikh Buryat i<br />
Soitov. in: Problemy buryatskoi dialektologii, 45–57, Buryatskii Nauchnyi Nauk, Ulan‐Ude (1996).<br />
Schönig, Claus: A new attempt to classify the Turkic languages (I). Turkic Languages 1: 117–133<br />
(1997)<br />
Schubert, Eva: Research about the Altayn Magtaal (Ode to the Altay Mountains). (2007).<br />
[2010, April 03].<br />
Shogaito, Masahiro 庄垣内正弘: Tuba‐go. トゥバ語. in: Gengo‐gaku dai‐jiten. 2, 1222–1225, Sansē‐<br />
dō (1988‐2001).<br />
Shoji, Hiroshi 庄司博史: Matoru‐go. マトル語. in: Gengo‐gaku Daijiten. vol. 3, 100, Sansē‐dō<br />
(1988–2001).<br />
Song, Zheng‐chun 宋正 : Wo‐guo Tu‐wa yu yin‐xi chu‐tan. 我国土瓦 音系初探. Min‐zu<br />
Yuwen 6: 58–65 (1982).<br />
Song, Zheng‐chun 宋正 : Tu‐wa yu gai‐kuang. 瓦 概况. Min‐zu Yuwen 31: 65–80 (1985).<br />
Sugahara, Mutsumi: Turkic languages <strong>of</strong> western Mongolia a preliminary report. in: Issues in<br />
Turkic languages -description and language contact-. 157–166, Department <strong>of</strong> Linguistics, Kyoto<br />
University, Kyoto (1999).<br />
Todoriki, Masahiko: Old maps <strong>of</strong> Tuva 1-The detailed map <strong>of</strong> the nomadic grazing patterns <strong>of</strong> total<br />
area <strong>of</strong> the Tannu‐Uriankhai. The Research and Information Center for Asian <strong>Studies</strong>, The<br />
Institute <strong>of</strong> Oriental Culture, University <strong>of</strong> Tokyo (2008).<br />
Todoriki, Masahiko: Old maps <strong>of</strong> Tuva 2-Tannu‐Uriankhai maps in eighteenth century China. The<br />
Research and Information Center for Asian <strong>Studies</strong>, The Institute <strong>of</strong> Oriental Culture,<br />
University <strong>of</strong> Tokyo (2009).<br />
Todoriki, Masahiko: Tuba‐no kochizu‐ga imi suru mono―yūbokumin‐no sekai‐ninshiki.<br />
トゥバの古地図が意味するもの―遊牧民の世界認識―. Tōyō Bunka 90: 261–293 (2010).<br />
Tschinag, Galsan: Das Ende des Liedes. A1 Verlag, Munich (1993).<br />
Wang, Hui, Zhaoping Yang, Li Chen, Jingjing Yang & Rui Li: Minority community<br />
participation in tourism: A case <strong>of</strong> Kanas Tuva villages in Xinjiang, China. Tourism Management<br />
31: 759–764 (2010).<br />
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Wu, Hong‐wei 吴宏<br />
(1999).<br />
: Tu‐wa yu yan‐jiu. 瓦 研究. Shanghai Far East Publishers, Shanghai<br />
Xinhua News Agency (2007): [2008, June 02].<br />
Zhong‐hua jin‐li wang‐luo she‐qu lun‐tan 中 网 社区 :<br />
[2008, June 02].<br />
Zhong‐yang yan‐jiu‐yuan jin‐dai‐shi yan‐jiu‐ suo 中央研究院近代史研究所, Li, Yu‐shu 李毓澍,<br />
Guo, Ting‐yi 郭廷以 & Hu, Qiu‐yuan 胡秋原: Zhong‐guo jin‐dai‐shi zi‐liao‐hui‐ bian : Wai meng‐gu<br />
: Zhong‐e guan‐xi shi‐liao : Zhong‐hua‐min‐guo liu‐ nian zhi ba‐nian<br />
中國近代史資料彙編:外蒙古:中俄關係史料:中華民國六年至八年, Zhong‐yang yan‐jiu‐yuan<br />
jin‐dai‐shi yan‐jiu‐suo, Nan‐ gang (Tai‐bei xian) (1959).<br />
Zhukovskaya, Nataliya L’vovna, Oreshkina, M.V. & Rassadin Valentin Ivanovich: Soiotskii<br />
yazyk. in: Yazyki narodov Rosii krasnaya kniga : Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’‐spravochnik. 164–170,<br />
Academia, Moscow (2002).<br />
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GEOSTRATEGY<br />
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ABILOV, Shamkhal<br />
Historical Development <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijan Oil Industry and the Role<br />
<strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan in Todayʹs European Energy Security<br />
Azerbaijan is one <strong>of</strong> the birthplaces <strong>of</strong> the oil industry and one <strong>of</strong> the first countries where people<br />
learned how to produce oil and use it for medicinal and household needs. The earliest exploration <strong>of</strong> oil in<br />
the Apsheron Peninsula goes back approximately to the 7 th century BC. Beginning in the 5 th century BC,<br />
oil was lifted from wells in leather buckets. 1 The information about the oil production in the Apsheron<br />
Peninsula had found its reflection also in the manuscripts <strong>of</strong> the Arabic and Iranian authors such as Ibn<br />
Miskaveykh (10 th c.), Abu Dulaf (10 th c.), Yakut al‐Khamavi (13 th c.), Khamdullakh Gazvini (14 th c.) and<br />
others. 2 The early use <strong>of</strong> oil in Azerbaijan was similar to the use <strong>of</strong> oil in America and in the Middle East<br />
during ancient times — mainly used for home, construction, medicinal and military purposes. Dg. Dyuket<br />
illustrates the first use <strong>of</strong> oil in Baku as:<br />
ʺOne can observe a strange occurrence near the town ‐ striking quantity <strong>of</strong> acid refined oil rises<br />
here which is popular in the remote part <strong>of</strong> Persia; it serves for illumination <strong>of</strong> houses throughout<br />
the country. This acid refined oil is black and called ´oil´. It is transported throughout the<br />
country on mules and donkeys that can frequently be met in caravans <strong>of</strong> 400‐500 at the same<br />
time. Near the above mentioned Baku city there is also another kind <strong>of</strong> oil, <strong>of</strong> white and very<br />
valuable, and it is assumed that it is the same what we call petroleumʺ. 3<br />
Considering the ancient past <strong>of</strong> the emerging oil industry in Azerbaijan, this research paper aims at<br />
scrutinizing the historical development <strong>of</strong> the oil industry: from its very onset to the contemporary<br />
period. Hence I outline the structure <strong>of</strong> the paper according to the following periodization: from the<br />
middle <strong>of</strong> the 19 th century until the end <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union; Azerbaijan after independence and the<br />
second oil boom – massive inflow <strong>of</strong> foreign investment (1991‐1994); contemporary international oil and<br />
gas deals/projects (1994 up until our days).<br />
After the independence, Azerbaijan put forward an independent energy policy, which has been a<br />
central factor in an uneasy competition among regional as well as global actors. Hereby the ever<br />
1 Farid Alakbarov, “Baku: City that Oil Built”, Azerbaijan International, Summer 2002 (10.2);<br />
(http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/ai102_folder/102_articles/102_overview_alakbarov.html<br />
September 2010.<br />
). Accessed on 10<br />
2 “Oil Industry <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan”, Caspian Energy; (http://www.old.caspenergy.com/19/oilidustry_e.html ). Accessed on 10<br />
September 2010.<br />
3 Ibid, “Oil Industry <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan”.<br />
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increasing global significance <strong>of</strong> oil and gas has driven the very interests <strong>of</strong> international powers. Tapping<br />
to Azerbaijani energy resources has become particularly important for the European Union, questing for<br />
secure energy routes to overcome Russian monopoly. In this sense, the paper concentrates also on the<br />
EU‐Azerbaijan relationship in the energy field as well as on the analysis <strong>of</strong> the role <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan in the<br />
energy security <strong>of</strong> Europe.<br />
Early history <strong>of</strong> oil in Azerbaijan<br />
The history <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan and its capital Baku is linked with oil from ancient times. Even in the third<br />
millennium BC, people <strong>of</strong> this territory were aware <strong>of</strong> the value <strong>of</strong> oil. Charle van der Leeuw, in his book<br />
“Oil and Gas in the Causasus and Caspian: a history”, writes:<br />
“Oil and its uses were also known on the Western Caspian shore well before the coming <strong>of</strong><br />
Alexander the Great, who managed to defeat the masse armies <strong>of</strong> the Persian emperor Darius III<br />
thanks to the governor <strong>of</strong> the then Persian province <strong>of</strong> present‐day eastern Azerbaijan”. 4<br />
Oil and fire have been a defining force in Azerbaijan for thousands <strong>of</strong> years and important symbols <strong>of</strong><br />
Zoroastrianism, a “fire worshiping” 5 . If we look at the history <strong>of</strong> the Zoroastrian religion and Baku as one<br />
<strong>of</strong> the centres <strong>of</strong> this religion, we can easily understand the history <strong>of</strong> oil and its use in Azerbaijan. Natig<br />
Aliyev, in his article “The History <strong>of</strong> Oil in Azerbaijan”, in this sense, cogently puts:<br />
“The Absheron Peninsula was famous for its eternal fires ‐ the underground fire gases rising to<br />
the earth’s surface. Zoroaster established fire worshipping and Baku became one <strong>of</strong> the most<br />
sacred sanctuaries. People from throughout the world wished to visit and bow before the eternal<br />
flame. In the Baku region there were three cult hearts or “Temple <strong>of</strong> Fire” ‐ one in Surakhany,<br />
another at Pirallahy Island, and the third one at Shubanu Mountain”. 6<br />
Even though there were a lot <strong>of</strong> memories about the first use <strong>of</strong> oil in Baku in ancient times, the first<br />
reliable information <strong>of</strong> the extraction <strong>of</strong> oil for commercial exploitation dates back to the 7 th or 8 th century.<br />
4 Charle van der Leeuw, Oil and Gas in the Caucasus and Caspian: A History, (Great Britain, Curzon Press, 2000), p. 29.<br />
5 Note: Zoroastrianism is one <strong>of</strong> the worldʹs oldest monotheistic religions. Founded by the Prophet Zoroaster (or Zarathustra) in ancient<br />
Iran approximately 3500 years ago, it has been one <strong>of</strong> the most powerful religions <strong>of</strong> the world for more than 1000 years. Between 600 BCE<br />
and 650 CE it was the <strong>of</strong>ficial religion <strong>of</strong> ancient Persian Empire. Today it is one <strong>of</strong> the smallest religions <strong>of</strong> the world. According to the New<br />
York Times reports <strong>of</strong> 2006 estimated number <strong>of</strong> Zoroastrian believers is approximately 190,000 worldwide. Zoroastrians believe there is one<br />
God called Ahura Mazda (Wise Lord) and He created the world. Zoroastrians are not fire‐worshippers, it is wrong interpretation, but they<br />
believe that fire is pure and it represents Godʹs light or wisdom. The Zoroastrian book <strong>of</strong> Holy Scriptures is called The Avesta;<br />
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/zoroastrian/). Accessed on 10 September 2010.<br />
6 Natiq Aliyev, ”The History <strong>of</strong> Oil in Azerbaijan” Azerbaijan International, Summer 1994 (2.2);<br />
(http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/22_folder/22_articles/22_history<strong>of</strong>oil.html). Accessed on 10 September 2010.<br />
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At that time, oil was extracted primarily by very primitive and natural ways. 7 According to historical<br />
data, in the 10 th century hand‐made oil wells were already being dug in Absheron Peninsula with an<br />
average depth <strong>of</strong> 10‐12 meters. Iranian Muslim philosopher Abul Hasan Ali Al‐Masuʹdi during his visit to<br />
Baku in 915, writes:<br />
“Vessels sail to Baka (Baku) and (there is) a spring <strong>of</strong> white naphta and other (kinds) and there is<br />
not in the world‐and Allah is the most knowing ‐ white naphta except in this spot, and it is (on)<br />
the shore <strong>of</strong> the kingdom <strong>of</strong> Sharvan (Shirvan), and in this naphta‐district (Nafata) there are<br />
chimneys (i.e., craters or vents) which are sources <strong>of</strong> fire which cease not to burn”. 8<br />
The well‐known Venetian traveler Marco Polo during his travel from Europe to the Far East, along the<br />
ancient Silk Route in 13 th century, also notes the use <strong>of</strong> oil in Baku. According to him, oil was considered<br />
as a remedy for skin diseases in men and cattle. He also mentioned that oil was used for burning and<br />
illuminating, and exported to the neighboring countries. He describes this in his memo:<br />
“Near the Georgian border there is a spring from which gushes a stream <strong>of</strong> oil, in such abundance<br />
that a hundred ships may load there at once. This oil is not good to eat; but it is good for burning<br />
and as a salve for men and camels affected with itch or scab. Men come from a long distance to<br />
fetch this oil, and in all the neighborhood no other oil is burnt but this”. 9<br />
According to the historical notes <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijani geographer Abd ar‐Rashid Bakuvi during the 14 th<br />
and 15 th century approximately 200 camel bales <strong>of</strong> oil were exported from Baku every day. 10<br />
In his book about Persia, published in 1543, the Venetian traveller Giosafat Barbaro illustrates the oil<br />
production in Baku:<br />
7 Ibid, Natiq Aliyev.<br />
“Upon this side <strong>of</strong> the sea there is another city called Bachu (Baku), where<strong>of</strong> the sea <strong>of</strong> Bachu<br />
taketh name, near unto which city there is a mountain that casteth forth black oil, stinking<br />
horrible, which they, nevertheless, use for furnishing <strong>of</strong> their light and for anointing <strong>of</strong> their<br />
camels twice a year. For if they were not anointed they would become scabby”. 11<br />
8 Bülent Gökay, “History <strong>of</strong> Oil Development in the Caspian Basin”, in Michael P. Croissant, Bülent Aras ed., Oil and Geopolitics<br />
in the Caspian Sea Region, (USA, Praeger Publishers, 1999), p. 4.<br />
9 Marco Polo & Ronald Latham, The Travels <strong>of</strong> Marco Polo, (London, Penguin Classics, 1958), p. 48.<br />
10 Ibid, Farid Alakbarov.<br />
11 Ibid, Bülent Gökay, “History <strong>of</strong> Oil Development in the Caspian Basin”.<br />
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Nevertheless, the first detailed description about the oil industry in Baku came from the memory <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Secretary <strong>of</strong> Swedish Embassy to Persia (Iran) Engelbert Kempfer in 1683. Referring to his memo, Farid<br />
Alakbarov notes in his article:<br />
“Baku: City that Oil Built” that, “the oil wells there were up to 27 meters deep, with walls<br />
covered in limestone or wood. During this period, Baku oil was already being exported to Russia<br />
and other countries in Eastern Europe.....Surakhani, a village alone not far from Baku, between<br />
2,700 kg to 3,000 kg <strong>of</strong> oil was extracted daily for export. This quantity filled 80 carriages<br />
carrying 8 oil bags each”. 12<br />
According to historical estimations, there were approximately 500 wells drilled in the Apsheron<br />
Peninsula at the beginning <strong>of</strong> the 17 th century. Azerbaijani historian Miryusif Mirbabayev writes that oil in<br />
many European and North American countries between the 15 th and 17 th century was extracted in a<br />
primitive way, “a tissue was lowered inside superficial wells and lakes, and then, it was squeezed to get<br />
oil to leak into vessels”, but at the same time the people <strong>of</strong> the Baku region already were aware <strong>of</strong> how to<br />
dig oil wells and extract oil using horse traction. The depth <strong>of</strong> the wells at that time, were around 20<br />
meters. 13<br />
In his memory a Turkish scientist and traveler, also gave information about the Baku oil in the second<br />
half <strong>of</strong> the 17 th century. According to him:<br />
“People extracting the oil are descending inside the wells: they extract oil day and night by<br />
accumulating it into cylinder‐shaped vessels made from goatskin. Oil is found in eight colors, but<br />
the best oil is yellow colored oil”.<br />
He writes that the extracted oil was transported to the neighboring countries, such as; Uzbekistan,<br />
Persia, Georgia and used for lighting and military purpose. 14<br />
At the eve <strong>of</strong> the 19 th century an English missionary to the region John Cartwright wrote down:<br />
“Concerning Bachu, it is a very ancient Hauentowne, very commodious for ships to harbor in, as<br />
also pr<strong>of</strong>itable to vent commodities, by reason that Ardouill, Tauris, Eres, Sumachia, and<br />
Derbent, lie not many days thence. Near unto this town, is a very strange and wonderful<br />
Fountain under ground, out <strong>of</strong> which there springeth and issueth a marvelous quantity <strong>of</strong> black<br />
oil, which serveth all parts <strong>of</strong> Persia to burne in their houses; and they visually carry it all over<br />
12 Ibid, Farid Alakbarov.<br />
13 Miryusif Mirbabayev, Concise History <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijani Oil, (Baku, 2010), p. 8.<br />
14 Ibid, Miryusif Mirbabayev, p. 9.<br />
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the country upon Kine and Asses, where<strong>of</strong> you shall <strong>of</strong>tentimes meet three or four hundred in<br />
company”. 15<br />
However, despite these facts, the methods used for the extraction <strong>of</strong> oil were very primitive, mainly<br />
hand dug wells drilled in shallow depths during those times and the drilling <strong>of</strong> oil by industrial methods<br />
was witnessed from the second half <strong>of</strong> the 19 th century.<br />
Otkupchina lease system and drilling the first oil well by industrial methods in oil´s world history<br />
With the death <strong>of</strong> Nadir Shah in 1747, the historical Azerbaijani territory witnessed a period <strong>of</strong> feudal<br />
fragmentation and divided into small independent units, which were called khanates in Azerbaijani<br />
historiography and regulated by the Khan. As the result <strong>of</strong> this fragmentation, the oil property <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Baku region became a direct ownership <strong>of</strong> the Khan. This situation came to an end in 1806, with the<br />
occupation <strong>of</strong> the Baku Khanate by Tsarist Russia. As the result <strong>of</strong> Russian intervention all properties <strong>of</strong><br />
the Khan were transferred to the Tzar. Following this, royal monopoly was created and the so‐called<br />
otkupchina lease system was applied to the oil industry by the Russian government, which means the<br />
monopolization <strong>of</strong> oil production by individuals. According to the otkupchina lease system, the Russian<br />
government granted the Apsheron oil wells to different lease out holders, who had no any intention than<br />
to extract as much oil as possible. This grant was given for certain time period, usually between 4‐8 years<br />
with a special contract under the direct control <strong>of</strong> the government. 16 According to Miryusif Mirbabayev:<br />
“This Contract gave guarantees to the lease‐out holder for almost everything: manpower for<br />
digging and repairing wells; dredging oil out <strong>of</strong> wells and its transportation to the city<br />
warehouses; as well as the right to dig and search new sources <strong>of</strong> oil. In his turn, the lease‐out<br />
holder had to pay large sums for the extraction <strong>of</strong> Baku oil in conformity with the concluded<br />
Contract”. 17<br />
The first lease out holder <strong>of</strong> Baku oil wells was the secretary <strong>of</strong> province, eighteen years old<br />
M.M. Tarumov, from the occupation <strong>of</strong> Baku in 1806 and the last one was I.M. Mirzoyev from 1860 until<br />
the end <strong>of</strong> otkupchina lease system in 1872. 18<br />
As the result <strong>of</strong> this system, in the oil industry in the first half <strong>of</strong> the 19 th century, there was no<br />
competition between the oil companies and every four year the producers were faced with the risk <strong>of</strong><br />
15 James Lawson Chapman, “The Modern Great Game in Central Asia”, Thesis presented in partial fulfillment <strong>of</strong> the<br />
requirements for the degree <strong>of</strong> Master <strong>of</strong> Arts in Geography, The University <strong>of</strong> Montana, Missoula, MT, Autumn 2006; p. 9.<br />
16 Richard Ryan Weber, “Power to the Petrol: How the Baku Oil Industry Made Labor Strikes and Mass Politics Possible in the<br />
Russian Empire (and beyond)”, Submitted in partial fulfillment <strong>of</strong> the requirements for the degree <strong>of</strong> Master <strong>of</strong> Arts, Columbia<br />
University, Graduate School <strong>of</strong> Arts & Sciences, May 2010; p. 9.<br />
17 Ibid, Miryusif Mirbabayev, p. 11.<br />
18 Ibid, Miryusif Mirbabayev, p. 11.<br />
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losing their entire investment, since there was no any guarantee that they wouldl be granted again with a<br />
contract by the Russian government. Consequently, investors were intended to get back their money in a<br />
short time period <strong>of</strong> time, hence they tried to extract as much as oil possible.<br />
“The only practical method to achieve this was to maximize short‐term pr<strong>of</strong>its, which entailed a<br />
variety <strong>of</strong> techniques and practices, such as drilling primarily for gushers and failing to properly<br />
isolate boreholes, that had detrimental effects on the longevity <strong>of</strong> individual wells”. 19<br />
Following this, the annual production <strong>of</strong> oil had not changed in the first half <strong>of</strong> the 19 th century and<br />
demand began to decrease. The estimated production was 250‐30 poods (4–5 thousand tons). The number<br />
<strong>of</strong> oil wells was 116 in 1813, then 125 in 1825, 120 in 1850, and only 218 in 1860. 20<br />
As I mentioned before, oil development and extraction <strong>of</strong> oil in Azerbaijan by industrial means began<br />
in the second half <strong>of</strong> the 19 th century when Baku was transformed into the biggest oil field <strong>of</strong> the Tsarist<br />
Empire. In July 1847, the first viceroy <strong>of</strong> the Caucasus, Prince Mikhail S. Vorontsov wrote to Vronchenko,<br />
the Russian State Secretary that:<br />
“I authorized new oil exploration in the Bibi‐Eibat section, Baku District, on the Caspian Sea<br />
coast, by means <strong>of</strong> earth drills, and used 1,000 rubles allocated by you for this purpose. In<br />
consequence, the director <strong>of</strong> the Baku and Shirvan mineral fields has reported that oil was found<br />
in a well drilled at Bibi‐Eibat”. 21<br />
In 1848, engineer Alekseev, eleven years prior to the striking <strong>of</strong> the first oil wells in United States on<br />
August 27, 1859 by ʺColonelʺ Edwin L. Drake near Titusville, Pennsylvania, drilled a 21 meter deep well<br />
using industrial equipment in Bibi‐Heybat oil field under the supervision <strong>of</strong> state advisor V.N. Semyonov.<br />
This event is considered the starting point <strong>of</strong> industrial oil extraction in Azerbaijan as well as in the whole<br />
world. 22 In December 1863, Javad Melikov built a first kerosene plant in the city <strong>of</strong> Baku and used cooling<br />
stations in the refining process for the first time in history. 23<br />
Later, however, no any serious step was taken in increasing the oil production and the development <strong>of</strong><br />
industrial technology, because the Russian government had supported the otkupchina lease system in oil<br />
industry, which prevented mass exploration <strong>of</strong> the oil fields in Baku until 1872. Prior to this, the<br />
19 Ibid, Richard Ryan Weber, p. 12.<br />
20 “Baku Oil: Pre‐Industrial Period”, UsakPedia, (http://www.usakpedia.com/content/Baku_Oil:_Pre‐Industrial_Period). Accessed<br />
on 12 September.<br />
21 Bülent Gökay, “The Background: History and Poitical Change”, in Bülent Gökay ed., The Politics <strong>of</strong> Caspian Oil, (New York,<br />
Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. 4.<br />
22 Ibid, Bülent Gökay, “The Background: History and Poitical Change”, p. 4.<br />
23 Robert W. Tolf, The Russian Rockefellers: The Saga <strong>of</strong> the Nobel Family and the Russian Oil Industry, (U.S Hoover Institution<br />
Press, February 1982), p. 44.<br />
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opponents <strong>of</strong> the otkupchina lease system, mainly businessmen and technical experts, such as<br />
V.A. Kokorev and the well‐known scholar in chemistry Dimitri Mendeleev, insisted on the abolishment <strong>of</strong><br />
this system. According to them, the free enterprise in oil production was the only adequate way for the<br />
development <strong>of</strong> the petroleum industry. The year 1872 was considered the year <strong>of</strong> dramatic changes in oil<br />
development technology and abolishment <strong>of</strong> otkupchina lease system, which let the local entrepreneurs<br />
and foreign investors to extract oil in the Baku region. With the end <strong>of</strong> the monopoly system the oil fields<br />
<strong>of</strong> Baku were sold to private individuals under auction. 24<br />
The first oil boom in Azerbaijan<br />
With the abolishment <strong>of</strong> the otkupchina lease system in 1872, Baku was transformed into a huge<br />
industrial center <strong>of</strong> Russia and gained a reputation as the “Oil Capital <strong>of</strong> the World” with the investment<br />
<strong>of</strong> foreign oil companies and local oil barons. As mentioned earlier, the abolishment <strong>of</strong> the lease system,<br />
the oil industry was declared free and oil fields were given to individuals by auctions, for which they paid<br />
only once. That year marked the beginning <strong>of</strong> oil drilling on a massive scale and increase <strong>of</strong> industrial<br />
production in the Russian oil sector. The new owners <strong>of</strong> oil fields immediately applied American<br />
techniques and methods to the drilling process <strong>of</strong> oil extraction, which led to the development <strong>of</strong> oil<br />
industry at great rate. The crude oil <strong>of</strong> Baku, which was successfully processed in domestic refineries,<br />
began to compete on the world market with the illuminating and lubricating products that were exported<br />
from the United States. 25<br />
Starting from 1872, the last three decades <strong>of</strong> the 19 th century witnessed an increase <strong>of</strong> the output <strong>of</strong> the<br />
oil industry in Azerbaijan <strong>of</strong> more than 170 times. In 1897, production was equal to the oil production in<br />
the United States; a year later it overtook that <strong>of</strong> the United States. 26 At the end <strong>of</strong> the 19 th century,<br />
fundamental changes had happened in the Azerbaijani oil industry and Azerbaijan became the largest oil<br />
producing country in the world. At the turn <strong>of</strong> the century, beginning from 1898 up to 1902, more than<br />
50% <strong>of</strong> the entire worldʹs oil production, and 95% <strong>of</strong> Russian oil was produced in Baku. 27 Comparing the<br />
development <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijani oil production after 1872 until 1902 with the oil production in United<br />
States Richard Ryan Weber mentions:<br />
“In 1873, the United States oil industry produced 7 million barrels <strong>of</strong> crude oil from over 1,000<br />
wells within the 9 square mile area <strong>of</strong> Pennsylvania’s Oil Creek valley. That same year, the Baku<br />
oil industry produced less than 400,000 barrels <strong>of</strong> crude, and featured only a handful <strong>of</strong> drilled<br />
wells scattered across 10 square miles on the shores <strong>of</strong> the Caspian Sea. Three decades later, in<br />
24 John P. McKay, “Baku Oil and Transcaucasian Pipelines, 1883‐1891: A Study in Tsarist Economic Policy”, Slavic Review, Vol.<br />
43, No. 4, Winter 1984, pp. 606‐607.<br />
25 Ibid, John P. McKay.<br />
26 Garskova I & Akhanchi P, “Discrimination in the Labour Market in the Baku Oil Industry (Late Nineteenth to Early Twentieth<br />
Century)”; (http://www.hist.msu.ru/Labour/Article/Moscow_congress.htm). Accessed on 12 September 2010.<br />
27 Bulent Gokay, “Caspian Uncertainties: Regional Rivalries and Pipelines”, Perceptions, <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> International Affairs, Vol. 3,<br />
Num. 1, March‐May 1998.<br />
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1901, the US industry had increased its output almost tenfold to 69 million barrels <strong>of</strong> annual<br />
production....same year, Baku produced an astonishing 85 million barrels <strong>of</strong> crude oil from 1,840<br />
active wells, and enlarged its area as well....From 1898 until 1902, the Apsheron Peninsula in the<br />
Russian province <strong>of</strong> Transcaucasia, on which Baku was situated, produced the majority <strong>of</strong> the<br />
world’s petroleum products”. 28<br />
However, beginning from the first years <strong>of</strong> the 20 th century the Azerbaijan oil industry suffered from<br />
political turbulence that spread all over Russia, culminating with the Russian revolution <strong>of</strong> 1905. The<br />
disastrous war between Russia and Japan in 1904‐05, 29 ethnic conflict throughout Caucasus, increase <strong>of</strong><br />
world oil production 30 , and later in the second decade <strong>of</strong> the 20 th century, with the outbreak <strong>of</strong> World<br />
War I and revolutionary change in the Russian government in 1917 were those factors that led to the<br />
decline <strong>of</strong> the oil production <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan. 31 Concerning the Russo‐Japanese war and the 1905 strike<br />
Manfred Weissenbacher writes in his book,<br />
“The economic crisis during this conflict further increased the tensions between two social groups<br />
working in the Azerbaijani oil industry: on the one hand, Muslim Azeris and Persians, and on the other<br />
hand, their Armenian employers....When strikes and riots erupted all over Russia in 1905....oil fields were<br />
set on fire, and over half the oil installations were destroyed”. 32<br />
The international oil crisis between 1901 and 1903 reduced the demand <strong>of</strong> oil. The number <strong>of</strong> refineries<br />
decreased from 91 to 86 and only 57 <strong>of</strong> them remained functional. The damage to the oil industry <strong>of</strong> Baku<br />
resulting from the fires <strong>of</strong> the 1905 strike is estimated at 19,500,000 rubles. 33 Hence, Russia did no longer<br />
take part in the increase <strong>of</strong> the worldwide production. The occupation <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan by the Soviet Empire<br />
in 1920 and its nationalization policy brought an end to most foreign investors and the oil barons were<br />
forced to leave the country. 34<br />
28 Ibid, Richard Ryan Weber, p.1.<br />
29 “Oil Barons <strong>of</strong> Baku, 1901‐1905”, Far Outliers, 4 August 2006; (http://faroutliers.wordpress.com/2006/08/04/oil‐barons‐<strong>of</strong>‐baku‐<br />
1901‐1905/). Accessed on 12 September 2010.<br />
30 “Attitudes <strong>of</strong> Major Soviet Nationalities”, Center for International <strong>Studies</strong>ʹ Massachusetts Institute <strong>of</strong> Technology, Vol. 3, June 1973.<br />
31 Nazim Rza Israfiloglu, Neft Qlobal Münaqişələr mənbəyi (Oil as a Source <strong>of</strong> Global Conflicts), (Bakı, Şərq‐Qərb, 2009), p. 102.<br />
32 Manfred Weissenbacher, Sources <strong>of</strong> Power: How Energy Forges Human History, (U.S, Greenwood Publsihing Group, 2009), p. 370.<br />
33 Firouzed Mostashari, “Development <strong>of</strong> Caspian oil in Historical Perspective”, in Hooshang Amirahmadi ed., The Caspian<br />
Region at a Crossroad: Challenges <strong>of</strong> a New Frontier <strong>of</strong> Energy and Development, (U.S, Palgrave Macmillan, 10 June 2000); pp. 98‐99.<br />
34 Khoshbakht Yusifzade, “The Development <strong>of</strong> the Oil and Gas Industry in Azerbaijan”, Azerbaijan International, Summer 1996<br />
(4.2); (http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/42_folder/42_articles/42_socarkhoshbakht.html ). Accessed on 15 September<br />
2010.<br />
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Foreign companies and local oil barons<br />
As mentioned earlier, during the last three decades <strong>of</strong> the 19 th century, the Russian oil industry began<br />
to attract considerably interest from foreign companies and local investors and Baku became the<br />
energy‐industrial capital <strong>of</strong> the world, thanks to the abolishment <strong>of</strong> the otkupchina lease system. The flow<br />
<strong>of</strong> foreign capital to Azerbaijan began with the arrival <strong>of</strong> the Nobel brothers, which was followed by the<br />
Rothschild investment in the Baku oil industry. Except them, the finance <strong>of</strong> the native bourgeoisie also<br />
played a crucial role in the oil fortunes <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan.<br />
Branobel (Nobel Brothers Oil Company) or Russian “Rockefeller”: While talking about Azerbaijani oil<br />
in the 19 th century, it is impossible not to draw the attention to the investment <strong>of</strong> the Nobel brothers,<br />
which was considered a revolutionary beginning <strong>of</strong> the Russian oil industry. The foundation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Branobel oil company took place after the visit <strong>of</strong> Robert Nobel to Baku in 1873. He was the eldest son <strong>of</strong><br />
Immanuel Nobel, the Swedish inventor, who moved to Russia in 1837 and created an industrial company<br />
for underwater mines. After the death <strong>of</strong> Immanuel Nobel, his second sun, Ludwig Nobel was running<br />
the company. The company signed a huge contract with the Russian government for manufacturing rifles.<br />
For the provisioning <strong>of</strong> wood for rifle stock with domestic supply Ludwig Nobel sent his brother Robert<br />
to the Caucasus in order to search for Russian walnut. His arrival to Baku in 1873 coincided with the<br />
abolishment <strong>of</strong> the lease system and the period <strong>of</strong> oil development in the Baku oil sector. Daniel Yergin<br />
describes that period as follows:<br />
“During that period the recent oil development had begun to bring great change to Baku; and<br />
Robert, immediately on his arrival in Baku, was caught up in the favor. Without consulting his<br />
brother — after all, he was the eldest and, therefore, held certain prerogatives — Robert took the<br />
twenty‐five thousand rubles that Ludwig had entrusted to him for buying wood — the “walnut<br />
money” — and instead bought a small refinery”. 35<br />
This event was the first step by which Nobel investment penetrated the oil industry <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan. The<br />
Branobel oil company was created on May 25, 1879. The founders <strong>of</strong> the company were the three sons <strong>of</strong><br />
Immanuel Nobel: Ludwig, Robert, and Alfred. The total capital asset <strong>of</strong> the company was three million<br />
rubles. Prior to the 1890s the Branobel company was producing 17.7 % <strong>of</strong> Russian and 8.6% <strong>of</strong> world oil<br />
output, which played a significant role in the Russian oil industry for being the world´s first country in<br />
the oil production at the turn <strong>of</strong> the century, between 1898 and 1902. 36 The flaw <strong>of</strong> the Nobel investment to<br />
Baku was considered a revolutionary change in the Russian oil industry. They introduced technological<br />
revolution in oil extraction, refinement, and transportation; they developed the first pipelines between oil<br />
35 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, & Power, (U.S, Free Press, 1 January 1993), p. 58.<br />
36 Lyubov Zheltova, “The Tsaritsyn Heritage <strong>of</strong> the Nobel Brothers”, OIL OF RUSSIA, Num. 4, 2007;<br />
(http://www.oilru.com/or/33/643/). Accessed on 15 september 2010.<br />
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fields and refineries and the first steam‐powered tankers for oil transportation. 37 In this regard, the<br />
famous Russian scholar Dimitri Mendeleev estimated the existence <strong>of</strong> the Branobel company in the oil<br />
industry <strong>of</strong> Russia as, “the Branobel Company, which began its large‐scale activity only recently, has<br />
today expanded it to proportions unparalleled in our industry”. 38<br />
For reducing the transportation cost the Branobel Company built a first oil tanker in the world oil<br />
history. The tanker called Zoroaster bearing the name <strong>of</strong> the ancient prophet <strong>of</strong> Zoroastrainism in the<br />
region and was built in Sweden at the Motall Shipbuilding Factory in 1877 following the design <strong>of</strong><br />
Ludwig Nobel. 39 With the steel body, the tanker was 184 feet long, 27 feet wide, and 9 feet immersion. The<br />
capacity <strong>of</strong> it was 15,000 poods <strong>of</strong> kerosine. 40 After Zoroaster Ludwig Nobel ordered more tankers <strong>of</strong> the<br />
same design, which were called Buddha and Nordenskjöld. Following the success <strong>of</strong> the first tankers, the<br />
Branobel Company built an entire fleet <strong>of</strong> tankers in the Caspian Sea, which turned Baku into one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
world´s most busy port cities. According to Robert W. Tolf:<br />
“In November 1880 Ludwig ordered a new type <strong>of</strong> tanker which utilized the shell — the skin <strong>of</strong><br />
the vessel itself — as the wall <strong>of</strong> the bulk cargo hold. The hold <strong>of</strong> kerosene completely filled the<br />
storage area from side to side and clear up to the deck....the ship was christened Moses and within<br />
a year <strong>of</strong> its launching Ludwig ordered seven more vessels <strong>of</strong> the same design for delivery in<br />
seven to eight month. They were named Mohammed, Tatarin, Bramah, Spinoza, Socrates,<br />
Darwin, Koran, Talmut, and Calmuck...fitting tribute to the richness <strong>of</strong> Caucasian history....”. 41<br />
In 1878 the Branobel Company built a pipeline connecting the Balakhani oil fields with the oil refinery<br />
in Baku, which reduced the expense <strong>of</strong> transportation by five times and paid for itself within a single year.<br />
It was 12 km long with pipes 75 mm in diameter. By the end <strong>of</strong> 1898 there were 230 km <strong>of</strong> pipes with an<br />
annual throughput <strong>of</strong> one million tons <strong>of</strong> oil. 42<br />
Another event that the Branobel Company made was the transportation <strong>of</strong> Baku oil to Russia. Before<br />
the foundation <strong>of</strong> the Branobel Company, despite the vast energy resources <strong>of</strong> the Russian Empire at the<br />
end <strong>of</strong> the 19 th century, it was difficult to transport it to the regions <strong>of</strong> the empire due to lack <strong>of</strong><br />
infrastructure. For example, until 1880 Tbilisi was just 340 miles West <strong>of</strong> Baku, but relied on kerosene<br />
imports from the US. 43 Before 1874, the kerosine and crude oil <strong>of</strong> Baku were transported to Russia mainly<br />
37 Douglas Frantz, “Baku <strong>Journal</strong>; How the Nobels Made a Prize <strong>of</strong> Baku”, The New York Times, 3 February 2001;<br />
(http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/03/world/baku‐journal‐how‐the‐nobels‐made‐a‐prize‐<strong>of</strong>‐baku.html).<br />
September 2010.<br />
38 Ibid, Lyubov Zheltova.<br />
Accessed on 15<br />
39 Natig Aliyev, “The History <strong>of</strong> Oil in Azerbaijan”, Azerbaijan International, Summer 1994 (2.2);<br />
(http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/22_folder/22_articles/22_history<strong>of</strong>oil.html). Accessed on 15 September 2010.<br />
40 Ibid, Lyubov Zheltova.<br />
41 Ibid, Robert W. Tolf, pp. 55‐56.<br />
42 Nasib Nassibli, “The Independent Azerbaijanʹs Oil Policy”, Lecture at the University <strong>of</strong> California at Berkeley, 15 April 1998;<br />
(http://www.zerbaijan.com/azeri/nasibzade1.html). Accessed on 15 September 2010.<br />
43 Ibid, Richard Ryan Weber, p. 51.<br />
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by cart in wooden barrels holding 25 poods, which was more expensive than transporting it from the<br />
United States. The barrels cost from 10 to 12 rubles and the leakage was great. 44 For that reason Ludwig<br />
<strong>of</strong>fered the railroad tank cars for the transportation <strong>of</strong> the Baku oil to Petersburg. These cars were put on<br />
the Gryaze‐Tsaritsyn railroad and by 1881 Baku oil was delivered to Petersburg by train for the first<br />
time. 45 The construction <strong>of</strong> the Transcaucasus railroad in 1883 between Baku and Batumi was another<br />
effective access for the transportation <strong>of</strong> the Baku oil to the domestic and world market.<br />
It is interesting that the Nobel Prize, the most prestigious award in the world, is related to the oil fields<br />
in Baku. The Prize was established in 1901 after the death <strong>of</strong> Alfred Nobel, via the execution <strong>of</strong> his will.<br />
The wealth <strong>of</strong> Alfred Nobel was valued 31 million Swedish crowns coming from his 12 percent share <strong>of</strong><br />
the Nobel Brothers Petroleum Company and his earnings from the dynamite invention. 46 But despite its<br />
long history and deep heritage in Baku the Branobel Company came to an end after World War I. The<br />
Bolshevik Revolution <strong>of</strong> 1917 forced the foreign companies to shut down and their properties were<br />
confiscated. Following this, the Nobel family began to flee to Stockholm, after loosing their Russian assets<br />
to the Bolsheviks. After the occupation <strong>of</strong> Baku by the Soviet Empire, half <strong>of</strong> the Branobel Oil Company´s<br />
shares were sold to Standard Oil <strong>of</strong> New Jersey. 47<br />
The Caspian‐Black Sea Oil Company or BNITO: The Rothschild family was one <strong>of</strong> the prominent<br />
foreign investors in the Baku oil industry after the abolishment <strong>of</strong> the otkupchina lease system. The<br />
penetration <strong>of</strong> Rothschild investment was due to financing the construction <strong>of</strong> the Transcaucasian railroad<br />
in 1879 in order to transport oil from Baku to the Black Sea port <strong>of</strong> Batum in Georgia and later to the<br />
world market. 48 As stated above, due to the lack <strong>of</strong> infrastructure, the transportation <strong>of</strong> the Baku oil to the<br />
world market was extremely difficult. In this sense, building the Transcaucasus railroad was in the<br />
interest <strong>of</strong> the Russian government and added another dimension to the oil industry <strong>of</strong> Russia. Firouzed<br />
Mostashari comments this as follows:<br />
“The Russian administrations <strong>of</strong> the Caucasus were among the promoter <strong>of</strong> the railways across<br />
the region. The Grant Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich, viceroy <strong>of</strong> the Caucasus (1863‐1881), saw<br />
railroads as a means <strong>of</strong> solidifying Russian control over the Caucasus....The region drawn more<br />
to its Persian and Turkish neighbors than to Russia, and in the event <strong>of</strong> a war, like Crimean War,<br />
the absence <strong>of</strong> railroads to provide troop transportation would have proven disastrous for Russia.<br />
44 Mira Wilkins, European foreign investments as seen by the U.S. Department <strong>of</strong> Commerce, (U.S, Arno Press, 1977), p. 25.<br />
45 Ibid, Lyubov Zheltova.<br />
46 Fuad Akhundov, “Legacy <strong>of</strong> the Oil Barons: Part II, The ʺGreeningʺ <strong>of</strong> Baku by the Nobel Brothers”, Azerbaijan International,<br />
Autumn 1994 (2.3); (http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/23_folder/23_articles/23_oilbarons.html). Accessed on 15<br />
september 2010.<br />
47 Brita Asbrink, “The Nobels in Baku: Swedesʹ Role in Bakuʹs First Oil Boom”, Azerbaijan International, Summer 2002 (10.2);<br />
(http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/ai102_folder/102_articles/102_nobels_asbrink.html). Accessed on 15 September<br />
2010.<br />
48 “Georgia’s Oil and Gas Potential: Georgia as a Traditional Transit Country for Azeri Energy Resources”, Report prepared by<br />
Transparency International Georgia, June 2008; p. 6.<br />
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So, Nikolaevich argued, connecting the region to Russia via rail was not only in the interest <strong>of</strong><br />
the Caucasus economy, but also served Russiaʹs strategic interests”. 49<br />
In this regard, on June 1878, the plan was made to connect the oil fields <strong>of</strong> Baku to the Transcaucasian<br />
Railroad. The construction was completed in 1883 and the railroad was put in service in the same year.<br />
This event ended the Branobel transportation monopoly and facilitated the access <strong>of</strong> the Baku oil to the<br />
world market. 50<br />
During the 1880s, the Rothschilds made large‐scale investments in production assets and refineries in<br />
the Baku oil industry. In 1886, the Rothschilds established the Caspian‐Black Sea Oil Company or BNITO.<br />
By the end <strong>of</strong> 1890s, the Company was controlling 42% <strong>of</strong> the Baku oil export. 51 Lately the company<br />
signed an agreement with the British entrepreneurs Markus Samuel, an Englishman <strong>of</strong> Jewish origin who<br />
later founded Shell, in order to export the Baku oil from Batumi to British and Dutch East Indies through<br />
the Suez Canal. Beginning from the 1880s, due to the increase <strong>of</strong> Russian oil export to the European<br />
market, Rockefeller, the head <strong>of</strong> Standard Oil Company, began to act aggressively in order to diminish the<br />
role <strong>of</strong> Russian oil. He began a campaign <strong>of</strong> price reduction, a traditional way that Standard Oil used in<br />
the United States to force its competitors out <strong>of</strong> business. The signing <strong>of</strong> an agreement with Marcus<br />
Samuel for selling Baku oil in the Far East, where Standard’s dominance was also overwhelming, was a<br />
counter‐attack made by the Rothschild family. The idea <strong>of</strong> Samuel was to build an oil tanker with<br />
sophisticated engineering and to get an allowance for passing it through the Suez Canal. Traditionally the<br />
trade vessels from Europe to Asia were sailing around the Cape <strong>of</strong> Good Hope. Passing through the Suez<br />
Canal would shorten transport routes and put them ahead <strong>of</strong> Standard Oil. In the end he was successful<br />
in realizing his idea and in 1892 the first oil tanker, built according to Samuel´s design, sailed from Batum<br />
to the Far East. 52 According to a report prepared by Transparency International Georgia:<br />
“In spite <strong>of</strong> the limitations on navigation existing in the Suez Canal, with the support <strong>of</strong> his<br />
friends at the British Court, he gained the privilege to transport the oil by tankers through this<br />
canal and ordered the first double‐hulled ocean tanker. In the Batumi port, the first such tanker<br />
appeared in 1892. It was called Murex. Until that time, only the oil <strong>of</strong> the American oil magnate<br />
Rockefeller was being sold in Southeast Asia”. 53<br />
Following this, Marcus Samuel founded the Shell Oil Company on October 18, 1897 in Baku. The<br />
Company owned 30 ocean‐going ships and more than 340 oil terminals that were situated between Baku<br />
49 Ibid, Firouzed Mostashari, p. 95.<br />
50 Ibid, Firouzed Mostashari, p. 95.<br />
51 “History <strong>of</strong> Development <strong>of</strong> Oil Industry”, Azerbaijan.Az;<br />
(http://www.azerbaijan.az/_Economy/_OilStrategy/oilStrategy_02_e.html ). Accessed on 15 September 2010.<br />
52 Leonardo Maugeri, The Age <strong>of</strong> Oil: The Mythology, History, and Future <strong>of</strong> the World’s Most Controversial Resource, (U.S, PRAEGER,<br />
2006), p. 12.<br />
53 Ibid, Transparency International Georgia.<br />
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and Shanghai. Furthermore, prior to the 20 th century more than 11% <strong>of</strong> the Baku oil fieldʹs management<br />
were controlled by British producers. In 1907, Shell and Royal Dutch companies were merged into the<br />
international trust Royal Dutch Shell under the leadership <strong>of</strong> Henry Deterding in order to compete with<br />
the US competitors. The output <strong>of</strong> Royal Dutch Shell up to 1914 from the Baku oil fields was 57 million<br />
pounds. 54 Transportation <strong>of</strong> the Baku oil to the Far East was one <strong>of</strong> the most important reasons that<br />
increased the Russian position in the oil export to the world market. In 1900, the oil production<br />
worldwide had reached nearly 430,000 barrels per day (bpd). Russia was producing more than 50%,<br />
around 200,000 bpd, with the United States delivering less than Russia, around 165,000 bpd. However, as<br />
aforementioned after few years due to political turmoil in Russia the oil production decreased there and<br />
the United States had dramatically jumped ahead, reaching 370,000 bpd, more than twice the Caucasian<br />
production. 55<br />
Nevertheless, the construction <strong>of</strong> the Transcaucasus railroad was not sufficient for the transportation <strong>of</strong><br />
the Baku oil to the world market. For this reason, an American businessman in Russia, Herbert Twedle,<br />
together with his Russian business partner Lieutenant Khanykov put forward an <strong>of</strong>fer to the Russian<br />
ministry <strong>of</strong> finance for the construction <strong>of</strong> a pipeline that would connect Baku with the Black Sea port<br />
Batum. The minister <strong>of</strong> state affairs M.N. Ostrovskii wrote to the minister <strong>of</strong> finance in January 1884, that<br />
the Transcaucasian railroad was not enough for the transportation <strong>of</strong> the Baku oil. Moreover, one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
main reasons <strong>of</strong> the current crisis in the oil sector was due to the lack <strong>of</strong> cheap transportation<br />
infrastructure for the transportation <strong>of</strong> oil to foreign markets and this factor did not allow the Russian<br />
producer to compete with US oil companies in the world markets. Three years later, in April 1887, the<br />
committee <strong>of</strong> ministers <strong>of</strong> the Russian government approved the project for the construction <strong>of</strong><br />
Trans‐Caucasian pipeline. In May 1887, a member <strong>of</strong> the Russian Physics‐Chemistry Society I.P. Ilimov<br />
was granted the construction <strong>of</strong> the pipeline. Nevertheless, because <strong>of</strong> bureaucratic difficulties the<br />
construction <strong>of</strong> the pipeline was postponed until the first decade <strong>of</strong> the 20 th century. 56<br />
The construction <strong>of</strong> the largest pipeline in the world <strong>of</strong> that period, with a length <strong>of</strong> 560 miles, was<br />
completed from Baku to Batumi on the Black Sea Coast in 1905. The construction cost amounted to<br />
$17,000,000. It had an 8‐inch pipe and 19 pumping stations. While crossing on the Suram Mountains it<br />
reached 2,480 feet hight above the level <strong>of</strong> the Black Sea. The pipeline capacity was estimated around<br />
60,000,000 poods <strong>of</strong> oil per year, but the maximum amount <strong>of</strong> oil pumped through it was 27,700,000<br />
poods in 1908. 57<br />
In general, until 1917 the total amount <strong>of</strong> foreign investment in the Baku oil industry was estimated at<br />
111 million rubles. 60% <strong>of</strong> the oil production and 75% <strong>of</strong> the trade in oil product in Russia was managed<br />
by foreign companies. According to historical data, until 1920 foreign businessmen from Great Britain,<br />
France, USA, Sweden, and Germany owned approximately 70% <strong>of</strong> the Baku oil industry. However, as<br />
54 Miryusif Mirbabayev, “Baku Baron Days: Foreign Investment in Azerbaijanʹs Oil”, Azerbaijan International, Summer 2004<br />
(12.2). (http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/ai122_folder/122_articles/122_foreign_investment.html). Accessed on 15<br />
September 2010.<br />
55 Ibid, Leonardo Maugeri, p. 13.<br />
56 Ibid, Firouzed Mostashari, p. 96.<br />
57 Ibid, Mira Wilkins, p. 28.<br />
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mentioned above the Russian revolution <strong>of</strong> 1917 at the end <strong>of</strong> World War I stopped any further flow <strong>of</strong><br />
foreign investment into the oil capital <strong>of</strong> the world. In March 1918 the Bolsheviks established their power<br />
in Baku and two month later, on the 2 nd <strong>of</strong> June they declared the Russian oil industry as a property <strong>of</strong> the<br />
people. After the occupation <strong>of</strong> Baku by the Red Army, on May 24 th May 1924, the Revolutionary<br />
Committee <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan decreed the nationalization <strong>of</strong> the oil industry in Azerbaijan. According to that<br />
decree all oil enterprises related to production, refining, and trade were declared as a state property. 58<br />
Haji Zeynalabdin Taghiyev: (1823‐1924) Taghiyev was one <strong>of</strong> the wealthiest oil barons and prominent<br />
oil producers in Baku. His firm was producing 1900 bopd in 1887 and occupied the 4 th place in the<br />
refining business. A son <strong>of</strong> a shoemaker, Taghiyev was born in a poor family in the Old Town <strong>of</strong> Baku<br />
and worked as mason from his early age to support his family. During the first oil boom in Baku after the<br />
abolishment <strong>of</strong> the otkupchina lease system in 1872, Taghiyev purchased a piece <strong>of</strong> land with his two<br />
partners in the Bibi‐Heybat region <strong>of</strong> Baku and began drilling in 1873, but they were unsuccessful. Hence,<br />
his friend gave up and sold his shar to him, but he continued drilling until 1877 when the oil gush<br />
happened on his property and instantly made him an oil baron and millionaire. 59 Later Taghiyev sold his<br />
oil fields to the British entrepreneurs for 5 million rubles, where they generated more than 7.5 million<br />
rubles in two years. It should be mentioned that he quit his oil businesses in order to diversify in other<br />
industries <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijani economy, such as textile, civil engineering, shipyard and fishery. In 1880, he<br />
founded a shipping company after purchasing the “Kaspi” shipping society for 1,136,000 rubles. 60<br />
He remains in the memories <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijanis as not only a local oil baron, but also a national industrial<br />
magnate and philanthropist who spent most <strong>of</strong> his money on charity projects, mainly in the field <strong>of</strong><br />
education. He sent many talented Azerbaijani youths to the different parts <strong>of</strong> the world for getting<br />
education; he also invested in the construction <strong>of</strong> various schools. After becoming oil baron, the first thing<br />
that he made was the construction <strong>of</strong> the road to the oil field <strong>of</strong> Bibi‐Heybat and later extended that road<br />
up to the “Bibi‐Hyebat” mosque, one <strong>of</strong> the historical and sacred places in Azerbaijan. In 1883, Taghiyev<br />
financed the construction <strong>of</strong> the First Drama Theater in Baku. Taghiyev was also founder <strong>of</strong> the first<br />
Azerbaijani girls´ school where the education language was Azerbaijani. He asked permission from Tzar<br />
Alexander III for the construction <strong>of</strong> a school for the Muslim girls, but his request was rejected. After<br />
Alexander III, when Nicolas II came to power in Russia, Taghiyev sent an expensive present to his wife<br />
Alexandra Fyodorovna and asked her for helping him for the acceptance <strong>of</strong> the school project. Later the<br />
school was named after Alexandra Fyodorovna, as the Russian Muslim Alexandrian Female Boarding<br />
School. Currently that building is the house <strong>of</strong> the National Institute <strong>of</strong> Manuscripts and situated at the<br />
Istiqlaliyyat (Independence) District, outside <strong>of</strong> Old Town. It is an interesting fact that Taghiyev ordered<br />
an Arabic font from Leipzig, Germany for the translation <strong>of</strong> the Koran, the Holy book <strong>of</strong> Islam and despite<br />
all difficulties posed by the clergy he financed the translation <strong>of</strong> the Koran. They insisted that it was a<br />
Holy book and no one had the right to translate it. Next to the translation <strong>of</strong> the Koran, considering<br />
58 Ibid, Miryusif Mirbabayev, “Baku Baron Days: Foreign Investment in Azerbaijanʹs Oil”.<br />
59 Manaf Suleymanov, “Stories <strong>of</strong> Taghiyev: Bakuʹs Most Renowned Oil Baron”, Azerbaijan International, Summer 2002 (10.2);<br />
(http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/ai102_folder/102_articles/102_taghiyev_residence.html). Accessed on 15 September<br />
2010.<br />
60 Ibid, Miryusif Mirbabayev, p. 29.<br />
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mosques as centers <strong>of</strong> enlightenment, science, tradition, and moral upbringing, Taghiyev also invested in<br />
the building <strong>of</strong> several mosques in Azerbaijan, as well as other parts <strong>of</strong> Russia. The mosque in Petersburg<br />
for Tatars is still functioning. He also gave financial support to the construction <strong>of</strong> several churches for<br />
Russians, Georgians, and Armenians. 61<br />
When Baku was occupied by the Red Army, unlike other entrepreneurs, Taghiyev rejected to leave the<br />
country. All his properties, including his residence, were confiscated by the Bolsheviks and he lived until<br />
the end <strong>of</strong> his life in his summer home in the suburb <strong>of</strong> Baku, in Mardakan and died in 1924. 62<br />
Agha Musa Naghiyev: (1849‐1919) One <strong>of</strong> the most famous oil millionaires among local Azerbaijanis<br />
was Agha Musa Naghiyev. The oil company owned by Naghiyev, which was established in 1887, was one<br />
<strong>of</strong> the largest Baku oil producers. From 1904 up to 1910, his oil company ranked as the 6 th or 7 th oil<br />
company in Russia. 63 Like Taghiyev, he was also born into a poor peasant family but became the richest<br />
oil baron after the industrial boom in Baku. He was well known as a stingy person among the oil<br />
millionaires, but despite his greediness, the 19 th century architecture <strong>of</strong> Baku became more adorned by the<br />
investment <strong>of</strong> Naghiyev. He financed the construction <strong>of</strong> the Muslim Charity Society in the one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
most beautiful places <strong>of</strong> Baku. In 1912, he financed the construction <strong>of</strong> the largest hospital <strong>of</strong> the city,<br />
which is still functioning today. The design <strong>of</strong> the hospital was in the shape <strong>of</strong> the first letter <strong>of</strong> his name<br />
“H” (Cyrillic “N”) and was named after him. He also gave financial support to the building <strong>of</strong> the largest<br />
male technical school <strong>of</strong> the city, called Real School in that time. Today that building serves as the<br />
Azerbaijan State Economic Institute. 64<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the most gorgeous and impressive constructions made by him was the “Ismailliye” Palace, built<br />
to honor his son. It was made in Venetian Gothic style and is reminiscent <strong>of</strong> the Palazzo Contarini in<br />
Venice. Today that building serves as the Primary Office <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijanʹs Academy <strong>of</strong> Sciences and is<br />
located in the Istiqllaiyyat district next to the aforementioned “Girls School”, constructed with the<br />
investment <strong>of</strong> Taghiyev. 65<br />
Shamsi Asadullayev: (1841‐1913) Another local oil baron <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan, Shamsi Asadullayev, was also<br />
born in a poor family <strong>of</strong> porters who became one <strong>of</strong> the oil millionaires during the first oil boom in Baku.<br />
During his youth, he collected harvest in the Surakhani village <strong>of</strong> Baku and transported it to Tbilisi, to the<br />
current capital city <strong>of</strong> Georgia. Following the abolishment <strong>of</strong> the otkupchina lease system, he bought a<br />
small oil field, which made him one <strong>of</strong> the leading industrialists and oil barons. His oil firm, called<br />
61 Ibid, Manaf Suleymanov.<br />
62 “The Taghiyev Museum: A Glimpse <strong>of</strong> the Opulence <strong>of</strong> an Oil Baron”, Azerbaijan International, Summer 2000 (8.2);<br />
(http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/82_folder/82_articles/82_taghiyev_museum.html). Accessed on 17 September 2010.<br />
63 Ibid, Miryusif Mirbabayev, “Baku Baron Days: Foreign Investment in Azerbaijanʹs Oil”.<br />
64 Fuad Akhundov, “Legacy <strong>of</strong> the Oil Barons ‐ Part I”, Azerbaijan International, Summer 1994 (2.2);<br />
(http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/22_folder/22_articles/22_oilbarons.html). Accessed on 17 September 2010.<br />
65 Jon L. Rau, “Environmental and Urban Geology <strong>of</strong> Selected Cities in Central, South‐West and South Asia: Baku, Almaty,<br />
Samarkand, Tashkent, Tehran, Ankara, Istanbul, Calcutta, Hyderabad‐Secunderabad, Mumbai”‐Part II, Atlas <strong>of</strong> Urban Geology,<br />
Vol. 14, p. 26.<br />
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“SH. Asadullayev”, was producing 60% <strong>of</strong> the oil and was one <strong>of</strong> the 12 leading oil producing firms in<br />
Baku. He established his own oil‐fleet for oil transportation. As a member <strong>of</strong> the City Duma <strong>of</strong> Baku, like<br />
other oil barons, Asadullayev was also involved in philanthropic activities and made lots <strong>of</strong> donations to<br />
the city and to charitable societies. He died in 1913. 66<br />
Murtuza Mukhtarov: (1865‐1920) Azerbaijani oil industrialist and millionaire Murtuza Mukhtarov was<br />
also born in a poor family in the Amirajan village <strong>of</strong> Baku. Following the path <strong>of</strong> other Baku oil barons,<br />
Mukhtarov managed to be one <strong>of</strong> the most prominent drilling experts in Baku due to his ability and<br />
experience. The company that he owned was specialized in manufacturing machinery for oil derricks and<br />
well drilling. One <strong>of</strong> his specialities among other oil barons <strong>of</strong> Baku was that he was the author <strong>of</strong> various<br />
patents <strong>of</strong> drilling equipment. As a philanthropist, he financed the construction <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the most<br />
gorgeous and magnificent buildings in the heart <strong>of</strong> Baku, which is now the Wedding Palace <strong>of</strong> the city.<br />
The residence that he ordered to be built in 1911‐1912 for his wife Liza Mukhtarova by the Polish architect<br />
Joseph Ploshko was one <strong>of</strong> the most fabulous buildings and celebrated examples <strong>of</strong> the Baku Pseude<br />
Gothic architecture. He also gave financial support to the construction <strong>of</strong> several schools and mosques in<br />
Baku and its villages. In April 1920, he committed suicide while defending his own residence from the<br />
soldiers <strong>of</strong> the Red Army. 67<br />
In general, the first oil boom in Azerbaijan following the abolishment <strong>of</strong> the lease system in 1972<br />
influenced the architectural view <strong>of</strong> Baku. The oil millionaires were competing between each other for the<br />
construction <strong>of</strong> beautiful buildings and residences different to each other in design, which led to the<br />
transformation <strong>of</strong> Baku into one <strong>of</strong> the most marvelous and beautiful cities in the world. Nevertheless, as<br />
mentioned before, after the intervention <strong>of</strong> the Red Army in Baku in April 1920, all properties belonging<br />
to local oil barons and millionaires were confiscated and nationalized by the Bolshevik Government and<br />
the life <strong>of</strong> them ended mostly tragically.<br />
Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918‐1920) and the interests <strong>of</strong> Great Powers in Azerbaijani oil<br />
After the Russian Revolution <strong>of</strong> 1917 the political situation changed in Azerbaijan. Baku apparently<br />
began to attract the interests <strong>of</strong> the great powers and fell into a power vacuum because <strong>of</strong> its vast energy<br />
resources and geopolitical situation. The desire to control the Baku oil industry caused intense rivalries<br />
among Russian, Turkish, German, and British forces. After the revolution, Russia regarded the Baku oil as<br />
a vital issue for the Bolshevik regime; hence it established Soviet Rule at the beginning <strong>of</strong> 1918 in Baku,<br />
nationalized the oil industry and kept the oil flowing to Soviet Russia. During that period, 165<br />
independent oil companies were nationalized in Azerbaijan 68 and more than 1.3 million oil and oil<br />
66 Official information from Administrative Department <strong>of</strong> the President <strong>of</strong> the Republic <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan, PRESIDENTIAL<br />
LIBRARY, p. 114; (www.elibrary.az/docs/azerbaijan/eng/gl6.pdf). Accessed on 17 September 2010.<br />
67 Ibid, PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY, p. 115.<br />
68 Sabit Bagirov, “Azerbaijani Oil: Glimpses <strong>of</strong> a Long History”, Perceptions, Vol. 1, No. 2, June‐August 1996, p. 34.<br />
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products were transported to Bolshevik Russia. 69 Due to nationalization and political changes there was a<br />
rapid reduction in oil production. Nevertheless, after the declaration <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan Democratic Republic<br />
on 28 May 1918 the situation totally changed. On September 18, the joint military force <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan and<br />
Ottoman Turkey seized Baku and the rule <strong>of</strong> the Bolsheviks ended. 70 The newly formed government <strong>of</strong><br />
the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR) took a decision <strong>of</strong> denationalizing the oil industry and<br />
returning all oil fields and enterprises to the owners. 71 During its two years independence the ADR tried<br />
to follow an independent policy in the oil industry and made several steps for establishing a relationship<br />
with western companies. After the stabilization <strong>of</strong> the political situation the oil industry witnessed some<br />
growth and began to draw the attention <strong>of</strong> big companies. For instance, at the beginning <strong>of</strong> 1919 the<br />
Standard Oil <strong>of</strong> New Jersey signed an oil contract with the newly created Azerbaijani government in<br />
order to buy undeveloped oil field in Baku at the cost <strong>of</strong> $320,000 and also half <strong>of</strong> Nobel interests. One<br />
year later, in March 1920, Standard Oil concluded a contract with four Baku companies for purchasing<br />
64,000 tons <strong>of</strong> kerosine. When Azerbaijani independence came to an end due to the Soviet intervention<br />
these contracts became obsolete. 72<br />
After the Russian revolution <strong>of</strong> 1917, Caucasus emerged as a strategically vital point for the interests <strong>of</strong><br />
Great Britain in Persia, Afghanistan, and most importantly in India. The treaty <strong>of</strong> Brest‐Litovsk, signed on<br />
3 March 1918 provided a legal basis for the direct intervention <strong>of</strong> Ottoman Turkey into Caucasus.<br />
According to the treaty three strategic regions <strong>of</strong> the Russian Empire, namely Ardahan, Kars, and Batum,<br />
were merged to the Ottoman Empire. According to article IV <strong>of</strong> the Brest‐Litovsk Treaty the Ottoman<br />
Empire got a right to provide military support to Azerbaijan in case <strong>of</strong> necessity in order to preserve<br />
domestic stability and national security. Following the article the Ottoman troops together with the newly<br />
established Azerbaijani army moved toward Baku in order to liberate Baku from the control <strong>of</strong> Russian<br />
Bolsheviks and Armenians, who were controlling the region since the tragic events <strong>of</strong> March 1918 <strong>of</strong><br />
Baku. These events increased the concern <strong>of</strong> Britain <strong>of</strong> losing the valuable resources and strategic<br />
positions <strong>of</strong> Caucasus to the Turkish‐Germany allayment. Britain considered that once Turks established<br />
their control in Baku, it would be easy for them to penetrate into Persia and Central Asia. Due to these<br />
fears, the head <strong>of</strong> the British forces in Persia, Major‐General Lionel C. Dunsterville asked General<br />
Marshall, General Officer Commanding‐in‐Chief <strong>of</strong> the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force in Bagdad on<br />
22 May to gather all available troops for the protection <strong>of</strong> Baku against Ottoman Forces. 73 In May 1918, the<br />
British forces successfully captured Baku temporarily. But it was difficult to stand against the Ottoman<br />
69 Vasif Qafarov, “Ekim 1917 Devriminden Sonra Bolşevik Rusya’nın Azerbaycan Siyaseti ve Bakü Sorunu (Russian Policy on<br />
Azerbaijan and the Question <strong>of</strong> Baku after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917)”, Gazi Akademik Bakış (<strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Gazi Academic<br />
View), Vol. 2. No. 3, Winter 2008, p. 149.<br />
70 Bulent Gokay, “The battle for Baku (May‐September 1918): a peculiar episode in the history <strong>of</strong> the Caucasus”, Middle Eastern<br />
<strong>Studies</strong> 34, 1998, p. 42.<br />
71 Ibid, Sabit Bagirov, “Azerbaijani Oil: Glimpses <strong>of</strong> a Long History”, p. 35.<br />
72 Philip S. Gillette, “American Capital in the Contest for Soviet Oil, 1920‐23”, Soviet <strong>Studies</strong>, Vol. 24, No. 4 April 1973, p. 480.<br />
73 Ibid, Bulent Gokay, “The battle for Baku (May‐September 1918): a peculiar episode in the history <strong>of</strong> the Caucasus”, p. 24.<br />
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troops with limited military forces. The joint Ottoman‐Azerbaijani forces penetrated Baku and captured it<br />
in September 1918. 74<br />
But later, with the signing the Armistice <strong>of</strong> Mudros on 30 October 1918, the Ottoman forces were<br />
withdrawn from Transcaucasia and the British Empire seized the chance to control both Baku and Batum<br />
and all the railroads that were under the control <strong>of</strong> Ottoman forces, which was considered by General<br />
Curzon as an essential line <strong>of</strong> advance towards India. This event meant the end <strong>of</strong> Turkish, indirectly<br />
Germany interests in the region. The supporters <strong>of</strong> British military force presence in Transcaucasia were<br />
in favor <strong>of</strong> creating three independent states in the region: Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. 75 After<br />
getting control <strong>of</strong> the Baku oil industry, the British Empire immediately ordered the repairing <strong>of</strong> the oil<br />
pumping stations and railroads, which were essential for the transportation <strong>of</strong> oil. The Foreign Secretary<br />
<strong>of</strong> Britain A.J. Balfour and the Secretary <strong>of</strong> State for India Edwin Montagu were against the policy <strong>of</strong><br />
Curzon to defend the independence <strong>of</strong> three Transcaucasian countries because that region is important for<br />
the defense <strong>of</strong> India and argued why Britain would have the responsibility to establish the independent<br />
Transcaucasian Republics. According to General Curzon the Transcaucasian Republics were against the<br />
policy <strong>of</strong> bolshevik Russia in the region and supporting the nationalistic aspiration <strong>of</strong> these countries<br />
Britain gave an opportunity to it to make Batum a free port on the Black Sea and control <strong>of</strong> the Baku oil<br />
Industry.<br />
“I should say we are not going to send all our money and men in civilizing a few people who do<br />
not want to be civilized. We will protect Batum, Baku, the railway between them, and the<br />
pipeline”, Curzon said.<br />
As a result, on 16 December 1918, the Eastern Committee <strong>of</strong> Great Britain agreed to the creation <strong>of</strong><br />
independent states in Transcaucasia. Beginning <strong>of</strong> 1920, three month before the Soviet penetration into the<br />
region, three countries de facto recognized by the Allied Supreme Council. 76 By April 28, 1920 Baku was<br />
occupied by the Soviet Red Army, which was estimated by Lenin as follows:<br />
“We all know that our industries stood idle because <strong>of</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> fuel. However, today, the proletariat<br />
<strong>of</strong> Baku has toppled the Azerbaijani government and is in charge <strong>of</strong> running the government.<br />
This means that now we own a basic economy that is capable <strong>of</strong> supporting our industries”. 77<br />
74 Donald Ewalt, “The Fight for Oil: Britain in Persia, 1919”, History Today, Vol. 31, Issue.<br />
9;(http://www.historytoday.com/donald‐ewalt/fight‐oil‐britain‐persia‐1919). Accessed on 17 September 2010.<br />
75 Sean Kelly, “Britannia has ruled here”: Transcaucasia and Considerations <strong>of</strong> Imperial Defense in Lord Curzonʹs Search for the<br />
Near Eastern Settlement, 1918‐1923”, Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment <strong>of</strong> the Requirements for the Degree <strong>of</strong> Mater <strong>of</strong> Arts<br />
in the Department <strong>of</strong> History, Simon Fraser University, October 2003; p. 45.<br />
76 Ibid, Donald Ewalt.<br />
77 Ibid, James Lawson Chapman, p. 14.<br />
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Azerbaijan oil industry during the Soviet Union<br />
In April 1920, when the Red Army captured Baku, the Soviet government realized the significance <strong>of</strong><br />
Azerbaijani energy resources for the young Bolshevik Russia, which did not have strong economic basis<br />
and financial resources. In this regard, Soviet Russia began to take significant efforts to revitalizate the oil<br />
extraction and directed the entire oil industry <strong>of</strong> Baku towards the purpose <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union. At the<br />
beginning <strong>of</strong> 1920 the Soviet government accepted the New Economic Policy (NEP), which was essential<br />
for the revitalization <strong>of</strong> the Soviet economy and retreated from the centralized economic policy <strong>of</strong> the<br />
previous era. According to the NEP the Soviet government gave permission to limited free trade. In any<br />
case the Soviet leadership had no other choice. The idea behind the NEP was to recover the economy that<br />
was totally devastated as the result <strong>of</strong> World War I and the Civil War in Russia. According to Philip S.<br />
Gillette, granting foreign companies concessions for the exploitation <strong>of</strong> the Soviet fields had two kinds <strong>of</strong><br />
appeal for the Bolshevik Russia:<br />
As an instrument <strong>of</strong> the Soviet diplomacy by which greedy capitalist governments could be bribed to<br />
desist from hostile measures or set themquarreling among themselves over rights to exploit some piece <strong>of</strong><br />
Russian territory.<br />
As an aid to economic development, supplying the war‐ravaged industries <strong>of</strong> Russia with needed<br />
capital and technology that could make the Marxian dream <strong>of</strong> a modern state a reality. 78<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the controversial issues <strong>of</strong> NEP was that, it granted the foreign capitalist concessions for<br />
exploiting natural resources on Russian territory in return for payment <strong>of</strong> taxes and a portion <strong>of</strong> the pr<strong>of</strong>it.<br />
On 1 February 1921, a resolution was introduced by Lenin to the Council <strong>of</strong> Commissars for approving<br />
the principle that would grant oil concessions in Grozny and Baku oil fields. J.V. Stalin and M.I. Tomsku<br />
opposed the resolution and insisted that workers would never support this policy and the existence <strong>of</strong><br />
foreign companies would raise the workers against the Soviet Union. But despite all opposition Lenin<br />
secured the passage <strong>of</strong> the resolution. 79 According to Robert Mabro — “Lenin justified the NEP on the<br />
grounds that the economy needed ‘imperialist’ technology to recover”. 80 During that period, the principal<br />
American companies, such as Standard Oil <strong>of</strong> New Jersey and Standard Oil <strong>of</strong> New York, signed an<br />
agreement for the operation in Soviet Union. On 20 September 1922, the Barnsdall company signed two<br />
contracts with the Soviet government for providing the equipment and pumping <strong>of</strong> oil wells and<br />
developing the undeveloped oil fields. 81<br />
However, the situation changed after J.V. Stalin came to power. As mentioned earlier, with the<br />
decision <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijani Revolutionary Committee state control was established over the oil industry in<br />
1924. Replacing Leninʹs New Economic Policy, Stalin launched the Five Year Economic Plan in 1927 by<br />
which the state assumed full responsibility for central planning over all aspects <strong>of</strong> the economy, including<br />
the oil industry. Following the first and the second Five Year Plan the production <strong>of</strong> oil grew<br />
78 Ibid, Philip S. Gillette, p. 479.<br />
79 Ibid, Philip S. Gillette, p. 482.<br />
80 Robert Marbo, “Oil Nationalism, the Oil Industry and Energy Security Concerns”, International Economy & Trade ‐ ARI<br />
114/2007, 25 October 2007; p. 2.<br />
81 Ibid, Philip S. Gillette, p. 487.<br />
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substantially. A large part <strong>of</strong> the oil products was provided by the Baku oil industry. 82 In 1941 the level <strong>of</strong><br />
oil output reached 23,482,000 tons. By 1940, Azerbaijan was producing 71.5 % <strong>of</strong> the total Soviet oil<br />
output. According to Sabit Bagirov, from the beginning <strong>of</strong> 1920s up to the first years <strong>of</strong> World War II<br />
Azerbaijan remained a center <strong>of</strong> oil technology and science in the world, where vast deposits <strong>of</strong><br />
hydrocarbon were discovered. The construction <strong>of</strong> the 834 km Baku‐Batum pipeline with the 250 mm<br />
diameter and 13 pumping stations was finished in 1925. In 1927 the immense project <strong>of</strong> filling up<br />
Bibi‐Heybat, where the first industrial drilling happened in 1848, was done. In 1928 the peak <strong>of</strong> 1901 oil<br />
production was surpassed. Azerbaijani oil played a significant role in the victory <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union over<br />
Nazi Germany. Baku was providing 63.2% <strong>of</strong> the oil output <strong>of</strong> the Union between 1941 and 1945. 83<br />
Following the technological innovation in the oil industry in Baku, Yusif Mammadaliyev, an Azerbaijani<br />
scientist, invented high octane components for the aircraft gasoline in 1942. 84 He was granted the Stalin<br />
award for his innovation and later nominated for the Nobel Prize, but the Soviet Union declared that the<br />
Nobel Prize is an award <strong>of</strong> capitalism and did not let him to get it.<br />
During World War II, the oil resources <strong>of</strong> Baku were also among the Germans´ top priorities. Hitler set<br />
a plan for capturing Bakuʹs oil fields in order to fuel his war machines. During the first years <strong>of</strong> the war<br />
94% <strong>of</strong> Germany´s oil needs was provided by Rumania. But it was not sufficient tp decrease the nation´s<br />
dependency on imported crude oil. 85 In this sense, capturing Baku was one <strong>of</strong> the top priorities <strong>of</strong><br />
Germany as part <strong>of</strong> its strategy for world domination. Mark Jacobson in his article “Big Oil Comes Back<br />
To Baku” illustrates the willingness <strong>of</strong> Hitler to seize Baku as follows:<br />
“Not everyone had forgotten the former oil capital, however, as documented in a grainy wartime<br />
home movie shot at a birthday party for Adolf Hitler. The Führerʹs cake is adorned by a map <strong>of</strong><br />
the Caspian Sea, with the letters B‐A‐K‐U spelled out in chocolate cream. Hitler eats a piece and<br />
then avidly licks his fingers. “Unless we get Baku oil, the war is lost”, he would declare”. 86<br />
But despite a great effort made by the German machinery, it was not successful to bring the vast oil<br />
region <strong>of</strong> the Caucasus under the control <strong>of</strong> Nazi Germany, which was one <strong>of</strong> the main reasons <strong>of</strong> Hitler´s<br />
failure in World War II.<br />
In 1948, Azerbaijan made another innovation in the history <strong>of</strong> oil. The Neft Dashlari (Oil Rock) oil field<br />
was discovered in the Caspian Sea, 40 km from the cost <strong>of</strong> the Apsheron Peninsula. It marked the<br />
82 Ibid, Bülent Gökay, “Caspian Uncertainties: Regional Rivalries and Pipelines”.<br />
83 Ibid, Sabit Bagirov, “Azerbaijani Oil: Glimpses <strong>of</strong> a Long History”, p. 36.<br />
84 Miryusif Mirbabayev, “Azerbaijanʹs Oil History: Brief Oil Chronology since 1920 Part 2”, Azerbaijan International, Summer<br />
2003 (11.2); (http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/ai112_folder/112_articles/112_chronology.html). Accessed on 17<br />
September 2010.<br />
85 Joel Hayward “Hitlerʹs Quest for Oil: The Impact <strong>of</strong> Economic Considerations on Military Strategy, 1941‐42”, The <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
Strategic <strong>Studies</strong>, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 1995, p. 99.<br />
86 Mark Jacobson, “Big Oil Comes Back To Baku”, bnet, March 1999;<br />
(http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1134/is_2_108/ai_54032989/?tag=content;col1). Accessed on 17 September 2010.<br />
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beginning <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fshore extraction <strong>of</strong> oil and was considered the “eighth wonder <strong>of</strong> the world”. 87 For the<br />
first time in the history <strong>of</strong> oil, an <strong>of</strong>fshore oil field was constructed on trestles on the open sea.<br />
Considering Oil Rock Betty Blair points out:<br />
“…who could imagine that Oil Rocks with its dozens <strong>of</strong> kilometers <strong>of</strong> roadway built up on<br />
trestles and piers in the Caspian, <strong>of</strong>f the coast <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan, would give birth, not only to the<br />
worldʹs first successful <strong>of</strong>fshore venture in oil drilling [1949], but also to an art movement<br />
countering the calculated artificiality and lies <strong>of</strong> Stalinʹs regime”. 88<br />
From its start, the Oil Rocks fields have produced more than 170 million tons <strong>of</strong> oil and 15 billion m 3 <strong>of</strong><br />
associated natural gas. According to current estimation the volume <strong>of</strong> recoverable reserves is as high as 30<br />
million tons. 89 But despite all these innovations, since 1950 the oil production <strong>of</strong> Baku has dropped. Many<br />
oil wells were shut dawn by the Soviet Union that was concerned that they would fall into the hands <strong>of</strong><br />
German troops during World War II. Later, with the discovery <strong>of</strong> huge hydrocarbon resources first in the<br />
Volga‐Ural region and then in Western Siberia led the Soviet Union to move its production away from<br />
Azerbaijan. As a result, Azerbaijan´s part <strong>of</strong> Soviet oil output dropped from 39.1% in 1950 to 12.0% in<br />
1960 to 5.7% in 1970 and 2.4% in the 1980s. 90 Since 1980, with the discovery <strong>of</strong> 700 million tons <strong>of</strong> oil and<br />
200 billion cubic meters <strong>of</strong> gas in four new <strong>of</strong>fshore fields; Gunashli (1979), Chirag (1985), Azeri (1988),<br />
and Kapaz (1989) 91 and later Gorbachevʹs perestroika policy resulted in the flow <strong>of</strong> foreign capital and the<br />
second oil boom in Azerbaijan after gaining its independence in 1991.<br />
Energy policy <strong>of</strong> the independent Azerbaijan and its role in todayʹs energy security <strong>of</strong> Europe<br />
Energy security has been a cornerstone <strong>of</strong> the power politics <strong>of</strong> the 21 st century. It has been defined by<br />
International Energy Agency as an adequate, affordable, and reliable supplies <strong>of</strong> energy. 92 World leading<br />
countries are aware that without guaranteeing their energy supplies it is hard to preserve their position as<br />
an affective player in global politics. The European Union (EU) pays a lot <strong>of</strong> attention to its energy policy<br />
in order to access reliable energy resources, which is considered a backbone <strong>of</strong> the EUʹs economic and<br />
political performance. This part <strong>of</strong> our paper will focus on the Azerbaijani role in the energy security <strong>of</strong><br />
the EU, while analyzing the oil contracts signed between the Azerbaijani government and Western<br />
87 “AZERBAIJAN ‐ Socar & Production Background”, ALLBusiness, 7 July 2008; (http://www.allbusiness.com/trade‐<br />
development/international‐trade‐exports‐imports‐by/11417873‐1.html). Accessed on 18 September 2010.<br />
88 Betty Blair, “Oil Rocks in the Caspian: Birthplace to a New Trend in Soviet Art”, Azerbaijan International, Summer 2006 (14.2);<br />
(http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/ai142_folder/142_articles/142_salahov_oil_rocks.html). 18 September 2010.<br />
89 Vladimir Igorev, “A Man Made Island <strong>of</strong> Oil Treasures”, OIL OF RUSSIA, No. 3, 2010; (http://www.oilru.com/or/44/925/). 18<br />
September 2010.<br />
90 Ibid, Sabit Bagirov, “Azerbaijani Oil: Glimpses <strong>of</strong> a Long History”, p. 37.<br />
91 Ibid, Khoshbakht Yusifzade.<br />
92 International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2007.<br />
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countries and projects that play an important role in transporting vast energy resources <strong>of</strong> the Caspian<br />
Basin to the European market while bypassing Russia.<br />
As the largest energy importer in the world, the EU imports 82 percent <strong>of</strong> its oil and 57 percent <strong>of</strong> its<br />
gas, 93 which are mainly provided by Russia, one <strong>of</strong> the biggest energy suppliers, and Middle Eastern<br />
countries. The statistics <strong>of</strong> 2007 indicate that the EU imports 30 percent <strong>of</strong> its oil and more than half <strong>of</strong> its<br />
natural gas demands from Russia, while most <strong>of</strong> the Eastern European countries are totally dependent on<br />
Russian natural gas supply. 94 According to the estimate <strong>of</strong> the European Commission, by 2030 the amount<br />
<strong>of</strong> European energy demand will be high in comparison with the current statistics and its traditional<br />
suppliers, Russia and Middle Eastern countries will supply great amounts <strong>of</strong> that energy demand.<br />
“By 2030, because <strong>of</strong> growing energy demand and declining domestic production, Europe will<br />
rely on imports for two‐thirds <strong>of</strong> its energy needs. Dependence on imported oil will remain<br />
extremely high, reaching 94 percent in 2030. Dependence on imported gas will rise to 84 percent<br />
in 2030, and imports <strong>of</strong> solid fuels are projected to reach 59 percent in 2030”. 95<br />
Europe realized that increasing dependency from Russian energy resources can cause serious<br />
challenges in terms <strong>of</strong> energy security and may lead to geopolitical turbulence. Beginning from 2006, the<br />
gas crises between Ukraine and Russia (January 2006), the Georgian conflict <strong>of</strong> 2008, later cut‐<strong>of</strong>fs <strong>of</strong> gas<br />
supply by Russia to Poland and the Czech Republic in preventing the agreement between these countries<br />
and the US to settle anti‐missile basis in Eastern Europe, and finally the gas crises <strong>of</strong> Ukraine and<br />
Belorussia, respectively in 2009 and 2010, alarmed the European Union that Russia can use the energy<br />
factor as a political tool whenever it needs. 96 On the other hand, turning to the Middle East, political<br />
instability and the existence <strong>of</strong> OPEC in this region does not give a guarantee to the EU in the term <strong>of</strong><br />
energy security either.<br />
Therefore, following the energy demand increase, the EU is trying to find alternative energy sources<br />
and transportation routes in order to decrease its dependency from Russian and Middle Eastern energy<br />
monopoly and diversify its supply sources. Concerning the EU energy dependency Melissa Lu pleads<br />
that “the EU must have a comprehensive plan that includes a diversification <strong>of</strong> its sources, better relations<br />
with other source states, and the strict gas market that will restrict and prevent any Gazprom monopoly<br />
on the internal gas market”. 97 In this sense, Azerbaijan plays an important role in the energy security <strong>of</strong><br />
the Europe Union not only as an alternative energy source for diversifying its import, but also as a<br />
93 Catalina Lupu, “Russia and EU at crossroads: The role <strong>of</strong> the Black Sea region in the European Energy security”, Trieste, 2009,<br />
p. 9.<br />
94 Zeyno Baran, “EU Energy Security: Time to End Russian Leverage”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 30, Num. 4, Autumn 2007,<br />
p. 132.<br />
95 Ibid, Catalina Lupu, p. 10.<br />
96 S. Kolundzig, “Eurasia, Energy Cooperation or Conflict? 3rd Part: Competiti (Impositi) on Of Projects for Oil and Gas Supply<br />
in the Light <strong>of</strong> Geopolitics”, NAFTA, Vol. 60, 2009, p. 322.<br />
97 Melissa Lu, “EU Energy Security: Challenges in Creating a Common Energy Policy”, Paper presented at 8th Annual<br />
Claremont‐UC Undergraduate Research Conference on The European Union, University <strong>of</strong> Washington, 8‐9 April 2010, p. 1.<br />
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significant gate to the immense energy resources <strong>of</strong> the Caspian Basin, which possesses high amounts <strong>of</strong><br />
proven and possible energy resources, estimated between 10 and 32 billion barrels <strong>of</strong> proven and 233<br />
billion barrels <strong>of</strong> possible oil resources. 98 Proven gas reserves are estimated to 243‐248 trillion cubic feet,<br />
with the 293 tcf possible gas reserves. 99<br />
The main oil product <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan, as the second largest oil producer <strong>of</strong> the Caspian Basin after<br />
Kazakhstan, comes from the three <strong>of</strong>f‐shore fields <strong>of</strong> Azeri‐Chirag‐Guneshli. According to the State<br />
Statistics Committee <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan, oil production has increased by 13.5% year‐on‐year in the first 11<br />
months <strong>of</strong> 2009. Most <strong>of</strong> this output was provided by higher production levels from the Azeri‐Chirag‐<br />
Guneshli (ACG) field, which provided 83.3% <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijanʹs oil output over the mentioned period. Gas<br />
production recorded a more modest increase <strong>of</strong> 2.3% to just over 21 bn cubic meters (bcm). Over 40% <strong>of</strong><br />
this production (9.1bcm) was provided by the Shah Deniz field and its associated gas from the ACG<br />
field. 100<br />
The collapse <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union opened a new era in the history <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijan oil industry. As we<br />
mentioned before, beginning from the mid 1980s, after the perestroyka policy <strong>of</strong> Gorbachev, the economic<br />
situation in the entire empire began to change. This created a favorable condition for the foreign oil<br />
companies to direct their investment for the extraction <strong>of</strong> the vast energy resources <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan. By<br />
January 1991, the Azerbaijani government announced a decree that gave a tender for the exploration <strong>of</strong><br />
the huge energy resources in the fields (Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli) that were discovered in the last<br />
decade <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union. British Petroleum, together with Statoil, Amoco, and Unocal participated at<br />
this tender and Amoco won the tender. Following the decision the Azerbaijani Amoco created a<br />
consortium, with the participation <strong>of</strong> Unocal, BP/Statoil, McDermott, and Ramco, for the exploitation <strong>of</strong><br />
the Azeri oil field. In May 1992, Azerbaijan witnessed political changes in government and the leader <strong>of</strong><br />
the Popular Front, Abulfez Elchibey, came to power. The government under Elchibeyʹs presidency began<br />
negotiations and he succeeded in attracting foreign firms and tried to involve more companies for the<br />
exploitation <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijan oil and gas resources. 101<br />
The new government <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan signed an agreement together with BP and Statoil on the Chirag<br />
field and Shah Deniz on 7 September 1992. This was followed by the signing <strong>of</strong> another draft contract<br />
with Pennzoil and Ramco on 1 October. In October 1992, SOCAR (State Oil Company <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan<br />
Republic) made a decision for the establishment <strong>of</strong> a general infrastructure that would connect the<br />
aforementioned energy fields. As a result, in November five memorandums were signed with foreign<br />
companies “on the establishment <strong>of</strong> a general supply base, a common network <strong>of</strong> underwater pipelines<br />
and terminals, a common fleet and a common export pipeline”. After a long negotiation process the<br />
foreign oil companies were prepared to sign an agreement with the Azerbaijani government in June 1993,<br />
which would grant SOCAR 30 % share <strong>of</strong> the project. Nevertheless, in June 1993, the political power<br />
98 M K Bhadrakumar, “Catalysts <strong>of</strong> conflict in Central Asia”, Asia Times, 2 June 2005;<br />
(http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GF02Ag01.html). Accessed on 18 September 2010.<br />
99 Mikhail A. Molchanov & Yuri Yevdokimov, “Regime Building as a Prime Mover <strong>of</strong> Technological Progress: The Energy Sector<br />
in the Central Asia‐Caspian Region”, Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, Vol. 3, Num. 4, p. 418.<br />
100 “Azeri‐Chirag‐Guneshli Field Production Up 17%”, BUSINESS MONITOR INTERNATIONAL, 17 December 2009;<br />
(http://store.businessmonitor.com/article/313934). Accessed on 18 September 2010.<br />
101 Ibid, Nasib Nassibli.<br />
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situation in Azerbaijan changed. Haydar Aliyev, the leader <strong>of</strong> the new Azerbaijani government<br />
suspended all negotiations. 102 The negotiation with the western companies began again in 1994, which<br />
resulted in the signing <strong>of</strong> the “Deal <strong>of</strong> the Century” on 20 September 1994.<br />
Deal <strong>of</strong> the Century: Also called the “Contract <strong>of</strong> the Century”, was signed on 20 September 1994<br />
between the Azerbaijani government and the Western oil consortium for the exploration <strong>of</strong> three joint<br />
<strong>of</strong>fshore fields: Azeri‐Chirag‐Guneshli, worth approximately $8 billion. The estimated reserves <strong>of</strong> these<br />
three <strong>of</strong>fshore fields were estimated at 4 billion barrels <strong>of</strong> oil. Three month later, in December 1994, the<br />
consortium established AIOC (Azerbaijan International Operating Company) in order to observe the<br />
daily operation <strong>of</strong> the project. The members <strong>of</strong> AIOC consisted <strong>of</strong> the representatives <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijani<br />
government and <strong>of</strong> every company. The head <strong>of</strong> BP in Azerbaijan, Terry Adams, was elected the Head <strong>of</strong><br />
the AIOC Board. The Azerbaijani government and the State Oil Company had 50% representation on the<br />
Board <strong>of</strong> AIOC Directors. 103<br />
Russia, immediately after the signing <strong>of</strong> the “Deal <strong>of</strong> the Century” between the government <strong>of</strong><br />
Azerbaijan and the Western consortium, questioned the legitimacy <strong>of</strong> the contract declaring that it cannot<br />
be enforced. The idea behind the Russian threat was that the Deal was a unilateral agreement that was<br />
signed between two sides only: the Azerbaijani government and the foreign oil companies, and violates<br />
the legal status <strong>of</strong> the Caspian Sea. But the main issue was that Russian interests were ignored while<br />
signing the Deal, the Russian energy company Lukoil was not participating in the consortium and was<br />
not given any share. Therefore in order to neutralize the Russian position regarding the contract the<br />
Consortium decided to give share in the Agreement and SOCAR, the State Oil Company <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan,<br />
granted its 10% shares to Lukoil. 104<br />
According to the “Deal <strong>of</strong> the Century” over the next 30 years 500 million metric ton <strong>of</strong> crude oil will<br />
be produced. 80 % <strong>of</strong> the shares <strong>of</strong> the Deal were given to the government <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan and 20 % to the<br />
representatives <strong>of</strong> the consortium. The 20 % shares <strong>of</strong> the consortium were divided among its members as<br />
follows: SOCAR 20 %, BP 17.1267 %, Amoco 17.01 %, Lukoil 10 %, Penzoil 9.8175 %, UNOCOL 9.52 %,<br />
Statoil 8.5633 %, McDermott 2.45 %, Remco 2.08 %, TRAO (Turkish Petroleum) 1.75 %, Delta‐Nimir<br />
1.68 %. Later, in April 1995, TPAO was given 5 % more shares in the consortium. Exxon was also<br />
provided with 5 % share <strong>of</strong> SOCARʹs share. Hence, the share <strong>of</strong> SOCAR was reduced from 20 % to 10 % <strong>of</strong><br />
the project. 105 According to BP statistics, the final version <strong>of</strong> the parties to the Azeri‐Chirag‐Gunashli<br />
(ACG) Production Sharing Agreement are: BP (operator ‐ 34.1 %), Chevron (10.3 %), SOCAR (10 %),<br />
INPEX (10.,0 %), Statoil (8,6 %), ExxonMobil (8 %), TPAO (6.8 %), Devon (5.6 %), Itochu (3.9 %), Amerada<br />
Hess (2.7 %). 106<br />
102 Sabit Bagirov, Azerbaijani Oil: Revenues, Expenses and Risks (view from 2007), (Baku, Yeni Nesil, 2008), pp. 21‐22.<br />
103 Emmanuel Karagiannis, Energy and security in the Caucasus, (London, RoutledgeCurzon, 28 March 2002), p. 19.<br />
104 Nasser Sagheb & Masoud Javadi, “Azerbaijanʹs “Contract <strong>of</strong> the Century”: Finally Signed with Western Oil Consortium”,<br />
Azerbaijan International, winter 1994; (http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/24_folder/24_articles/24_aioc.html). Accessed<br />
on 18 September 2010.<br />
105 Ibid, Emmanuel Karagiannis, p. 19.<br />
106 “Phase 3 Drilling Modules And Living Quarters Arrive In Baku”, BP Caspian, 21 June 2006;<br />
(http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9006615&contentId=7020647). Accessed on 18 September 2010.<br />
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Early Oil: Signing the “Deal” for securing access to the Azerbaijani oil fields was the first issue that the<br />
international consortium has done. The challenge was <strong>of</strong> how to transport the Azerbaijani oil to the world<br />
market. According to the President <strong>of</strong> AIOC, Terry Adams, “the unlocking <strong>of</strong> the Caspian is entirely<br />
dependent on the pipeline issue. Without a regional pipeline to the West, these resources will not be<br />
developed quickly. But if an early pipeline can link to the West, the investment and pace <strong>of</strong> development<br />
will accelerate”. 107 There were two options for the transportation <strong>of</strong> the initial production <strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong>fshore fields<br />
<strong>of</strong> ACG, which was called “early oil” by partners, to the world market; via the Baku‐Novorossiysk<br />
pipeline, which passes through Russia and Baku‐Supsa through Georgia. 108<br />
The contract for the transportation <strong>of</strong> “early oil” from Azerbaijan through Russia to the Black Sea port<br />
<strong>of</strong> Novorossiysk was signed in Moscow on 18 February 1996 between three parties; AIOC, SOCAR, and<br />
Transneft. The pipeline extends 1330 km with 720 mm in diameter. The construction <strong>of</strong> the Novorossiysk<br />
pipeline ended in 1997. Establishment <strong>of</strong> an alternative route to the Baku‐Novorossiysk pipeline was one<br />
<strong>of</strong> the top priorities <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijani oil strategists. Therefore in the same year, on 8 March 1996, the<br />
Azerbaijani government agreed with the President <strong>of</strong> Georgia on the construction <strong>of</strong> the Baku‐Supsa<br />
pipeline. The trilateral agreement was signed between SOCAR, AIOC, and the Georgian government for<br />
the transportation <strong>of</strong> the Azeri oil from the Chirag and Guneshli fields to the Black Sea first, then to the<br />
European market. The first batch <strong>of</strong> oil was transported by the Baku‐Supsa pipeline on 17 April, 1999. The<br />
Baku‐Supsa pipeline extends 837 km to the Supsa, Black Sea port, with 530 mm in diameter. Between 1999<br />
and 2005 both pipelines transported 48.7 million tons <strong>of</strong> oil to the western market. 109 Transportation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
“early oil” by two pipelines was entirely for political and security reasons and did not make any sense<br />
economically to use two pipelines for oil that would amount only 5 million tons per year. “The most<br />
important reason for a dual‐pipeline solution was a simple one: once oil starts flowing from the Caspian<br />
towards its final destination in the West, it is unthinkable to have disruptions in the supply line. Since the<br />
security <strong>of</strong> this major economic investment was the number one concern, the foreign oil companies<br />
decided that two less‐than‐ideal routes were better than one less‐than‐ideal route”. 110<br />
Nevertheless, transporting Azerbaijani oil via Novorossiysk was not beneficial for Azerbaijan, because<br />
while passing through this pipeline the Azerbaijani oil brand called “Azer light” was mixed with the<br />
Russian low quality oil “Ural light”, which resulted in decreasing the quality <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijani oil and<br />
losing in price in the western market. Additionally, the Baku‐Novorossiysk pipeline was passing through<br />
the war‐torned region <strong>of</strong> Russia, Chechnya, which was not secured. Another facet was that next to the<br />
estimated increase <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijani oil production, plus the possible Kazakhstan oil in the future, the<br />
capacity <strong>of</strong> both pipelines was not sufficient. The Baku‐Novorossiysk pipeline was able to transport a<br />
maximum <strong>of</strong> 5 million tons <strong>of</strong> oil annually, while the capacity <strong>of</strong> Baku‐Supsa was 5.5‐6 million tons per<br />
107 Ibid, Emmanuel Karagiannis, p. 23.<br />
108 Ibid, Emmanuel Karagiannis, p. 24.<br />
109 “Transport Routes <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijani Oil (Baku‐Novorossiysk, Baku‐Supsa)” Azerbaijani Az,<br />
(http://www.azerbaijan.az/_Economy/_OilStrategy/oilStrategy_05_e.html). Accessed on 20 September 2010.<br />
110 Ibid, Emmanuel Karagiannis, p. 26.<br />
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year. With this in mind, the idea <strong>of</strong> constructing the BTC (Baku‐Tbilisi‐Ceyhan) pipeline was a reality,<br />
which could be an alternative to Baku‐Novorossiysk and Baku‐Supsa. 111<br />
BTC Pipeline: The BTC Pipeline, which enjoyed the active support <strong>of</strong> the U.S. and European<br />
governments, is considered the perfect alternative for Azerbaijan and its partners in term <strong>of</strong> bypassing<br />
Russia and transporting their newly drilled oil <strong>of</strong> the ACG fields instead through Georgia and Turkey to<br />
the port <strong>of</strong> Ceyhan in the eastern Mediterranean. It was the longest pipeline in the world after Druzhba <strong>of</strong><br />
Russia with 1,768 km and 1 million barrel capacity per day. The construction cost <strong>of</strong> the pipeline was<br />
4 billion US dollars. The pipeline was considered as one <strong>of</strong> the most significant legs <strong>of</strong> the East‐West<br />
corridor, which eliminated the need for nearly 350 cargo tankers that were passing via the Bosporus<br />
Straight and provided Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey with a greater geopolitical space in order to<br />
maneuver in terms <strong>of</strong> energy policy. 112 The BTC Co Shareholders currently are: BP (30.1 %), SOCAR<br />
(25 %), Chevron (8.9 %), Statoil (8.71 %), TPAO (6.53 %), Itochu (3.4 %), Amerada Hess (2.36 %), ENI (5 %),<br />
ConocoPhilliрs (2.5 %), Inрex (2.5 %), Total (5 %). 113 The first stage <strong>of</strong> the BTC oil export pipeline was<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficially inaugurated at the Sangachal terminal <strong>of</strong> Baku on May 25, 2005, by the presidents <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan,<br />
Georgia and Turkey. 114<br />
Next to transporting Azerbaijani oil, the capacity <strong>of</strong> the BTC pipeline also provides the opportunity for<br />
transporting Kazakhstan oil to the European market bypassing Russia. It is largest oil producer and<br />
exporter <strong>of</strong> the Caspian Basin with a great potential <strong>of</strong> proven and potential resources. By 2007, it<br />
produced nearly 67 million tons <strong>of</strong> oil. According to estimates, by 2015 the production will reach 130<br />
million tons while exporting 110 million tons. However, the existing transportation infrastructure is not<br />
sufficient and restricts the export capacity <strong>of</strong> the country. Due to this reason, Kazakhstan intensified its<br />
efforts to increase the volume <strong>of</strong> its oil transportation through the BTC pipeline, which will break the<br />
Russian oil monopoly over oil transportation from Kazakhstan. 115<br />
Therefore, Kazakhstan <strong>of</strong>ficially joined to BTC in the summer <strong>of</strong> 2006. The construction <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Trans-Caspian oil pipeline was planned under the Caspian Sea in order to transfer large amounts <strong>of</strong><br />
oil <strong>of</strong> the Kashagan <strong>of</strong>fshore, the main oil field <strong>of</strong> Kazakhstan, to the European markets via the BTC<br />
Pipeline. The pipeline was planned to run from the port <strong>of</strong> Aktau to Baku in Azerbaijan that will be<br />
connected to the BTC pipeline. The Russian government opposes the construction <strong>of</strong> the Trans‐Caspian<br />
pipeline declaring that it is a threat to the environment <strong>of</strong> the Caspian Sea. In reality Russia does not want<br />
to lose its monopoly over the East‐West transportation route. If this pipeline becomes reality it will not<br />
111 Rovshan Ibrahimov, “Azerbaijan: Happiness is the Availability <strong>of</strong> Export Corridors”, USAK, 30 October 2008;<br />
(http://www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale.asp?id=552). Accessed on 20 September 2010.<br />
112 Ksenia Broisocheva, “Analysis <strong>of</strong> the Oil‐ and Gas‐Pipeline‐Links between EU and Russia”, CERE, November, 2007, p. 10.<br />
113 Rufat Abbasov, “BTC pipeline exports 11.9 mln tons <strong>of</strong> oil in 2010”, News.Az, 12 May 2010;<br />
(http://www.news.az/articles/15256). Accessed on 20 September 2010.<br />
114 Tamam Bayatly, “BP Current Developments: BTC Pipeline Filling Up”, The <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan International, Autumn 2005;<br />
(http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/ai133_folder/133_articles/133_bp_developments.html). Accessed on 20 September<br />
2010.<br />
115 Aleksandra Jarosiewiez, “Oil transport through the Caucasus is a top priority issue in Kazakh oil export policy”, CENTER<br />
FOR EASTER STUDIES, Issue. 6, 23 June 2008, pp. 1‐2.<br />
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Russia will loose some <strong>of</strong> its control over the routes, and in the same time it will increase the importance<br />
<strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan as a transit country. 116<br />
South Caucasus Gas Pipeline (BTE): Azerbaijan, a predominant oil exporter, also possesses huge gas<br />
resources, which is strategically as significant as oil. As mentioned above, proven gas reserves <strong>of</strong><br />
Azerbaijan are estimated at 243‐248 trillion cubic feet, with the 293 tcf possible gas reserves, which<br />
provide it with the opportunity to push its role as a significant strategic actor in the energy security <strong>of</strong><br />
Europe.<br />
The year 2007 marked a crucial turning point in the energy history <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan. After the years <strong>of</strong><br />
dependence on Russia, Azerbaijan emerged as a net exporter <strong>of</strong> natural gas with the startup <strong>of</strong> the Shah<br />
Deniz natural gas field. A production share agreement between the Azerbaijani government and seven oil<br />
companies for the extraction and exportation <strong>of</strong> the first phase <strong>of</strong> Shah Deniz gas field was signed in June<br />
1996, and ten years later, in December 2006, the field came on stream. According to BP, gas in the Shah<br />
Deniz field is initially estimated at 33 tcf and by 2009 the production <strong>of</strong> the field was acombined total <strong>of</strong><br />
137 mmboe gas and condensate. 117 The participants <strong>of</strong> the production sharing agreement <strong>of</strong> Shah Deniz<br />
<strong>of</strong>fshore are BP (operator – 25.5 %), Statoil (25.5 %), SOCAR (10 %), LUKOIL (10 %), NICO (10 %), Total<br />
(10 %) and TPAO (9 %). 118<br />
The production <strong>of</strong> the first phase <strong>of</strong> the Shah Deniz gas field is initially transported to the Shangachal<br />
terminal <strong>of</strong> Baku, one <strong>of</strong> the worldʹs largest integrated oil and gas processing terminals. Later the gas is<br />
piped to the world market via the South Caucasus pipeline, also called Baku‐Tbilisi‐Erzurum pipeline, to<br />
Erzurum through Georgia. With the 692 km length the pipeline is capable <strong>of</strong> transporting 20 billion cubic<br />
meters gas (bcm) annually. 119 The construction <strong>of</strong> the pipeline was completed in 2006. The investors <strong>of</strong> the<br />
South Caucasus Pipeline Company are: BP (Technical Operator – 25,5 %), Statoil (Commercial Operator<br />
25,5 %), Azerbaijan SCP Ltd. (10 %), LUKoil (10 %), NICO (10 %), Total (10 %), and TPAO (9 %). The<br />
Ministry <strong>of</strong> Industry and Energy <strong>of</strong> the Azerbaijan Republic is a non‐funding shareholder. 120 In the first<br />
phase, the plan was that the pipeline would supply gas only to the Georgian and Turkish markets, but<br />
later this route was extended toward Greece and Italy as well. The construction <strong>of</strong> the pipeline gave a<br />
chance to Europe to diversify its gas routes and to build the East‐West energy corridor while bypassing<br />
Russia. It is considered the first project that broke the Gazprom monopolized gas system. Additionally,<br />
the pipeline was a good opportunity for transporting the vast gas resources <strong>of</strong> Central Asia, mainly<br />
Turkmenistan, through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan. Then by the South Caucasus Pipeline to Turkey<br />
and later with the proposed Nabucco Gas Pipeline to the European market.<br />
116 “First Signature for Baku‐Tbilsi‐Ceyhan Oil Pipeline”, TODAY.AZ, 13 April 2007;<br />
(http://www.today.az/news/business/39349.html). Accessed on 20 September 2010.<br />
117 “Shah Deniz and the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP)”, Statoil, 30 August 2007,<br />
(http://www.statoil.com/en/About/Worldwide/Azerbaijan/Pages/ShahDeniz.aspx). Accessed on 20 September 2010.<br />
118 Rufat Abbasov, “South Caucasus pipeline exports 1.3 bn cubic meters <strong>of</strong> gas”, News.Az, 17 April 2010;<br />
(http://www.news.az/articles/13578). Accessed on 20 September 2010.<br />
119 “SCP Commissioning Commences”, Press release, 01 June 2006;<br />
(http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9006615&contentId=7018471). Accessed on 21 September 2010.<br />
120 “Production Begins at Shah Deniz gas condensate field in the Caspian Sea”, Press release, 15 December 2006,<br />
(http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9006615&contentId=7026800). Accessed on 21 September.<br />
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Nabucco Pipeline: As mentioned before, in January 2009 the energy crisis between Russia and Ukraine<br />
resulted in the interruption <strong>of</strong> the natural gas supply to some European countries in the middle <strong>of</strong> winter.<br />
This event led the European countries to think about alternative energy sources and also alternative<br />
energy routes to transport those energy resources to the European market. In this sense, the necessity for<br />
the establishment <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco pipeline became part <strong>of</strong> the agenda <strong>of</strong> the European countries, which<br />
will transport the Caspian Basin and perhaps Middle Eastern gas resources to Europe bypassing Russia.<br />
The first idea for constructing the Nabucco pipeline came up in 2000 and in 2003 this proposal was<br />
supported by the European Parliament and Council. Then it became one <strong>of</strong> the top European priorities<br />
following the gas crisis <strong>of</strong> 2006 between Russia and Ukraine. 121 As a significant European energy<br />
infrastructure concept the idea behind the proposed Nabucco project is to strengthen European energy<br />
security by diversifying existing supply routes. If the project will be realized it will cost $6 billion, it will<br />
be 3,300 km long and 25‐30 billion m 3 transportation capacity. It will be constructed as the continuation <strong>of</strong><br />
the South Caucasus Pipeline and as mentioned before it will transport Turkmenistani and Kazakhstani<br />
gas to Azerbaijan via the proposed Trans‐Caspian Gas Pipeline, then by the BTC pipeline to Turkey. The<br />
western part <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco pipeline will pass through Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and<br />
Austria. 122 The shareholders <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco consortium are Austriaʹs ÖMV, Hungaryʹs MOL, Turkeyʹs<br />
BOTAŞ, Bulgariaʹs Bulgargaz, Romaniaʹs Transgaz, and Germany`s RWE. 123<br />
The contract for the realization <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco pipeline was signed in May 2010 by the Turkish<br />
Minister <strong>of</strong> Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yıldız, and the Azerbaijani Industry and Energy<br />
Minister Natig Aliyev. In the same week the Turkish parliament ratified the agreement to construct the<br />
Nabucco Gas Pipeline, which would deliver 20–30 bcm <strong>of</strong> Caspian gas to Europe per year. Construction<br />
<strong>of</strong> gas pipeline was planned to begin in 2011 and the first supply <strong>of</strong> gas is expected in 2014. 124<br />
Even though the agreement for the construction <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco pipeline was ratified by the Turkish<br />
parliament, the realization and viability <strong>of</strong> the pipeline has been questioned by various authors and<br />
analysts due to several backstage problems <strong>of</strong> the project and unless these problems are not resolved the<br />
construction <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco pipeline seems utt <strong>of</strong> reality.<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the outstanding problems in the realization <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco project is the unstable energy policy<br />
<strong>of</strong> Turkmenistan. It is obvious that without Turkmenistani gas it is nonsense to talk about the Nabucco<br />
pipeline. For years, after the collapse <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union, the gas <strong>of</strong> Turkmenistan was transported to the<br />
European market via Russia, which gave Russia the opportunity to get the gas <strong>of</strong> Turkmenistan for a very<br />
cheap price. For that reason, beginning from 2006, Turkmenistan began an active policy in its energy<br />
sector in order to diversify its supply routes. In this regard, the Nabucco proposal was welcomed by the<br />
121 Maureen S. Crandall, “Who is Bypassing Whom? Russian, European and Caspian Gas and Oil”, Paper presented at “32nd<br />
IAEE International Conference”, San Francisco, California, 21‐24 June 2009, p. 10.<br />
122 Igor Tomberg, “Energy Poilcy and Energy Projects in Central Eurasia”, Central Asia and The Caucasus; <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Social and<br />
Political <strong>Studies</strong>, Vol.6, Num. 48, Sweden 2007, p. 49.<br />
123 Rashid Ziyadli, “Transportation <strong>of</strong> Energy Resources (Oil & Gas) From Caspian Region to Euro‐Mediterranean Countries,<br />
Current Situation and Plans For”, Paper presented at “The Euro‐Mediterranean Student Research Multi‐conference”, 9 June<br />
2009.<br />
124 “Nabucco Pipeline forges ahead”, Pipelines International, 8 June 2010;<br />
(http://pipelinesinternational.com/news/nabucco_and_south_stream_forge_ahead/041261/). Accessed on 22 September 2010.<br />
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new Turkmenistan government headed by President Berdymuhamedov. 125 But Russia launched a new<br />
political attack in order to prevent Turkmenistan joining the Nabucco project. Russia understands that if<br />
Turkmenistan agrees to transport its gas via Russia, the Nabucco pipeline will simply have nothing to be<br />
filled with. Thereforeç without Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan alone will not be able to provide gas for<br />
Nabucco. For that reason, Russia proposed a European market gas price for the gas <strong>of</strong> Turkmenistan. This<br />
process was finalized with the signing <strong>of</strong> a new energy agreement between Russia and Turkmenistan in<br />
2007. But stopping the flow <strong>of</strong> Turkmenistan gas through Russia in 2009 by the Russian government led<br />
to big losses for the Turkmenistan government and changed the condition in favor <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco<br />
pipeline that would be a strategic project diversifying the transportation routes. Such blackmail by Russia<br />
has convinced Turkmenistan to pursue an open policy <strong>of</strong> finding alternative transportation routes to the<br />
Gazprom gas system. 126 However, this was not sufficient because the current gas capacity <strong>of</strong><br />
Turkmenistan is 60 bcm and almost 50 bcm <strong>of</strong> this amount is supposed to be transported through<br />
Russia. 127 Next to this, Turkmenistan also signed energy contracts with China and Iran concerning the<br />
transportation <strong>of</strong> Turkmenistan gas to these countries, which raised a big anxiety in Europe whether<br />
Turkmenistan will be able to fulfill all <strong>of</strong> these agreements.<br />
Another problem in the realization <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco project is the lack <strong>of</strong> political support from the<br />
European Union. The realization <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco project needs political support from European countries.<br />
In this regard, the well‐known scholar Svante E. Cornell writes:<br />
“The EU and its member states can do several things for energy development in the region, and<br />
by extension for itself. The first would be to strongly support the Nabucco project, understanding<br />
that this commercial project is dependent on political support and cannot be left to market forces<br />
alone; since all its competitors are politically supported and not market‐oriented, and energy<br />
issues are by nature political”. 128<br />
But instead <strong>of</strong> giving full support to the realization <strong>of</strong> Nabucco the EU members flocked to make<br />
bilateral agreements with Gazprom in order to ensure their secure gas supply. Due to the unwillingness<br />
<strong>of</strong> the European countries in the construction <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco pipeline, Azerbaijan began to alternate its<br />
energy market. Russia used this opportunity as a remedy for the realization <strong>of</strong> its monopolized energy<br />
corridor and stressed its interest for buying Azerbaijani gas at a European price. This culminated in<br />
125 Rovshan Ibrahimov, “Nabucco Pipeline: Increased Actuality, but Inertia in Realization (I)”, The <strong>Journal</strong> Of Turkish Weekly, 17<br />
February 2009; (http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3101/nabucco‐pipeline‐increased‐actuality‐but‐inertia‐in‐realization‐i‐<br />
.html ). Accessed on 22 September.<br />
126 Vladimir Socor, “Russia resumes gas imports from Turkmenistan”, Asia Times, 6 January 2010;<br />
(http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LA06Ag02.html ). Accessed on 22 September.<br />
127 Rovshan Ibrahimov, “Trans‐Afghan Pipeline:Will Ambitions Convert into the Reality”, The <strong>Journal</strong> <strong>of</strong> Turkish Weekly, 15 May<br />
2008; (http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/2903/trans‐afghan‐pipeline‐will‐ambitions‐convert‐into‐the‐reality.html ).<br />
Accessed on 23 September.<br />
128 Svante E. Cornell. “Trans‐Caspian Pipelines and Europe’s Energy Security”, in Svante E. Cornell & Niklas Nilsson ed.,<br />
Europe’s Energy Security: Gazprom’s Dominance and Caspian Supply Alternatives, (Central Asia – Caucasus Institute & Silk Road<br />
<strong>Studies</strong> Program, 2008), p. 152.<br />
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signing an agreement on 29 June 2009 between Azerbaijan and Russia for delivering Azerbaijani gas to<br />
Russia; the signing took place during the first visit <strong>of</strong> the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev to<br />
Azerbaijan. The sides agreed for the transportation <strong>of</strong> 500 million cubic meters <strong>of</strong> gas to Russia starting<br />
from January 1, 2010. The initial volumes <strong>of</strong> gas transportation was small, but such an agreement with<br />
Azerbaijan, a backbone <strong>of</strong> Nabucco project, was the curtail step by the Russian government in preserving<br />
its monopol position over the transportation <strong>of</strong> the Caspian Basin gas resources to western markets. It was<br />
obvious that without Azerbaijan, talking about the construction <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco pipeline is not logical.<br />
This agreement was considered by scholars as a clear message by Azerbaijan to the Western countries. 129<br />
Even going further, on 3 September 2010, Azerbaijan renewed its gas agreement with Russia´s Gazprom,<br />
which will double the amount <strong>of</strong> Russian gas purchases, from 1 billion cubic meters in 2010 to 2 billion<br />
cubic meters in 2011. The deal also provides for an even greater level <strong>of</strong> imports in 2012 and beyond. 130<br />
All <strong>of</strong> these abovementioned factors posit an open question for the realization <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco project<br />
and stress the importance <strong>of</strong> European political support for the construction <strong>of</strong> the pipeline. Because, as<br />
mentioned before, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are the primary suppliers <strong>of</strong> the Nabucco pipeline and if<br />
the gas resources <strong>of</strong> these countries go to Russia there is no need to talk about the realization <strong>of</strong> it.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Azerbaijan, a significant oil and gas producer as well as a crucial transit country from the Caspian<br />
Basin and Central Asia to Europe, has been one <strong>of</strong> the birthplaces <strong>of</strong> the oil industry. In the global history<br />
<strong>of</strong> oil the first oil well operated by industrial drilling processes was opened in Azerbaijan in 1848. The<br />
modern development <strong>of</strong> the oil industry in Azerbaijan dates back to the 1870s, when it was a colony <strong>of</strong><br />
Tsarist Russia. Beginning from those years, after the abolishment <strong>of</strong> the otkupchina lease system, the first<br />
oil boom happened in the Azerbaijani oil industry, resulting in the flow <strong>of</strong> foreign investment to<br />
Azerbaijan. Consequently, Azerbaijan became a leading country as a world oil producer. At the turn <strong>of</strong><br />
the century, it held the first place in oil production and export. But beginning from the first years <strong>of</strong> the<br />
20 th century, the production decreased due to political turbulence, within the country, as well as at<br />
international level: the 1905 revolution <strong>of</strong> Russia, outbreak <strong>of</strong> World War I, and the Bolshevik Revolution<br />
<strong>of</strong> 1917. Azerbaijan was occupied by the Red Army in April 1920, the oil industry was nationalized and<br />
state control was established over the production and exportation <strong>of</strong> oil. During World War II,<br />
Azerbaijani oil played a significant role in the victory over Hitlerʹs Germany, producing more than half <strong>of</strong><br />
the world oil output and around 90 percent <strong>of</strong> Russian oil output. Later the discoveries <strong>of</strong> oil fields in<br />
other parts <strong>of</strong> Soviet Russia, Volga‐Ural and Siberia, led to the decreasing <strong>of</strong> production <strong>of</strong> oil in<br />
Azerbaijan until 1980. With the Gorbachev perestroika policy, which freed the economy and gave a<br />
chance to western companies to explore oil on Russian soil, as well as discovering the vast energy<br />
resources <strong>of</strong> the Azeri‐Chirag‐Guneshli <strong>of</strong>fshore field led to the flow <strong>of</strong> foreign investment to the<br />
129 Vladimir Socor, “Azerbaijan‐Russia Gas Agreement: a Wakeup Call to Brussels and Washington”, Eurasia Daily Monitor , Vol.<br />
6, Issue.127, 2 July 2009; (http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35216 ). Accessed on 17<br />
October 2010.<br />
130 Shahin Abbasov, “Medvedev Visit to Baku Produces Gas Export Agreement”, EURASIANET.org, 3 September 2010;<br />
(http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61857), Accessed on 17 October.<br />
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Azerbaijan oil industry. This event is considered the second oil boom in the oil history <strong>of</strong> Azerbaijan,<br />
which resulted in signing the “Deal <strong>of</strong> the Century” by the Azerbaijani government and a Western oil<br />
consortium in 1994 after a long peri<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> negotiations. In 2005, the BTC project became reality<br />
transportating Azerbaijani oil to western markets. Parallel to the oil exports, Azerbaijan also emerged as a<br />
net gas exporter in 2007 as the South Caucasus Pipeline became reality. The development and<br />
construction <strong>of</strong> such mega projects were beneficial both for Europe and for energy producing countries.<br />
As a result <strong>of</strong> these projects and contracts the Caspian Basin developed alternative routes to the European<br />
markets bypassing the monopol position <strong>of</strong> the Russian energy transport system and gave an opportunity<br />
to the European Union to diversify its energy suppliers and decrease its dependence from Russian and<br />
Middle Eastern energy, which has been always politically vulnerable. Next to these, Azerbaijan also<br />
played an important role in transferring Central Asian energy to western markets and the proposed<br />
Trans‐Caspian oil and gas pipeline and the Nabucco project will increase its role further.<br />
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(http://azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/ai112_folder/112_articles/112_chronology.html). Accessed on 17<br />
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Euro‐Mediterranean Student Research Multi‐conference”, 9 June 2009.<br />
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Rovshan Ibrahimov, “Nabucco Pipeline: Increased Actuality, but Inertia in Realization (I)”, The<br />
<strong>Journal</strong> Of Turkish Weekly, 17 February 2009; (http://www.turkishweekly.net/columnist/3101/nabucco‐<br />
pipeline‐increased‐actuality‐but‐inertia‐in‐realization‐i‐.html ). Accessed on 22 September.<br />
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pipeline‐will‐ambitions‐convert‐into‐the‐reality.html ). Accessed on 23 September.<br />
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April 2010; (http://www.news.az/articles/13578).<br />
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Projects for Oil and Gas Supply in the Light <strong>of</strong> Geopolitics”, NAFTA, Vol. 60, 2009, p. 322.<br />
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August 1996, p. 34.<br />
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in Lord Curzonʹs Search for the Near Eastern Settlement, 1918‐1923”, Thesis Submitted in<br />
Partial Fulfillment <strong>of</strong> the Requirements for the Degree <strong>of</strong> Mater <strong>of</strong> Arts in the Department <strong>of</strong><br />
History, Simon Fraser University, October 2003; p. 45.<br />
Shahin Abbasov, “Medvedev Visit to Baku Produces Gas Export Agreement”,<br />
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October.<br />
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Cornell & Niklas Nilsson ed., Europe’s Energy Security: Gazprom’s Dominance and Caspian<br />
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152.<br />
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Bakü Sorunu (Russian Policy on Azerbaijan and the Question <strong>of</strong> Baku after the Bolshevik<br />
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Washington”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, Issue. 127, 2 July 2009;<br />
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(http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35216 ). Accessed on 17 October<br />
2010.<br />
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Quarterly, Vol. 30, Num. 4, Autumn 2007, p. 132.<br />
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Abstract<br />
MAHAPATRA, Debidatta Aurobinda<br />
Post‐Cold War World Order and Ideal Human Unity:<br />
A Perspective from Sri Aurobindo’s Philosophy<br />
This paper analyzes the emerging world order from the perspective <strong>of</strong> Sri Aurobindo’s philosophy,<br />
while arguing that the concept <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity as developed by the Indian philosopher provides<br />
the parameter to scrutinize the current working <strong>of</strong> inter‐state relations and also the ways how the<br />
nation‐states can play a dynamic role towards a world order based on peace and harmony. The cardinal<br />
argument on which the whole theory <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity is based is that at the current working the<br />
nation‐state system has not been mature enough to evolve an egalitarian system in which the realistic<br />
paradigm <strong>of</strong> nation‐state relations can be transcended, rather it has perpetuated the state‐centric<br />
international system mostly governed by national egos and prejudices. Sri Aurobindo argues unless a<br />
universal ethic based on supreme social trinity‐ liberty, equality and fraternity is evolved, the<br />
domination <strong>of</strong> one nation‐state or nation‐states over others will continue in one way or other. For this<br />
evolution <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity Sri Aurobindo envisages a greater role for India.<br />
Sri Aurobindo (1872‐1950), the Indian philosopher and thinker, who contributed to a range <strong>of</strong><br />
disciplines including philosophy, psychology and literature played a major role in the Indian freedom<br />
struggle in the 20 th century and shaped the Indian thinking during and aftermath <strong>of</strong> the freedom struggle.<br />
This paper draws heavily from his reflections on nation‐state system and the world order, which have<br />
immense significance for the post‐cold war world. Sri Aurobindo strongly argues that international peace<br />
and stability can not be achieved by mere mechanical coming together <strong>of</strong> the states but by psychological<br />
understanding and feeling the urge from within <strong>of</strong> the necessity <strong>of</strong> a world union. He argues that this<br />
feeling is inherent in the consciousness <strong>of</strong> every nation but to identify with this consciousness; nations<br />
must transcend the confinements <strong>of</strong> narrow national ‘ego’ which leads to either aggressive nationalism or<br />
expansive imperialism found in varied forms in the conduct <strong>of</strong> nations. The religion <strong>of</strong> humanity which in<br />
its centre cherishes the principles <strong>of</strong> liberty, equality and fraternity, which nations in their policies at<br />
home implement or endeavour to implement, need to be widened to the international sphere and only<br />
then complicated issues can be resolved in a non‐zero sum framework. While elaborating the main<br />
arguments, the paper will follow this course. First, it will focus on Sri Aurobindo’s categorization <strong>of</strong> the<br />
concepts <strong>of</strong> state and nation and their inherent dynamics. The second section <strong>of</strong> the paper will focus on<br />
his concept <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity. The third section highlights the weakness <strong>of</strong> international bodies both<br />
in their conception and working. The fourth section brings India into picture and prospects <strong>of</strong> its<br />
contribution towards the realization <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity.<br />
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State and Nation and the World Order<br />
Sri Aurobindo makes a distinction between the concepts <strong>of</strong> state and nation – the state represents the<br />
transition <strong>of</strong> society from the infrarational organic stage to the rational stage and it attempts to bring<br />
about an organic unity <strong>of</strong> the aggregate people’s political, social and economic life through centralized<br />
administration. The need for compactness, single‐mindedness and uniformity to promote security and<br />
strengthen national defence is sought to be fulfilled by the state‐idea. According to him, “The state has<br />
been most successful and efficient means <strong>of</strong> unification and has been best able to meet the various needs<br />
which the progressive aggregate life <strong>of</strong> societies has created for itself and is still creating.” (Sri Aurobindo<br />
1962, p. 618) The state is only an outward form, a convenient machinery to enforce unity and uniformity,<br />
while the nation idea implies the living unity <strong>of</strong> the aspirations and powers <strong>of</strong> its peoples. A common<br />
race‐origin, a common language, a common culture and geographical unity may be its elements but it is<br />
basically a psychological unit with a distinct personality or ‘soul’ <strong>of</strong> its own. The evolution <strong>of</strong> the state<br />
follow this order: man by nature seeks the association <strong>of</strong> his fellow beings, and this seeking <strong>of</strong> association<br />
<strong>of</strong> individuals begins within the family followed by the tribe, then the clan, the community and<br />
subsequently the nation. But the progression does not end at the nation idea because there is a drive in<br />
Nature towards larger agglomerations and this drive can lead to the final establishment <strong>of</strong> the largest <strong>of</strong><br />
all and the ultimate union <strong>of</strong> the world’s people. (Sri Aurobindo 1962, p. 797)<br />
Though the concept <strong>of</strong> nationalism emerged in the 18 th century Europe, it emerged not as a concept<br />
embodying evolutionary consciousness but proceeded from some kind <strong>of</strong> expediency, mainly<br />
geographical and historical. In the beginning, it surfaced as a secondary or even tertiary necessity which<br />
resulted not from anything inherent in the vital nature <strong>of</strong> human society but from circumstances. (Sri<br />
Aurobindo 1962, p. 743) It lacked the idea <strong>of</strong> larger human unity in its core. Though Sri Aurobindo did<br />
not reject the role <strong>of</strong> external factors, i.e. geography, language, and common objectives, or the internal<br />
factors like common sentiment and culture in the emergence <strong>of</strong> the nation‐state idea, he applied a more<br />
nuanced approach. He argues, “nationalism is not a mere political programme; nationalism is a religion<br />
… If you are going to be a nationalist, if you are giving assent to this religion <strong>of</strong> nationalism, you must do<br />
it in the religion spirit.” On the surface this approach may give a sense for the advocacy <strong>of</strong> crude<br />
revivalism, but a deeper analysis does not hold this viewpoint true. Karan Singh argues, “Sri Aurobindo’s<br />
nationalism never descended into chauvinism or obscurantist revivalism. He always placed it in a<br />
broader, international context.” (Singh 1972, p. 55) In his Open Letter to Countrymen, written in 1909 – Sri<br />
Aurobindo emphasized, “our ideal <strong>of</strong> patriotism proceeds on the basis <strong>of</strong> love and brotherhood and it<br />
looks beyond the unity <strong>of</strong> the nations and envisages the ultimate unity <strong>of</strong> mankind. But it is a unity <strong>of</strong><br />
brothers, equals and freemen that we seek…” But, the evolutionary principle which Sri Aurobindo<br />
emphasized in his analysis <strong>of</strong> nationalism does not find place in the works <strong>of</strong> other scholars on<br />
nationalism. E. J. Hobsbawm (quoting Stalin) writes, “a nation is a historically evolved, stable community<br />
<strong>of</strong> language, territory, economic life and psychological make‐up manifested in a community <strong>of</strong> culture.”<br />
(Hobsbawm 1993, p. 5) Benedict Anderson emphasizes on the psychological aspect and writes, “it (nation)<br />
is an imagined political community‐ and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” (Anderson<br />
1991, p. 6) Among other differences, Anderson’s nationalism does not take into account the evolutionary<br />
and ideal nature that forms an integral part <strong>of</strong> Sri Aurobindo’s nationalism.<br />
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The psychological feeling <strong>of</strong> being in nation brings unity among people <strong>of</strong> different shades <strong>of</strong> opinion<br />
as it makes the principle <strong>of</strong> unity in diversity possible. It has the following utilities: first, it brings the<br />
sense <strong>of</strong> unison among people; second, it helps in developing a collective consciousness leading to<br />
collective goals in national affairs; and third, it transcending national divides bears the seed <strong>of</strong> a larger<br />
formation, towards a greater unity <strong>of</strong> human beings. Nationalism is evolutionary in nature and its<br />
evolution towards a higher form <strong>of</strong> synthesis <strong>of</strong> mankind is mandated in its very nature. There is always<br />
an urge in nation idea even in a way to ‘destroy it’ in the larger synthesis <strong>of</strong> mankind. In the growth <strong>of</strong><br />
human civilization nationalism is an intermediary stage towards higher forms <strong>of</strong> union, transcending<br />
narrow national boundaries because the nation idea finds its consummation in the development <strong>of</strong> ideal<br />
human unity. But, the nation idea must be developed to its full before any possibility <strong>of</strong> formation <strong>of</strong><br />
world union arises. In The ideal <strong>of</strong> Human Unity Sri Aurobindo explicates the possibility <strong>of</strong> emergence <strong>of</strong><br />
world union. For him, the exact name does not matter, whether it is called world union or federation <strong>of</strong><br />
states, what matters is the highest possible achievement <strong>of</strong> human civilization in which different nations<br />
and different cultures live in peace and harmony, as in one family. The characteristic feature <strong>of</strong> Sri<br />
Aurobindo’s concept <strong>of</strong> nationalism is the development <strong>of</strong> a crucial tool to explicate the instability in the<br />
world order and the crises that afflict it by making a distinction between ‘national ego’ and ‘nation‐soul’.<br />
While national ego, i.e. a vague sense <strong>of</strong> group subjectivity is reflected in national idiosyncrasies, habits,<br />
prejudices and marked mental tendencies, nation‐soul embodies a deeper awareness <strong>of</strong> group<br />
subjectivity. (Mohanty 1993, p. 142) While national ego is a barrier towards larger unity <strong>of</strong> mankind,<br />
nation‐soul has in itself a tendency towards larger agglomerations <strong>of</strong> mankind. Wherever there is<br />
domination <strong>of</strong> national ego, there is a tendency on part <strong>of</strong> national leaders to pr<strong>of</strong>ess supremacy <strong>of</strong> their<br />
nation and to proclaim their right to expand into other territories, thus leading to imperialism. Whether it<br />
is British or French or German imperialism, an inherent urge was prominent on part <strong>of</strong> those nations to<br />
assert supremacy and domination over other nations and cultures. This tendency <strong>of</strong> national ego and<br />
domination persists even now as the recent developments in the international politics indicate. These<br />
developments are dealt in detail in the later chapters.<br />
For Sri Aurobindo nation‐state system is not the culmination <strong>of</strong> the formations <strong>of</strong> human civilization,<br />
rather it is an intermediary phase for the ultimate ideal human unity. Nationalism is neither aggressive<br />
nor imperialistic rather it is a significant phase towards the evolution <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity. While Sri<br />
Aurobindo argued for moderation <strong>of</strong> aggressive nationalism towards evolution <strong>of</strong> larger human unity in<br />
the wake <strong>of</strong> the First World War, almost same line <strong>of</strong> argument was followed by two worth mentioning<br />
scholars on the eve <strong>of</strong> the Second World War. Clarence Streit’s Union Now and W. B. Curry’s The Case for<br />
Federal Union were full <strong>of</strong> insightful arguments with roadmaps for moderation <strong>of</strong> the concept <strong>of</strong><br />
aggressive nationalism, especially practiced in Germany under the leadership <strong>of</strong> Hitler. Curry appealed<br />
nations to come out <strong>of</strong> their narrow grooves to make the idea <strong>of</strong> federal union possible. For the survival <strong>of</strong><br />
the civilization, Curry argued, “the groups which we call nations should become like other groups, less<br />
fierce, less exclusive, less aggressive, less dominating, admitting allegiance to, and submitting to some<br />
measure <strong>of</strong> control by the community consisting <strong>of</strong> mankind as a whole.” (Curry 1939, p. 65)<br />
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Ideal Human Unity<br />
Nationalism in its true spirit leads to internationalism as it cannot provide the anchor for the final<br />
solution to the problems emerging out <strong>of</strong> the nation‐state mechanism. When nation‐states do not mature<br />
and transform themselves to a larger possible human unity, they become subject to evils <strong>of</strong> aggressive and<br />
imperialist impulses. Only when the spirit <strong>of</strong> nationalism is developed to its full, it graduates to the<br />
higher goal <strong>of</strong> human unity. The nature which embodies the world is basically a ‘pluriverse’ not a<br />
universe, which contains in its core an inherent urge towards multiple poles <strong>of</strong> interaction which<br />
negotiates and reconciles diverse forms <strong>of</strong> expression as is the case with the nation‐idea embodying<br />
plurality and diversity.<br />
Attempts were made in the past to establish some kind <strong>of</strong> world order, howsoever limited in scale, but<br />
these failed mainly because these were not based on intrinsic values <strong>of</strong> the ideal human unity but purely<br />
on mechanical and superficial means. Empires like the Roman and the Persian adopted absolutist and<br />
monarchical means to bring some kind <strong>of</strong> unity and order among divergent units but those attempts<br />
failed because they were not addressed to the basic values <strong>of</strong> humanity in its genuine form. Sri Aurobindo<br />
developed the idea <strong>of</strong> religion <strong>of</strong> humanity to make his scheme <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity a feasible initiative.<br />
The underlying basis <strong>of</strong> this religion is not any kind <strong>of</strong> dogma or exclusivist tenets or ideas, rather three<br />
supreme values‐ liberty, equality and fraternity. This supreme social trinity or ‘three godheads <strong>of</strong> soul,’ as<br />
he names it, can provide a stable basis for a new world order based on peace and harmony. But, these<br />
three supreme values cannot develop and transform the world until the nation states rise to the occasion<br />
and cultivate them in habit, thinking and ways <strong>of</strong> life. In fact none <strong>of</strong> these values has really been realized<br />
in true spirit in spite <strong>of</strong> all the progress that has been achieved by the human society. Sri Aurobindo<br />
writes: “The liberty that has been so loudly proclaimed as an essential <strong>of</strong> modern progress is an outward<br />
and mechanical and unreal liberty. The equality that has been so much sought after and battled for is<br />
equally an outward and mechanical and will turn out to be an unreal equality. Fraternity is not even<br />
claimed to be a practicable principle <strong>of</strong> the ordering <strong>of</strong> life and what is put forward as its substitute is the<br />
outward and mechanical principle <strong>of</strong> equal association or at best a comradeship <strong>of</strong> labour.” (Sri<br />
Aurobindo 1962, pp. 762‐763) Liberty, equality and fraternity are largely in conflict with each other, unless<br />
transformed and reconciled in a balanced framework. Liberty on its own emphasizes on human freedom,<br />
some kind <strong>of</strong> laissez faire, thus neglecting the principle <strong>of</strong> equality. Similarly, the principle <strong>of</strong> equality on<br />
its own contradicts the principle <strong>of</strong> liberty as it emphasizes on parity ‐ at the cost <strong>of</strong> individual freedom,<br />
hence the never‐ending debate in political theory concerning the principles <strong>of</strong> liberty and equality. Sri<br />
Aurobindo argues these two apparently contradictory principles can be reconciled with the higher<br />
principle <strong>of</strong> fraternity. But this reconciliation appears unworkable in the present scheme <strong>of</strong> things which<br />
put emphasis on mere perfunctory order because fraternity as it is implied in its present working means<br />
mere formal coming <strong>of</strong> nations together or just some kind <strong>of</strong> formal unity without change in character and<br />
motives.<br />
The religion <strong>of</strong> humanity is the true embodiment <strong>of</strong> the three supreme values in proper harmony.<br />
Liberty in its true sense is not exclusive. Freedom not only implies ‘freedom to’ but also ‘freedom from’.<br />
Similarly, equality in its true sense not only implies equitable rights but also equitable duties. This<br />
harmonious working <strong>of</strong> the principles <strong>of</strong> liberty and equality is possible only when the spirit <strong>of</strong><br />
brotherhood encompasses all the human minds including the minds that govern the nation states. Only<br />
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then the ideal for human unity will emerge not as a distant possibility but as an imperative for the<br />
mankind because, as Sri Aurobindo argues, with the passing <strong>of</strong> time nations have come closer to each<br />
other. The major contributions made by ‘science, commerce and rapid communication’ (Sri Aurobindo<br />
1962, p. 617) in this regard cannot be ignored. His allusion in the early decades <strong>of</strong> the 20 th Century to these<br />
three important vehicles <strong>of</strong> globalization brings forth the seminar character <strong>of</strong> this approach <strong>of</strong> ideal<br />
human unity and its relevance in the 21 st century. As the achievements <strong>of</strong> commerce, science and<br />
technology transcend national boundaries, similarly the religion <strong>of</strong> humanity transcends all narrow<br />
national mentalities and all those forces that confine national mentality to rigidities.<br />
The basic underlying motive behind the ideal <strong>of</strong> human unity is not the establishment <strong>of</strong> any particular<br />
kind <strong>of</strong> formation like world state or world federation or confederation. The objective is the achievement<br />
<strong>of</strong> the highest possible world unity among nations and their peoples. It may take the shape <strong>of</strong> a world<br />
state or federation or confederation, that is not more important but what is more important is that the<br />
nations must come out <strong>of</strong> the confinements <strong>of</strong> the collective ego to participate in the widest possible<br />
human unity. Hence, the world union will neither be rigid nor dogmatic nor subject to dictates <strong>of</strong> a<br />
particular nation or group <strong>of</strong> nations. It will not succumb to hegemonic ambitions <strong>of</strong> any particular nation<br />
because a true world union will be based on the ‘principle <strong>of</strong> equality in which considerations <strong>of</strong> size and<br />
strength will not enter.’ It will give equal respect to diverse cultures and patterns <strong>of</strong> life. It will, in the<br />
language <strong>of</strong> Crossing the Divide: Dialogue Among Civilizations, (Giandomenico and et al 2001) recognize the<br />
principles <strong>of</strong> equality and distinction, not domination and disintegration. It will not allow big, powerful<br />
nations to usurp the rights <strong>of</strong> other nations in violation <strong>of</strong> the basic principles <strong>of</strong> the world body. This<br />
world order will be akin to a rich tapestry in which different shades <strong>of</strong> colour are beautifully placed in<br />
their own places or like an ornament in which different precious stones are placed in their requisite order.<br />
Crossing the Divide written under the auspices <strong>of</strong> the UN and forwarded by then UN Secretary General,<br />
K<strong>of</strong>i Annan challenges the theories <strong>of</strong> ‘Clash <strong>of</strong> Civilizations’ and ‘End <strong>of</strong> History’ and posits hope on the<br />
UN for the resolution <strong>of</strong> the global problems. It envisages the emergence <strong>of</strong> the UN as a kind <strong>of</strong> ‘global<br />
social contract,’ which recognizes the principle <strong>of</strong> equality and distinction among the nations and rejects<br />
the old paradigm <strong>of</strong> international relations and advocates for a new paradigm governing the relations<br />
between nations on the following bases: equal footing, reassessment <strong>of</strong> ‘enemy’, dispersion <strong>of</strong> power,<br />
stake holding, individual responsibility, and Issue‐driven alignments. (Giandomenico and et al 2001, pp.<br />
109‐152)<br />
International Bodies<br />
Did the League <strong>of</strong> Nations and the UN live up to the expectations with which they were established?<br />
Did they make in any sense the world better for the progress <strong>of</strong> nations and for the humanity at large?<br />
Both these mechanisms were not free from defects in their origin and conception. Sri Aurobindo writes,<br />
“the League (the League <strong>of</strong> Nations, established after the end <strong>of</strong> the First World War) was eventually<br />
formed with America outside it as an instrument <strong>of</strong> European diplomacy, which was a bad omen for its<br />
future.” (Sri Aurobindo 1962, p. 710) He warned about the danger <strong>of</strong> assigning ‘preponderant place to the<br />
five great powers in the Security Council’ <strong>of</strong> the UN, thus ensuring a ‘strong surviving element <strong>of</strong><br />
oligarchy’ in the international body. (Sri Aurobindo 1962, p. 782) He further warned that its defects might<br />
lead to pessimism and doubt regarding its final success. The League <strong>of</strong> Nations failed because it was not<br />
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truly representative <strong>of</strong> the nations and the member nations frequently violated its principles. Many<br />
members <strong>of</strong> the League gave the impression that they joined the League not for universal peace and<br />
harmony but the fulfillment <strong>of</strong> their narrow interests. This was reflected in frequent violation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
League principles and in agreements like Kellog‐Briand Pact and Nine‐ Power treaty and many others.<br />
The key player in the formation <strong>of</strong> the League, the US did not join it because <strong>of</strong> opposition from its Senate.<br />
The humiliation <strong>of</strong> Germany at the Versailles treaty in 1919 opened up the possibilities <strong>of</strong> the rise <strong>of</strong><br />
aggressive nationalism. Instead <strong>of</strong> resolving the problem it gave vent to the suppressed anger and<br />
frustration on part <strong>of</strong> Germany to come out in open two decades later. These developments finally led to<br />
the Second World War, shattering the hopes for the building <strong>of</strong> a new world order.<br />
In the emerging post‐cold war scenario the UN could have provided avenues for divergent nations to<br />
display their diversities in a harmonious way under one ro<strong>of</strong>, where the differences among them could be<br />
resolved under the framework <strong>of</strong> international law applicable equally to all nations. But the sanctioning <strong>of</strong><br />
veto power to the five permanent members <strong>of</strong> the UN Security Council marred the prospects <strong>of</strong> the rise <strong>of</strong><br />
an egalitarian world structure. As the past records show, this veto power has been exercised arbitrarily by<br />
the big powers for the fulfillment <strong>of</strong> their interests. Ostrom J. Moller, an advocate <strong>of</strong> world governance,<br />
argued “The five victorious nations decided that they should govern the world. Is that the best solution?<br />
Whether the world should be governed by the Security Council is itself an interesting question, but if so<br />
should it then be these five nations who should do it?” (Moller 2000, p. 173) Moller also pointed that a<br />
new international system cannot be built upon sovereign nation‐states as participant but has to be built on<br />
the transfer <strong>of</strong> sovereignty from the nation‐state to international institutions. He does not reject nation‐<br />
states as participants in international mechanism but they have to partially transfer their sovereignty.<br />
(Moller 2000, p. 146) For this to happen some kind <strong>of</strong> ‘creative destruction’ on part <strong>of</strong> the nation‐states<br />
need to take place.<br />
The UN, which emerged as a ‘global social contract’, appeared to be more representative in<br />
comparison to its predecessor the League <strong>of</strong> Nations. The General Assembly, comprise almost all nations<br />
<strong>of</strong> the world (at present the number <strong>of</strong> the members is 192; in 1945, the year it was established, the<br />
number was 51). The Assembly has been working on the principle <strong>of</strong> one nation, one vote, thus giving<br />
equal voice to all nations, big or small, powerful or marginal. Through its various bodies like UNESCO,<br />
UNICEF and WHO the UN has done a commendable work in adopting and organizing welfare activities<br />
throughout the world. This supreme international body was expected to provide the ground for the<br />
emergence <strong>of</strong> the ideal human unity but as its functions later showed the powerful nations in the Security<br />
Council used their special powers arbitrarily. The defects in the working <strong>of</strong> the UN and in its structure<br />
can be summarized in the following points. First, the system built up more than fifty years ago has not<br />
developed suitable mechanisms to adapt itself to the changing circumstances. The menace <strong>of</strong> terrorism,<br />
the challenges emerging out <strong>of</strong> market economy and globalization, the accentuating north‐south divide,<br />
the problems related to human rights and democracy have not been tackled by the world body<br />
appropriately. Though the theories <strong>of</strong> Clash <strong>of</strong> Civilization and End <strong>of</strong> History have been challenged by<br />
the proponents <strong>of</strong> the UN system, no grand alternative or any kind <strong>of</strong> mechanism to address these<br />
emerging problems have been devised. Second, the decision‐making power has been concentrated in few<br />
powerful centres. The Permanent‐5 countries by the means <strong>of</strong> veto power have weakened the real motive<br />
behind the establishment <strong>of</strong> the UN. Third, the UN lacks the effective means to enforce its rules and<br />
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regulations. It lacks adequate financial means to implement its plans and programmes. (Novossel<strong>of</strong>f 2000,<br />
pp. 945‐963) What Curry said about seventy years ago seemed to be true now: “There still remains the<br />
idea that nationalism somehow is defensible in terms <strong>of</strong> freedom and must there be resisted. This<br />
obsession is very deeply rooted”. (Curry 1939, p. 77) Fourth, in many cases the effectiveness <strong>of</strong> the UN has<br />
been challenged or dominated by other international bodies like International Monetary Fund and World<br />
Bank, controlled by the developed nations.<br />
The weakness <strong>of</strong> the UN machinery as mentioned above does not nullify its validity. Further<br />
improvements can be made on this system by gradual reforms. In this context two simultaneous<br />
developments need to be undertaken. First, nations must shun narrow considerations and participate in<br />
the international process towards peace and development in an egalitarian framework. The organizations<br />
like European Union, Association <strong>of</strong> South‐East Asian Nations, Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation, G‐8<br />
and G‐20 have already shown the ways to success, when working in unison. This collective spirit should<br />
be imparted in the working <strong>of</strong> the UN. Various non‐governmental organizations such as World<br />
Constitution and Parliament Association, World Citizens’ Assembly, World Association <strong>of</strong> World<br />
Federalists, International Registry <strong>of</strong> World Citizens and many others have launched movements to bring<br />
a just and harmonious union among the nations. (Basu 1999) Second, the structure <strong>of</strong> the UN and its<br />
decision‐making process needs reforms. Measures like the enlargement <strong>of</strong> the membership <strong>of</strong> the Security<br />
Council, providing financial autonomy, and giving wider recognition to the leadership <strong>of</strong> the Secretary<br />
General can be undertaken to this effect.<br />
There have been attempts to impart greater visibility and dynamism to multilateral organizations like<br />
the G‐20 towards bringing regional centres <strong>of</strong> economic power in playing an important role in global<br />
economic management. The rising clout <strong>of</strong> the G‐20 and coming together <strong>of</strong> developed and developing<br />
countries shows a clear inclination on part <strong>of</strong> crucial players in international politics to promote the path<br />
<strong>of</strong> multilateralism to manage global economic crisis. Since 1999 the grouping has played an effective role<br />
to set common principles for sound economic management, broaden the Washington consensus on<br />
economic development, devise strong measures to curb terror finance. It has also adopted the Accord for<br />
Sustained Growth outlining policies to promote monetary and financial stability, enhance domestic and<br />
international competition, and empower people to participate successfully in markets. The G‐20 may<br />
appear small but the grouping represents about 90 per cent <strong>of</strong> the world’s economic output with 67 per<br />
cent <strong>of</strong> world population and its success in meeting global crisis show that this body with diverse<br />
countries with diverse levels <strong>of</strong> growth and societal make up have struck a right balance between<br />
legitimacy and effectiveness and met the challenge better than any similar effort. (Martin 2005, pp. 2‐6)<br />
The Canadian leader Paul Martin, who chaired the first G‐20 meeting, argued that the G‐20 model which<br />
is primarily a multilateral economic instrument in international politics can be replicated in the form L‐20<br />
(Leaders‐20) to meet the global challenges. The lessons drawn from working <strong>of</strong> the G‐20, i.e. crucial<br />
decisions are taken at political level, commonality despite differences and focus on larger issues <strong>of</strong><br />
stability and predictability can be further extended in creating another organization L‐20 which can focus<br />
on political issues confronting nations <strong>of</strong> the world. The globalized world where borders seldom work as<br />
barriers in the spread <strong>of</strong> ideas, commerce or devious forces terrorism or diseases or weapons <strong>of</strong> mass<br />
destruction or environmental concerns justify the creation <strong>of</strong> an L‐20.<br />
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The complex international relations <strong>of</strong> the 21 st century appear to be fraught with same old problems as<br />
in past towards creating a multilateral body to solve the global crises. For instance, in case <strong>of</strong> the proposed<br />
L‐20 who will be the members? Who will set the agenda for the body to deliberate upon? Whether the<br />
body will meet the issues <strong>of</strong> common concern such as terrorism (which is much contested), or<br />
environmental degradation (too much divergence as the Copenhagen summit <strong>of</strong> 2009 shows), or<br />
pandemics (politics about vaccines, etc.) with effective mechanism to enforce its decisions, or it will just<br />
impart guidelines leaving to nation‐states to follow at their will? The post‐cold war (still it is cold war<br />
with the prefix post) so far lacks the needed momentum to evolve a global egalitarian architecture.<br />
Attempts or ideas such as L‐20 will be fraught with the similar problems as that <strong>of</strong> the UN. The structural<br />
and conceptual reform <strong>of</strong> the UN including inclusion <strong>of</strong> new permanent members such as the rising<br />
nations <strong>of</strong> India, Brazil and South Africa in the Security Council has been marred by disagreements. The<br />
reluctance on part <strong>of</strong> some <strong>of</strong> the big powers to come out <strong>of</strong> their national egos and accommodate the<br />
rising aspirations in the council has delayed the reform process. The same kind <strong>of</strong> ‘confinement’ and<br />
‘exclusion’ mentality will likely continue for the near future, thus obstructing any attempt towards ideal<br />
human unity.<br />
Unless the UN is transformed into a genuine representative <strong>of</strong> divergent nations, it will not be to cater<br />
the divergent aspirations <strong>of</strong> nation states in a global framework in a harmonious blending. The concern<br />
expressed by Sri Aurobindo regarding the future <strong>of</strong> the UN has also been echoed by the noted scientist<br />
Albert Einstein, “The United Nations is an extremely important and useful institution provided the<br />
peoples and governments <strong>of</strong> the world realize that it is merely a transitional system towards the final<br />
goal, which is the establishment <strong>of</strong> supranational authority vested with sufficient legislative and executive<br />
powers to keep the peace.” (Basu 1999, p. 1) Similarly, Emery Reves in his The Anatomy <strong>of</strong> Peace writes,<br />
“World government is not an ‘ultimate goal’ but an immediate necessity. It has been overdue since 1914”.<br />
(Basu 1999, p. 4) Likewise, the Parliament <strong>of</strong> World Religions in 1993 advocated for the adoption <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Golden Rule (Giandomenico and et al 2001, p. 74) by the nations for the evolution <strong>of</strong> a world union.<br />
Golden Rule has both positive and negative dimensions: in its positive dimension it embodies the<br />
principle: do unto others what you would want others to do unto you; and in its negative dimension it<br />
embodies the principle: do not do unto others what you would not want others to do unto you. If nations<br />
could adopt this rule shared by all great religious traditions the authors <strong>of</strong> the Crossing the Divide argue, it<br />
will help in the evolution <strong>of</strong> a global ethic to be equally observed and respected by different nations<br />
towards emergence <strong>of</strong> a multipolar world without compromising national interests rather elevating them<br />
to a higher pedestal in which peace, harmony and development will be core principles.<br />
India’s Emergence<br />
The element <strong>of</strong> force as effective means for the establishment <strong>of</strong> an ideal world union is ruled out in the<br />
scheme <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity. History makes it evidently clear that force may bring some kind <strong>of</strong> formal<br />
world unity but it will not last long unless the mechanism <strong>of</strong> force gives way to the means <strong>of</strong> harmony<br />
and order. Curry stipulated the following conditions for the emergence <strong>of</strong> a genuine world federation:<br />
independent control <strong>of</strong> foreign policy, common armed force, common economic policy, common control<br />
<strong>of</strong> communications, international control <strong>of</strong> currency, and effective world public opinion. Streit<br />
emphasized on the following points: union citizenship, union defence force, union customs‐free economy,<br />
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union money, and union postal and communications system. (Curry 1939, pp. 107‐114 and 147) Though<br />
Sri Aurobindo analyzed the possibility <strong>of</strong> administrative unity, common economic policy, common<br />
military force, he did not give any specific guidelines regarding the future structure <strong>of</strong> the world body.<br />
What he emphasized most was the cultivation <strong>of</strong> the religion <strong>of</strong> humanity among the nations. The<br />
emergence <strong>of</strong> world unity for Sri Aurobindo is the manifestation <strong>of</strong> a higher consciousness in the world.<br />
The march from the state to the higher, world state can be explained as a movement <strong>of</strong> nature from<br />
infrarational to rational and then to suprarational forms <strong>of</strong> consciousness. Sri Aurobindo’s ideal <strong>of</strong> human<br />
unity provides the rationale for the nation states to come out <strong>of</strong> the hegemonic ambitions and related<br />
foreign policy postures pursued by them as clearly reflected in turmoil <strong>of</strong> the past decade. Sidney Kartus<br />
observes: “The Western world knows far more <strong>of</strong> Marx’s call to the working men to unite than it does <strong>of</strong><br />
Sri Aurobindo’s message to the humanity to unite. Yet it is a message such as that <strong>of</strong> Sri Aurobindo with<br />
which humanity must become familiar and which it must need in order attain human unity.” (Kartus<br />
1960, p. 314)<br />
An integral part <strong>of</strong> Sri Aurobindo’s concept <strong>of</strong> nationalism was spiritualism. He advocated spiritual<br />
nationalism during the Indian freedom struggle. In his editorials in Bande Mataram, he demanded for<br />
complete independence from the British domination against the moderate demand for dominion status<br />
as, he argued, swaraj (self‐rule) <strong>of</strong> India was not a factor sole to India herself but was an imperative for the<br />
larger cause <strong>of</strong> humanity. He, thus, demanded complete independence for India and for the achievement<br />
<strong>of</strong> that purpose advocated for spiritual nationalism, having four‐fold dimensions: swadeshi (self‐reliance),<br />
swaraj, boycott and national education. Such an approach, he argued, will arouse national consciousness<br />
for India’s freedom so that India with her non‐antagonistic posture can play an important role towards<br />
ideal human unity. In his message on the eve <strong>of</strong> first Independence Day on 15 August 1947, he outlined<br />
five dreams about India and humanity. While the third dream was about the formation <strong>of</strong> a world union,<br />
the fourth one emphasized India’s spiritual role in promoting the ideal <strong>of</strong> human unity. India with its rich<br />
cultural heritage and pluralistic character could play a vital role towards bringing nations together for the<br />
larger objective <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity.<br />
Once the principle <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity is embedded in the approaches <strong>of</strong> nations in their mutual<br />
conducts, though a difficult proposition in the current state <strong>of</strong> affairs keeping in view the post‐cold war<br />
developments, then the world order free from aggressive tendencies will be stable and the question <strong>of</strong><br />
force as a foreign policy tool will become largely obsolete. Whether it is ‘peaceful rise <strong>of</strong> Chine’ or ‘rise <strong>of</strong><br />
Asian powers’ or ‘decline <strong>of</strong> the West’ these developments will not be viewed in the ambit <strong>of</strong> zero sum<br />
game in international politics as they will emerge as facts to contend with in evolving international<br />
politics. The power alignments meant to contain one power or the other will be viewed differently from<br />
the evolutionary perspective towards ideal human unity. India’s relations vis‐à‐vis other powers<br />
particularly China with which India enjoys an asymmetric relationship can be analyzed in this context.<br />
India‐China relations can be described by the biological aphorism as malnutrition <strong>of</strong> political relations<br />
and surfeit <strong>of</strong> economic relations. China is India’s second largest trade partner though they display<br />
disagreements on various issues including border, terrorism, principles governing bilateral and<br />
multilateral relationship. Lee Kuan Yew in an article analyzed how in March 2005 the US Secretary <strong>of</strong><br />
State Condoleezza Rice in New Delhi lured Indian leadership to cooperate with the US to contain China<br />
and in return “America will help India become a world power,” and posed the question with a sense <strong>of</strong><br />
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disagreement “Will India line up with the U.S. against its powerful neighbor, China, as Japan has? India<br />
has a deep sense <strong>of</strong> its separate destiny.” (Yew 2005) India’s foreign policy in its core has the principle <strong>of</strong><br />
accommodation and appreciation, clearly reflected in the statement by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan<br />
Singh, “The world is large enough to accommodate the growth and ambitions <strong>of</strong> both our countries (India<br />
and China). I do not look upon our relations with the US as meant to rival China. I look forward to<br />
enhanced cooperation with China.” (Yew 2005)<br />
In the coming decades the world’s economic centre <strong>of</strong> gravity will move from the Atlantic to the Pacific<br />
and Indian oceans with the rise <strong>of</strong> India and China, but it does not predicate that the world will then be<br />
free from disorder, instability and violence unless a framework is evolved to contain the aggressive<br />
nationalist spirit that still looms large in the policies <strong>of</strong> nation‐states. This further reinforces the ideal <strong>of</strong><br />
human unity which is predicated on the premise that nation‐states must come out <strong>of</strong> their aggressive<br />
mindset to make the unity feasible. India in the post‐cold war situation has aspired to multi‐task its<br />
foreign policy by simultaneously engaging diverse powers both perceived friends and enemies. India<br />
since independence has made rapid strides in development. The Nuclear Suppliers’ Group’s waiver on<br />
the recent Indo‐US nuclear deal reflects India’s acceptability as a responsible rising power. The<br />
philosophical as well historical background <strong>of</strong> India’s foreign policy, with having roots as early as 6 th<br />
Century BC, has in core promotion <strong>of</strong> peace and condemnation <strong>of</strong> violence. This is well reflected in the<br />
teachings and philosophy <strong>of</strong> spiritual and political leaders including Mahatma Gandhi and Sri<br />
Aurobindo. This tradition was espoused and practised by the father <strong>of</strong> the Indian nation Mahatma<br />
Gandhi, whose influence on the making <strong>of</strong> India’s foreign policy is indisputable as the first Prime Minister<br />
<strong>of</strong> India, Jawaharlal Nehru was his ardent follower. In fact the principles <strong>of</strong> non‐alignment, peaceful<br />
coexistence have in their core the Gandhian approach, which held in a very literal sense that human<br />
beings were the nation and that the behaviour <strong>of</strong> every individual ultimately moulded the fate <strong>of</strong> his<br />
country. The rapid strides in the Indian development and increasing circle <strong>of</strong> its foreign policy have<br />
maintained synchrony with this traditional core <strong>of</strong> India’s foreign policy. India has broken out <strong>of</strong> the<br />
‘claustrophobic confines <strong>of</strong> South Asia’ (Gupta 1997, p. 309) and looked forward to extend its<br />
neighbourhood across the Pacific and the Atlantic. The principle <strong>of</strong> accommodation and non‐antagonistic<br />
postures embedded in foreign policy approach <strong>of</strong> India provide it a higher pitch to play a crucial role in<br />
crafting a framework in which nation‐states can collaborate towards a world <strong>of</strong> harmony and order<br />
without a single centre <strong>of</strong> domination but with multiple centres <strong>of</strong> interaction and cooperation.<br />
Conclusion<br />
Any evolving world order, as Sri Aurobindo rightly argues, must in its core have an eclectic approach<br />
governing interstate relations and confronting challenges emerging out <strong>of</strong> the complex web <strong>of</strong> these<br />
relations, while according nations big or small, developed or developing equal voice in the global decision<br />
making process. The global problems such as climate change or terrorism or epidemics like swine flu<br />
preclude prospects <strong>of</strong> getting resolved with wherewithal <strong>of</strong> a particular state or a particular group <strong>of</strong><br />
states. Hence, the emphasis that states must discard narrow confinements <strong>of</strong> rigid thinking and think<br />
global assumes increasing significance in the post‐cold war world. The world has become truly global<br />
with new means <strong>of</strong> communication and myriad interactions among the people <strong>of</strong> the globe guiding<br />
towards a framework <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity transcending national peculiarities and in its place evolving a<br />
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global ethic. The two factors, i.e. global imperative towards unity among nations and national assertion at<br />
the cost <strong>of</strong> international norms can not run parallel or work simultaneously as they embody contrary<br />
forces. They need to be reconciled or transcended in a wider framework <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity. In this<br />
direction, India with its peaceful rise and not‐antagonistic postures can play an effective role towards<br />
building new architecture <strong>of</strong> inter‐state relations shun <strong>of</strong> national proclivities but grounded on the<br />
principle <strong>of</strong> ideal human unity.<br />
References<br />
Anderson, Benedict, 1991 Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread <strong>of</strong> Nationalism,<br />
London: Verso.<br />
Basu, Samar, 1999 The UNO, the World Government and the Ideal <strong>of</strong> World Union, Pondicherry: Sri<br />
Aurobindo Ashram.<br />
Curry, W. B., 1939 The Case for Federal Union, Middlesex: Penguin Book Ltd.<br />
Giandomenico, Picco and et al, 2001 Crossing the Divide: Dialogue Among Civilizations, New Jersey: Sheton<br />
Hall University.<br />
Gupta, Bhabani Sen, 1997 “India in the Twenty‐first Century,” International Affairs, 73 (2).<br />
Hobsbawm, E. J., 1993 Nations and Nationalism Since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge:<br />
Cambridge University Press.<br />
Kartus, Sidney, 1960 “World Unity”, in H. Chaudhuri and F. Speigelberg, ed., The Integral Philosophy <strong>of</strong> Sri<br />
Aurobindo, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.<br />
Martin, Paul, 2005 “A Global Answer to Global Problems: The Case for a New Leaders’ Forum,” Foreign<br />
Affairs, 84 (3), May‐June.<br />
Mohanty, J. N., 1993 Essays on Indian Philosophy, Traditional and Modern, Delhi: Oxford University Press.<br />
Moller, Ostrom J., 2000 The End <strong>of</strong> Internationalism or World Governance?, Westport: Praeger.<br />
Novossel<strong>of</strong>f, Alexandra, 2001 “Revitalizing <strong>of</strong> the United Nations: Anticipation and Prevention as<br />
Primary Goals,” Strategic Analysis, 25 (8), November.<br />
Singh, Karan, 1972 “Towards an Assessment <strong>of</strong> Sri Aurobindo as a Political Thinker”, in Kishore Gandhi,<br />
ed., Contemporary Relevance <strong>of</strong> Sri Aurobindo, Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram.<br />
Singh, Karan, 1991 Prophet <strong>of</strong> Indian Nationalism, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan<br />
Sri Aurobindo, 1962 The Human Cycle, The Ideal <strong>of</strong> Human Unity and The War and Self‐ determination,<br />
Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram.<br />
Yew, Lee Kuan, 2005 “A Rising Asia,” Forbes Magazine, 25 July,<br />
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/0725/039.html<br />
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LITERATURE & ARTS<br />
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EKUKLU, Bülent<br />
Zeki Demirkubuz ve “Kader”<br />
Yeni dönem Türk sinemasının Nuri Bilge Ceylan, Semih Kaplanoğlu, Derviş Zaim, Reha Erdem ile<br />
birlikte önemli yönetmenlerinden birisi Zeki Demirkubuz. Bu yorum, bu dönemle ilgili akademik<br />
çalışmalar yapan insanların da katıldığı bir görüş. Kuşağının ve takip eden sinemacıların arasında da,<br />
‘kişisel sinema’ diye adlandırabileceğimiz bir tarzda öne çıkan, “auteur” diyebilecegimiz bir yönetmen<br />
aynı zamanda.<br />
Son filmi “Kıskanmak” dışında bütün filmlerinin öyküsünü ve senaryosunu yazan, hatta bir kısmının<br />
görüntü yönetmenliğini ve kurgusunu da bizzat üstlenen bir yönetmen ve çok kendine ait bir tarzı olan<br />
bir sinemacı Zeki Demirkubuz. (“Kıskanmak” filmini Nahid Sırrı Örik’in romanından kendisi<br />
uyarlamıştır.) Hem anlattığı öyküler, hem tüm filmlerinde takip ettiği ortak izlek açısından, hem<br />
karakterlerinin filmlerden öne çıkacak referanslarla takip edebileceğimiz ortak yanları açısından üzerinde<br />
düşünmeye ve incelemeye değer bir yönetmendir Zeki Demirkubuz. Demirkubuz’un sinemasındaki<br />
bütünlük hakkında, iddialı olmakla birlikte şöyle söylenebilir: Zeki Demirkubuz’un bütün filmlerini belki<br />
tek bir filmin(in) farklı ‘episode’ları gibi seyretmek mümkündür. Nitekim yazının devamında “Kader”<br />
hakkında konuşurken de zaten öteki filmlerine sık sık referans veriyor olacağız. O yüzden Zeki<br />
Demirkubuz’un bir filmi hakkında derinlikli bir tahlil yapabilmek için mümkünse bütün filmlerini<br />
seyretmek gerektiğini düşünüyorum.<br />
Benim kişisel favorilerim “Masumiyet” ve bu yazının konusunu oluşturan “Kader” filmleri. Zaten iki<br />
filmin çok yakın bir ilişkisi var. “Kader” aslında daha sonra çekilen bir film olmasına rağmen,<br />
“Masumiyet”teki Bekir karakterinin bir monologundan yola çıkarak, orada anlatılan hikayenin uzun<br />
haliyle filmleştirilmiş bir versiyonudur. Ama “Kader”in ve “Masumiyet”in yanında öteki filmleriyle de<br />
değerlendirildiğinde Zeki Demirkubuz, hem temaları açısından, hem genel olarak kafa yorduğu<br />
meseleler açısından, hem “insanı anlamak” diye özetleyebileceğimiz bir “üst başlıkta” toplayabileceğimiz<br />
hikayeleri açısından ortak bir izleği takip eden bir sinemacıdır. Biz bu yazıda 2006 tarihinde çektiği ve<br />
senaryosunu da yazdığı “Kader” filmiyle birlikte Demirkubuz sinemasının bazı yönlerini inceleyeceğiz.<br />
“Kader”in ana karakterleri 3 kişidir. Bütün öykü, birbirlerini hapsedecek bir sevginin esiri olmuş,<br />
birbirlerini tutkuyla, saplantıyla seven 3 kişinin Türkiye’nin farklı şehirlerindeki hikayesidir. Ve bu öykü,<br />
bu 3 karakterin, birbirleriyle neredeyse bir tür zorunlulukla ilerleyen ilişkisi üzerinden anlatılır.<br />
Öykünün merkezinde Bekir isminde bir karakter vardır. Onun büyük bir aşkla, hatta saplantılı bir<br />
tutkuyla sevdiği “Uğur” isminde bir kadın ve Uğur’un da Bekir’in kendisine duyduğu aşka benzer bir<br />
saplantıyla sevdiği “Zagor” isimli 3. karakter öykünün ana eksenini oluşturan karakterlerdir. Bekir’le<br />
Uğur’un filmin hemen başında tanışmasından sonra Zagor bir cinayete karışır ve ortadan kaybolur.<br />
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Uğur’da Zagor’la birlikte ortadan kaybolduktan bir süre sonra, Zagor 2 polisi öldürdüğü başka bir<br />
cinayetin ardından tutuklanır ve sonra “Masumiyet”e de kaynaklık eden asıl hikaye başlar. Bütün film<br />
boyunca Zagor gittiği her cezaevinde suça karıştığı için Türkiye’nin farklı şehirlerindeki cezaevlerine<br />
gönderilir. Uğur’da onun peşinden, Zagor’un gönderildiği her şehire uğrunda pek çok sıkıntılar çekerek<br />
gider. Bekir’de Uğur’a duyduğu saplantılı aşk dolayısıyla Uğur’u takip eder.<br />
Oscar Wilde’ın Reading Zindanı Baladı’nda “Herkes sevdiğini öldürür” biçiminde bir ifade vardır. Bu<br />
filmde de hem karakterlerin akli olanın dışında bir tutkuyla, neredeyse kendilerini kontrol edemeyecek<br />
bir saplantıyla takip ettikleri birisi vardır. Hem de aslında onlar için belki ailelerinin, belki toplumun<br />
belirlediği, aslında başka bir hapislik duygusu oluşturan bir hayat hikayesi vardır. Ve sevdiğini takip<br />
eden, onu sevgisiyle hapseden, bir anlamda kendisini de yokoluşa götüren bu sevgiyle sevdiğini öldüren<br />
kahramanlar vardır.<br />
Bunun sıklıkla işlenen bir tema olduğunu söylemek çok iddialı bir ifade olabilir ama Türk sineması<br />
açısından şu söylenebilir: Başka türlü bakışlar ya da anlatımlarla zaman zaman işlenen bir temadır<br />
‘sevgisiyle hapsetmek’ kavramı. Mesela Zeki Demirkubuz’un filmlerinde anlattığı hikayenin çok kabaca<br />
benzerlerini başka pek çok filmde görebiliriz. Bunların büyük bir kısmı ‘melodram’ diye<br />
adlandırabileceğimiz türe ait filmlerdir ama oradaki işleniş ve yorum Zeki Demirkubuz’un bakış<br />
açısından çok farklıdır. Öte yandan bu zaman zaman sanat sinemasının da işlediği temalardan birisi olur.<br />
Sanat sinemasının bazen insanın kendisini yokoluşa götüren birşeye, herhangi birşeye, ki bu bir aşk<br />
olabilir, bir nesneye duyulan arzu olabilir, işlediği temalardan birisidir. Mesela Luis Bunuel de bununla<br />
ilgili bir film yapmıştır. 80’lerde video furyasının çok yoğun olduğu dönemlerde arabesk diye<br />
adlandırabileceğimiz filmlerde de sıklıkla işlenen bir temadır. Ama sinemadan öte, “birini sevgi(si)yle<br />
tutsak etmek” bizim hayatta karşılaştığımız birşeydir.<br />
“Kader”, Bekir’in babasının onun için açtığı mobilya dükkanında uyuduğu bir sahneyle açılır. Uğur<br />
halı bakmak için dükkana gelir, Bekir’i uykusundan uyandırır. Bu tanışıklık gerçekleştikten birkaç gün<br />
sonra da Uğur Bekir’i tekrar ziyaret eder ve Bekir ona aşkını itiraf eder.<br />
Bekir o ana kadar, yani Uğur’a ona duyduğu aşkı bir tür mahcubiyetle söylediği ana kadar aslında bir<br />
tür ‘cennet’ içinde yaşamaktadır. Çünkü yaşadığı mahalledeki arkadaşları, akranları ya da daha genel bir<br />
ifadeyle söylemek gerekirse Türkiye’de onun konumundaki pek çok insandan avantajlı olarak bir işe<br />
sahiptir. İyi bir ailesi vardır, ona gözkulak olan bir babası vardır. Nitekim filmin ilerleyen bölümlerinde<br />
babası Bekir’in bütün serseriliklerine rağmen onu derleyip toparlamaya, ailesine sahip çıkmaya devam<br />
eder. O yüzden Uğur’un geldiği ana kadar bir tür ‘cennet’ içerisinde yaşamaktadır Bekir ve o ana kadar<br />
gayet masumdur. Bu masumiyet dolayısıyla da Uğur’a onu çok sevdiğini söylediği sahnede bir boynu<br />
büküklükle, adeta yaptığından utanır bir ifadeyle ‘ilan‐ı aşk’ eder. Fakat bu aşkın ilanı an’ı, onun<br />
hayatında bir dönüm noktasıdır, daha doğrusu dönüm noktası haline gelecektir.<br />
O ana kadar kendi cenneti içinde yaşayan masum bir karakterdir Bekir. Aslında filmin öyküsüne daha<br />
bütünlüklü biçimde baktığımızda Adem‐Havva öyküsüyle bir benzerlik kurmak mümkün olabilir. Orada<br />
da, bilindiği gibi cennette yaşarken yasak elma meselesi dolayısıyla ikisi birden, ‘şeytanın baştan<br />
çıkartması‘ dolayısıyla cennetten kovulurlar. Ana izleğiyle ‘Kader’i belki bu bağlamda pek çok dinsel ve<br />
mitolojik metinde de gördüğümüz arketiplerle ilişkilendirmek mümkün. Bekir’de o ana kadar yani<br />
kadının hayatına girdiği ana kadar ailesinin, babasının onun için yarattığı cennette yaşayan bir insandır.<br />
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Zeki Demirkubuz’un, filmi Bekir’in uyuduğu bir sahneyle açması da bu dünyanın dertlerinden uzak<br />
olma açısından bu bağlamda yorumlanabilir. Dolayısıyla aslında Bekir’in hayatının kalanını bu güven ve<br />
rahatlık içinde sürdürmesi için herşey hazırdır. Ta ki Uğur’un hayatına girdigi ana kadar. O andan sonra<br />
Uğur, onu bilerek ya da bilmeyerek baştan çıkaracak ve Bekir’i ‘Masumiyet’ filminde intihar etmesiyle<br />
noktalanan maceranın içine çekecektir.<br />
Zeki Demirkubuz “Kader” dahil bütün filmlerinde karakterlerinin mahremiyetiyle arasına bir mesafe<br />
koyar.<br />
Zeki Demirkubuz’un bunu özellikle yaptığını söyleyebiliriz. Çünkü, Bekir’in kaderini yani onu<br />
yokoluşa götürecek kaderini ‘femme fatal’ diye adlandırabileceğimiz ve edebiyatta, sinemada çok sık<br />
örneğini gördüğümüz bir karaktere yüklemek istememiş olabilir. Çünkü Uğur’un peşinden gitmek<br />
öncelikle Bekir’in kişisel seçimi ve bilinçli tercihidir. Dolayısıyla Uğur Onu ayartmak, baştan çıkartmak<br />
için herhangi birşey yapmamıştır. Öte yandan insanın ‘yoldan çıkması’ diye tabir edebilecegimiz bir<br />
tercihe yönelmesinin ya da onun sonunu yokoluşa, ölüme götürecek her türlü kötü yolu takip etmesinin<br />
sebebi illaki bir kadın ya da başka birşey olmak zorunda değildir diye düşünüyorum. İnsan bazı şeyleri<br />
tamamen sebepsiz de yapabilir. Ki biz bunu pek çok Zeki Demirkubuz filminde de görürüz. Nitekim<br />
“Kader” filminde bu görüşü destekleyen sahneler vardır. Finalde Bekir ve Uğur’un birlikte esrar içtikleri<br />
sahne örneğin. O sahnede her ikisinin de hayatıyla ilgili bu yazıda değindiğimiz ‘teslimiyet’ meselesiyle<br />
ilgil olarak ‘içlerini döktükleri’ bir bölüm vardır. O sahnede bütün bu yaşananların kökeninde esrar, seks<br />
ya da aşktan öte bir şey olduğu ya da aslında tam tersi, açıklanabilir hiçbir şey olmadığı anlaşılır. Zaten<br />
film boyunca Bekir’le Uğur arasında bir cinsellik yoktur. Bekir’in buna yeltendiği ama Uğur’un şiddetli<br />
tepkisi üzerine hemen vazgeçtiği bir tek an vardır. Nitekim “Kader”de anlatılan hikayenin devamı olan<br />
“Masumiyet”te bu noktayla ilgili çok önemli ve sinema tarihine geçtiğini söyleyebileceğimiz bir kavga<br />
sahnesi vardır. Bekir’le Uğur’un birlikte olma meselesinden dolayı otelde yaşadıkları kavga sahnesinden<br />
sonra zaten Bekir belki de aralarındaki aşk ilişkisinin masumiyetini yitirdiğini düşündüğü için intihar<br />
eder. Çünkü Uğur’la birlikte olmak ister ve bunu çok kaba bir biçimde dile getirir.<br />
Filmin “karakterlerin davranışlarındaki sebepsizlik” açısından önemli sahnelerinden bir başkası<br />
Bekir’in, Uğur’la İzmir’de konuştuğu sahnedir. Bu sahne Bekir açısından önemlidir çünkü Uğur’a<br />
davranışlarının nedenini sorduğu sahnedir. Nitekim ‘bu yaptığın kötülük, hayatın boyunca böyle devam<br />
mı edeceksin? Gel İstanbul’ a dönelim, evleniriz istersen, normal insanlar gibi yaşarız’ dediği sahnedir bu.<br />
Dolayısıyla bir taraftan kendisine çok benzer bir macera yaşayan Uğur’u yargıladığı ve neden böyle<br />
yaptığını anlayamadığı, bir taraftan da ikisi içinde kötü olacak sonu gördüğü için oradan kurtulmaya<br />
çalıştığı bir an diyebiliriz. Bu sahnenin kırılma noktası olması açısından şunu söyleyebiliriz: Bu nokta<br />
Uğur’un Bekir’i şiddetle reddettiği ve ‘sen dön, ben seninle böyle bir hayatı kabul etmem’ dediği yerdir.<br />
Dolayısıyla filmin sonu için artık neredeyse hem Bekir açısından hem Uğur açısından kaderlerinin<br />
bundan sonra nasıl devam edeceklerinin ipuçlarını gördüğümüz yerdir bu sahne. Bekir açısından bir<br />
dönüşüm sözkonusudur. Çünkü Bekir’in belki de önceki hayatına dönmek için, yani Uğur’u da alıp<br />
kendisinin tabiriyle ‘normal insanlar gibi yaşamak için’ son çabalarını gösterdiği yerdir burası.<br />
Dolayısıyla bunu da kabul ettiremeyince bütün film için kullanabileceğimiz o ‘teslimiyet’ duygusunun<br />
başgösterdiği nokta haline gelir bu sahne.<br />
Kendilerini bir felakete götürecek hayatın içinde olan, dahası kurtulmak bir yana bunu isteyen<br />
karakterlerin, yukarıda anlattığımız bu ‘sebepsizlik’ dışında nasıl bir motivasyonları olabilir öyleyse?<br />
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Uğur’la Bekir arasında bir sevgi ilişkisi olduğu aşikar. Bunu ‘aşk’ olarak adlandırmak daha doğru. Ama<br />
bir tür ‘saplantı’ olarak adlandırmak da mümkün. Nitekim pek çok aşk kolaylıkla bir saplantıya<br />
dönüşebilir. Bu kadar kesin çizgilerle tarif etmek belki fazla iddialı olur. Ama bir bakıma Bekir açısından<br />
bile bu duygunun net bir tarifi yoktur. (Hem film için hem genel olarak hayattaki karşılıkları açısından ne<br />
kadar açıklanabilir bir duygu olduğu da tartışılır.) Çünkü bu sahnedeki konuşmada ‘ama bu kötülük’<br />
ifadesini kullanır Bekir. Uğur’un yaşadığı ve kendisine de yaşattığı şey için Uğur’un cevabı bir açıdan çok<br />
basittir: ‘O zaman kötülük istiyorum’ der ve biz filmin seyircisi olarak tanık olduğumuz bütün bu öykü<br />
için ‘Bu çocuk bunu neden yapıyor? Aşk için mi, başka bir sebebi mi var?’ diye sorguladığımızda da<br />
bulacağımız cevap aslında çok belirgin olmayacaktır. Bunu da Zeki Demirkubuz’un pek çok filminde<br />
kullandığı ‘nedensizlikle’ açıklamak mümkün.<br />
Hayatta da bunun karşılığını sıklıkla bulmak mümkün aslında. Yani adına aşk dediğimiz, sevgi<br />
dediğimiz ya da istek dediğimiz başka birçok şeyi biz kendi rasyonel aklımızla yine kendi<br />
deneyimlerimizden, kendi hayatımızdaki karşılıklarından yola çıkarak tarif edebiliriz. Ama bizim<br />
tariflerimizin başka birisi için hiçbir anlamı olmayabilir. Buradaki nedensizlik duygusunun da böyle bir<br />
açıklaması var. Yani “bunu neden yapıyor?” sorusunun açık, net ve bizim rasyonel aklımıza uymayan bir<br />
cevabı olmasının da kökeninde bu var denilebilir. Nietchze’nin bir sözü vardır; ‘insanın akli bir varlık<br />
olduğu kadar, akıl dışı bir varlık olduğunu kabul etmemiz gerekir.’ Nitekim bunun örneklerini<br />
edebiyatta da görmek mümkündür. Dostoyevski’nin “Yeraltından Notlar” romanı buna başarılı bir örnek<br />
olarak gösterilebilir. Romanın kahramanı tanıdıklarının ve eski arkadaşlarının çeşitli vesilelerle onu<br />
aşağılamasına müsaade eder, hatta kendisini özellikle aşağılatacağı durumlar içine sokar. Romanı<br />
okuduğumuz süre boyunca bunu neden yaptığını anlayamayız. Bizim değer yargılarımız, bizim aklımız<br />
açısından kabul edilebilir birşey değildir bu. Ama O neredeyse bir aşkla, büyük bir tutkuyla defalarca<br />
aynı şeyi yapar.<br />
Peki bir insan ya da bir film karakteri neden aklıyla açıklayamadığı bir saplantının esiri olur?<br />
Kuşkusuz, bu derin psikolojik tahliller ve teknik bilgiyle açıklanması gereken bir soru. Ama konunun<br />
sinemadaki işlenişine bakarak ana hatlarıyla şunları söylemek mümkün: Öncelikle karakterin<br />
saplantısının bir nesneyle, o saplantının, arzunun objesi olacak bir nesneyle ilişkilendirilmesi gerekir. Bu<br />
bazen bir insan, çoğunlukla bir kadın olur. Para ya da mücevher, altın, hazine vb değerli bir meta olabilir.<br />
Ama sonuçta bütün o arzuyu besleyecek ve karakterin değer yargılarını hatta bazen akli kontrolünü<br />
dışarda bırakacak birşey olmalıdır. O yüzden “saplantılı bir karakter” için öncelikle o arzunun objesi diye<br />
adlandırabileceğimiz bir nesne olması gerekir.<br />
(Devam edecek.)<br />
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EKUKLU, Bülent : Zeki Demirkubuz<br />
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Zeki Demirkubuz is undoubtedly one <strong>of</strong> the most important figures in the new era <strong>of</strong> the Turkish<br />
cinema, next to Nuri Bilge Ceylan, Semih Kaplanoğlu, Derviş Zaim and Reha Erdem.<br />
Demirkubuz is unequalled in his demand for independence. He is a director who also merits the title<br />
<strong>of</strong> ‘auteur’. Except for his last film (‘Jealous’), he wrote the stories and screenplays, directed and edited all<br />
his movies himself. Therefore, his film making approach can be called a ‘personal cinema’.<br />
In his films and in the individual characters portrayed in them, there are some common elements<br />
which together allow us to draw a trajectory. This trajectory, truly worth <strong>of</strong> deep analysis, unfolds<br />
gradually as we watch each <strong>of</strong> his movies. Demirkubuz himself summarized it as “trying to understand<br />
human being”.<br />
In present paper we focus on the main message <strong>of</strong> the film ‘Destiny’ (2006) and discuss some aspects <strong>of</strong><br />
Demirkubuz’s oeuvre.<br />
‘Destiny’ is a story <strong>of</strong> three people who love each other passionately and desperately. The only way to<br />
escape from the prison <strong>of</strong> this obsessive love is death; they in fact kill each other. There is a phrase in ‘The<br />
Ballad <strong>of</strong> Reading Gaol’ from Oscar Wilde which describes a similar situation: “For each man kills the thing he<br />
loves”.<br />
At the one hand, the ‘love trap’ concept is quite <strong>of</strong>ten employed in the Turkish cinema. It was one <strong>of</strong><br />
the favorite themes <strong>of</strong> the video films <strong>of</strong> the 80s (see the movie genre ‘arabesque’). On the other hand, it is<br />
an eternal theme that pops up in art cinema from time to time. Naturally, it is not restricted to the cinema,<br />
as obsessive desires might imprison people in reality, too.<br />
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MURAKEÖZY, Éva Patrícia<br />
A propos d’une exposition:<br />
Hans Bellmer — Louise Bourgeois Double Sexus 1<br />
If one enters the exhibition “Hans Bellmer – Louise Bourgeois Double Sexus” from the back (as I did, by<br />
accident, when I got lost in the labyrinths <strong>of</strong> corridors after having a rewarming cup in the cafeteria) one<br />
might in an instant find oneself in a different world. Far and near, familiar and strange is the world <strong>of</strong> our<br />
own body. This — <strong>of</strong>ten ignored — part <strong>of</strong> our existence appears as a fantastical object in this exhibition.<br />
Between hanging phalli and standing breasts, twisted bodies and impossible postures, may we experience<br />
the body as a battlefield <strong>of</strong> sexual desire, lust and violence.<br />
As I walked into the spacious hall, my eye was caught by a huge metal cage.<br />
L. Bourgeois: Cell XXVI (2003)<br />
1 The exhibition embracing over 70 sculptural, graphic and photographic works from the two artists is to be seen between<br />
September 11, 2010 and January 16, 2011, in the Gemeentemuseum in The Hague.<br />
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Enclosed there hung a humanoid figure in front <strong>of</strong> a distorting mirror. His upper body was twisted in<br />
a spindle‐like form. Next to him there were two transparent, delicate clothes: underwear pieces. Locked<br />
away or protected from the exterior, in his self‐constructed cell, lives man watching at the outside world<br />
only through the distorting mirror. His connection to and his intimacy with other existences is hampered<br />
by a barrier.<br />
There is another story that this figure is telling me. This story is about man being irrevocably and<br />
unalterably bound to his earthliness. The twisted spindle form evokes an image <strong>of</strong> the gut. Tightly<br />
fastened in his material body, man is lost and sad. He travels through time as if passively floating in<br />
seawater, accompanied by transparent jellyfishes. He is gripping in his vulnerability; he looks as someone<br />
that ought to be helped.<br />
This sculptural installation entitled Cell XXVI (2003) 2 is one <strong>of</strong> several similar works by Louise<br />
Bourgeois.<br />
The work <strong>of</strong> Louise Bourgeois (1911‐2010) is rooted in the French Surrealist Movement, an extremely<br />
influential cultural movement in Paris between the two world wars, which fed upon Sigmund Freud’s<br />
studies on sexuality and the subconscious. Members <strong>of</strong> the surrealist movement aimed to move beyond<br />
empirical reality and into the realm <strong>of</strong> the wondrous, in the hope <strong>of</strong> attaining a more appropriate vision<br />
about man and his world(s).<br />
However, those who know surrealism from the whimsical worlds <strong>of</strong> Magritte or Dali might get<br />
surprised by the violent character <strong>of</strong> the artworks exhibited in the Gemeentemuseum. Sexual violence was<br />
in fact an ongoing theme for artists <strong>of</strong> the surrealist movement. They wanted to harness the libido for the<br />
benefit <strong>of</strong> their work. (Marquis de Sade was regarded by them as a revolutionary moralist and poet.)<br />
Women were <strong>of</strong>ten portrayed as fragmented and violated, and at the same time, womenʹs sexuality was<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten regarded as threatening to men.<br />
Surrealist artists were not interested in the Mysterium coniunctionis 3 , the harmonious unification <strong>of</strong><br />
the opposites. The time had not yet come for it. A new idea <strong>of</strong> the woman was just about to emerge.<br />
Unknown, dark and strong appeared the woman, who — contrarily to her subjected position — was felt<br />
dangerous and threatening to devour man and his (!) intelligence. In Surrealist artworks what appears in<br />
place <strong>of</strong> a hermaphrodite is in fact an “androgynous doubling”.<br />
2 Cell XXVI was recently acquired by the Gemeentemuseum <strong>of</strong> The Hague.<br />
3 The term “mysterium coniunctionis” is suggested by C.G. Jung as a designation for the unification <strong>of</strong> opposing polarities:<br />
conscious and unconscious, reason and instinct, spiritual and material, masculine and feminine.<br />
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L. Bourgeois: Janus Fleuri (1968)<br />
The hanging artwork Janus Fleuri (1968) shows a doubled phallus with a center part reminiscent <strong>of</strong> an<br />
open vulva. The broken surface in the middle contrasts with the smooth, polished surfaces <strong>of</strong> the sides.<br />
According to the author, this object expresses passivity, but also resistance and duration for which she<br />
called it one <strong>of</strong> her self‐portraits. “Janus is a reference to the kind <strong>of</strong> polarity we represent…The polarity I<br />
experience is a drive towards extreme violence and revolt…and a retiring,” wrote the artist.<br />
Portrait <strong>of</strong> Louise Bourgeois by Robert<br />
Mapplethorpe (1982)<br />
The sculpture Fillette (1968) in front <strong>of</strong> the<br />
artist’s photograph at the exhibition<br />
“Double Sexus”<br />
In the famous portrait <strong>of</strong> Bourgeois by Robert Mapplethorpe (1982) Bourgeois holds her sculpture<br />
named Fillette under her arm. Fillette (1968) is a latex and plaster sculpture <strong>of</strong> a huge phallus with some<br />
details <strong>of</strong> a vulva. Contrarily to its size, and the ideas we commonly associate with the might <strong>of</strong> the<br />
phallus, it looks rather comic and diminishing. (Its curious title Fillette is a French word literally meaning<br />
‘little girl’.) Bourgeoisʹs mischievous smile on the photograph and the manner in which she carries the<br />
aggressively looking object under her arm, as a baguette, describe a person <strong>of</strong> playful geniality. She<br />
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interpreted the act as: “It gave me a sense <strong>of</strong> security. I’ve always felt that my sculpture was more “me”<br />
than my physical presence.”<br />
Bourgeois’ oeuvre cannot be simply categorized as “surrealist”. It has a deeply personal character,<br />
through which it has reached timeless, eternal realities. (Contrarily to Hans Bellmer, whose work —<br />
however sharp and suggestive — remained bound to surrealist ideas.)<br />
As I was looking at Cell XXVI, it called upon a new reality in me. It lifted me above my own<br />
earthliness. It was an artwork that talked to me, which — with the worlds <strong>of</strong> Martin Heidegger —<br />
‘opened up a world’ in me. Heidegger sees the great work <strong>of</strong> art as something that takes us out <strong>of</strong> the<br />
ordinary. More than this, he states that the work <strong>of</strong> art connects us to that ‘world’ in such a meaningful<br />
way that it allows us to be part <strong>of</strong> the truth. Bourgeois’ artworks own this world‐opening power,<br />
whatever frightful and violent they may seem at first.<br />
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TRAVELOGUE<br />
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TAPON, Francis<br />
The Hidden Europe: What Eastern Europeans Can Teach Us<br />
Introduction: Stepping into the Hidden Europe<br />
“This would be a pretty lousy way to die,” I thought.<br />
I was locked in an outhouse with no way out. Outhouses sometimes have two latches—one on the<br />
outside and one on the inside. The outside latch keeps the door shut to prevent rodents and other<br />
creatures who like hanging out in crap from coming in. Somehow that outside latch accidentally closed,<br />
thereby locking me in this smelly toilet. I was wearing just a thin rain jacket and the temperatures were<br />
rapidly dropping.<br />
“This stinks,” I mumbled. It was midnight, I was above the Arctic Circle, and the temperatures at night<br />
would be just above freezing. There was no one around for kilometers. If I didn’t get out, I could freeze to<br />
death in this tiny, smelly, fly‐infested shithole.<br />
My mom would kill me if I died so disgracefully. She would observe that when Elvis died next to a<br />
toilet, he was in Graceland. I, on the other hand, was in Finland, not far from Santa Claus. This Nordic<br />
country was my warm up before setting out to visit all 25 countries in Eastern Europe over five months.<br />
The fool wonders. The wise man wanders. — Susan Rea<br />
I had started my hike at 5:30 p.m. and planned to hike all night. It was June 21 and the sun doesn’t set<br />
when you’re above the Arctic Circle on the Summer Solstice. So it really doesn’t matter when you hike. At<br />
11:00 p.m. I ate some food in a deserted cabin and then went to use the outhouse. I tried all sorts <strong>of</strong> clever<br />
ways <strong>of</strong> getting out and they all failed. Then I thought, “Wait a sec. I am an American. Therefore, I must<br />
love violence and be a brute. Hell, Arnold Schwarzenegger is my governor. What would he do?”<br />
I decided that the old fashioned, just‐bang‐the‐door‐down method was best. I gave the door a swift<br />
kick. BLAM!<br />
Nothing.<br />
“Okay…” I took a deep breath <strong>of</strong> the foul air and then let out the hardest kick my legs could deliver.<br />
BING! BAM! BOOM! The door stubbornly stared at me.<br />
I sat on the toilet to think. Finland has one <strong>of</strong> the most sophisticated telecommunications<br />
infrastructures in the world, far better than America. I may be in the middle <strong>of</strong> some remote forest around<br />
the Arctic Circle, but I wouldn’t be surprised if those crafty Finns had a cell phone tower nearby.<br />
Checking my phone, I had a solid reception. “Gotta love these Finns,” I smiled to myself. So as my<br />
California friends were getting ready for lunch, I punched out a text message (SMS) to describe my<br />
predicament:<br />
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Funny, but scary: I am trapped in an outhouse. The outside lock flipped when<br />
I went in. Nobody here. Getting cold. Trying 2 bang out.<br />
Most were busy eating a t<strong>of</strong>u burger so they didn’t get back to me. One friend, though, suggested<br />
“CALL 911!”<br />
“Good idea,” I thought. But then I remembered that dialing 911 in another country usually doesn’t get<br />
you the emergency services. However, it might get you a pizza delivery service, which would be nice.<br />
On the other hand, even if I got an emergency service, I was so deep in the Arctic wilderness they<br />
wouldn’t get here until morning at the earliest. By then I would be a frozen Popsicle. So I went back to<br />
kicking. Then I threw my measly body into the door a few times. I cursed, “I knew I should have eaten<br />
more cheeseburgers before I left!” I slammed my shoulder into the door so many times that I was nearly<br />
breaking a sweat in the frigid temperatures. “Damn it, Hollywood makes this look so easy!”<br />
I screamed and lunged at the door with vigor. The door put me back in my place: on the toilet seat. I<br />
panted in the putrid air wondering what else I could do. I started to shiver as my sweat cooled my body. I<br />
couldn’t tip over the outhouse. I couldn’t break open the ro<strong>of</strong>. Finally, I had one last idea: Matrix‐like,<br />
Keanu Reeves rapid‐fire kicks. I may not be The One, but I was the only one around, so I better kick some<br />
ass.<br />
I lay down so that my back rested on the toilet seat while I looked at the ceiling. My legs were cocked<br />
close to my chest, ready to repeatedly slam the obstinate door into submission. I took a few deep breaths<br />
and then let out a fury <strong>of</strong> kung fu kicks that would make Bruce Lee proud. After 20 kicks (and nearly<br />
falling into the toilet), the tenacious door flew open.<br />
I’m not as manly as you might think: I didn’t even break the lock. The vibrations from the continuous<br />
kicks just made it unlatch. Nevertheless, I breathed a sigh <strong>of</strong> relief (and some fresh air), and hiked the rest<br />
<strong>of</strong> the night.<br />
I had always wanted to live an adventurous life. It took a long time to realize that I was<br />
the only one who was going to make an adventurous life happen to me. — Richard Bach<br />
It was June 2004, exactly three years after I set <strong>of</strong>f on my Appalachian Trail thru‐hike. I craved another<br />
adventure. Once again, I wanted to wander and learn. I visited Prague and Budapest in 1992, and Russia<br />
and Ukraine in 1999. However, the rest <strong>of</strong> Eastern Europe was still a mystery to me.<br />
Therefore, in 2004 I set a simple goal: visit every country in Eastern Europe and see what I could learn.<br />
I wanted the Eastern Europeans to teach me about their cuisine, history, languages, sites, innovations,<br />
economy, religion, and drinking habits. Then after five years, in 2009, I would return to spend two years<br />
there to see what’s changed. By 2011, I will have spent nearly three years collecting the wisdom <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Hidden Europe.<br />
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Reopening the American mind<br />
I am a first generation American. My mom was born and raised in Santiago, Chile. Her dad was laid<br />
<strong>of</strong>f from his factory job when she was 16 years old, so she quit high school to work and help support the<br />
family. When she was 25, she emptied her retirement fund so that she could have enough money to buy a<br />
one‐way ticket to America. She arrived in the United States with only $300 in her pocket—too little to buy<br />
a flight back to Chile. It was far easier to immigrate to America in 1964 than it is today. She barely spoke<br />
any English when she arrived alone in San Francisco. Within two weeks, however, she landed a job that<br />
didn’t require speaking much English—being a clerk at Bank <strong>of</strong> America. My father was born and raised<br />
in France. He grew up with the Great Depression, the Nazi occupation, and World War II. Yes, my dad<br />
had issues, and not just because he’s French.<br />
By 1947, France’s military was getting involved in Vietnam and Algeria. My grandfather didn’t want to<br />
lose his only son after having lost his brother in World War I. Therefore, he put my 17‐year‐old dad on a<br />
one‐way boat voyage to Buenos Aires, Argentina. He lived there for seven years under the rule <strong>of</strong> Juan<br />
and Evita Peron. He witnessed how their populist policies destroyed the economy, and so, at the age <strong>of</strong><br />
25, he immigrated to the land <strong>of</strong> liberty: Philadelphia. After two years there, he crisscrossed the United<br />
States in his car and parked it in San Francisco. He started working there and several years later, he met<br />
my mom. They started a successful company importing goods from Latin America. In short, they<br />
achieved the American Dream.<br />
My parents didn’t just bring their bodies and hard work ethic to America. They brought their ideas. It’s<br />
that fresh input <strong>of</strong> ideas that has kept America competitive and strong since its founding. America’s open<br />
mind and flexibility helped it become the most powerful nation in the world. However, the fear <strong>of</strong><br />
terrorism and xenophobic worries has made it incredibly difficult to immigrate here. Millions <strong>of</strong> brilliant<br />
minds lie outside our borders yearning to get in. If we don’t nab them, another country will. Our<br />
competitive advantage will decrease and the American Era will end.<br />
Therefore, the purpose <strong>of</strong> this book isn’t to just share the insights <strong>of</strong> the Eastern Europeans. Its purpose<br />
is also to stir curiosity in you. I hope to inspire you to wander and learn. I want America to open its<br />
borders and brains not just to the brightest minds <strong>of</strong> Eastern Europe, but to the brightest minds <strong>of</strong> the<br />
world.<br />
When it’s OK to stereotype<br />
This book may <strong>of</strong>fend you. You will read sweeping statements like “Slovenians are polyglots,” or<br />
“Latvians like to dress up,” or “Americans are idiots.” Some people hate such stereotyping and<br />
generalizing, especially when it’s negative. Nobody will complain if I say “Ukrainian women are<br />
beautiful,” but they will say I’m a closed minded, superficial American if I say “Polish women are fat<br />
slobs.” Politically correct folks tell us that we should never stereotype. “Generalizations are always bad,”<br />
they declare, not realizing the contradiction in their statement.<br />
If our ancestors didn’t stereotype, we’d be dead. Let’s say cavemen with a blue dot on their cheek are<br />
responsible for killing half <strong>of</strong> your tribe. What would happen to your idealistic neighbor if she refused to<br />
stereotype those with the blue dot? Let’s just say she would produce few descendants. Hence, the human<br />
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brain is wired to look for patterns and to categorize everything. We can’t suppress that. It’s part <strong>of</strong> being<br />
human. That’s why when we’re looking for potential suicide bombers, we instinctively look for young<br />
Arab men and not old ladies from Sweden.<br />
You think you don’t stereotype? Sure you do. You avoid dark alleys with disheveled humans, because<br />
you know that you’re more likely to be assaulted there than in an <strong>of</strong>fice building. You stereotype <strong>of</strong>fice<br />
workers as peaceful creatures and gun totting gangsters in alleyways as high risk. Of course, these<br />
stereotypes are sometimes wrong: <strong>of</strong>fice workers go on shooting sprees and gangsters can help you to a<br />
hospital. However, you continue to depend on stereotypes to get you through the day.<br />
Stereotypes simply summarize the tendencies <strong>of</strong> a group <strong>of</strong> people. I’ve tried to document the Eastern<br />
European tendencies, while recognizing that there are no absolutes and that there are plenty <strong>of</strong><br />
exceptions. Therefore, when I say, “Albanians are friendly,” obviously there are plenty who are assholes.<br />
Pointing out all the exceptions gets tedious after a while, especially for the intelligent reader who realizes<br />
that a generalization is not an absolute statement.<br />
Admittedly, stereotyping gets tricky when you have few data points. Although I spent nearly three<br />
years in Eastern Europe, sometimes I only stayed two weeks in a particular country. I would have loved<br />
to spend months (or years) in each country, but with 25 Eastern European countries, I had to keep<br />
moving. Therefore, a few <strong>of</strong> my observations are based on just a brief glimpse <strong>of</strong> a country. If I was<br />
unlucky to meet the only four jerks who live in Lithuania (and met no one else), it was hard not to walk<br />
away concluding that Lithuanians are jerks.<br />
I did my best to get around these limitations. For instance, I would ask neighboring countries, “Are all<br />
Lithuanians really jerks?”<br />
They would usually reply, “No, but Americans are.”<br />
By asking the locals about how their life is really like, I could make up for my lack <strong>of</strong> data points. On<br />
the other hand, locals also make mistakes and spread false stereotypes. Bulgarians told me that most<br />
Romanians are thieves, which is obviously wrong, since Bulgarians are so poor that there is nothing to<br />
steal! (Relax, Bulgarians, I’m kidding.)<br />
A great way to avoid the pitfalls <strong>of</strong> anecdotal evidence is to consider polls that systematically survey<br />
thousands <strong>of</strong> people. Thus, we’ll consider what reputable international pollsters, such the Pew Research<br />
Center and Gallup, reveal about Eastern Europeans, while recognizing that surveys have their own<br />
shortcomings. By combining extensive personal travel with statistics and surveys, we should be able to<br />
paint a fair and accurate description <strong>of</strong> each country. You’ll finally understand how an Albanian differs<br />
from a Kosovar.<br />
Why not avoid stereotyping completely? “Please don’t!” cry the Baltic states. Estonians, Latvians, and<br />
Lithuanians hate that the world thinks they are all the same. They each want their own identity. In short,<br />
they want their own unique stereotype. Slovaks, Belarusians, and Ukrainians created their countries<br />
partly because they were tired <strong>of</strong> being lumped together with some other nationality and identity.<br />
Moreover, the people in those countries <strong>of</strong>ten have common character traits. To claim that Germans and<br />
Italians, for example, have the same character is idiotic. It’s cute and idealistic to believe that we should<br />
just avoid labels altogether and just call ourselves Homo sapiens, but humans demand more granularity<br />
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than that. Lastly, if you just say, “There are all types <strong>of</strong> people everywhere,” we miss an interesting<br />
opportunity to understand the traditional values, beliefs, and characteristics <strong>of</strong> a people.<br />
Hence, the solution isn’t to avoid stereotypes—that’s impossible. Instead, the solution is to have<br />
flexible stereotypes and to be open to exceptions. More importantly, if you see enough exceptions, consider<br />
changing the stereotype. For example, let’s say you believe that most Arab men are suicidal, religious<br />
maniacs. However, after visiting an Arabic country, you quickly notice that most young men aren’t<br />
blowing themselves up. Now you can create a new stereotype: young Arab men are friendly, peaceful, and<br />
have fewer weapons than the average American. In short, you still have a stereotype (because your brain<br />
demands it), but you’ve adjusted it to the new information you learned.<br />
Travel is fatal to prejudice, bigotry, and narrow‐mindedness.... Broad, wholesome,<br />
charitable views <strong>of</strong> men and things cannot be acquired by vegetating in one little corner<br />
<strong>of</strong> the earth all one’s lifetime. — Mark Twain<br />
To avoid making inaccurate stereotypes, I sought to experience the country from the ground level—<br />
where the “real people” live. Unlike most tourists, I avoided hotels, fancy restaurants, taxis, and rented<br />
cars. I rode crowded buses, ate sketchy food from street vendors, shopped at farmers markets, and stayed<br />
with locals whenever possible. In short, I did my best to detect the subtle differences among Eastern<br />
European countries, while trying not to impose stereotypes or invent differences that don’t exist. Of<br />
course, everything is extremely nuanced, especially a country’s history.<br />
Learning history from the locals<br />
Even before this book went to press, it was already pissing <strong>of</strong>f some people. Whenever I shared early<br />
versions <strong>of</strong> it with Eastern Europeans they would typically say, “I loved it! You’re so accurate at depicting<br />
the people and places in Eastern Europe. However, what you said about my country is completely<br />
inaccurate and unfair. You’re just like every other American: arrogant and stupid.”<br />
For example, Albanians thought I depicted every country in the Balkans well except for Albania.<br />
Macedonians thought I depicted every country in the Balkans well except for Macedonia. In addition,<br />
some Eastern Europeans disagreed with how I summarized their country’s history. As one Serbian put it<br />
in an e‐mail to me, “U R so full <strong>of</strong> incompetence and not up to this story. But that’s only my opinion and<br />
don’t let me discourage U. Keep up the good work.”<br />
Pay no attention to what the critics say; there has never been set up a statue in honor <strong>of</strong> a<br />
critic. — Jean Sibelius, a Finnish composer<br />
Although I wanted to learn everything about each country from its locals, that methodology has its<br />
flaws. First, their knowledge <strong>of</strong> their country’s demographics and economic activity might be based on<br />
their town, not their country. Second, their impression <strong>of</strong> their neighbors frequently had no empirical<br />
evidence, just hearsay. Third, their recollection <strong>of</strong> history is highly selective. People remember and forget<br />
different events. They emphasize certain events while overlooking others. Every country does this.<br />
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Throughout my travels in Eastern Europe, people would vividly recount both how their country came to<br />
be and the root cause to their country’s problems. I would travel 100 kilometers to another region and<br />
listen to others describe, with equal passion and zeal, the same events in a completely different way.<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the things important about history is to remember the true history.<br />
—George W. Bush<br />
Not exactly, George. History is a funny thing. I always believed that there was only one true, objective<br />
version <strong>of</strong> history. In theory, that might be true, but in practice it isn’t. First, even if all history books in the<br />
world said the same thing, what really matters is what the people believe, because that is what they will<br />
teach the next generation. It is said, “victors write history.” That’s true, but the losers don’t necessarily<br />
read or believe it. Instead, they tell their children “what really happened.”<br />
Although I’ve thoroughly researched Eastern Europe’s history, retelling history is a thankless task<br />
because it’s impossible to please everyone. Moreover, I’m not a scholarly historian, so some snooty PhD<br />
might tell me that my facts are slightly <strong>of</strong>f. However, there’s <strong>of</strong>ten no consensus even among pr<strong>of</strong>essional<br />
historians, who love to gather in conferences and deliver astonishingly dull speeches meant to cure<br />
anyone <strong>of</strong> insomnia.<br />
History is a set <strong>of</strong> lies agreed upon. — Napoleon Bonaparte (1769‐1821)<br />
If you dig deep enough, perhaps you can uncover the truth, but it is <strong>of</strong>ten a murky and tricky affair.<br />
However, in some ways the truth doesn’t really matter to me. I’m not a historian. I’m an explorer. For me,<br />
perception is reality; the people’s version <strong>of</strong> history is, for this book, the history that matters. I wanted to<br />
hear the history parents tell their children.<br />
Even when I knew the locals were wrong, I had little hope (and even less interest) in changing their<br />
minds. My goal was to understand them, their reasoning, their beliefs, and their world view. This book<br />
compares their view <strong>of</strong> history with “what really happened,” while recognizing that my sources (as<br />
objective as I hope they are) have their own biases. If this all ends up making you more confused than<br />
ever, wonderful. Welcome to Eastern Europe.<br />
A not‐so‐stupid question: where is Eastern Europe?<br />
Asking, “Where is Eastern Europe?” seems as stupid as asking, “Who is buried in Grant’s tomb?”<br />
Obviously, Eastern Europe is in the eastern part <strong>of</strong> Europe. However, where to draw that line is extremely<br />
controversial. Indeed, it’s hard to find two people who agree on what countries are in Eastern Europe.<br />
Back in good old Cold War days, defining Eastern Europe was easy: it was made up <strong>of</strong> all those losers<br />
who were on the wrong side <strong>of</strong> the Iron Curtain. Eastern Europe had those backward, communist<br />
countries who were frozen in the Stone Age.<br />
Because the world had such a low opinion <strong>of</strong> Eastern Europe, nowadays nobody wants to admit that<br />
they live there. For example, let’s just look at the Baltic countries. I’ve met Estonians who assert that they<br />
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are in Northern Europe, Latvians who proclaim that they are in Central Europe, and Lithuanians who<br />
argue that they are in Western Europe!<br />
If you were to believe everyone you talked to, you would conclude that Eastern Europe just doesn’t<br />
exist! When pressed, Eastern Europeans admit that Eastern Europe exists, but they all believe the region<br />
starts just east <strong>of</strong> whatever country they happen to live in. I like this definition. My father was French, so<br />
Eastern Europe, for me, starts in Germany. Sorry, Germans.<br />
If you’re European, it’s time to review Geography 101. Any territory can be divided a number <strong>of</strong> ways.<br />
For instance, you can divide it east‐west and/or north‐south. If you like, you can create a central region. To<br />
have even more granularity, you can create a northeast region, a southeast region, and so on. However,<br />
sometimes people don’t want all those options. They just want a simple binary division (thereby eliminating<br />
the concept <strong>of</strong> a central region). For example, if you want to divide the US with a north‐south split, we<br />
usually use the old Civil War dividing lines. If you want a simple east‐west split, we usually use the<br />
Mississippi River, even though it’s an imperfect split. Chicago boys may dislike being called an Eastern<br />
American just as a Hungarian might dislike being called an Eastern European. They both would yell,<br />
“We’re Central, not Eastern!” Similarly, someone from Montana might say, “I’m not in the Western US,<br />
I’m in the Northern US!” They would all have a good point. However, if central and northern are not<br />
options (and they are not, when you divide a territory with a simple east‐west split), then you must<br />
choose a side. You may not like east‐west splits, but there’s nothing evil about dividing any region that<br />
way. So get over it.<br />
However, we still have the challenge <strong>of</strong> deciding where that east‐west line should be. Let’s be scientific<br />
about it. Geologists agree that Eastern Europe ends at the Ural Mountains, which lie hundreds <strong>of</strong><br />
kilometers east <strong>of</strong> Moscow, Russia. Let’s assume that Western Europe begins in Portugal. If you made a<br />
perfect 50/50 split <strong>of</strong> Europe, then the east‐west line would be roughly near the cities <strong>of</strong> Helsinki, Rīga,<br />
Warsaw, Budapest, and Belgrade. However, geologists would point out that the westernmost point <strong>of</strong><br />
Europe is not Portugal, but rather Iceland. Therefore, with Iceland at one end <strong>of</strong> Europe and the Urals at<br />
the other, the perfect east‐west line shifts eerily near to where the Iron Curtain used to be. Although most<br />
Eastern Europeans like to deny they are in Eastern Europe, it’s hard to argue against geology and a simple<br />
50/50 split.<br />
Of course, Eastern Europeans won’t like that answer. They would cry, “Iceland isn’t in Europe! It’s on<br />
another freakin’ planet!”<br />
So let’s do another geological split. As the crow flies, it’s 5,200 kilometers (3,250 miles) from Lisbon,<br />
Portugal to Perm, Russia (a city next to the Urals). The halfway point for the crow would be Wrocław, a<br />
Polish city near the German border. If you extend a north‐south line through Wrocław, it would cross the<br />
Czech Republic, Austria, and western Croatia. Only Slovenia would find itself on the west side <strong>of</strong> that<br />
dividing line (I can hear the Slovenians cheering). In short, this alternative way <strong>of</strong> finding the middle<br />
point <strong>of</strong> Europe also results in an east‐west border that is quite close to the Cold War dividing line.<br />
One more way to solve this tedious problem is to learn where experts say is Europe’s geographic<br />
center. Wherever that point is, we could project a north‐south line across it, thereby clearly marking<br />
Europe’s east‐west division. Unfortunately, geographers can’t agree on the edges <strong>of</strong> Europe, so they can’t<br />
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agree on its exact center. Geographers have placed Europe’s center as far west as Dresden (Germany), as<br />
far east as Rakhiv (Ukraine), and as far north as Estonia’s island <strong>of</strong> Saaremaa.<br />
War is God’s way <strong>of</strong> teaching Americans geography. – Ambrose Bierce<br />
Before we invest too much time finding the perfect 50/50 split, let’s remember that many east‐west (or<br />
north‐south) divisions are asymmetrical. For example, about two‐thirds <strong>of</strong> America lies on one side <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Mississippi River. Russia’s east‐west line is the Ural Mountains, even though that results in an 80/20 split.<br />
Cities <strong>of</strong>ten have artificial and arbitrary east‐west divisions that are hardly symmetrical. They might be<br />
based on a historic railway line or a river. Therefore, even if you play with a world map to “prove” that<br />
Europe’s perfect 50/50 east‐west split lies east <strong>of</strong> Romania, it doesn’t mean that’s where the division<br />
should be.<br />
Although a dispassionate view <strong>of</strong> a map favors having an east‐west split near the old Iron Curtain,<br />
there’s another good reason to use the old Cold War dividing line. History shapes who we are. Whether<br />
Eastern Europeans like it or not, the communist experience is still in their collective memory. Those who<br />
are under 30 years old today might yell, “But I don’t remember those days! I grew up with Western<br />
values!” However, their parents and teachers drilled their local history and values into their children’s<br />
brains. It’s part <strong>of</strong> who they are. The legacy <strong>of</strong> slavery can still be felt in the southern regions <strong>of</strong> the US,<br />
even though slavery ended 150 years ago. Communism, in contrast, ended less than 25 years ago.<br />
Communism may have left Eastern Europe, but its long shadow is still there.<br />
Finally, there’s one more thing that Eastern European countries have in common: they’re still relatively<br />
hidden. Of course, businesses and tourists have poured into the region ever since the Wall came down in<br />
1989. However, the world is still far more familiar with Western Europe than Eastern Europe. Most<br />
people can explain the difference between Italy and Ireland; however, they’ll give you a blank look if you<br />
ask them to compare Slovenia and Slovakia.<br />
In conclusion, for geological, historical, and even touristy reasons, I have defined Eastern Europe quite<br />
broadly. This book puts 25 countries in Eastern Europe. This includes Western Russia, Germany’s eastern<br />
half, and the ex‐Yugoslavian countries. It also includes three countries that few consider part <strong>of</strong><br />
traditional Eastern Europe: Finland, Greece, and Turkey. Finland is east <strong>of</strong> Poland (and north <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Baltic), so geographically it is certainly in Eastern Europe. Greece is also geographically in Eastern Europe<br />
(it’s south <strong>of</strong> the Balkans). However, we will only examine the part <strong>of</strong> Greece that is most tied to the rest<br />
<strong>of</strong> Eastern Europe: Greece’s northern portion. Like Russia, most <strong>of</strong> Turkey is in Asia, so we will look just<br />
at its western side. In sum, I spent three years in 25 countries nearly 25 years after the Wall came down.<br />
Americans may wonder why I’m taking so much time to define Eastern Europe. “What’s the big deal,<br />
anyway?” you may ask. “So you’re in Eastern Europe. So what? Who cares?” Trust me. It’s a really big deal<br />
in this region. It’s a highly charged and emotional topic that sparks endless and explosive debates. If you<br />
want to make Eastern Europeans twitch and squirm, just tell them that they are from Eastern Europe. The<br />
only people who don’t seem to care are the Moldovans. They’re just happy that anyone knows that<br />
Moldova exists.<br />
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About the lessons<br />
Each chapter in this book focuses on one Eastern European country. Every chapter ends with a brief<br />
summary <strong>of</strong> what that country can teach you. Although it’s tempting to just read the summaries and skip<br />
the rest, that might make you jump to erroneous conclusions. I can already hear the proud Russian who<br />
skips right to the summary <strong>of</strong> the Russian chapter and then yells at me, “All you learned from the biggest<br />
country in the world is how great it is to drink vodka?!”<br />
Therefore, before you read the summaries, remember that:<br />
These aren’t the only things you can learn. Just because there are only two ideas in a summary,<br />
doesn’t mean that those are the only two things you can learn from a country. First, you can learn many<br />
more things within the chapter itself, which is packed with information about each country’s culture.<br />
Second, the summaries only focus on practical ideas that you can implement in your everyday life. Third,<br />
there are plenty <strong>of</strong> things to learn about each country that I missed.<br />
Other countries may be able to teach you the same lesson. Just because one good idea is in the<br />
summary, doesn’t mean that you couldn’t have learned that same concept elsewhere. For instance, if five<br />
countries can all teach you the same concept, only one country will get credit so that you don’t have to<br />
read about the concept five times.<br />
Other countries may have been the pioneers. Just because I give credit to one country for doing<br />
something clever, doesn’t mean it invented the idea.<br />
Other countries may do it better. Just because I give credit to one country for something useful,<br />
doesn’t mean they are the best at practicing it.<br />
Therefore, to answer the patriotic Russian, “Yes, there’s much more to Russia than drinking vodka;<br />
Belarus is also great at drinking vodka; Ukraine invented vodka; and nobody drinks more vodka per<br />
capita than Moldova. Now are you all happy?”<br />
“No,” says the Russian, “because those last two points are not true. Poland invented vodka and we’re<br />
the best in the world at drinking it, not Moldova!”<br />
“Yeah, you’re right. See, I told you that Russia has a lot to teach you about drinking vodka.”<br />
Lastly, the main purpose <strong>of</strong> this book is positive—to learn the best things about Eastern Europeans;<br />
however, we’ll also learn about the stupid and idiotic things in Eastern Europe. Indeed, sometimes the<br />
most effective Eastern European lessons are the ones where they show us what not to do. I fell in love<br />
with Eastern Europe, warts and all. Perhaps you will too.<br />
Before the development <strong>of</strong> tourism, travel was conceived to be like study, and its fruits<br />
were considered to be the adornment <strong>of</strong> the mind and the formation <strong>of</strong> the judgment.<br />
— Paul Fussel<br />
I began my voyage in Finland. During the Soviet Era, Finland was a quasi‐Eastern European country. It<br />
was neither in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), nor in the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, it<br />
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would be a good place to start the adventure. So we’ll start there too, using it as a useful stepping‐stone<br />
into the Hidden Europe.<br />
Francis Tapon’s mother is from Chile and<br />
his father is from France. They met in San<br />
Francisco thanks to a slow elevator. His<br />
brother, Philippe Tapon, is the author <strong>of</strong><br />
A Parisian from Kansas and The Mistress,<br />
published by Dutton.<br />
Francis was born and raised in San<br />
Francisco, California where he attended a<br />
French school for 12 years. He is fluent in<br />
English, French, and Spanish. Pr<strong>of</strong>icient in<br />
Portuguese, Italian, and Russian. Horrible in<br />
Slovenian and Japanese. He earned a Religion<br />
Degree with honors from Amherst College,<br />
and wrote his thesis on the Baháʹí Faith and<br />
the Worldwide Church <strong>of</strong> God.<br />
After working for Hitachi in Latin<br />
America, he earned an MBA from Harvard<br />
Business School.<br />
After Harvard he co‐founded SIGHTech<br />
Vision Systems, a robotic vision company.<br />
Four years later he sold his stake to hike the<br />
Appalachian Trail. He consulted at Micros<strong>of</strong>t<br />
before hiking the Pacific Crest Trail in 2006. In<br />
2007, he became the first person to yo‐yo the<br />
Continental Divide Trail. This seven‐month<br />
journey spanned nearly 6,000 miles (9,000<br />
km). He backpacked from Mexico to Canada<br />
through New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming,<br />
Idaho, and Montana. Once he reached<br />
Canada, he turned around and walked back<br />
to Mexico through the Rocky Mountains.<br />
Today Francis is an author, speaker, and<br />
life coach. He delivers fun and informative<br />
speeches on getting your life and your<br />
* * *<br />
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organization out <strong>of</strong> a rut and onto the ridge.<br />
He also runs workshops and <strong>of</strong>fers individual<br />
coaching too.<br />
He is the author <strong>of</strong> Hike Your Own Hike: 7<br />
Life Lessons from Backpacking Across America.<br />
He is donating half <strong>of</strong> his book royalty to the<br />
Triple Crown <strong>of</strong> thru‐hiking—Appalachian<br />
Trail, Pacific Crest Trail, and Continental<br />
Divide Trail.<br />
His next book, The Hidden Europe: What<br />
Eastern Europeans Can Teach Us, will be about<br />
his travels in Eastern Europe. It will be out in<br />
August 2011.<br />
In 2012, he plans to spend two years<br />
visiting every country in Africa and plans to<br />
write a book about that too.<br />
His website is http://FrancisTapon.com<br />
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BOOK (P)REVIEW<br />
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BÉRCZI, Szaniszló<br />
Etruscan, Roman and Toscan Art<br />
Example issue from the Coloring Booklet Series <strong>of</strong> <strong>Eurasian</strong> Arts *<br />
Introduction<br />
There are lands in Western‐Eurasia which are well‐endowed and layered with arts. Among them the<br />
ancient Etruria is prominently beloved for its known and admired artistic heritage which had been<br />
formed during the 1 st millenium B.C. on the Italian land <strong>of</strong> the old Etruscan people. The migrating sailors<br />
with rich eastern cultural background arrived to Italy at the beginning <strong>of</strong> the millenium.<br />
Fig. 1. The migrating ancestors <strong>of</strong> Etruscans with rich eastern cultural heritage from Asia Minor.<br />
* The complete series can be accessed in electronic format at: http://www.federatio.org/tkte.html. The graphical illustrations <strong>of</strong><br />
this paper are the author´s drawings and paintings.<br />
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Origin <strong>of</strong> the Etruscan people<br />
Etruscans, according to Herodotus migrated to Italy from Ludia, Asia Minor. After the collapse <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Cretean State the sailors <strong>of</strong> the Mediterranean threatened the peace all around the sea. Egypt repulsed<br />
their attack several times, as can be read on old pillars. There is archaeological evidence in Asia Minor<br />
that also proves their origin. Their complex heritage preserved several Mesopotamian and Scythian<br />
elements like the animal fight scenes, and the princeps jewel: the pectoral. The well‐known face‐covering<br />
plate belongs to this heritage, too. The famous, developed smithworkmanship also reveals Asia Minor<br />
origin. Etruscans had well‐known balcksmith (ironsmith) centers and mines on the Elba Island. They also<br />
melted Greek art elements into their ceramics.<br />
Fig. 2. Etruscan ceramics picturing Greek character figures wrestling with ladies dancing around them.<br />
Town building architecture, iron industry ceramic art<br />
The arriving Etruscans found wild territories. They dried out marshes and built stone towns. They had<br />
developed rich industrial technologies and famous blacksmith culture in their new homeland. They<br />
formed a confederacy <strong>of</strong> towns and competed with the neighboring Italian tribes in forming the<br />
landscape.<br />
The Etruscan state organisation was the confederacy <strong>of</strong> the townstates. Rules governed the building <strong>of</strong><br />
a town. They fixed the position <strong>of</strong> the city by a ceremonial procedure and furrowed the line <strong>of</strong> the city<br />
walls. At the place <strong>of</strong> the gates they took out the plough from the ground and moved it in the air to the<br />
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next wall position. They selected two main streets <strong>of</strong> the town: the north and south and the east and west<br />
axes. They erected a holy well at the crossing point. They guarded the walls, nobody was allowed even to<br />
approach them. The Middle‐Italian pastoral tribes gradually occupied the Etruscan towns. On the place <strong>of</strong><br />
the present‐day Rome there were several ancient Etruscan towns like Veii. The well‐known Apollo <strong>of</strong> Veii<br />
is a famous sculpture from the facade <strong>of</strong> the temple from the town. The Etruscan temple was different<br />
from the Greek one, because <strong>of</strong> different traditions as sources. Open porticus was standing before the<br />
closed inner sanctuary. Triple God sculptures were standing in the sanctuary; later the Romans accepted<br />
them by the names <strong>of</strong>: Iuno, Jupiter and Minerva.<br />
Fig. 3. Iron production in a great Etruscans blacksmith workshop.<br />
Fig. 4. Etruscan ceramics with human figures, witnessing <strong>of</strong> great phantasy.<br />
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Arts: sculptures, paintings, cemeteries<br />
There are several preserved, well‐known products <strong>of</strong> the Etruscan art: the Lion <strong>of</strong> Arezzo, and the Wolf<br />
<strong>of</strong> Capitolium. The latter had been complemented by the figures <strong>of</strong> Romulus and Remus by Pollaiulo, the<br />
renaissance master. But the city walls, the gates on them, the houses and the tombs are also masterworks.<br />
The dome like tombs were constructed in a half sphere ceiling with outer ground coverage. The Etruscan<br />
paintings can be studied in the graves. Their style and richness is somewhat similar to those <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Creteans, and Southern Italians, like as those <strong>of</strong> Pompei and Herculaneum.<br />
Fig. 5. Etruscan carved figures on a sarcophagus.<br />
Fights aganist Latin tribes and against the forming Rome<br />
Etruscans had given three kings to the early Roman Kingdom. Later, however, they had got the worst<br />
<strong>of</strong> the fights against the Latin tribes. Nevertheless, their work had been incorporated into the culture <strong>of</strong><br />
the Roman Empire.<br />
Fig. 6. The fights <strong>of</strong> Etruscans against the conquering Romans.<br />
Octavian, the first emperor <strong>of</strong> Rome, under the name <strong>of</strong> Augustus, originated from an Etruscan ancient<br />
family. Maecenas, the famous patron <strong>of</strong> artists, especially poets, also had Etruscan origin.<br />
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When the Roman Empire became weaker and finally collapsed, Italy was dissected to town states. In a<br />
region with the name Toscana the new era brought the resurrection <strong>of</strong> the ancient Etruscan traditions and<br />
with the central town state Firenze gave the renaissance to Europe.<br />
Toscana, Michelangelo<br />
Almost unquestionable Michelangelo is the immortal master <strong>of</strong> arts who represents the living Etrsucan<br />
artistic traditions in the form <strong>of</strong> the renaissance, not only in sculputre, but in painting and architecture<br />
and even in poetry. In several <strong>of</strong> his masterpieces he continues the 2500 years old Etruscan traditions. The<br />
best example is the group <strong>of</strong> sculptures that adornes the tomb <strong>of</strong> the Medici Princeps.<br />
Fig. 7. The front cover <strong>of</strong> the coloring booklet: The family sarcophagus from Cervitery cemetery and<br />
the figure <strong>of</strong> Down by Michelangelo’s Medici tomb sculptures are compared for body arrangement.<br />
We can see the modernised variants <strong>of</strong> this group even in present‐day Budapest on buildings built<br />
during the Hungarian Millennium festivities, at the turn <strong>of</strong> the 19 th and 20 th centuries. They are used as<br />
tympanons above the windows <strong>of</strong> the neorenaissance building facades. On the Medici tombs the figures<br />
were taken from the ancient Etruscan sarcophagi, where single persons or pairs <strong>of</strong> a man and woman are<br />
leaning on their elbows: the allegoric sculptures <strong>of</strong> Dusk and Dawn, the Day and Night. They can be seen<br />
all over Europe till today, too. Hence, the Etruscan art, and its countinuation, the Roman and Toscan art is<br />
a rich store <strong>of</strong> the stratifications <strong>of</strong> cultures. It is a branch <strong>of</strong> <strong>Eurasian</strong> arts, which preserved its beauty and<br />
expressivity during thousands <strong>of</strong> years.<br />
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Fig. 8. The back cover <strong>of</strong> the coloring booklet: Sculpture and fresco art <strong>of</strong> Michelangelo together with<br />
ancient Etrsucan sculptures <strong>of</strong> the Lion <strong>of</strong> Arezzo and Wolf <strong>of</strong> Capitolium<br />
There is another branch <strong>of</strong> the Etruscan culture which achieved new and new bloomings through the<br />
Roman and Toscan ages till today. That is the technological production, the engineering works and<br />
inventions. The engineering creativity brought the arc from the east to western Eurasia, as it appears in<br />
the architecture <strong>of</strong> the Etruscan towns. There are aquaducts which also use this invention. This<br />
engineering art is further developed in the imperial Rome and distributed all over the known world at<br />
that time.<br />
Fig. 9. Etruscan pietà from the ancient sculptural art and Pietà <strong>of</strong> Michelangelo.<br />
The Romanesque arc became an important architectural element in the communal buildings:<br />
aquaducts, triumphal gates, and finally in baths and in amphiteatres. The best well‐known <strong>of</strong> them is the<br />
Colosseum in Rome, but all around the Mediterranean Sea we can find remnant ruins <strong>of</strong> them. This<br />
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proves that inventious people can enrich the larger community by distribution <strong>of</strong> their heritage via a<br />
larger empire, Rome. This engineering branch <strong>of</strong> the Etruscan culture reached a peak in the person <strong>of</strong><br />
Leonardo da Vinci. His machines, studies <strong>of</strong> motion, plans and realized constructions also prove the<br />
vitality <strong>of</strong> the ancient Etruscan culture later, in medieval Europe.<br />
Summary<br />
The Etruscan, Roman and Toscan culture became part <strong>of</strong> the Hungarian life in several branches. The<br />
Christianity connected us to Rome; later King Matthias had rich renaissance relations with Italy. We hope<br />
that the study <strong>of</strong> the Etruscan arts will also help us to develop our love for <strong>Eurasian</strong> arts by painting in<br />
this booklet, we hope it gives joy and amusement, good work and good thinking to our fellows who<br />
prefer art and engineering history, or art alone, remembering the destiny <strong>of</strong> old peoples, old nations, old<br />
traditions.<br />
References<br />
Artner T. (1979): Az ókor művészete. Móra, Budapest;<br />
Bakay K. (1997, 1998): Őstörténetünk régészeti forrásai. I. II. Miskolc;<br />
Beke L. (1987): Műalkotások elemzése. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest;<br />
Bérczi Sz., Bérczi K., Bérczi Zs., Kabai S. (2003): Coloring Booklet Series about the Arts <strong>of</strong> Central Eurasia with Rich<br />
Heritage <strong>of</strong> Ethnomathematical Ornamental Arts. Symmetry: Culture and Science, 12. No. 1‐2. p. 231‐239.;<br />
Castiglione L. (1971): Római művészet. Corvina, Budapest;<br />
Götz L. (1995): Keleten kél a Nap. Püski, Budapest;<br />
Hajnóczi Gy. (1973): Az építészet története. Ókor. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest;<br />
Hood, S. (1978): The Arts in Prehistoric Greece. Penguin, Harmondsworth;<br />
Huszka J. (1930): A magyar turáni ornamentika története. Pátria, Budapest;<br />
Huyghes, R. (1971): Formes et Forces. Flammarion, Paris;<br />
Kenediné Szántó L. (1977): Az etruszkok nyomában. Corvina, Budapest;<br />
László Gy. (1974): A népvándorláskor művészete Magyarországon. Corvina, Budapest;<br />
Lükő G. (1993): Az ige, a magyar ige. Zöldövezet, 2. szám. 48. old.;<br />
Pogány F. (1965): Szobrászat és festészet az építőművészetben. Műszaki, Budapest;<br />
Pogány F. (1971): Firenze. Corvina, Budapest;<br />
Pogány F. (1967): Róma. Corvina, Budapest;<br />
Pogány F. (1973, 1975): Itália építészete. I. II. Corvina, Budapest;<br />
Vayer L. (1982): Az itáliai reneszánsz művészete. Corvina, Budapest;<br />
Vickers, M. (1985): A római világ. Helikon, Budapest;<br />
Warren, P. (1989): Az égei civilizációk. Helikon, Budapest.<br />
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CLASSICAL WRITINGS ON<br />
EURASIA<br />
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HIRTH, Friedrich<br />
Die chinesischen annalen als Quelle zur Geschichte<br />
asiatischer Völker<br />
* * *<br />
This writing, providing an analysis <strong>of</strong> the value the classical Chinese annals bear as a source if<br />
Asian history, is a chapter from ´Chinesische Studien I.´ [´Chinese <strong>Studies</strong> I.´], München und<br />
Leipzig 1890.<br />
* * *<br />
Die Chinesen dürfen sich bekanntlich einer historischen Litteratur rühmen, wie sie an Umfang und<br />
Einheit der Methode ihrer Behandlung kaum ein anderes Kulturvolk besitzt. Mit dem Vater der<br />
chinesischen Geschichte Ssû‐ma‐chʹien anfangend, hat seit der älteren Han‐Dynastie jedes Herrscherhaus<br />
seine eigene Geschichte gehabt. Das Material zu diesen dynastischen Geschichtswerken wurde den<br />
während der jeweiligen Regierungszeit verfassten H<strong>of</strong>chroniken (Jih‐li, täglichen Chroniken) entlehnt,<br />
und diese wurden den Blicken des Regenten wie der Minister vorenthalten. So verlangte es das Gesetz,<br />
das auf uralter Ueberlieferung beruhend, nur ausnahmsweise durch die Willkür der Machthaber verletzt<br />
worden ist. Die Zusammenstellung des Materials geschah erst nach dem Sturze eines jeden<br />
Regentenhauses, und zwar durch die <strong>of</strong>fiziellen Geschichtsschreiber der folgenden Dynastie.<br />
Die bis jetzt existierenden vierundzwanzig dynastischen Geschichtswerke oder Shih bilden eine<br />
stattliche Bibliothek, im Ganzen 3000 Chʹüan oder Bücher. Am Ende eines jeden Werkes finden sich<br />
ethnographische Mitteilungen über die fremden Völker, mit denen der chinesische H<strong>of</strong> während der<br />
verflossenen dynastischen Periode in Berührung gekommen ist. Diese von jeder Parteifärbung<br />
unberührten Skizzen wurden aus den gleichzeitigen Aufzeichnungen der H<strong>of</strong>chronisten meist nicht<br />
allzulange (ein bis drei Jahrhunderte) nach der bezüglichen Periode zusammengestellt. Sie bilden die<br />
wichtigste Quelle der gesamten ethnographischen Kenntnis der Chinesen während des Altertums und im<br />
Mittelalter bis zur Zeit der Ming‐Dynastie, die im Jahre 1644 von der gegenwärtigen Dynastie der Ts´ing<br />
gestürzt wurde.<br />
In dem »Buche über die Völker des fernen Westens« (Hsi‐yü‐chuan), womit die Geschichte der<br />
späteren Han‐Dynastie (Hou‐han‐shu) abschliesst, findet sich zum ersten Male die Beschreibung eines<br />
Landes namens Ta‐ts´in. Wir finden in diesem im knappen historischen Stil der Zeit verfassten Abriss<br />
eine Anzahl von Thatsachen betreffend die Grenzen, die Lage, das Volk, die Produkte und sonstige<br />
Eigentümlichkeiten des Landes, die allein im Stande sind, uns die nötigen Fingerzeige zur Identifizierung<br />
zu geben. Leider hat sich, sobald der Inhalt dieser in ihrer ersten Gestalt den beiden ersten Jahrhunderten<br />
nach Christus entstammenden Mitteilungen bekannt wurde, das Vorurteil eingeschlichen, dass mit dem<br />
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Lande Ta‐tsʹih, als dem mächtigsten des Westens, das römische Reich mit der Hauptstadt Rom gemeint<br />
sei. Diese Theorie ist unter anderen von Visdelou und de Guignes, und neuerdings wieder von<br />
Bretschrieider, Edkins und von Richth<strong>of</strong>en verteidigt worden. Ich muss gestehen, dass ich anfangs dieses<br />
Vorurteil geteilt habe, und dass ich mich mit dem besten Willen, in den chinesischen Annalen die Stadt<br />
des Romulus mit ihrem grossen Volke wiederzuerkennen, in die Urquellen vertieft habe. Ich kann sagen,<br />
dass ich dies sine studio et ira gethan habe; denn die europäische Litteratur über diesen Gegenstand war<br />
mir so gut wie unbekannt, als ich anfing, die chinesischen Historiker zu lesen. Diese Unkenntnis, möchte<br />
ich behaupten, ist mir sehr zu statten gekommen, indem ich so gezwungen war, lediglich aus dem<br />
chinesischen Material heraus mir von der Identität des Landes ein Bild zu machen. Dabei stellte sich<br />
heraus, dass eine ziemliche Anzahl von Thatsachen auf Rom gar nicht passen wollte, so dass ich, einmal<br />
zweifelnd, anfing, das mir vorschwebende Bild mit den übrigen Ländern des antiken Westens zu<br />
vergleichen. Zunächst waren es gewisse Produkte, die mich in die Levante führten. Die Bewohner von<br />
Ta‐ts´in »sammelten das Harz gewisser Bäume und kochten Storax«. Dies konnte weder in Rom, noch in<br />
Griechenland der Fall gewesen sein; denn der beste Storax kam aus Syrien. Syrien war ferner der Sitz des<br />
Handels mit Gold, Edelsteinen, Perlen, der Glas‐ und Tuchindustrie; in syrischen oder phönizischen<br />
Städten wurde chinesische Seide gefärbt, zu Stickereien verwendet und, wenn eine Parallelstelle im<br />
Plinius und in einem der chinesischen Berichte nicht trügt, auseinandergezupft, um anderweitig<br />
verwoben zu werden. Dazu kamen die Gründe, die bereits vor zwanzig Jahren von Wylie zu Gunsten der<br />
nestorianischen Inschrift von Hsi‐an‐fu geltend gemacht wurden, und die nach ihm inʹs Feld geführten<br />
Argumente Pauthierʹs, der trotz seiner mangelhaften Kenntnis der chinesischen Sprache gegenüber<br />
seinen sonst überlegenen Gegnern Julien, Neumann und Renan in der Hauptsache Recht behalten hat,<br />
wenn auch seine Idee, das spätere Fu‐lin mit dem ost‐römischen Reiche zu identifizieren, eine<br />
unglückliche genannt werden muss. Der Bericht des Hou‐han‐shu würde genügt haben, die Identität mit<br />
Syrien herzustellen. Doch bringen andere, zum Teil bisher unbekannte Texte wichtiges Material bei,<br />
Material, das nicht allein die damalige Kenntnis der Chinesen charakterisieren hilft, sondern, wenn<br />
einmal richtig interpretiert, manches Licht auf antike Verkehrsverhältnisse zu werfen und so die<br />
bezüglichen klassischen Autoren des Westens zu ergänzen geeignet ist.<br />
Um auf die Annalen der zweiten Han‐Dynastie zurückzukommen, so müssen wir annehmen, dass die<br />
vom Verfasser Fan‐yeh (420 bis 477 n. Chr.) benutzten Dokumente während der bezüglichen Dynastie<br />
niedergeschrieben wurden, d. i, in den Jahren 25 bis 220 n. Chr. Wir dürfen annehmen, dass Fan‐yehʹs<br />
Text ein halbes Jahrtausend hindurch nur als Manuskript existierte. Ich habe die editio princeps dieses<br />
Werkes nicht gesehen, doch hat mir eine der ältesten Ausgaben, die vom Jahre 1168 (mit Ergänzung<br />
verlorener Blätter aus einer Ausgabe des Jahres 1242) vorgelegen. Ich habe mich davon überzeugt, dass<br />
der das Land Ta‐ts´in betreffende Text mit einer unbedeutenden, den Sinn nicht berührenden Ausnahme<br />
sich vom Text der jetzt kursierenden Standard editions in nichts, ausser im äusseren Anblick,<br />
unterscheidet, dass sich mithin der Text sieben Jahrhunderte hindurch erhalten hat, ohne von der Kritik<br />
irgendwie berührt zu werden.<br />
Dies ist ein für die Entwicklung der chinesischen Litteratur charakteristisches Zeichen; die Verehrung<br />
des Alten ist so gross, dass niemand es wagt, einen als klassisch anerkannten Text anzutasten. Was somit<br />
für die letzten sieben Jahrhunderte erwiesen ist, lässt sich für die vorhergehenden fünf Jahrhunderte<br />
behaupten. Ich glaube aus den übereinstimmenden Zeugnissen fast gleichzeitiger Texte, sowie besonders<br />
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aus der Zuverlässigkeit der darin gemachten Angaben (die mit der tabula rasa und gänzlichen<br />
UnZuverlässigkeit dessen, was wir in griechischen und römischen Schriftstellern über das Land der<br />
Thinai und Seres, über die Stadt Cattigara und die terrae incognitae des Ostens entnehmen, in grellem<br />
Kontrast stehen) schliessen zu dürfen, dass es sich mit der Manuskript‐Ueberlieferung ähnlich verhalten<br />
hat. Den bedeutenderen Werken der chinesischen Litteratur, namentlich solchen, denen sich die <strong>of</strong>fizielle<br />
Aufmerksamkeit der Archiv‐Verwaltung zuwendete, wie dies bei den dynastischen Geschichtswerken<br />
der Fall war, ist es bei der Erhaltung ihres Textes ungleich besser ergangen als unseren besterhaltenen<br />
antiken Klassikern. Text‐Kritik existiert für diese Werke so gut wie gar nicht, ins<strong>of</strong>ern es nie nötig<br />
gewesen ist, sie zu üben. Die Gründe dafür liegen auf der Hand. Die gelehrten Archivbeamten, denen zu<br />
allen Zeiten die Staatsbibliotheken mit den in hohen Ehren gehaltenen Manuskript‐Annalen früherer<br />
Regentenhäuser anvertraut waren, Hessen sich mit den Mönchen unseres Mittel‐ alters, die durch ihre <strong>of</strong>t<br />
hirnlosen Schreibfehler in griechischen und lateinischen Texten die Philologie zu einer so nützlichen<br />
Wissenschaft gemacht haben, in Bezug auf Nachlässigkeit nicht vergleichen. Auf der anderen Seite hatten<br />
sie auch nicht mit gleichen Schwierigkeiten zu kämpfen; denn während das Studium klassischer Sprachen<br />
Jahrhunderte lang darniedergelegen hatte, als ihre Schätze von neuem an´s Licht gezogen wurden,<br />
arbeitete der chinesische Gelehrte zu allen Zeiten in einer ihm von Jugend auf vertrauten, seiner<br />
Muttersprache. Die Manuskripte, die er zu kopieren hatte, bestanden nicht in verstümmelten<br />
Pergamenten, und der Begriff des Palimpsestes ist hier schwerlich je bekannt gewesen; die Gestalt der<br />
Schrift, die sich bei uns für die klassischen Texte beider Sprachen immerhin genügend verändert hat, um<br />
dem Ungeübten Schwierigkeiten zu bereiten, ist in China während der letzten fünfzehnhundert Jahre<br />
dieselbe geblieben. Als der Text der Annalen der späteren Han‐Dynastie redigiert wurde, war bereits<br />
mehr als ein Jahrhundert seit dem Tode des berühmten Schönschreibers Wang Yu‐chün (st. 379 n. Chr.)<br />
verflössen, dessen Handschrift noch heute als Muster der Eleganz nachgeahmt wird.<br />
Als Urquelle dieser, sowie der übrigen dynastischen Geschichtswerke müssen wir, wie gesagt, die<br />
gleichzeitigen »täglichen Aufzeichnungen« (Jih‐li), die ἔργα καἰ ἡμἑραι der chinesischen Höfe,<br />
betrachten. Diese gehörten nach Ma Tuan‐lin (Ch. 51, S. 15) zu den Obliegenheiten der<br />
H<strong>of</strong>geschichtsschreiber (Shih‐kuan), die eine ähnliche, wenn auch bequemere Rolle spielten als die<br />
öffentlichen Zensoren (Tu‐ch´a‐yüan) der gegenwärtigen Dynastie, ins<strong>of</strong>ern ihnen das Recht zustand, die<br />
Handlungen ihrer Regierung einer nach ihrer Ansicht gerechten Kritik zu unterziehen, ohne dass der<br />
Monarch und seine Räte den Inhalt der Aufzeichnungen kannten. Ob dieser im Prinzip von allen<br />
Dynastien anerkannte Brauch häufig oder selten verletzt wurde, hat auf die Zuverlässigkeit unserer<br />
ethnographischen Texte kaum irgend welchen Einfluss, da weder der Monarch, noch die Räte, noch die<br />
Chronisten an der Fälschung von Thatsachen bei der Beschreibung so fern gelegener Länder ein<br />
persönliches Interesse hatten. Die Art und Weise, wie jene ethnographischen Aufzeichnungen durch<br />
Vermittlung der Tageschroniken zu Stande kamen, lässt sich aus dem, was über die Arbeit der<br />
H<strong>of</strong>geschichtsschreiber bekannt ist, sowie aus der Natur der vorgefundenen Mitteilungen wenn nicht<br />
beweisen, so doch vermuten. Die in den Hsi‐yü‐chuan oder ethnographischen Kapiteln sich vorfindenden<br />
Mitteilungen entstammen entweder den Protokollen über die Vernehmung fremder Gesandten und<br />
sonstiger Reisenden, die, wie es scheint, nach bestimmten Formeln über ihr Heimatsland ausgefragt<br />
wurden; oder den Akten chinesischer Gesandtschaften nach dem Auslande, die wiederum bald das<br />
Selbstgesehene, bald das durch Hörensagen in Erfahrung Gebrachte niederschrieben; oder endlich den<br />
bereits vorliegenden chinesischen Litteraturprodukten.<br />
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Bei der Vernehmung der fremden Gesandten wurde es vermutlich mit den Beglaubigungsschreiben<br />
fremder Monarchen nicht allzu genau genommen. Was hätte auch ein noch so gelehrter Würdenträger<br />
des H<strong>of</strong>es der Han mit einer Papyrusrolle voll griechischer, lateinischer oder syrischer Schriftzeichen<br />
anfangen sollen? Das wichtigste Dokument, das von den Gesandtschaften eingereicht wurde, war ohne<br />
Zweifel die Liste der Tributartikel, die vermutlich nicht in der fremden Sprache verfasst war. Die<br />
chinesischen Höfe aller Zeiten waren augenscheinlich etwas zu sehr dazu geneigt, die als Tribut (kung)<br />
dargebrachten Geschenke als den hauptsächlichsten Biestandteil einer Gesandtschaft anzusehen, so dass<br />
irgend ein fremder Abenteurer sich als Gesandter seines Monarchen einführen und die damit ohne<br />
Zweifel verbundenen Reise‐, Handels‐ und sonstigen Vorteile gemessen konnte, wenn er nur durch die<br />
nötigen Tributgeschenke die Gunst des H<strong>of</strong>es für sich zu gewinnen vermochte ; und dies konnte bei der<br />
volkstümlichen Eitelkeit der Regierungen der früheren Dynastien, die ihr Ansehen im Auslande nicht<br />
nach wirklichem Einfluss, sondern nach der Häufigkeit, der mit Geschenken belasteten<br />
Huldigungskommissionen bemassen, für den bemittelten Unterthan eines fernen Staates nicht allzu<br />
grosse Schwierigkeiten bieten.<br />
Die zahllosen Berichte, die uns über die Länder des mittleren und westlichen Asiens in den<br />
chinesischen Annalen des Altertums erhalten sind und die vermutlich zum Teil den Protokollen über die<br />
Vernehmung der betreffenden Tributbringer entstammen, zeugen trotz der Verschiedenheit des<br />
behandelten Materials von einer gewissen Uniformität in der Behandlung, ins<strong>of</strong>ern gewisse Gruppen von<br />
ethnographischen Thatsachen mit fast schematischer Regelmässigkeit behandelt sind. Wie bei den<br />
Aufzeichnungen Marco Poloʹs suchen wir vergeblich nach Mitteilungen über manche uns jetzt<br />
interessierende Gegenstände, wogegen uns das Berühren stereotyper Thatsachen, die unserem Interesse<br />
mehr oder weniger fern liegen, als monoton und überflüssig erscheint. Es will scheinen, als ob diese Art<br />
der Behandlung mit irgend einem Reglement zusammenhing, wonach die fremden Tributbringer bei<br />
ihrem Erscheinen am chinesischen H<strong>of</strong>e ein nach festgesetztem Schema vorgenommenes Kreuzverhör zu<br />
bestehen hatten, dass mit Hilfe der zu Gebote stehenden doppelten oder dreifachen Dolmetscher<br />
bestimmte Fragen an die aufzunehmenden »Gesandten« gerichtet wurden. Der vermeintliche Abgesandte<br />
des Kaisers An‐tun zum Beispiel hätte von Ceylon, wo das Griechische als Handelssprache gesprochen<br />
wurde, in Begleitung eines griechisch sprechenden Ceylonesen, sowie eines mit Ceylon verkehrenden<br />
und die in Ceylon gesprochene Landessprache ver‐ stehenden annamitischen Kaufmannes seine Reise<br />
nach Annant fortsetzen und von hier aus mit diesen beiden, sowie einem Chinesisch verstehenden<br />
annamitischen Dolmetscher nach Chang‐an (Si‐ngan‐fu), der damaligen Hauptstadt Chinaʹs, reisen<br />
können; wenn nicht die Fähigkeiten der drei Dolmetscher sich in einem einzigen Individuum vereinigt<br />
fanden, was bei der Natur des antiken ceylonesischen Handels keineswegs ausgeschlossen ist Die am<br />
chinesischen H<strong>of</strong>e vorgelegten stereotypen Fragen mochten etwa folgendermassen lauten: Wie heisst dein<br />
Vaterland? Wo liegt es? Wie viel Li umfasst es? Wie viel Städte enthält es? Wie viel abhängige Staaten?<br />
Aus welchem Material ist eure Hauptstadt erbaut? Wie viel Einwohner enthält sie? Wie heissen die<br />
Produkte des Landes, u. s. w.; und schliesslich: was kannst du uns sonst noch über deine Heimat<br />
mitteilen?<br />
Dies mag der Ursprung der ethnographischen Aufzeichnungett in den »täglichen Chroniken« sowie in<br />
den Annalen gewesen sein, ins<strong>of</strong>ern sie nicht den Akten der eigenen Gesandtschaften im Ausland (z. B.<br />
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Chang Chʹien im zweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr., Pan Chʹao am Ende des ersten Jahrhunderts n. Chr.) oder<br />
den Berichten eingeborener Reisender (Hsüan‐chuang im siebenten Jahrhundert u. A.) entstammen.<br />
Dass die Verfasser der dynastischen Geschichtswerke ihre Eintragungen nicht auf die Aufzeichnungen<br />
der H<strong>of</strong>chronisten beschränkten, geht aus der jetzigen Gestalt ihrer Texte deutlich genug hervor. Als<br />
Männer von hervorragendem litterarischen Ansehen, und von ihren Zeitgenossen als Meister des<br />
historischen Stils chinesischer Prosa geschätzt, mussten sie es als ihre erste Aufgabe betrachten, das<br />
vorgefundene Aktenmaterial in einen zusammenhängenden Bericht zu verarbeiten. Sie entledigten sich<br />
dieser Aufgabe in echt chinesischer Weise, indem sie vor allen Dingen nicht allein die Akten der<br />
beschriebenen Dynastie sondern auch die über den betreffenden Gegenstand bereits vorhandene ältere<br />
und gleichzeitige Litteratur verwerteten. Sehr kritisch sind sie dabei nicht zu Werke gegangen; es ist<br />
daher besonders bei späteren Historikern <strong>of</strong>t ebenso schwer, wie es wichtig ist, zu unterscheiden, was aus<br />
den Aufzeichnungen früherer Perioden herübergenommen und was sich auf die beschriebene Periode<br />
selbst bezieht. Zu den Ausnahmen dürfte es gehören, dass ein Autor in der Zeit noch über die Quellen<br />
der beschriebenen Periode hinausgeht, indem er Nachrichten, die erst seit dem Erlöschen der Dynastie bis<br />
zu seiner eigenen Blütezeit nach China gedrungen, mit seinen Berichten vermengt Trotz dieser<br />
Schwächen, die uns ja in vielen deshalb nicht minder wertvollen Aufzeichnungen des Altertums in<br />
anderen, ja selbst den klassischen Litteraturen entgegentreten, haben wir allen Grund, den Chinesen für<br />
ihre Berichte dankbar zu sein.<br />
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