gunduz-aktan-kitap-soyledikleri-ve-yazdiklari

ANKARA 2012

TASARIM 

Ruhi ALAGÖZ 

Sağlık 1 Sokak 12/1 Kızılay/ANKARA 

Tel: +90 312 431 47 22 - +90 532 391 03 29 

E-mail: alagozr@gmail.com 

BASKI 

Özyurt Matbaacılık 

Büyük San. 1. Cad. Süzgün Sok. No: 7 İskitler/ANKARA 

Tel: +90 312 384 15 36 • Faks: +90 312 384 15 37

Contents 

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 

About Gündüz Aktan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 

Photo Album . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 

HUMAN RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49-104 

Speech delivered by Ambassador Gündüz Aktan at the 

Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of 

Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 43th Session, 

Agenda Item 6, 14 August 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 

Summary record of the speech delivered by Ambassador Gündüz Aktan at the 

Commission on Human Rights, 49th Session, 15th Meeting, 

Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia 

(E/CN.4/1993/SR.15) 10 February 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61 


Commission on Human Rights, Second Special Session, 

1st Meeting, (E/CN.4/1992/S-2/SR.1) 30 November 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 




13th Meeting, 11 August 1993, Geneva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 




24th Meeting, 19 August 1993, Geneva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 


Commission on Human Rights, 51st Session, 32nd Meeting, 

Question of the human rights of all persons subjected to any form of 

detention or imprisonment, in particular torture and other cruel, 

inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment 

E/CN.4/1995/SR.32 24 February 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77 


Commission on Human Rights, 51st Session, Geneva 6 March 1995, 

Statement made under Agenda Item 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 

Gündüz Aktan 

3


Sub-Commmission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 

Minorities, 43th Session, Agenda Item 18, 15 August 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85 


Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations 

High Commissioner For Refugees, 45th Session, 491st Meeting, 

4 October 1994, Geneva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93 

Statement made by Ambassador Gündüz Aktan at the 

“International Conference on the Protection of Victims of War”, 

1 September 1993 (After the statements by Boutros Gali and Flavio Cotti) . . . . . . . .95 


Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees, Forty-fourth session, 485th Meeting, 

6 October 1993, Geneva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 




12th Meeting, 12 August 1992, Geneva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 

RACISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105-140 




6th Meeting, 5 August 1993, Geneva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111 



Violation of human rights in southern Africa: report of the 

ad-hoc Group of Experts (E/CN.4/1993/SR.17) 11 February 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115 


Psychological Mechanisms of Anti-Semitism and Racism During 

Conference given at the Maison Juive of Geneva 17 January 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 


Commission on Human Rights, 51st Session, 11th Meeting 

Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Third Decade to 

Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination 

E/CN.4/1994/SR.11 9 February 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133 

4 

Gündüz Aktan



Implementation of the Programme of Action for the Second Decade 

to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, 8 February 1994 

E/CN. 4/1994/SR.12 of 11 February 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135 


Commission on Human Rights, 8 February 1994, 

Statement made under Item 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137 

TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141-171 



Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th Session, 11th Meeting, 

15 August 1994, Geneva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145 


Commission on Human Rights, 50th Session, 

Statement made under Item 10, 16 February 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 


Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention Against Torture and 

Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Committee 

Against Torture, 5th Meeting, Geneva, 24 November 1993, Geneva . . . . . . . . . . . .153 




19th Meeting, 15 August 1994, Geneva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159 


Commission on Human Rights, 51st Session, “Human Rights 

Violations around the World” (Agenda Item 12), Reply of 1 March 1995 

to the statement made on behalf of the European Union by 

France on 28 February 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 



The right of peoples to self-determination and its application to 

peoples under colonial or alien domination or foreign occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 



Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 46th Session, 19th Meeting, 

3 February 1994, Geneva, Statement on Agenda Item 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167 


5

THE ARMENIAN ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .173-280 

The Legal Approach to the Armenian Issue and the Armenian 

Allegations in the Light of International Law (Speech made by 

Ambassador Gündüz Aktan during the seminar entitled 

“Turkey and the South Caucasus”, held at the 

Turkish Embassy in London, October 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .175 

Article by Ambassador Gündüz Aktan About 

The Armenian Problem and International Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .229 


Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Relations, 

House of Representatives, 14 September 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .277 

Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .281 

Gündüz Aktan, Diplomacy and Psychoanalysis 

Prof. Vamık VOLKAN 

6 

Gündüz Aktan

İçindekiler 

Önsöz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 

Gündüz Aktan Hakkında . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 

Fotoğraf Albümü . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 

İNSAN HAKLARI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49-104 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından İnsan Hakları Komisyonu, Ayrımcılığın 

Önlenmesi ve Azınlıkların Korunması Alt Komisyonuʼnda yapılan konuşma, 

43. Oturum, 6 Noʼlu Gündem Maddesi, 14 Ağustos 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından İnsan Hakları Komisyonuʼnda yapılan 

konuşmanın özet kaydı, 49. Oturum, 15. Toplantı, eski Yugoslavya 

topraklarındaki insan hakları durumu (E/CN.4/1993/SR.15) 10 Şubat 1993 . . . . . . .61 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından İnsan Hakları Komisyonuʼnda 

yapılan konuşmanın özet kaydı, İkinci Özel Oturum, 1. Toplantı, 

(E/CN.4/1992/S-2/SR.1) 30 Kasım 1992 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından İnsan Hakları Komisyonu, 

Ayrımcılığın Önlenmesi ve Azınlıkların Korunması Alt Komisyonuʼnda 

yapılan konuşmanın özet kaydı, 45. Oturum, 13. Toplantı, 

11 Ağustos 1993, Cenevre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 


Önlenmesi ve Azınlıkların Korunması Alt Komisyonuʼnda yapılan konuşmanın 

özet kaydı, 45. Oturum, 24. toplantı, 19 Ağustos 1993, Cenevre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından İnsan Hakları Komisyonuʼnda 

yapılan konuşmanın özet kaydı, 51. Oturum, 32. Toplantı, Başta işkence ve 

diğer zalimane insanlık dışı ve aşağılayıcı muamele veya cezalar olmak 

üzere, herhangi bir alıkoyma ve hapis biçimine maruz bırakılan tüm 

insanların insan hakları meselesi E/CN.4/1995/SR.32, 24 Şubat 1995 . . . . . . . . . . .77 


konuşma, 51. Oturum, Cenevre 6 Mart 1995, 12 Noʼlu Gündem Maddesi 

kapsamında sunulan beyan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından Ayrımcılığın Önlenmesi ve Azınlıkların 

Korunması Alt Komisyonuʼnda yapılan konuşma, 43. Oturum, 18 Noʼlu 

Gündem Maddesi, 15 Ağustos 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85 


7

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek 

Komiserliği Programı Yürütme Komitesiʼnde yapılan konuşmanın özet kaydı, 

45. Oturum, 491. Toplantı, 4 Ekim 1994, Cenevre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından “Savaş Mağdurlarının Korunması Konulu 

Uluslararası Konferans”ta sunulan beyan, 1 Eylül 1993 (Butros Gali ve 

Flavio Cottiʼnin beyanlarının ardından) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek 

Komiserliği Programı Yürütme Komitesiʼnde yapılan konuşmanın özet kaydı, 

44. Oturum, 485. Toplantı, 6 Ekim 1993, Cenevre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 



özet kaydı, 44. Oturum, 12. Toplantı, 12 Ağustos 1992, Cenevre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 

IRKÇILIK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105-140 



özet kaydı, 45. Oturum, 6. Toplantı, 5 Ağustos 1993, Cenevre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111 


konuşmanın özet kaydı, 49. Oturum, 15. Toplantı, Güney Afrikaʼdaki insan 

hakları ihlalleri: Ad-Hoc (Geçici) Uzmanlar Grubu Raporu 

(E/CN.4/1993/SR.17) 11 Şubat 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından Cenevreʼdeki Maison Juiveʼde 

düzenlenen Konferans sırasında Yahudi Düşmanlığı ve Irkçılığın Psikolojik 

Mekanizmaları konusunda yapılan konuşma, 17 Ocak 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 


konuşmanın özet kaydı, 51. Oturum, 11. Toplantı, Irkçılık ve Irk Ayrımcılığı ile 

Mücadelede Üçüncü On Yıllık Eylem Programının Uygulanması, 

E/CN.4/1994/SR.11 9 Şubat 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133 


konuşmanın özet kaydı, 50. Oturum, 12. Toplantı, Irkçılık ve Irk Ayrımcılığı ile 

Mücadelede İkinci On Yıllık Eylem Programının Uygulanması, 8 Şubat 1994 

E/CN.4/1994/SR.12 11 Şubat 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .135 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından İnsan Hakları Komisyonuʼnda yapılan konuşma, 

8 Şubat 1994, 14 Noʼlu Gündem Maddesi kapsamında sunulan beyan . . . . . . . . . . . . .137 

8 

Gündüz Aktan

TERÖRİZM VE İNSAN HAKLARI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141-171 



özet kaydı, 46. Oturum, 11. Toplantı, 15 Ağustos 1994, Cenevre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145 


konuşma, 50. Oturum, 10 Noʼlu Gündem Maddesi kapsamında sunulan 

beyan, 16 Şubat 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından İşkence ve Diğer Zalimane, 

İnsanlık Dışı veya Aşağılayıcı Muamele veya Ceza Karşıtı Sözleşmeʼye 

Taraf Devletler Toplantısında yapılan konuşmanın özet kaydı, 

İşkence Karşıtı Komite, 5. Toplantı, Cenevre, 24 Kasım 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153 



yapılan konuşmanın özet kaydı, 46. Oturum, 19. Toplantı, 

15 Ağustos 1994, Cenevre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .159 


konuşma, 51. Oturum, “Dünyadaki İnsan Hakları İhlalleri” (12 Noʼlu Gündem 

Maddesi), Fransa tarafından Avrupa Birliği adına sunulan 28 Şubat 1995 

tarihli beyana yönelik 1 Mart 1995 tarihli yanıt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 


konuşmanın özet kaydı, 50. Oturum, 6. Toplantı. Halkların kendi kaderini 

tayin hakkı ve bu hakkın sömürge veya yabancı egemenliği veya yabancı 

işgali altındaki halklar açısından uygulanması . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163 



yapılan konuşmanın özet kaydı, 46. Oturum, 19. Toplantı, 3 Şubat 1994, 

Cenevre, 9 Noʼlu Gündem Maddesi kapsamında sunulan beyan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167 

ERMENİ SORUNU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .173-280 

Uluslararası Hukuk ışığında Ermeni Meselesine ve Ermeni İddialarına 

Hukuki Yaklaşım (Ekim 2001ʼde Londraʼdaki Türkiye Büyükelçiliğiʼnde 

düzenlenen “Türkiye ve Güney Kafkasya” başlıklı seminer sırasında 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından yapılan konuşma) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktanʼın Devletler Hukukuna Göre 

Ermeni Meselesi Makalesi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .183 


9

WHAT HE SAID AND WHAT HE WROTE 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan tarafından Temsilciler Meclisi, Uluslararası İlişkiler 

Alt Komitesi huzurundaki oturumda yapılan konuşma, 14 Eylül 2000 . . . . . . . . . . .277 

Son Söz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .281 

Gündüz Aktan, Diplomasi ve Psikanaliz 


10 

Gündüz Aktan

Preface 

L 

ate Gündüz Aktan was a highly esteemed ambassador and 

intellectual who served at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 

more than thirty years. He contributed to Turkish diplomacy 

significantly. What made him exceptional was his ability to combine 

his rich cultural background with his skillful command of diplomacy. 

Ambassador Aktan set an eminent example for his younger colleagues 

with his meticulous professional ethics, intellectual depth, common sense, 

humility and knowledge. The diplomatic tradition of Turkey has benefited 

extensively from his dynamic and inquisitive style. 

Following his retirement, Ambassador Aktan continued to serve his 

country and the Ministry by employing his valuable knowledge and vast 

experience at home and abroad in such diverse areas as civil society, 

politics and journalism. His work reflects a multidisciplinary approach based 

on his vociferous readings in history and literature, and extensive studies in 

international law, political science and psychology. 

His knowledge, his refined approach to global issues and his illustrious 

oratory skill earned the lasting appreciation of, not only those of us who had 

the good fortune to work with him, but also his foreign colleagues. It makes 

us very proud to hear foreign diplomats mention his name with great 

enthusiasm whenever they talk about Turkish diplomacy. 

Ambassador Aktan always prioritized the human factor and common 

sense, i.e. the essence of diplomacy, and aimed for peaceful resolution of 

conflicts. He was therefore the voice of reconciliation against conflict and 

wisdom against turmoil. His virtues and devotion to his country, underlined 

by his humanitarian values, enabled him to successfully secure Turkey’s 

interests in every domain. His contributions in Turkish foreign policy 

consistently brought resonance and set standards at international level. 

Ambassador Aktan always dealt with problems using a multi-dimensional 

and multi-layered approach. He was never content with a mediocre answer. 

He would often personally study the background of any problem at hand, 

developing not only specific answers, but also formulating new questions 

and methods. 

I can confidently say that Gündüz Aktan was a revolutionary in terms of 


11

our profession. He always pushed the limits of the conventional in search of 

the better and the more accurate. 

The life of Ambassador Aktan was an honorable and determined 

endeavor of a man of duty and intellect. It was, therefore, our obligation to 

convey his ideas, findings and evaluations to future generations. 

This book is a modest collection of texts by Gündüz Aktan, prepared 

during different stages of his career, reflecting the extraordinary talent of a 

Turkish diplomat. I believe that this small compilation from his vast 

contributions reflects the richness of his philosophy and areas of activity, 

and will enable future generations to benefit from his thoughts and 

example. 

May he rest in peace. 

Ambassador Feridun Hadi Sinirlioğlu 

Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 

12 

Gündüz Aktan

Önsöz 

O 

tuz yılı aşkın bir süre Bakanlığımıza hizmet eden Rahmetli Büyükelçi 

Gündüz Aktan, Türk diplomasisine önemli katkılarda bulunmuş çok 

değerli bir Büyükelçi ve aydındır. Onu istisnai kılan, kültürel donanımı ile 

diplomasi araçlarına hâkimiyetini en uygun terkip içinde 

birleştirebilmesiydi. 

Büyükelçi Aktan, profesyonel diplomasi etiği, fikir zenginliği, sağduyusu, 

alçakgönüllülüğü ve bilgi donanımıyla genç meslektaşları için kıymetli bir 

örnek teşkil etmektedir. Diplomasi geleneğimiz Gündüz Aktan’ın dinamik ve 

sorgulayan tavrından geniş ölçüde istifade etmiştir. 

Meslekten ayrıldıktan sonra da kıymetli birikimini ve engin deneyimini sivil 

toplum, siyaset ve gazetecilik gibi farklı alanlarda gerek yurtiçinde, gerek 

yurtdışında kullanarak Bakanlığımıza ve Ülkemize verdiği hizmetleri 

sürdürmüştür. Çalışmaları, geniş bir tarih ve edebiyat okumasına, uluslararası 

hukuktan ve siyaset biliminden psikoloji ve hafıza incelemelerine kadar 

uzanan çok-disiplinli bir yaklaşıma dayanmaktadır. 

Sadece kendisiyle çalışma şansı yakalayan bizlerin değil, bilgisi, evrensel 

konulara yaklaşımı ve hitabet sanatının tüm inceliklerini yansıttığı üslubuyla 

muhatabı olduğu yabancı meslektaşlarının da takdirini toplamıştır. Kendisiyle 

aynı görev yerlerinde çalışan yabancı diplomatların Türk diplomasisinden söz 

ederken ağız birliği etmişçesine, büyük bir heyecanla onun ismini dile 

getirmeleri hepimiz için gurur verici olmaktadır. 

Diplomasinin özünü teşkil eden insan unsurunu ve aklı ön planda tutarak 

sorunların barışçıl çözümünü şiar edinen Büyükelçi Aktan, çatışmaya karşı 

uzlaşının, hoyratlığa karşı muhakemenin sesi olmuştur. Bu meziyetleri ve 

insani değerlerle beslenen yurtseverliği sayesinde Türkiye’nin her zemindeki 

çıkarlarını en iyi şekilde korumayı bilmiştir. Bunu yaparken de, dış politikamızın 

gündemindeki konulara uluslararası düzeyde yankı ve emsal yaratan 

katkılarda bulunmuştur. 

Büyükelçi Aktan; sorunları hep çok boyutlu açıdan ve tüm katmanlarını göz 

önünde bulundurarak ele almıştır. Ortalama cevaplarla yetinmediği için 

sorunların geçmişini ve ötesini üstün çalışma yeteneğiyle şahsen araştırmış, 

onlara gerekli yanıtları bulmuş, bu anlayış içinde yeni sorular ve yöntemler 

şekillendirmiştir. 


13

Gündüz Aktan’ın, mesleğimizin bir devrimcisi olduğunu rahatlıkla 

söyleyebilirim. Çünkü O; alışılagelmiş olanın sınırlarını, daha iyiyi, daha 

doğruyu bulma adına hep zorlamıştır. 

Büyükelçi Aktan’ın hayatı, bir görev ve düşünce insanının şerefli ve kararlı 

mücadelesidir. Bu sebeple fikir, tespit ve değerlendirmelerinin yeni kuşaklara 

aktarılması mutlaka yerine getirilmesi gereken bir vecibeydi. 

Bu kitap, ülkemizin yetiştirdiği olağanüstü yetenekte bir diplomat olan 

Gündüz Aktan’ın mesleğini icra ederken bizzat kaleme aldığı bazı metinleri bir 

araya getiren mütevazı bir derlemedir. O’nun büyük katkılarının küçük bir 

manzumesi olan bu kitabın Gündüz Aktan’ın düşünce ve faaliyet alanlarının 

zenginliğini yansıtabildiğini ve gelecek kuşakların hem Büyükelçi Aktan’ı örnek 

almaları hem de onun fikirlerinden istifade etmeleri bakımından yararlı bir 

çalışma olduğunu düşünüyorum. 

Ruhu şad olsun. 

Büyükelçi Feridun Hadi Sinirlioğlu 

Dışişleri Bakanlığı Müsteşarı 

14 

Gündüz Aktan

About Gündüz Aktan 

Contributors: 

Wife, Ülkü AKTAN 

Daughter, Nazan AKTAN 

Son, Uygar AKTAN 

Retired Ambassador, Özdem SANBERK 

Retired Ambassador, Yaman BAŞKUT 

Retired Ambassador, Yüksel SÖYLEMEZ 

G 

ündüz Suphi Aktan was born in Safranbolu on August 7, 1941, during 

his father Bekir Suphi Aktan’s appointment as the township governor. 

He was schooled in various places due to his father’s appointments. 

In 1950, Bekir Suphi Aktan, then governor of Tokat, entered the 

elections as a nominee from the Republican People’s Party (CHP). The 

elections were won by the opposing Democratic Party (DP) and he was called 

back to the Interior Ministry in Ankara. Thus, the family moved first to Istanbul, 

then to Ankara. Gündüz Aktan completed his secondary education at the 

Istanbul Erkek Lisesi and the Ankara Atatürk Lisesi. He received his bachelor’s 

degree from the Ankara University Faculty of Political Science in 1962, and 

attended the Brighton Language School from 1962 to 1964 to learn English. 

He began his career at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1964, and was 

appointed administrator to the township of Akyazı, Adapazarı. He completed 

his military service between 1965 and 1967. In 1967, he was transferred to 

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

His appointments abroad prior to becoming Ambassador: 

l Permanent Representation of Turkey at OECD in Paris, 1970-73 

l Embassy of Turkey in Nairobi, 1973-75 

l Permanent Representation of Turkey at UN in New York, 1977-80 

l International Officer at UN in New York, 1980-81 

l Embassy of Turkey in Bern, 1983-85 

l Advisor to Prime Minister Turgut Özal and Director-General of the Office 

of Economic Affairs for EEC (EU) Affairs, 1985-88. Turkey applied for full 

membership during this period. 


15

Appointments as Ambassador: 

l Ambassador of Turkey in Athens, 1988-91 

l Permanent Representative of Turkey at the UN Office in Geneva, 1991- 

95. (Appointed as Chairman of the UNCTAD Trade and Development Council in 

1992). 

l Deputy Undersecretary of Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, 1995-96 

l Ambassador of Turkey in Tokyo, 1996-98 

Gündüz Aktan resigned from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1998 and 

became the chairman of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation 

(TESEV). He carried out this duty until 2000, during which time he 

implemented the “State Reform” project in collaboration with the European 

Union, and initiated a project to investigate corruption. 

T 

*** 

hose who assumed that a person who changes professional 

appointments so frequently will not have many admirers were clearly 

proven wrong. The top executives of the state were all present at his 

funeral. The ceremonies were attended by the President of the 

Republic, the Spokesperson of Parliament, the Prime Minister, ministers and 

deputies, secretary-generals of political parties, the 9th President of the 

Republic Süleyman Demirel and various former Foreign Ministers. The funeral 

was transformed into a platform of unity and solidarity much desired in Turkey. 

The reason behind this was, without a doubt, Gündüz Aktan’s personality. 

(SANBERK): “It is a great responsibility to say something about this 

personality; greater to write. Regardless of what is said about his superior 

qualities, something is always missing. His friends who will never forget the 

pain of losing him know how this feels. He took his steps according to the 

causes he believed in. His creativity was inspired by his convictions. 

Compromise was one word he did not know. He believed that his duty in his 

job was not to be admired, but to serve. His wealth of information, augmented 

by his humility, loyalty and fidelity, altruism, courage and firm belief in 

scientific integrity created a wave of admiration, from friend and foe alike, 

towards not only himself but also the country he represented on the 

international platform.” 

(BAŞKUT): “In a place like Turkey, where dwarfs keep jumping to make 

themselves seen, it was natural for Gündüz Aktan to be criticized. How could 

the leftist and social democrat of yesteryear become today’s liberal and 

influence Özal’s policies Was his transfer to the Nationalist Movement Party 

(MHP) the repetition of the same mistake Gündüz Aktan would simply laugh 

at these. According to him, labeling persons and institutions with permanent 

markers was a severe handicap of our time. Adaptation to national and 

16 

Gündüz Aktan

international changes would be the defining factor. Consequently, his foreign 

policy ranged from the Third World to the cautious and realistic relations with 

the West, and the development miracles in the Far East, particularly Japan. 

Above all, he believed that one must know the events that would lead to 

change by heart. Because of this, he spent a lot of time mastering, say, 

Turkish-Armenian relationships, but in the end, Turkey was awarded with a 

great advocate of the matter on an international level. 

Knowledge by itself is not enough. It must be supported by rhetoric. 

Gündüz Aktan was an excellent orator, which made him shine particularly in 

open panel discussions.” 

In his private life, Gündüz Aktan had a rich grasp of culture. (NAZAN 

AKTAN): “He was interested in all branches of art. He was especially fond of 

carpet weaving. He would find out the stories that the carpets told and 

merge these with ethnic characteristics, the history, economic and 

sociological conditions, the influence of religion, the type of dye and the 

method of weaving, and feel the warmth in the hearts and light in the eyes 

of the simple people who had woven the carpet. He admired traditional 

Turkish arts like calligraphy, gilding, murals, miniatures, carving, inlaying 

and seal making. He was fascinated by Ottoman mosques and the 

waterfront mansions along the Bosphorus. He loved classical music and had 

a large collection of opera.” 

For a man of such character, family solidarity and friendships were of great 

importance. (SANBERK): “I knew Gündüz Aktan as an outstanding diplomat 

and patriot, a great intellectual, a wonderful friend, but above all, as an 

excellent husband and father. I am a friend of his that knows his services to 

this country very closely. However, his greatest edifice is his two children they 

brought up together with his loving wife Ülkü. Nazan and Uygar will continue to 

uphold the wisdom and pride of their father in their own lives. I am sure that 

Gündüz Aktan was sure of this fact when he left us.” (UYGAR AKTAN): “My 

relationship with my father was much beyond the traditional fatherson 

relationship. He was my best friend, greatest teacher and most influential 

guide. In short, he was my idol. From a very early age, he helped me gain new 

perspectives in political science, mythology, psychoanalysis, history and 

philosophy – a blessing that few could attain. Whatever I know today, he has 

taught me. What is more, everything I will learn from now on, I will also owe to 

him because he showed me how to approach an issue and think about it. He 

was the most compassionate person I knew in this matter. He would share his 

knowledge with anyone eager to listen, showing great compassion and 

patience. In an age when all values are turning into slogans and clichés, he 

was one of the most honest, proud and principled representatives of a past 

generation.” 

(SÖYLEMEZ): “Gündüz Aktan died too early. He had an extraordinary 

personality and a great intellect. He ascended to the top of diplomacy. His 

extraordinary qualities could not have been hereditary alone. He knew how to 


17

create himself as a diplomat, thinker and writer that was the pride of Atatürk’s 

Turkey. He was sought for his wisdom at the top levels of state, and he was 

rightfully admired. 

“Gündüz was a shining beacon. He never tired of lighting the way and 

discussing the issue. His column in the Radikal was always a step ahead of its 

time and was read popularly. His analytical skills and sharp mind led him to 

write columns that were the envy of the more established columnists. 

“Following Athens, Bern, OSCE, Geneva and the UN, he resigned while he 

was the Ambassador of Turkey in Tokyo with the wish to become a columnist 

– it was too early and we were astonished; this was without precedent and we 

struggled to understand him. But his new career almost surpassed the old one 

and introduced Gündüz to the masses. In a few short years, Gündüz became 

a respected thinker and writer that was always sought after for his intelligent 

and courageous opinion and excellent oration on TV. (…) 

“The masses applauded Gündüz while some were critical of his staunch 

position. I am not sure if we could fully grasp his value. However, the wave of 

love and admiration he left in his wake is as impressive as his personality. He 

was a man of the people. (…) 

“Gündüz was always constructive in criticism and was strong and 

optimistic, even during his illness. He said to me, ‘I’m fine; once I make it to 

February, this will be all over.’ He was an intellectual dynamo that lit the way 

for Turkey. The country lost a very rare man of thought, a true statesman. 

Aktan always wrote and said what he knew to be true. His perspective was 

extremely wide and just as realistic. He was also an advocate of the ideal. 

“Turkey is in dire need of people like Gündüz Aktan. Gündüz Aktan was a 

legend in foreign affairs, and his name will live on. We see him off to a brighter 

land with pride and honor.” 

A 

*** 

ktan was a columnist in the Radikal daily from 1998 to 2007. During 

the same period, he was a Foreign Affairs Advisor to the Union of 

Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) and served as 

a member of the Board of Trustees of the TOBB University of 

Economics and Technology. He was the chairman of the Eurasian Strategic 

Research Center (ASAM) between 2004 and 2006. 

He was the main contributor to the book La Turquie en Europe (Paris 1988) 

published in the name of Prime Minister Turgut Özal. His research on 

neoracism was published as a European Council Document in 1993. His two 

articles on the psychoanalytical aspects of the exile of Sephardic Jews from 

Spain and racism in Europe were published in the Mind and Human 

Interaction periodical. He was one of the co-authors of the Michigan University 

publication “Combating Terrorism”. His English-language study titled “The 

18 

Gündüz Aktan

Armenian Debate and International Law” was included in the book Armenians 

in the Late Ottoman Period. 

His first book in his name, Açık Kriptolar (Deciphered Cryptos) was 

published in 2006 (Aşina Publishing House). 

D 

*** 

espite his busy schedule, he sought to be active in politics and was 

elected Istanbul deputy of the Nationalist Movement Party in the 

2007 elections. However, shortly after a year in this career, he passed 

away on 19 November 2008. He had spent most of his time in office 

battling against the unrelenting disease. It is now our solemn duty to walk in 

his footsteps. Even this book is a concrete and useful step that may set an 

example to future generations. 

(ÜLKÜ AKTAN): Gündüz Aktan was one of the most outspoken defenders of 

the country that he passionately loved. He took up and was in and at the 

forefront of the struggle in issues such that plagued Turkey, such as terrorism, 

Cyprus and allegations of genocide. 

He spent all his time and energy in this way. He tired himself out but never 

noticed it. Wherever he went, the best places he knew were bookshops. He 

always came back with a suitcase full of books on matters not limited to areas 

of his professional interests. Reading, thinking and drawing conclusions were 

his favorite pastime. He shared his thought with us and everybody who 

listened. “The truth is actually simple and plain. You have to reach the initial 

truth for answers” he used to say. He analyzed everything in depth and his 

comments were accurate. 

I have followed my husband’s career, struggles and successes with belief 

and admiration. For me, it seemed like he had solved all the mysteries of life 

and human kind. It was a privilege for us to have lived with him. Being 

deprived of him created an emptiness and an irreplaceable loss. 

“Giving one’s life” might seem like an ordinary expression. Gündüz was the 

personification of it. Yes, he gave his life. No creature is eternal, even though 

some deserve to be…" 

(UYGAR AKTAN): “As the children and students of Gündüz Aktan, it is our 

duty to uphold his heritage.” 

(NAZAN AKTAN): “My dear father, you are a man to be applauded and 

honored. You are a role model to us all with your exemplary services, excellent 

morals and high values. We are proud of you and we thank you for everything 

you have done.” 


19

20 

Gündüz Aktan

Gündüz Aktan Hakkında 

Katkıda Bulunanlar: 

Eşi / Ülkü AKTAN 

Kızı / Nazan AKTAN 

Oğlu / Uygar AKTAN 

Büyükelçi (E) / Özdem SANBERK 

Büyükelçi (E) / Yaman BAŞKUT 

Büyükelçi (E) / Yüksel SÖYLEMEZ 

G 

ündüz Suphi Aktan, babası Bekir Suphi Aktan’ın kaymakam olduğu 

dönemde 7 Ağustos 1941 tarihinde Safranbolu’da doğdu. Eğitim 

gördüğü yerler, babasının görev yerlerine bağlı olarak değişti durdu. 

1950’de Tokat Valisi Bekir Suphi Bey’in CHP’den seçime girmesi ve 

DP’nin iktidara gelmesi üzerine Merkez Valiliğine atanması nedeniyle aile 

önce İstanbul’a, sonra Ankara’ya taşındı. Bu nedenle Gündüz Aktan’ın lise 

öğrenimi İstanbul Erkek Lisesi ile Ankara Atatürk Lisesi arasında paylaşıldı. 

Gündüz Aktan, Ankara-Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesinden 1962 yılında mezun oldu 

ve daha sonra lisan öğrenimi için İngiltere’de Brighton Dil Okulunda okudu 

(1962-1964). 1964’de İçişleri Bakanlığında çalışmaya başladı ve Adapazarı- 

Akyazı Kaymakamlığına atandı. 1965-67 arasında askerlik görevini yaptı. 

1967’de Dışişleri Bakanlığına girdi. 

Büyükelçi olmadan önceki yurtdışı görevleri: 

l 1970-73 döneminde Paris’te OECD bünyesindeki Türkiye Daimi 

Temsilciliği, 

l 1973-75 döneminde Nairobi’deki Türkiye Büyükelçiliği, 

l 1977-80 döneminde New York’ta Birleşmiş Milletler nezdindeki Türkiye 

Daimi Temsilciliği, 

l 1980-81 New York’ta Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Merkezi (Uluslararası 

Memur), 

l 1983-85 döneminde Bern’deki Türkiye Büyükelçiliği, 

l 1985-88 döneminde Başbakan Turgut Özal’ın danışmanlığı ile AT (AB) 

ilişkilerinden sorumlu Ekonomik İşler Genel Müdürlüğü. Türkiye’nin tam üyelik 

başvurusu bu dönemde gerçekleştirildi. 


21

Büyükelçi Statüsündeki görevleri: 

l 1988-91 Türkiye’nin Atina Büyükelçisi, 

l 1991-95 Cenevre’deki Birleşmiş Milletler Ofisinde Türkiye Daimi 

Temsilcisi (1992’de: UNCTAD Ticaret ve Kalkınma Kurulu Başkanlığına 

getirildi), 

l 1995-96 Dışişleri Siyasi İşler Müsteşar Yardımcısı, 

l 1996-98 Türkiye’nin Tokyo Büyükelçisi. 

Gündüz Aktan, 1998 yılında istifa ederek Dışişleri Bakanlığından ayrıldı ve 

Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (TESEV) Başkanı oldu. 1998-2000 

yılları arasında süren bu görevi sırasında AB ile işbirliği içinde ‘Devlet Reformu’ 

projesini uyguladı ve yolsuzluk araştırmaları projesini başlattı. 

*** 

rofesyonel yaşamında bu kadar çok yer değiştiren birini sevenlerin 

sayısı fazla olmaz diyenlerin yanıldıkları açıkça ortaya çıktı. Aynı 

P durumdaki Gündüz Aktan’ı son yolculuğuna Devletin neredeyse tüm 

zirvesi uğurladı. Düzenlenen törenlere Cumhurbaşkanı, TBMM 

Başkanı, Başbakan, çeşitli bakanlar ve milletvekilleri, siyasi partilerimizin 

başkanları, dokuzuncu Cumhurbaşkanı Süleyman Demirel ve bazı eski 

Dışişleri Bakanları katıldılar. Böylelikle cenaze töreni Türkiye’nin özlediği birlik 

ve beraberliğin gerçekleştiği bir plâtforma dönüştü. 

Bunun nedeni, hiç kuşkusuz, Gündüz Aktan’ın kişiliğiydi. (SANBERK): “Bu 

kişilik hakkında bir şeyler söylemek, hele bir şeyler yazmaya kalkışmak büyük 

sorumluluk. Bu dünyada üstün nitelikleri hakkında ne söylenirse söylensin 

sözlerin yetersiz kaldığını hissetmemek mümkün değil. Onu kaybetmenin 

acısını içlerinde hiç bir zaman dindiremeyecek olan dostları bu hissiyatın ne 

demek olduğunu bilirler. Adımlarını, doğru bellediği davalar yönlendirdi. 

İnandığı görüşlerin tutkusu yaratıcılığının kaynağı oldu. Taviz, onun lûgatinde 

yer almayan sözcüklerdendi. Mesleğinde kendi görevinin hoşa gitmek değil, 

hizmet etmek olduğunu düşündü. Ama engin bilgisi yanında alçak 

gönüllülüğü, vefa ve sadakat duygusu, fedakârlığı ve bilhassa bilimsel 

dürüstlük ilkesine inancı ve cesareti, dost olsun olmasın çok geniş bir 

uluslararası çevrede, yalnız kendine değil temsil ettiği ülkesine daima saygı ve 

hayranlık yarattı”. 

(BAŞKUT): “Türkiye’deki gibi cücelerin boy göstermek amacıyla zıplayıp 

durduğu bir ortamda, Gündüz Aktan’ın eleştirilmesi doğaldı. Nasıl oluyor da, 

dünün solcusu veya sosyal demokratı bugünün liberali oluyor ve Özal’ın 

politikalarını etkileyebiliyordu. Son dönemde aynı kişinin MHP kadrolarında 

yer alması, aynı yanlışın tekrarı değil miydi Gündüz Aktan bu sözlere gülüp 

geçiyordu. Ona göre, insanlara veya kurumlara belli bir mekân ve zamanda 

hiç değiştirilemeyecek etiketler yapıştırmak çağımızın ciddi bir zaafıdır. 

22 

Gündüz Aktan

Belirleyici olan ulusal veya uluslararası değişimler ve bunlara karşı 

gösterilecek uyumdur. Bu durumda, onun dış politika tablolarında, bir yanda 

Üçüncü Dünya, diğerinde ihtiyatli ama gerçekçi ilişkilerle Batı ülkeleri ve 

nihayet kalkınmada mucizeler yaratan Uzak Doğu ülkeleri, özellikle Japonya 

yer alıyordu. Her şeyden önce değişime yol açacak olayları çok iyi bilmek 

gerektiğine inanıyordu. Bu yüzden, örneğin Türk-Ermeni ilişkileri konusundaki 

uzmanlığı çok zamanını almıştı, ama sonunda Türkiye bu konuda uluslararası 

düzeyde çok önemli bir avukata sahip olmuştu. 

Bilgi birikimi tek başına yeterli değildir. Mutlaka ifade zenginliğiyle 

desteklenmelidir. Gündüz Aktan’ın sözlü ifade yeteneği gerçekten çok iyiydi. 

Özellikle tartışmaya açık panellerde bu becerisi ona puan kazandırıyordu”. 

Kültürel açıdan Gündüz Aktan’ın özel yaşantısı da son derece zengindi. 

(NAZAN AKTAN): “Sanatın her dalına meraklıydı. Örneğin halıcılığa büyük 

önem verirdi. Halıların üzerinde anlatılan hikâyeyi, etnik karakteristiklerini 

öğrenip, tarihçelerini, ekonomik ve sosyolojik zamanlamalarını, dinin etkisini, 

kök boyasını, dokuma tekniğini bilir ve bu halıları sevgiyle dokuyan 

insancıkların kalplerindeki mutluluğun, gözlerindeki ışığın, yüzlerindeki 

tebessümün varlığını hissederdi. Ayrıca, hat, tezhip, nakkaş, minyatür, 

oymacılık, kakmacılık, mühürcülük gibi geleneksel Türk sanatlarını takdir 

ederdi. Osmanlı camilerine ve Boğaziçi kıyılarındaki eski yalılara hayrandı. 

Klâsik müzik severdi ve geniş bir opera koleksiyonuna sahipti”. 

Böyle bir insan için aile içi dayanışma da, dostluk ilişkileri de çok 

önemliydi. (SANBERK): “Gündüz Aktan’ı çok büyük bir diplomat ve 

vatansever, büyük bir aydın, çok iyi bir dost, ama her şeyden önce çok iyi bir 

eş ve çok iyi bir baba olarak tanıdım. Bu ülkeye büyük hizmetlerini en 

yakından bilen arkadaşlarındanım. Ama en büyük eseri, sevgili eşi Ülkü ile 

birlikte yetiştirdikleri iki değerli evlâdıdır. Nazan ve Uygar babalarının 

bilgeliğini ve vakarını kendi hayatlarında yaşatmaya devam edecekler. 

Gündüz Aktan’ın aramızdan bu gerçeğin bilincinde ayrıldığından eminim”. 

(UYGAR AKTAN): “Babam ile olan ilişkim bilinen baba-oğul ilişkilerinin çok 

ötesindeydi. O benim aynı zamanda en iyi arkadaşım, en büyük hocam ve yol 

göstericimdi. Kısacası o benim idolümdü. Çok küçük yaşlarımdan itibaren 

beni karşısına alıp siyaset bilimi, mitoloji, psikanaliz, tarih ve felsefe 

konularında çok az insana nasip olacak ufuklar açtı. Bugün ne biliyorsam o 

bana öğretmiştir. Dahası bundan sonra öğreneceklerimi de ona borçlu 

olacağım, zira bana bir konuya nasıl yaklaşacağımı ve nasıl düşünmem 

gerektiğini gösterdi. Bu konuda tanıdığım en müşfik insandı. Daima büyük bir 

sabır ve şefkatle dinlemeye hazır olan herkesle birikimini paylaşırdı. Bütün 

değerlerin bir slogan ve klişeye dönüştüğü çağımızda artık soyu tükenmekte 

olan bir neslin en dürüst, en vakur ve ilkeli örneklerindendi”. 


23

(SÖY LE MEZ): “Gün düz Ak tan ya şa mı nı er ken yi tir di. Sı ra dı şı bir ki şi lik, üs - 

tün bir ze kâ sa hi biy di. Dip lo ma si mes le ği mi zin zir ve gö rev le rin de bu lun du. 

Ola ğa nüs tü ni te lik le ri yal nız ge ne tik ola maz dı. Ata türk Tür ki ye’si nin göz be be - 

ği gi bi dip lo mat, dü şü nür ve ya zar ola rak ken di si ni ya rat ma yı bil di. Dev le tin 

do ruk nok ta la rın da akıl ver di, hak lı tak dir top la dı. 

Gün düz, göz ka maş tı rı cı bir ışıl dak gi biy di. Di na miz miy le her da im ay dın - 

lat tı, tar tış tı. Gün düz, top lu mun ve olay la rın hep bir adım ile ri sin de, Ra di - 

kal’de ki kö şe sin de, dai ma il giy le okun du. Ana li tik ze ka ve be ce ri siy le yer leş - 

miş kö şe ya zar la rı nı im ren di re cek dü zey de, ni te lik li ya zı lar ka le me al dı. 

Ati na, Bern, OS CE, Ce nev re ve Bir leş miş Mil let ler’den son ra Tür ki ye’nin 

Tok yo Bü yü kel çi si iken, kö şe ya za rı ol mak is te ğiy le, vak tin den ön ce ve hay ret - 

ler ya ra ta rak, emek li li ği is te di ğin de, ver di ği bir ör ne ği ol ma yan ka ra rı nı an la - 

mak ta güç lük çek miş tik. An cak bu ikin ci ka ri yer, bi rin ci si ni ne re dey se göl ge - 

de bı rak tı, Gün düz’ü ge niş kit le le re mal et ti. Bir kaç yıl için de Gün düz, kö şe ya - 

zı la rın da ki ze kâ pı rıl tı sı, ile ri sür dü ğü ce sur gö rüş le ri nin ağır lı ğı, TV ka nal la rın - 

da ki söy le şi le ri nin çe ki ci li ği ile her gün ara nan, say gın bir dü şü nür, ya zar ola - 

rak ne re dey se adı nı bir mar ka ha li ne ge tir di. (…) 

Kit le ler, Gün düz’ü al kış la dı, dik du ru şu nu eleş ti ren ler de ola cak tı. Biz 

Gün düz’ün de ğe ri ni ne ka dar bil dik, bil mi yo rum An cak ar ka sın dan du yu lan 

sev gi se li ken di ki şi li ği ka dar gör kem li dir. Top lu ma mal ol muş tur. (…) 

Gün düz, eleş ti rel üs lu bun da yı kı cı de ğil ya pı cı, kö tüm ser de ğil, has ta ya ta - 

ğın da bi le, dip di ri ve iyim ser, “İyi yim, şu bat ayı nı bir bu la lım bu nu da at la ta ca - 

ğız” di yor du ba na... Tüm ener ji si ni ül ke si ne bir en te lek tü el di na mo ha lin de 

Tür ki ye si ne ada mış tı. Tür ki ye, ör ne ği çok zor bu lu nur bir dü şün adı mı nı, ger - 

çek bir dev let ada mı nı kay bet ti. Ak tan, hep doğ ru bil di ği ni yaz dı, söy le di. Uf - 

ku ala bil di ği ne ge niş, ola bil di ğin ce ger çek çiy di. Ay nı za man da ide al ola nın da 

sa vu nu cu su ol du. 

Tür ki ye’nin Gün düz Ak tan’la ra çok ve çok ih ti ya cı var. Gün düz Ak tan, Dı - 

şiş le ri ca mi amız da bir ef sa ne ol du ve öy le ya şa ya cak. Gün düz’ü şan ve şe ref - 

le ay dın lık la ra uğur lu yo ruz.” 

*** 

998-2007 tarihleri arasında Radikal Gazetesinde köşe yazarlığı 

görevini üstlendi. Aynı dönemde Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği’nin 

1 (TOBB) Başkanlık Dışişleri Danışmanlığı ve TOBB Ekonomi ve 

Teknoloji Üniversitesi (TOBB-ETÜ) Mütevelli Heyeti Üyeliği de yaptı. 

2004-2006 yılları arasında ASAM (Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi) 

Başkanlığına getirildi. 

24 

Gündüz Aktan

Başbakan Özal adına yayınlanan ‘Avrupa’da Türkiye’ (La Turquie en 

Europe, Paris 1988) kitabının yazımında en büyük pay Gündüz Aktan’a aittir. 

Yeni-ırkçılık konusundaki araştırması 1993 yılında Avrupa Konseyi Belgesi 

olarak yayınlandı. Ayrıca, ‘Safarad Yahudilerinin İspanya’dan çıkarılışı ve 

Avrupa’da Irkçılık’ konularının psikanalitik yönüyle ilgili iki kapsamlı makalesi 

‘Mind and Human Interaction’ adlı yayında yer aldı. ‘Terörizmle Mücadele’ 

başlığıyla Michigan Üniversitesi tarafından yayınlanan ortak çalışmanın 

yaratıcılarından biriydi. ‘Ermeni Sorunu ve Uluslararası Yasa’ başlıklı İngilizce 

çalışması ‘Son Osmanlı Döneminde Ermeniler’ adlı kitapta yer aldı. 

Kendi adıyla yayınladığı ilk kitap ‘Açık Kriptolar’ adıyla 2006 yılında 

yayınlandı (Aşina Kitaplar). 

*** 

u kadar yoğun çalışma programına rağmen siyasete atılmayı tercih 

etti ve 2007 genel seçimlerinde MHP İstanbul milletvekili seçildi. 

B Ancak siyasetçi olarak verdiği hizmet bir yılını ancak tamamlamışken 

19 Kasım 2008 tarihinde aramızdan ayrıldı. Zaten bu sürenin önemli 

bir bölümünde amansız hastalığıyla mücadele etti. Şimdi bizlere düşen görev, 

onun çizmeye çalıştığı yoldan yürüyüşe devam etmektir. Elimizdeki bu kitap 

dahi, genç nesillere örnek olabilecek bilgiler içeren somut ve yararlı bir 

adımdır. 

(ÜLKÜ AKTAN): “Gündüz Aktan, tutkuyla sevdiği ülkesinin en yaman 

savunucusu idi. 

Terör, Kıbrıs Sorunu, asılsız soykırım suçlamaları gibi Türkiye'nin başına 

bela olan meselelerine sahip çıkıp, amansız bir mücadelenin hep içinde ve 

önünde oldu. 

Bütün zamanını, enerjisini bu yolda harcadı. Yoruldu ama, yorulduğunun 

hiç farkına varmadı. Yaşadığı, gittiği her yerde bildiği en iyi adres kitapçılardı. 

Mesleki kitaplarla sınırlı olmayan her konuda yazılmış bir valiz kitapla dönerdi 

herzaman. Okumak, düşünmek, sonuç çıkarmak en keyif aldığı oyunuydu. 

Düşüncelerini bizimle ve dinleyen herkesle paylaşırdı. “Gerçek aslında basit ve 

yalın, cevapları bulmak için başlangıçtaki ilk gerçeğe ulaşmak gerek” derdi. 

Herşeyi derinlemesine analiz eder, yorumlarında yanılmazdı. 

Eşimin mesleki hayatını, savaşını, başarılarını hayranlık ve inançla izledim. 

İnsana ve hayata dair bütün sırları çözmüş gibi gelirdi bana.Onunla yaşamak 

bizim için büyük bir ayrıcalıktı, bir talihdi. Ondan mahrum kalmakda büyük bir 

kayıp ve boşluk oldu. 

“Hayatını vermek” sıradan bir söz gibi gelebilir, Gündüz bunun somut 

örneğidir. Evet, hayatını verdi. Hiçbir canlı ebedi değil, bazıları bunu hakketseler 

bile..” 


25

(UYGAR AKTAN): Gündüz Aktan ekolünde yetişmiş birileri olarak onun 

mirasına sahip çıkmayı kutsal bir görev biliyoruz”. 

(NAZAN AKTAN): “Benim güzel babam, sen ayakta alkışlanacak, yaptığın 

her hizmetin yanı sıra, güzel ahlâkın ve yüksek değerlerin ile her birimize bir 

örnek, bir modelsin, seninle övünüyoruz, kutluyoruz, teşekkür ediyoruz. Her 

şey için...”. 

. 

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Gündüz Aktan

Photo Album / Fotoğraf Albümü 


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SÖYLEDİKLERİ VE YAZDIKLARI 


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47

Human Rights 

İnsan Hakları


Human Rights 

Ambassador Gündüz Aktan gave a number of speeches before 

the United Nations Human Rights Commission and subcommissions 

during his appointment as the Permanent 

Representative of Turkey at the UN Office in Geneva from 1991 to 

1995. 

In his speeches at conferences on human rights, Gündüz Aktan 

explained and criticized the contradictory attitude of the 

international community towards the crises that erupted in the 

most critical period of the past century. He frequently argued that 

restricting the focus of human rights to the developing countries 

and the rights and freedoms in those countries constituted a 

double standard. He criticized the lack of any initiative on resolving 

the West-centered issue of racism, on which he worked extensively, 

and argued that a subjective approach to human rights violations, 

portraying them as only existing in developing countries was 

wrong. He emphasized that, in its current status, the international 

human rights watch mechanism was an apparatus of oppression 

instead of an active movement. 

Gündüz Aktan argued that the uncertainty caused by 

disregarding international law and practice in the implementation 

of the principle of self-determination was at the heart of human 

rights violations. He claimed that the state was reduced to an 

oppressor and a violator of human rights against groups that are 

involved in terrorist activities under the pretext of selfdetermination 

and are brought to the status of warring factions by 

the West under the “guerrilla” nomenclature. According to Aktan, 

the boundaries of self-determination as a human right were 

purposely taken beyond legal grounds and human rights law and 

humanitarian law were confused. Anti-state activities, terrorism 

and separatist movements were legitimized. Based on this, Aktan 

argued that the human rights reports issued by international 


51


institutions such as Amnesty International and the Human Rights 

Watch against the government of Turkey from 1991 to 1995 were 

not objective in the depiction of human rights violations, and 

intended to put pressure on the government of Turkey. 

As it will be understood from the speeches, at the heart of the 

contradictory attitude of international human rights watch 

systems towards Turkey and other non-Western, developing 

countries lies the West’s effort to create new images of the “enemy” 

and to legitimize the sovereignty of the Western-oriented international 

system that is termed an empire. Gündüz Aktan 

effectively voices the hazards of such propaganda against Turkey 

on an international level in the early ‘90s for the human rights 

system as a whole, and emphasizes threats that may arise in 

connection with nonobjective criticism. 

52 

Gündüz Aktan


İnsan Hakları 

Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan’ ın 1991-1995 yılları arasında Cenevre 

Birleşmiş Milletler Ofisi’nde Türkiye Daimi Temsilcisi görevini 

sürdürdüğü dönemde, Birleşmiş Milletler İnsan Hakları 

Komisyonu ve alt komisyonlarında yaptığı konuşmalar: 

Gündüz Aktan, insan hakları konulu toplantılarda yaptığı 

konuşmalarda uluslararası toplumun geçtiğimiz yüzyılın bu en 

kritik döneminde karşı karşıya kaldığı krizler karşısında takındığı 

çelişkili tavrı ortaya koymuş ve eleştirmiştir. İnsan hakları 

konusunda yalnızca gelişmekte olan ülkeler ve bu ülkelerdeki hak 

ve özgürlüklerin incelenmesinin çifte standart olduğunu sıkça dile 

getirmiştir. Kendisinin üzerinde çalıştığı Batı merkezli bir olgu 

olarak ırkçılık sorununun çözülmesine yönelik herhangi bir 

çalışmanın yapılmayışını eleştirmiş, aksine insan hakları 

ihlallerinin yalnızca gelişmekte olan ülkelerde varmışçasına, 

objektif olmayan bir biçimde incelenmesinin yanlış olduğunu 

vurgulamıştır. Bu hali ile uluslararası insan hakları izleme 

mekanizmasının etkin olmaktan ziyade bir baskı aracı haline 

getirildiğinin altını çizmiştir. 

Gündüz Aktan, kendi kaderini tayin hakkı ilkesinin 

uygulanması konusunda uluslararası hukuk ve teamüllerin hiçe 

sayılması sebebiyle doğan belirsizliğin ise insan hakları ihlallerinin 

temelinde yer aldığını belirtmiştir. Kendi kaderini tayin ilkesine 

sığınarak terör faaliyetlerine girişen ve Batılı devletlerce gerilla adı 

verilerek savaşan taraf statüsü verilen gruplar karşısında devlet, 

baskıcı ve insan hakları ihlal eden taraf konumuna 

indirgenmektedir. Aktan’a göre bir insan hakkı olarak kaderine 

tayin hakkının sınırları, bilinçli olarak hukuki zemin dışına 

çıkarılmış , insan hakları hukuku ve insani (humani tarian) hukuk 

birbirine karıştırılmıştır. Devlet karşıtı faaliyetler, terör ve 

bölücülük meşru kılınmaktadır. Aktan bu noktada, 1991-1995 

yılları arasında Amnesty International ve Human Rights Watch 


53


gibi uluslararası sivil toplum kuruluşlarının Türkiye Cumhuriyeti 

devleti aleyhine ortaya koyduğu insan hakları raporlarının insan 

haklarının ihlallerinin tespit edilmesi bağlamında objektif 

olmadığını, bu kuruluşların Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devleti üzerinde 

baskı kurmayı amaçladıklarını ortaya koymuştur. 

Konuşmalarda görülebileceği gibi uluslararası insan hakları 

izleme sisteminde Türkiye’ye ve ayrıca (Batılı olmayan, gelişmekte 

olan ülkelere) yönelik bu çelişkili tavrın temelinde Batı’ nın yeni 

düşman imgeleri yaratma ve İmparatorluk olarak adlandırılan Batı 

merkezli uluslararası sistemin egemenliğinin meşru kılınması 

çabası yer almaktadır. Gündüz Aktan doksanlı yılların başında 

Türkiye aleyhine uluslararası alanda yürütülen bu propagandanın 

tüm uluslararası insan hakları sistemi açısından sakıncalarının ve 

objektiflikten uzak eleştiriler sebebiyle ortaya çıkabilecek 

tehlikeleri etkin bir biçimde dile getirmektedir. 

54 

Gündüz Aktan


Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on 

Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 

Minorities, 43th Session, Agenda Item 6, 

14 August 1991 

Mr. Chairman, 

I will start with the working group on the method of work which 

we consider as a reform attempt. 

We are in favour of annual global report with a analytical 

section. 

The report should give an overall assessment on developments 

related to human rights violations, trends, but also progress and 

improvements. Duplication is of secondary importance. 

The structure of the report should be based on both country-bycountry 

and thematic approaches which will be correlated with the 

relevant articles of the Universal Declaration and other 

instruments without a selective approach towards rights and 

freedoms. 

A distinguished expert consented the other day that racism is 

essentially a Western phenomenon. It is generally agreed that it is 

becoming a widespread and urgent problem. I believe, there is no 

rule or decision to focus exclusively on the violations in developing 

countries. Therefore, a special rapporteur should be assigned and 

the report should contain a major section on racism, racist 

practices both by groups, governments and prevailing popular 

attitudes. In this way, the perennial ‘human condition’ which no 

society can really escape is more equitably reflected, and respect 

and observance for human rights can be promoted in a more 

humane manner. 


55


NGO's should not get specialized on some human rights abuses 

neglecting others. We will judge their impartiality, objectivity and 

reliability to the extent to which they focus on racism in their own 

countries or elsewhere. 

Otherwise, unlike the claims that history came to an end in the 

absence of enemy after the collapse of communism, new enemy 

images will have been created in a manicheist manner in the form 

of those who were allegedly inferior to violate human rights and 

freedoms. 

I would suggest that another major section in the report should 

deal with the adverse effects on the enjoyment of human rights of 

acts of violence committed by armed groups. In this respect, one 

should also take into account that an important part of the alleged 

human rights violations are in cause-effect relationship with the 

activities of terrorist groups. 

We are interested more in the content of studies than their 

duplication. Studies should also be used in the analytical section 

of the report. 

Studies should not be confined to standard-setting and 

compliance with standards already set. Our subject is immensely 

complex. We should increase our understanding which will enable 

us to avoid habitual patterns, cliches and stereotypes. 

Historically speaking in tandem with progress towards 

democracy domestically, the international system became 

paradoxically more predatory. Total war has been invented. 

Xenophobia turned into racism with all its catastrophic 

consequences. We don't know the reasons why. But, at the present 

stage, we try to promote respect for human rights and freedoms 

through mechanisms of this international system. Under these 

conditions how can we eliminate political motives which are one of 

the main causes of failure in our endeavours 

Democracy and human rights emerged in history twice, first in 

the Classical Greece, second in the West. In both cases, individual 

which was born to history created freedoms and rights for himself 

not vice-versa. Now we reverse the process and try to establish 

democracy and respect for human rights in order to give birth to 

individual. Is it possible If yes, how The real problem at the 

moment seems to teach people to enjoy rights and freedoms 

already acquired or given. 

56 

Gündüz Aktan


The birth of individual is the most disruptive process in history. 

Athens committed suicide once and successfully. The West did the 

same twice in this century, fortunately unsuccessfully. How can we 

manage, if we can at all, this process with the least damage and 

the most benefit to humanity. If we do not want the disintegration 

of the countries and avoid the sufferings thereof the establishment 

of democracy in the first phase should have an overriding priority" 

over particular rights. Interdisciplinary studies with the 

participation of sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, 

historians etc. should address these crucial topics. 

The Center for Human Rights should accordingly be reinforced 

from personnel and resources point of view. It should establish 

close working relations with other centers, institutes and 

foundations. Otherwise, our efforts are condemned to remain 

sterile. 

Mr. Chairman, 

I now turn to a question which primarily concerns my country 

but which is also a case in point. 

Amnesty International (AI) produces reports on human rights 

violations in Turkey. When I go through these reports, I observe the 

following: 

This organisation acts in violation of Resolution I (XXIV), 

Operative Paragraph 2 of the Sub-Commission for it resorts to 

politically motivated stands. In 1987 when Turkey made its 

application to the EC for full membership, AI had produced 3 

reports totaling only 21 pages. In the following year, the number of 

reports went up to 4 and the pages to 45. In 1989, the volume of 4 

reports reached 141 pages with full of exaggerations and excesses. 

And a climax was orchestrated in December 1989 when the EC 

Commission gave its opinion on Turkish application. Was Turkey's 

human rights performance getting worse On the contrary. But 

some circles in member countries which object Turkey's 

membership on religious, cultural and racial grounds chose to 

deter Turkey through defamation. They should be honest enough 

to say a plain 'no' rather than playing up with the dignity of a 

nation. 


57


It is not terribly difficult to create an ethnic strife in an 

underdeveloped region of an open even penetrated country with a 

little subversive effort, money, promises, international propaganda, 

especially if there already existed some ethnic demands. AI 

practically provides international legitimacy to terrorist activities in 

South-East Turkey by depicting Turkey as torturer. In this respect, 

it is interesting to note that the number of torture cases mentioned 

in reports are limited, but information on some individual cases are 

pervertedly even sado-masochistically detailed. 

It is quite easy to establish a network of communications which 

could be used to present the existence of a socalled' consistent 

pattern of gross and reliably attested violations', with a sufficient 

number of allegations of torture episodes based on a prototype. 

In principle, a legal and judicial system depends on the morality 

and integrity of the people who administer it. In the case of Turkey 

AI considers police as torturer, prosecutors as collaborator, judges 

as lackey and doctors as charlatan. Had it been true, there could 

have been no legal safeguards on earth to prevent the human 

rights abuses in Turkey. Perhaps for this reason AI seems to be 

after an ideally composite system which may respond better to the 

aesthetic requirements of Greek sculptors rather than to the 

realities of a semiclosed social system with constraints which is 

called country. 

Since there are no objective rules, reliability of communications 

calls for an almost pious honesty. But AI is politically motivated 

against Turkey. Therefore its communications are unreliable. As a 

result we have systematic allegations of torture rather than 

allegations of systematic torture. 

Although AI does not highlight in its reports, Turkey is party to 

all international treaties and mechanisms, and accepted 

international jurisdiction against torture. Although AI seems to 

forget, Turkey is a democratic country with a highly competitive 

multi-party system for 50 years. Although AI overlooks, Turkey has 

an extremely critical and free press. Although AI underestimates, 

the judiciary in Turkey has an almost 150 years of independent 

tradition. 

Only through these optical errors, then, can AI act in a way 

which implies support to an ethnic terrorist struggle against a 

democratic country. Profession of high aspirations does not 

58 

Gündüz Aktan


determine whether a group is terrorist or not. But the method of 

struggle does. If they kill women, children, old and innocent they 

are terrorists. 

When similar acts are committed in the West, they are 

outrageously denounced as terrorism and treated as enemies of 

human rights and the rule of law. Why this double-standard in the 

case of Turkey, unless AI and some other consider Turkey and 

Turkish society as intrinsically evil. 

Mr. Chairman, 

Turkey is not one of those countries whose relations with the 

West present no peculiarities. We have special historic relations 

which have accumulated a large catalogue of prejudices. We are 

the Leviathan of Hobbes, 'oriental despot' of Montesquieu, 

Holopherne of the Venetians, anathema of the popes and, what 

not. In short we are the 'negative self' of the West onto which the 

West projects its own undesirable parts in a way reminiscent of 

racism, hence the relationship between racism and human rights 

as far as Turkey is concerned. 

We never said that we were perfect, as no one is. We admitted 

that we had torture incidences, though declining, that we were 

doing our best to prevent them. But gross exaggerations continue 

unabated. Instead of giving misrepresenting quotations, AI should 

pay attention to Turkish public opinion and the press which had 

initially lent a willing ear to its criticism. They now seem to be at a 

turning point where a general sentiment of revolt is emerging 

against the politically motivated hostile attitude bordering racism 

towards Turkey. 

I will not dwell on the last report of AI for it does not reflect the 

recent legislative changes in Turkey which I have already 

forwarded to Chairman Mr. Joinet which will be distributed as a 

document. 

Thank you. 


59

Gündüz AKTAN 

Commission on Human Rights, 49th Session, 15th 

Meeting, Situation of human rights in the territory of the 

former Yugoslavia (E/CN.4/1993/SR.15) 

10 February 1993 

Mr. AKTAN (Observer for Turkey) said that the situation in the 

territory of the former Yugoslavia was very simple indeed. When 

the former Yugoslavia had disintegrated, there had remained 

outside the borders of Serbia large groups of Serbs in Croatia and 

Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia had been legitimately concerned 

about the fate of those Serbs. Its concerns could have been met 

within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in-Europe, but 

Serbia had chosen to annex the areas in which the Serbs lived. Not 

content with its territorial conquest, it had then expelled other 

ethnonational groups from the territories. Thus, Greater Serbia 

was associated with the most painful and criminal ethnic cleansing 

in history. In that process, every human right had been violated. 

For the first time in history, genocide was taking place in the full 

view of the international community, which had not only failed 

miserably to avert and punish it but it was also preventing the 

victim from effectively defending itself. The Government of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina had been literally forced to negotiate with war 

criminals while the latter were carrying out ethnic cleansing and 

massacring, destroying, bombing and raping. The outcome of the 

negotiating process was bound to reflect that situation. 

The international community was discrediting itself by 

posturing as an objective and impartial observer and by 

distributing the blame for committing violations among the warring 

sides in an obvious attempt to conceal the fact that it had made the 

situation possible by failing to stop the aggression in the first place. 

Everyone knew who had committed ethnic cleansing and the other 


61


crimes and violations but the party which had merely tried to 

defend itself was being accused of committing violations and of 

feeling hatred towards its victimizer. 

The last straw had been the pretext of interim arrangements in 

order to dissolve the only legitimate authority in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. That was the way the international community saved 

a country it had recognized. 

It had frequently been said that the war was not a religious one 

but no evidence had been submitted to vindicate that statement. 

To say the least, the vacillation between the use of force to protect 

the Muslims and their abandonment to the fate of genocide 

revealed an incomprehensible ambivalence in the Christian West 

towards Islam. The sectarian attitude of the Serbs, who had 

branded the most secular Bosnian Muslims as fundamentalists, 

with the support of some Orthodox countries, strengthened that 

impression in the eyes of the Muslim world. 

The international community had laid a sinister trap for itself 

and had prepared the ground for ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, 

Sandzak and Vojvodina. Similar events of much greater magnitude 

were bound to occur next in other parts of Europe with apocalyptic 

consequences. In the midst of their political integration process, 

the Europeans had reverted to the balance-of-power conditions 

which prevailed before the First World War. They were lining up 

among themselves and against one another. Countries and groups 

of countries were being characterized as pro-Orthodox, pro-Serb, 

pro-Catholic and so forth. A simple moral issue which should have 

been dealt with on its merits had turned into a realpolitik 

quagmire. 

62 

Gündüz Aktan


Commission on Human Rights, Second special session, 

1st Meeting, (E/CN.4/1992/S-2/SR.1) 

30 November 1992 

Mr. AKTAN (Turkey) expressed gratitude to the Chairman and 

members of the Commission for supporting the call of the United 

States and Turkey for the convening of the second special session 

of' the Commission. The dangerously worsening crisis in the former 

Yugoslavia, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, warranted the 

urgent attention of the, international community. It was also 

appropriate for the Commission to discuss and act upon the 

reports of Mr. Mazowiecki, the Special Rapporteur it had 

appointed. 

His delegation, together with that of the United States, had 

submitted a draft resolution incorporating many suggestions made 

by a large number of countries from the Organization of the Islamic 

Conference (OIC) and the Western and other groups during 

extensive consultations. Despite some shortcomings, the draft had 

the merit of faithfully reflecting the situation in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina, distinguishing between victim and victimizer and 

defining the nature of the crimes committed there. 

The sponsors hoped that the draft resolution would be adopted 

by consensus. They would welcome as many co-sponsors as 

possible so as to show that religious or regional differences played 

no part in their attitude towards the tragedy. Although there were 

differences of approach as to how to deal with the crisis in the 

politico-military sphere, there should be no divergence in 

assessments of the human rights and humanitarian aspects of the 

question, aspects which were essential to the deliberations in the 

Commission. The draft resolution was strictly confined to the 

findings contained in the reports of the Special Rapporteur, to 

whom profound appreciation was due. 


63


Like the Special Rapporteur, Turkey believed that the underlying 

cause of the tragedy in the former Yugoslavia was the ultimate goal 

of creating a Greater Serbia through the incorporation of "ethnically 

cleansed" parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The 

aggression to that end had been perpetrated by the Yugoslav army 

in Croatia and, after its ostensible withdrawal, by the relocated 

Yugoslav forces and their heavy weaponry in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. The existence of Serbian irregular and paramilitary 

forces was being used by the Belgrade regime as an excuse to deny 

responsibility for atrocities and war crimes which in fact were not 

only condoned but also commissioned by it. As the Special 

Rapporteur noted, ethnic cleansing was openly pursued on the 

territory of those parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia 

which were under Serbian control. 

Thus the international community was compelled to conclude 

that the aggressor was Serbia and the self-proclaimed Serbian 

authorities under the direct influence and control of Serbia. The 

aggression was directed against two sovereign States Members of 

the United Nations, and hence against international peace and 

security. He agreed with the Special Rapporteur that a factor which 

had contributed to the intensity of ethnic cleansing in areas under 

Serbian control was the marked imbalance between the weaponry 

in the hands of the Serbian and of the Muslim population of Bosnia 

and Herzegovina. 

The Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina were the principal 

victims of the aggression, which involved ethnic cleansing and 

indiscriminate shelling of the civilian population in the besieged 

cities, towns and villages. The distinction between aggressor and 

victim should not be blurred by claims that human rights 

violations were perpetrated by all parties to the conflict. The 

unjustified violence that had been unleashed by Serbia had 

inevitably provoked a defensive reaction on the part of Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. It was a fact that when there was unjust violence of 

such magnitude and nature, violations were unavoidable. 

However, as the Special Rapporteur had clearly stated, in the areas 

under the Government's control, violations associated with ethnic 

cleansing were not committed in a systematic fashion and did not 

appear to form part of a deliberate campaign to cleanse those areas 

of the Serbian population. To be just, fair and balanced, any 

judgment by the international community should take that 

difference into account. 

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Ethnic cleansing was defined in Commission resolution 

1992/S-1/1 as entailing at the minimum deportations and forcible 

mass removal or expulsion of persons or destruction of national, 

ethnic, racial or religious groups. The Special Rapporteur defined 

it as the elimination by the ethnic group exercising control over a 

given territory of members of other ethnic groups (A/47/666- 

S/24809, para. 9). The inhuman practices employed in Serbian 

controlled areas as a means of achieving ethnic cleansing included 

threats, harassment and intimidation; shooting or using explosives 

against homes, shops and places of business; destruction of places 

of worship and cultural institutions; transfer or relocation of 

populations by force; summary executions; and commission of 

atrocities calculated to instill terror among the population, such as 

torture, rape, the mutilation of corpses and the shelling of civilian 

population centres. 

Taken separately, those elements of ethnic cleansing could be 

considered as violations of the individual provisions of 

international human rights law and humanitarian law. However, 

considering their magnitude in terms of massive and grave 

violations as well as their cumulative and simultaneous effect on 

the target group, ethnic cleansing of such proportions amounted to 

a crime against humanity. 

To date; 10 per cent of roughly 2.5 million Bosnian Muslims had 

either been killed or wounded. Half had been displaced or made 

refugees. Half a million were suffering indiscriminate shelling in 

besieged cities, towns and villages. According to the estimates of 

the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), 400,000 would perish in the winter cold unless urgent 

and adequate assistance was provided. No one could claim that the 

remaining fifth of the population was unaffected. The Convention 

on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 

provided that killing members of a group with intent to destroy it 

in whole or in part was sufficient to fulfil the conditions of that 

crime. The Special Rapporteur in turn solemnly warned the 

international community that ethnic cleansing might be imminent 

in certain parts of Serbia and Montenegro where there were large 

communities of persons not of Serbian origin, such as Kosovo, 

Sandzak and Vojvodina, and that the Muslim population, together 

with its cultural and spiritual heritage, was virtually threatened 

with extermination in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 


65


The question arose whether the final solution of the ethnic 

cleansing policy should be awaited before it was declared as 

genocide. That question was being put to States by the draft 

resolution. The continuation of that policy presumed the inability 

and unwillingness of the international community to enforce 

compliance, for thanks to the Special Rapporteur's reports, it could 

no longer claim innocence. Time was short. The coming winter 

would further inflict on the Muslim population conditions of life 

calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 

part by the aggressor, as provided in article II (c) of the Genocide 

Convention. 

The disaster that had reached apocalyptic proportions in Bosnia 

and Herzegovina was a crucial test for the present generation. It 

must not let history repeat itself. Inside the former Yugoslavia the 

question was whether the Muslim population would survive. 

Outside the country, however, the question was whether the world 

in the aftermath of that tragedy would be worth living in. 

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Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 

45th Session, 13th meeting, 

11 August 1993, Geneva 

Mr. AKTAN (Observer for Turkey) noted that a new approach to 

problems concerning human rights seemed to be emerging within 

the United Nations. Instead of condemning human rights violations 

wherever they occurred, people were now trying to analyse their 

underlying causes and to create conditions enabling those 

violations and obstacles to the exercise of those rights to be reduced 

and eventually eliminated. The countries where gross violations of 

human rights were committed could be divided into three main 

groups: the first consisted of countries under foreign occupation, 

the second of countries under authoritarian and dictatorial 

regimes, and the third of countries faced with internal strife. An 

examination of the situation in those three groups of countries led 

to the conclusion that their problems were in fact due to difficulties 

in implementing the right of self-determination. That right was 

reaffirmed in the Vienna Declaration, where it was defined as the 

right of peoples to “freely determine their political status, and freely 

pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (para. 2) 

and was associated with democracy, since democracy was “based 

on the freely expressed will of the people to determine their own 

political, economic, social and cultural systems” (para. 8). 

Consequently, “the denial of the right of self-determination” was to 

be considered “as a violation of human rights” and all other 

violations of human rights stemmed therefrom. The international 

community was thus called upon to strengthen and promote 

democracy, development and respect for human rights and 

fundamental freedoms throughout the world, in order to eliminate 

violations. 

Foreign occupation was another major form of violation of the 


67


right of self-determination. It was therefore paradoxical that Bosnia 

and Herzegovina should be the victim of cruel aggression under the 

pretext of achieving the Serbs' right to self-determination. His 

delegation was grateful to the Sub-Commission for the declaration 

that it had adopted on Bosnia and Herzegovina. It nevertheless 

regretted that there had been no mention of genocide, since the 

Bosnian case set an example which other countries also affected by 

extreme nationalism might wish to imitate. Of course, it was for the 

International Court of Justice to decide whether what was 

happening in Bosnia and Herzegovina could or could not be 

assimilated to genocide, but pending the Court's verdict, time was 

passing and soon only punishment and not prevention would be 

possible. Yet, in that area, prevention was of the essence. His 

delegation therefore wondered whether the Sub-Commission might 

not discuss the issue and formulate an expert opinion. The World 

Conference itself had unanimously adopted a decision condemning 

the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as genocide. It therefore 

seemed abnormal for the international community not to react. The 

reason was that some countries thought that, however ugly and 

painful it might be, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 

closer to a war than to genocide. The Sub-Commission might 

therefore clarify what should be understood by the words “intent to 

destroy ... a ... group”, as contained in the definition of genocide set 

forth in article II of the Convention on the Prevention and 

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In the last resort, what was 

genocide Did there have to be a "reason" for the mass killing of 

civilians in a war in order to be able to call such action genocide 

It was important to clarify that point, since in the not too distant 

future the world might be facing other similar wars waged mainly 

against civilian populations. 

The last group of countries where violations of human rights 

were being committed were those facing internal armed struggle. 

Since the collapse of communism and the disintegration of some 

former communist States, the number of armed struggles of ethnic 

character had increased dramatically. At the present time, many 

countries were experiencing ethnic terrorism, a term justified by 

the generally terrorist character of the violence generated by such 

struggles. In that connection, he recalled that paragraph 2 of the 

Vienna Declaration, concerning the right of peoples to selfdetermination, 

and paragraph 17 of the same Declaration, 

concerning terrorism, had been negotiated together in the informal 

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group of the World Conference on Human Rights. Those two 

paragraphs contained some very important new elements. 

The second subparagraph of paragraph 2 authorized peoples 

under colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign 

occupation to take “any legitimate action ... to realize their 

inalienable right of self-determination”. Some delegations had 

wanted a distinction to be made between terrorism and a struggle 

for self-determination. His delegation, for its part, had wanted to 

replace the concept of “legitimate action” by that of “legitimate 

struggle”. Unfortunately, those proposals had not been supported. 

The Vienna Conference had also reaffirmed the validity of the 

section of the Declaration on Principles of International Law 

concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in 

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations which 

concerned the application of the principle of self-determination in 

States with a democratic regime. It was easy to understand why 

the international community could not tolerate an interpretation of 

that right which would “dismember or impair ... the territorial 

integrity or political unity” of democratic States. 

In paragraph 17 of the Vienna Declaration, terrorism was 

described as an activity “aimed at the destruction of human rights, 

fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial 

integrity ... of States and destabilizing legitimately constituted 

Governments”. In addition, the international community, including 

NGOs, was called upon to “take the necessary steps ... to prevent 

and combat terrorism”. In no circumstances did the Declaration 

justify terrorism by an absence of collective rights. It should not be 

forgotten that democracy and socio-economic development did not 

automatically solve problems linked to ethnic aspirations. They 

merely created the conditions that permitted a peaceful struggle for 

the promotion of the rights of ethnic minorities without 

destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments or threatening 

the territorial integrity and political unity of States. Yet it was 

public knowledge that certain NGOs implicitly and indirectly 

supported terrorism as a response to alleged Government 

repression or as a means for promoting the rights of ethnic 

minorities. Those NGOs should realize that their position on 

terrorism at the present time was totally devoid of legality. 


69






Mr. AKTAN (Observer for Turkey) said that an important reform 

had been introduced in the field of criminal procedure in Turkey. 

Along with the reform, many new provisions relating to the Act on 

State Security Courts, Act on the State of Emergency, Act on 

Combating Terrorism and the Act on Duties and Powers of the 

Police had also been amended. He expressed thanks to Mr. Joinet 

who had summarized the reform in a concise and objective manner 

in his report on the independence of the judiciary 

(E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/25). However, unfortunately, the reform had 

been overlooked in the report which had been prepared by Mr. 

Chernichenko and Mr. Treat (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/24). The 

paragraph in the report on Turkey could not be regarded as 

accurate and complete unless it contained at least a brief reference 

to the reform. 

Speaking under agenda items 10 and 11, he said that a state of 

emergency was usually resorted to in order to deal with a major 

breakdown of law and order caused by armed groups. 

Governments could not derogate from the internationallydefined 

set of fundamental human rights and freedoms in their 

fight against armed groups. In that respect, they had contractual 

obligations and were accountable for any subsequent breach of 

them. Conversely, Governments were authorized to repress armed 

groups while respecting non-derogable rights. In principle, the 

international human rights community was supposed to refrain 

from passing judgment on who was right and who was wrong in a 

conflict. In reality, neither countries nor international 


71


organizations where they were represented, nor NGOs were 

disinterested parties in such a situation. They manifested their 

sympathies by way of criticizing human rights violations of one 

party and condoning those of another. 

According to a well-established pattern, most Western NGOs 

supported the struggles of ethnic armed groups and condoned 

their violations. Those NGOs appeared convinced that ethnic 

terrorism was a response, perhaps painful, violent and costly, but 

an unavoidable, even necessary response to prior government 

repression. In their views, once Governments had learned to grant 

and respect ethnic rights and freedoms, terrorism would come to a 

natural end. In any case, the gross violations committed by States 

which amounted to “State terrorism” should cease in the first 

place. 

With regard to issues related to terrorism, general wars, civil 

wars, revolutionary wars, wars of national liberation, resistance 

movements against foreign occupiers, insurrections and mob 

violence had all been accompanied by terror. However, they could 

not be called terrorism. 

Terrorism was a sub-State violence perpetrated by a limited 

number of individuals against the State. An armed group which 

consistently resorted to terrorist acts, methods and practices over 

a reasonably long period of time could be qualified as terrorists. 

In an attempt to avoid calling a group "terrorist”, the word 

guerrilla was sometimes used. According to Webster's Dictionary, 

a guerrilla was someone who carried on an irregular war in 

connection with a regular war waged by a foreign power. Therefore, 

a guerrilla war should not be confused with an ethnic terrorist 

conflict whose parties were the nationals of the same country. The 

fact that the guerrilla force could be larger than the average 

terrorist group did not cleanse the guerrilla from the label of 

terrorist, for the criterion was not the size, but the extent to which 

a group resorted to terrorism. 

Random attacks on innocent civilians were the most important 

component of terrorism. The main purpose of terror was to induce 

fear, panic and shock in society. The media gave higher profile to 

shocking news. The element of random attack terrorized the public 

and undermined political order. 

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There had never been clean forms of terrorism. But if one had 

to make a historical comparison between the anarchists and 

revolutionaries of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 

and present-day terrorists, one could conclude that there had been 

a radical deterioration in terrorist ethics, so to speak. New brands 

of terrorists had little in common with their idealistic, naive, poor, 

anonymous, amateur and self-sacrificing predecessors. Presentday 

terrorists included narco-terrorists, very rich ones, terrorists 

who were sponsored by other States as a mode of warfare by proxy, 

indeed simply as a substitute warfare, terrorists who ran expensive 

operations, employing and paying large numbers of militants, 

professional terrorists who had been reared and commissioned by 

foreign Powers, and ethnic terrorists killing mostly the people in 

whose name they claimed to fight. 

As paradoxical as it might sound, government repression on an 

ethnic group was not a necessary condition or the cause of 

terrorism. If government repression were as large-scale and violent 

as had been alleged by some NGOs, mass insurrections rather 

than a limited terrorist response would have risen up against those 

governments. 

The only political context in which terrorism had not happened 

was in truly oppressive regimes and totalitarian States where 

terrorism might perhaps have been morally justified. Historically, 

terrorism had almost always emerged in the declining and 

dissolution phase of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious empires, 

in the democratization process of States, or simply in democracies. 

The causes of terrorism in those contexts were not obvious. 

Frequently the path of terrorism was chosen even before other 

political options had been tried. 

Socio-economic grievances did not necessarily lead to terrorism 

either, for terrorism occurred both in the context of economic 

depression or underdevelopment and economic prosperity. 

In short, the connection between terrorism and objective 

factors was tenuous. There was a great deal of terrorism without 

injustice and oppression and a great deal of oppression without 

terrorism. 

The claim that terrorism happened in countries where violence 

was embedded in the political culture was tendentious, for all 

political cultures were predisposed to violence which emerged at 

various periods in their history. 


73


The role of leadership was crucial in ethnic terrorism. If the 

presence or absence of one leader played a crucial role in the 

Russian revolution of 1917, or in the rise of fascism in Europe, how 

much greater was the role of “accident” in the emergence of a 

terrorist leader. The personal motivation and intentions of 

individual leaders could have an extraordinary potential for 

destructive or the constructive shape of events, and it was upon 

the reservoir of positive and negative emotions that leaders played 

when they· sought to mobilize the populace. Ethno-nationalist 

leaders had a seemingly endless store of hatred, fear and desire for 

the redress of historical hurts and grievances between ethnic 

groups. The leader of an ethnic terrorist group was the one who did 

not perceive the sources of violence in his group, instead 

concentrated on his group's victimization by the violence of others 

and tried to mobilize his followers for a new aggression to redress 

past wrongs and to strengthen the ethnic identity on the basis of 

killing “the other”. 

Unlike ethnic groups which may struggle for cultural, linguistic 

and religious rights, ethnic terrorist did not aspire to anything less 

than independence within a given land. Therefore, granting ethnic 

rights did not lead to a decline and eventual disappearance of 

terrorism. When the terrorist group threatened the majority's 

territorial integrity and political unity, the struggle turned into a 

zero-sum-gain, whence its violence. The ethnic terrorist enterprise 

ran into insurmountable difficulties in the sense that ethnic 

groups had largely intermingled over the territory of the country 

and the delineation of a land on the basis of ethnicity required an 

extremely painful ethnic cleansing, as could be seen in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina. 

Thus far, no terrorist group had succeeded in its goals. Even if 

it was doomed to failure, terrorism had an innate tendency to 

continue. To succeed in achieving its espoused cause would 

threaten the goal of survival. It had to be successful enough in its 

terrorist acts to perpetuate itself, but it should not be so successful 

that it would put itself out of business. 

The fact that ethnic terrorists rebelled against the State 

(paternal symbol) to dismember a piece of land (maternal symbol) 

turned the terrorist into a guilt-ridden regressive undertaking. As 

a result of that situation, also, terrorists did not wish to attain 

success. Success unconsciously meant the realization of the goal 

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that engendered guilt-feelings in the first place. Therefore they 

feared such success. To redeem themselves they unconsciously 

looked for punishment from the political authority. The foolish 

mistakes they always made testified to that fact. Religious, 

fundamentalist terrorists did not suffer feelings of guilt because of 

their faith. Hence, they remained at least partly outside the scope 

of such an analysis. 

Despite those pathological characteristics of terrorism, it was 

surprising to see that there were supporters of terrorism, along 

with its more understandable opponents. The question arose of 

how some intelligent people could defend terrorism. 

An experienced psychoanalyst drew a parallel between reactions 

caused by patients in a clinical setting and by terrorists in national 

and international contexts. When a hospitalized patient presented 

one side of his character to certain staff members and the other 

side to others, that often caused the staff to take highly polarized 

positions regarding the patient. If left unrecognized and 

unresolved, projective identification often led both in clinical 

settings and political arenas to a regressive and polarizing group 

process. Then a confused response to terrorism occurred. That 

served to enhance the feelings of justification and victimization of 

the terrorist. 

That situation was occurring in some western human rights 

circles. The sympathies of some NGOs with ethnic groups could be 

explained as an unexpected outcome of the European integration 

process. 

The purpose of analysing NGO attitudes was not to discourage 

or deter them from criticizing human rights violations and their 

perpetrators. On the contrary, if they recognized and resolved the 

psychological mechanisms at work in them, they could more 

objectively and soundly develop and direct their critical faculties. 


75


Commission on Human Rights, 

51st Session, 32nd Meeting, 

Question of the human rights of all persons subjected to 

any form of detention or imprisonment, in particular 

torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading 

treatment or punishment 

E/CN.4/1995/SR.32 24 February 1995 

Summary Record of the meeting held on 20 February 1995 

Mr. AKTAN (Observer for Turkey) said that his country was 

being subjected to an intense campaign of unfounded allegations 

by some non-governmental organizations (NGOs). While it was not 

unusual for NGOs to exaggerate violations, the exaggerations in 

the case of his country came dangerously close to being outright 

lies. It was clear that the NGOs in question, such as Amnesty 

International and Human Rights Watch, were politically motivated 

and his Government certainly did not regard them as "impartial 

humanitarian bodies” within the meaning of article 3 common to 

the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, the prevailing approach to 

human rights within the United Nations focused exclusively on the 

concept of violations, thereby overlooking other essential legal 

parameters. 

Violations were committed in the context of violence generated 

by a conflict. An effective human rights system should thus 

determine first of all whether violence was legitimate in a given 

situation. Guidelines in that regard were to be found in the 

preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 

Vienna Declaration, and the Declaration on Principles of 

International Law. Indirect aggression by means of surrogates was 


77


a form of violence prohibited by the Charter and by United Nations 

General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) (Definition of 

Aggression). However, his delegation had never heard any 

representative of a Government or non-governmental organization 

denounce the violence initiated by armed groups on those legal 

premises; still less was it aware of any resolution containing such 

a denunciation. 

The first major flaw in the human rights system was thus that 

violence against States had become permissible in all 

circumstances, on the apparent assumption that violence was a 

practical means of promoting human rights in any country except 

one's own. In fact, any organized violence, even if theoretically free 

from terrorism, was bound to inflict considerable suffering on 

civilians, given the high destructive capability of modern weapons 

and the fact that contemporary conflicts usually took place in 

civilian areas. It was thus essential not to encourage or support 

violence under the pretext of promoting human rights. 

The human rights system also turned a blind eye to the method 

of' combat practised by armed "guerrillas", including the use of 

terror to subjugate members of the ethnic group on whose behalf 

they were allegedly fighting. Moreover, persons participating in a 

“guerrilla” war effort were wrongly regarded as civilians. The very 

use of the word “guerrilla" - rather than terrorist - indicated bias, 

when the movement concerned did not come within the scope of 

article 1, paragraph 4, of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva 

Conventions. 

The second major flaw in the system was that no resolution 

existed to outlaw the type of combat he had mentioned and no 

mechanism to report to human rights forums the many thousands 

of innocent civilians massacred by armed terrorist groups. The 

result was that a false picture was painted, especially by the NGOs, 

in which States appeared to be massively violating human rights 

and brutally repressing those whose only fault was to ask that 

their human rights be respected. No consideration was given to the 

question of who had initiated the armed struggle, what methods of 

combat they engaged in, and who was actually killing civilians. The 

implication was that State repression was the main cause of the 

problem and that, once the State halted that repression and 

granted "legitimate rights" to the populations which backed the 

armed groups, terrorism would come to a natural end. 

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The third major flaw in the system was thus its politicization by 

the NGOs and some States, and its increasing divorce from legality. 

To that end, the NGOs conveniently confused human rights law 

with humanitarian law, with the aim of creating suitable 

conditions for ethnic groups to take up arms. In that way, whether 

deliberately or unwittingly, they contributed to ethno-nationalism 

and tribalism. 

The three major flaws he had mentioned were largely 

responsible for the spread of violence against States and impaired 

the ability of the human rights system to curb the rise in violations 

and to promote democratization. Consequently, more and more 

political orders were crumbling. Encouragement of violence by the 

human rights system must cease. Governments, and NGOs with 

their politicized and legally confusing and confused approach, 

would bear a heavy responsibility if the United Nations human 

rights system, which had always been ineffective, were to become 

irrelevant or even absurd. 


79


Commission on Human Rights, 51st Session, Geneva 

6 March 1995, Statement made under agenda item 12 

Mr. Chairman, 

As you must notice, NGOs have privileged my country with 

intensive criticism. We are grateful to them for their very ‘objective’, 

‘disinterested’ and ‘depoliticized’ approach towards Turkey. We 

admire the ‘depth of their analyses’ and ‘knowledge of the human 

condition’. We particularly appreciate their ‘wisdom’, ‘moderation’ 

and ‘eloquence’. They displayed ‘a purity of heart’ subtly combined 

with ‘a profound sense of honesty’. 

Thanks to these NGOs, I now realize that the human rights 

violation in Turkey are incomparably more serious, frequent and 

wide-spread than those in Bosnia, Chechnia or Armenian occupied 

Azeri homeland etc. 

I think, Mr Chairman, in order to save humanity from the 

scourge of violations which are committed by evil governments, we 

should double the number of NGOs (of the same quality) and 

increase the time allocated to each of them in our meetings. 

I don’t know why all of a sudden recalled the famous book of 

Jean Christophe Rufin entitled “Empire and the New Barbarians” 

when I was listening to these NGOs. 

In reality, neither the Empire nor the barbarians are new. The 

same play is enacted under different historical circumstances. The 

Roman Empire had entertained such attributes as unique and 

universal. Pax-Romano had been the basis of universality over 

large territories or countries. Since all or almost all nations have 

withdrawn behind national boundaries the mission of universality 

is now fulfilled by the spread of democracy and human rights. 


81


NGOs of the contemporary ‘empire’ play their role to that end. 

This forum is one of the many for the universal dissemination, 

adoption, assimilation and application of human rights. Most of 

the ‘barbarians’ here also agree that respect for human rights is 

good for them. They willingly expose themselves to imperial 

monitoring and criticism. 

Nevertheless, some of the ‘barbarians’ are slightly disturbed at 

the present practice which seems to be geared to promoting the 

rights of minorities or ethnic groups, while neglecting somehow the 

promotion of the overall rights and freedoms that entire 

populations may enjoy together. 

Their disturbance increases in seeing that violent methods, 

including terrorism in their countries are condoned as a means of 

securing human rights. They are told that what ought to be 

condemned in the sphere of human rights is the violations 

committed by the states in combat against terrorist violence, that 

terrorists are more innocent than the innocents killed by them, 

and that they’d better recognize peacefully the rights demanded 

violently, or else face smear campaigns. 

Countries like Turkey which happen to be in the limen (the 

threshold or buffer of an empire) have a special place in this 

equation. 

They are the ones which have voluntarily assimilated the values 

of the ‘empire’ in the name of civilization. By some divine 

intervention, they face ethnic struggles which elicit particularly 

virulent attacks from the ‘empire’ and its NGOs. They are told 

however is a blessing for them, for they are considered as an 

integral part of the ‘empire’. Wasn’t it true that the ‘empire’ had 

used them in history as its negation and its opposite or as oriental 

despotism, Antichrist, Leviathan, Holopherne, and what not. Is it 

possible that their resemblance to the ‘empire’ beyond a certain 

point is not really sought for 

At this point, one starts to have a vague sense of suspicion for 

the price-tag of belonging is exorbitant i.e. dismemberment of the 

country. You are immediately assured against this danger. 

Although the ‘empire’ makes attempts to universalize human rights 

and freedoms, you surmise that it seems to believe that it is the 

only depository of these values, that others are not culturally fit to 

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borrow them. Then you cannot help recalling the other historical 

attribute of the empire, namely its uniqueness. 

One’s suspicion grows when one perceives that immigrants from 

the limen are treated as racially inferior within the ‘empire’, 

subjected to racist violence, ending up living in segregated areas, 

deprived of some essential rights. The real universality which 

presupposes the equality of human beings, however, could not be 

compatible with racism. 

In this context, one initially finds it difficult to explain the 

contradiction between racism towards immigrants and the 

excessive interest of the NGOs in the rights of the ethnic groups in 

the immigrants countries of origin. Later, however, one senses that 

there might be a link between these two basically opposite 

attitudes. 

A closer look reveals that, despite the aggressive tone and 

frenzied attacks of the NGOs on the countries of immigration, their 

aim is defensive. What these NGOs really mean by their wild 

criticism is that the countries which allegedly treat their ethnic 

groups unjustly are culturally inferior and that their diaspora in 

the ‘empire’ can be justifiably treated as racially inferior. 

In the international scene there are some other, perhaps more 

important, cases which may support this analysis. 

The populations of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Azerbaijan have 

been subjected to massive attack by armies and irregulars 

indiscriminately employing heavy weapons against civilians. As a 

result, civilian casualties have reached exceptionally high figures, 

civilian targets necessary for the survival of civilians deliberately 

destroyed and settlements as well as cultural and religious 

monuments utterly devastated. Apart from the untold suffering of 

the survivors deprived of the minimum requirements of life for long 

times, multitudes have also been displaced or made refugees, 

leaving behind ethnically cleansed areas. 

The civil war in Chechnia created conditions, in some respects, 

even worse than the other two international conflicts. In Chechnia 

an indiscriminate and massive repression executed by a heavily 

armed Russian military force brought about 24.000 civilian 

casualties including 3700 children and 4600 women in less than 

two months , with an immense civilian destruction and a displaced 


83


people reaching 1/3 of the total population of 1,5 million souls. 

Moreover these figures are presently on the rise. 

It is interesting to note that in all these conflicts the suffering 

populations have one essential aspect in common, namely, the 

Muslim religion. They also share it with those who are mostly 

subjected to racial humiliation elsewhere. And in all these 

conflicts, the influential segments of the international community 

together with their NGOs remained relatively indifferent to the 

most atrocious violations, even punished the victims. Then you 

remember that the aggression in each case is justified by the 

scepter of Islamic fundamentalism, a phenomenon which 

unwittingly the ‘empire’ encourages and fears in an ambivalent 

manner. 

Armenia as a country on the margin of the ‘empire’ exploits 

these weaknesses of the ‘empire’. She justifies her aggression 

against Azerbaijan with reference to an illusory past victimization 

created by a perverse interpretation of history. 

Is the famous of Prof. Huntington right after all, that the future 

struggles will take place along the fault lines of civilizations, i.e. 

religions. 

The countries with Muslim populations have hitherto been very 

careful not to give impression that a kind of religious confrontation 

is in the offing. This onus should be shared by others. Toynbee, 

another great theoretician, says that an empire cannot survive 

while its immediate surrounding is in turmoil, an ominous 

development quite different from what is happening in the far-east. 

In the meantime, the peoples who are carrying the heavy cross 

put on their shoulders cry out: ‘O God, forgive them; for they know 

not what they do’, while the skies singing; ‘when will they ever 

learn’ 

Thank you. 

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Sub-Commmission on Prevention of Discrimination and 

Protection of Minorities, 43th Session, Agenda Item 18, 

15 August 1991 

Mr. Chairman. 

The question of minorities has gained prominence within the 

framework of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Most of the 

alleged violations are related in one way or another to national. 

ethnic, religious or linguistic groups which Mr. Eide gathered 

under the broad umbrella of minorities. While consciously avoiding 

a strict definition. 

In our practice, minority as concept should be defined as such 

by specific instruments of international law. For instance the treaty 

of Lausanne in 1923. 

Within this understanding. I shall make some general 

comments on the subject. 

It is true, problems stemming from rapidly growing expectations 

of minorities destabilize many countries, constitute a threat to 

interstate relations and regional stability in various parts of the 

world. 

In order to understand the question that we are facing and will 

surely face some time to come, we should look into the causes and 

the evolution this question has undergone. 

Throughout history, minorities have always had problems 

almost in every country. So the sudden drive towards improving 

their sort might seem to be the natural consequence of the 

sensitivity created by the overwhelming importance that the 

human rights and freedoms have acquired in the contemporary 


85


world. Moreover, one might speculate that the democratization 

process, especially in the west, has deepened to such an extent 

that the fate of the fringes has come to the forefront. 

These seemingly plausible explanations do not stand however 

the test of an in depth analysis. 

I think the increased concern for minorities has originated 

within the EC roughly 20-25 years ago. 

European integration has created conditions of lasting peace in 

such a way that the old fears and suspicions aroused by the 

political manipulation of minorities have been removed for good. 

This is especially true for the great continental powers which were 

the center-pieces of the European architecture. Under these secure 

and suitable conditions, they afforded more recognition and less 

discriminatory treatment to their minorities. In this respect, their 

record is still far from perfection since. For instance, some of them 

cannot pronounce the word minority for their own groups, or 

almost all have some problems with respect to migrant workers by 

far the most populous group among aliens. But this situation does 

not hamper the efforts to promote minority rights in other 

countries, which in their own regions do not enjoy the security 

conditions prevailing in Europe. Indeed, one perceives in these 

efforts of the existence of a secondary objective in terms of 

compensating for the racially oriented poor record related to 

migrant workers. 

At a later stage of European integration, intensively debated 

aspirations of European federation, transfer of sovereignty to the 

supranational authority as a gradual process and deliberations 

on the political union started slowly eroding the rigid and 

powerful concept of nation-state. Falsely or not, this gave a vague 

but wide-spread impression that the nation-state began to 

disintegrate while integrating into a greater whole. In this 

process, minorities and regions were considered by some as the 

building blocks of the European integration. Bur others 

conceived it as a return to retribalization. Ultra-rightist parties 

emerged under these conditions to defend national unity against 

possible disintegration and purity against the alarmingly 

increasing aliens. The possibility of a return of pre-war fascism 

haunted the imaginations. 

More or less, the same time, the global economic crisis provoked 

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by the successive oil shocks brought about the collapse of the postwar 

socio-economic model together with it the European 

democratic left which having lost its original “raison d'être” either 

turned into liberal or assumed one of the three new vocations, 

namely pacifists, ecologists or human rights defenders. 

In the last role, for reasons not yet known to us, they identified 

themselves mainly with the minorities and to a lesser extent with 

leftist ideological groups in other countries, especially in 

developing ones, defending their minority rights as if fighting for 

their own survival. It is interesting to note that most of them 

avoided identifying themselves with migrant workers who 

happened to be their immediate neighbours while minorities whose 

rights were defended happened to live in conveniently far away 

lands. 

By identifying the European ultra-right with countries which 

were allegedly persecuting their ethnic or ideological minorities 

they tried to contain the growth of the former and fought for the 

respect of minority rights in the latter with an equal zeal. 

I stress, I don't claim that all NGO's and individual human 

rights defenders are motivated by the mental mechanism I have 

just described. Especially the young generation should be 

unaffected by these motives unless they have culturally inherited 

them. This analysis is inevitably a generalization. 

But, if it is correct with a reasonable margin of error, some 

conclusions can be drawn: 

Firstly, the activities of human rights groups focus in a lopesided 

manner on ideological and ethnic minority rights neglecting 

somehow other rights enunciated in the Universal Declaration 

including the promotion of democracy and democratic institutions. 

Secondly, these activities are totally indifferent to the territorial 

integrity of the states, and to peace and stability in inter-state 

relations because these concerns have nothing to do with the 

parameters within which their own internal mechanism and drive 

operate. 

Thirdly, countries accused of minority rights violations having 

been identified with the European ultra-right cannot escape being 


87


a-priori considered as basically evil, and their credibility together 

with their dignity has become an object to be destroyed. 

Fourthly, this concern for the minority rights in other countries 

which happen to be usually developing ones has not been 

engendered by the real needs of the minorities in question. Rather, 

it is the outcome of a specific evolution and configuration of 

political forces in Europe. Therefore, it is difficult to speak about a 

purely civilizing, progressive or humanistic mission in the whole 

enterprise. 

Nevertheless, the missionary traditions of the west were 

inherited by the new adepts of this creed who raised the 

expectations of the minorities all over the world. In their own words 

they now "monitor" or "supervise" single mindedly and with a 

missionary zeal the human rights violations created as a result of 

the ethnic strives everywhere with enormous sufferings for all 

concerned. 

We are however grateful to them. Although unwillingly, they 

have started off a movement which could serve as a historic 

opportunity to establish fully democratic regimes based on respect 

for broad human rights and freedoms beyond minority rights. 

Nevertheless, there is one essential pre-condition, the mechanism, 

presently at work should be dismantled and removed from those 

who have it. Exogenous motives, irrelevant projections and 

identifications as well as political manipulations are the main 

culprits which further complicate an already very complex subject 

which is human rights. 

In this respect, I wish to state our deep appreciation for the 

responsible, sensible and equitable way in which Mr. Eide has 

prepared his report, I believe that all of us should help him in his 

endeavours. 

I have some specific points to make on one section of the report. 

I see that Greece has replied the questionnaire. It is food. 

First of all, we should confess that both sides have committed 

mistakes in the past with regard to the minorities in our respective 

countries. 

Turkish people always remember the events of 6-7 September 

1956 with profound sorrow and regret, despite the responsibles 

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were punished and a compensation important for that time was 

made to meet the material damage if not the moral one. 

Greeks of Istanbul started leaving Turkey not after these events 

but after 1964, a date which represents the deterioration of 

intercommunal relations in Cyprus. Towards the end of the 1960's, 

the Greek economy flourished, whereas the Turkish one stagnated 

owing to the sharp ideological conflict. This situation further 

encouraged the Greeks of Istanbul who were mainly middle-class 

bourgeoisie to move to Greece. Another factor which contributed to 

this exodus was the exceptional measures of encouragement 

provided for expatriation in Greece. 

The hopeful aspect of this unfortunate development is that the 

Greeks of Istanbul living in Greece now largely prefer to preserve 

their Turkish citizenship and their links with Istanbul. Although it 

is difficult for them to return in great numbers, Turkey from the 

mouth of its highest responsible made an invitation in Athens in 

Mid-1988. 

Secondly, we wish to assure Greece that Turkey can have no 

designs whatsoever regarding Western Thrace. It stands ready to 

take up minority issues within the framework of the dialogue which 

we always ask to resume. Our sole aim is to see to it that the 

Turkish Moslem minority in Greece enjoy human rights and 

freedoms in accordance with the international law, its bilateral and 

international instruments, above all the treaty of Lausanne. 

Let me summarize the problems this minority has been facing. 

First problem is the identity of the minority. The minority 

professes its identity as Turkish-Moslem. Greece contends that the 

Lausanne treaty mentions only religious minorities. But in that 

case, we should call the minority in Istanbul not Greek but “non- 

Muslim” because this is the terminology in the treaty. 

Furthermore, the members of the community are adamantly 

opposed to a division on racial grounds such as the one 

incorporated in the Greek reply that they are composed of Turks, 

Pomaks and Gypsies. According to the Copenhagen Document, 

paragraph 32 of the CSCE to which Greece is also party, the 

minority has the right to identify itself. 

This problem required a new dimension with a court decision in 


89


1987, that is to say 65 years after the Lausanne treaty, o close the 

minority associations having the word "Turkish" in their names. 

Almost all of them have it. They resist this unfair and illegal 

decision and face closure. 

Second problem is demographic. Greek Government seems 

undecided over the statistical information on the population 

figures. If we accept the figure of 114.000 put forward by the Greek 

delegation at the Lausanne Conference in 1923 and multiply it 

with the rate of increase of Turkish people both in Turkey and 

Greece the population of the minority should have been around 

600.000. 

Nevertheless, this figure remained 120.000 after 68 years. 

Therefore, the anemia is around half a million. 

The main instrument to expell Turks of Greece is the famous or 

infamous article 19 of the citizenship act of Greece. This provides 

that the authorities may decide to deprive those of non-Hellenic 

origin of their citizenship if they conclude that they left the country 

for good. I don't think it needs any explanation. First, it has a racial 

approach. Second, their freedom to leave their country and return 

is severely restricted even prohibited. Therefore, unlike Greeks of 

Istanbul living in Greece, Turks of Greece living in Turkey could 

not preserve their Greek citizenship. 

Thirdly, the members of the Turkish Moslem Community who 

are mainly farmers hence attached to land have been 

systematically deprived of land through large scale confiscations 

and encouragement measures to sell their land to Greeks. As a 

result, while the land they had possessed in 1923 had amounted 

to 80% of the cultivable land in Western Thrace, it was reduced to 

20% although their population remained the same. This has 

created a general decline in their standard of living as compared to 

the majority. 

Fourthly, they have severe problems in education. Minority 

schools face all kinds of oppressive and restrictive measures. As a 

result minority members are forced to send their children to 

Turkey which accelerates the exodus. It suffices to say that there 

is only two minority students in Greek universities. 

Fifthly, the representation of the minority in parliament faces 

undemocratic practices and provisions. The new election law 

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envisages for independent MP’s to have a country-wide 3% vote 

average in order to be elected. This unusual law will bring to an 

end the short career of two minority MP's at the next election. 

Sixthly, the minority being Muslim is different from the 

Christian majority. But, they cannot elect their own muftis who are 

appointed by the government of Christian creed. This is a most 

unusual practice never seen in any part of the world. 

There are many other discriminatory measures which make 

everyday life miserable, such as construction permits. Traffic 

licenses etc… 

I will not elaborate the events of 29 January 1990 during which 

200 shops belonging to minority members were destroyed and 40 

of them beaten by organized mobs in front of the police. 

Responsibles have not been apprehended and indemnity has not 

been paid up to now. 

A last point, it is customary to mention the geographic names in 

the language of the country concerned. Therefore, Constantinople, 

Tenedos and Imbros should be changed as Istanbul, Bozcaada and 

Gökçeada in the report. 

Thank you. 


91


Executive Committee of the Programme of the United 

Nations High Commissioner For Refugees, 45th session, 

491st Meeting, 4 October 1994, Geneva 

Mr. AKTAN (Turkey) said that his delegation regretted that the 

effects of armed conflicts and media pressures forced the 

international community to take humanitarian action rather than 

to examine the root causes of the tragedies which produced 

refugees and displaced persons. In such circumstances, prevention 

remained an essential element of the UNHCR programme. 

However, it was difficult to forecast when a crisis might degenerate 

into a conflict and to sound the alarm in time. And there were some 

crisis-prone countries which knew how to live with their problems. 

International intervention of a preventive nature in such cases 

might well accelerate the process rather than eliminate the 

possibility of a conflict. 

Violence had always been part of history. What was new was the 

attempt to control violence by nurturing human rights and 

democracy in situations of conflict marked by anarchy or famine. 

Democracy and human rights required not only a socio-economic 

infrastructure but also a political order, a prior condition of which 

was respect for State sovereignty, a concept sometimes regarded as 

obsolete. 

However, it was not history alone which condemned the crises 

in various countries of the world. It seemed that a sudden 

dislocation in international affairs had caused virtually 

simultaneous upheavals in a very large number of countries. 

Ethnic, religious or cultural disputes were not the causes of such 

dislocation; they were its effects, and it was not certain that a 

preventive approach would be effective. Such an approach 

concealed a humanitarian trap which was much more serious than 

it seemed at first sight. It concealed the terrible fact that a political 


93


order which had collapsed was being restored by violence and that 

the rule of law which was supposed to restrain coercion by the 

State would be instituted only at a later stage. In the interim, acts 

of violence of every kind were part and parcel of the process. 

Another characteristic of the humanitarian trap was the 

obsessive tendency of the international community to promote 

ethnic, religious and cultural rights as a means of stifling potential 

conflicts without any regard for the traditional balances in the 

countries concerned and thus to contribute to the problems which 

it would later have to solve. Such a situation was to be found, for 

example, in developing countries where a disintegrated political left 

seemed to identify its own pitiful fate with the fate of ethnic groups 

which appeared repressed, marginalized or despised. The NGOs, 

most of which were acting out their existential problems in a 

dislocated manner, could only exacerbate the problems of others, 

which were fundamentally different from their own. 

The purely humanitarian approach could not compensate for 

the collapse of the North-South dialogue or take the place of the 

political will and action which conflict situations demanded. That 

was why a new order which had certainly degenerated into empty 

rhetoric remained the only comprehensive response to the ills of 

the post-cold-war era. 

In her Note on International Protection the High Commissioner, 

aware of the gaps in the international legal regime governing 

refugees, had put forward the notion of "temporary protection". 

That revolutionary concept was the product of a pragmatic 

approach. When applied in practice, temporary protection should 

be used on a case by case basis and for a clearly limited period. 

After that period, the protection of the persons concerned must be 

taken over by the whole international community. Temporary 

protection should preferably lead to early voluntary return to the 

country of origin, where the necessary preparations for that 

eventuality would have to have been made. Any other option might 

invite refoulement and thus the definitive refusal of that pragmatic 

solution. Such a flexible approach should be regarded as an 

expedient and not codified in any way. 

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Statement made at the “International Conference on the 

Protection of Victims of War”, 1 September 1993 

(After the statement by Boutros Gali and Flavio Cotti) 

Mr. President 

This is a timely conference. 

We can take stock of recent experiences and try to devise ways 

and means to overcome difficulties. We can also undertake a soulsearching 

exercise to see where we made mistakes, if any. 

It is obvious that international humanitarian law has been 

increasingly frequently and atrociously violated in the recent 

conflicts. What is more, we witness almost daily all kinds of 

violations on our TV screens. Our peoples sharply aware of the 

shortcomings of humanitarian efforts and extremely sensitised to the 

pains of the victims expect of us immediate, practical and effective 

response to this situation. 

As a first step we will give them a thoroughly negotiated text of the 

Declaration, showing that we know the problem and that we 

committed ourselves to doing our best to ensure universal respect for 

the law. 

However, unless we correctly assess the situation, our renewed 

commitments would be doomed to failure. In the past also, Parties to 

conflicts must have violated the rules of their customs and the law 

much more frequently and flagrantly than national histories 

admitted. The main characteristic of the present armed conflicts, 

however, is that the Parties’ non-observance of the rules embodied in 

the Geneve Conventions has turned into a contempt for them. 

New developments related to armed conflicts have adversely 

affected the behaviour of the Parties. It is quite possible that this is 


95


an ongoing trend since the Second World War. Growing mass 

destruction capability of conventional weapons together with the 

concept of total war resulted in an enormous increase in civilian 

casualties. Limited objectives of the previous wars gave way to life 

and death struggles of ideological nature during the cold-war era. 

Strategies of revolutionary warfare justified all means for prescribed 

ends. 

Therefore, armed conflicts are now waged in a context where law, 

morals and ethics of war had already been largely eroded. 

The changing character of the present armed conflicts further 

exacerbates violations. Wars are fought not by well-established 

States which are conscious of their obligations. Ethnic groups are 

the main Parties to the conflicts which broke out as a result of the 

disintegration of the States. These conflicts in turn accelerate the 

disintegration process. In many countries, they have already 

degenerated into tribal wars. 

The only goal of these struggles is to expel the members of other 

ethnic groups from a given territory which is designated to be the 

exclusive homeland of one ethnic group, hence the ominous term of 

ethnic cleansing. Victimizers unscrupulously dehumanized 

centuries-old neighbors in order to feel justified to subject them to 

untold cruelties. To this effect they memorized almost automatically 

the real or mythological hurts they themselves had encountered in 

history. This gave them a sense of entitlement. In the grip of egoism 

of the victimized, they felt entitled to doing every evil in order to reach 

their objective without feeling any regret or guilt. They lost their 

empathy for others. They even dared to complain about genocide 

against them when only they themselves committed genocide against 

their victims. 

The first casualty of these conflicts is humanity together with 

what human civilization painstakingly brought about in terms of 

ethos and institutions, including international humanitarian law. 

Under these conditions I have some doubts as to whether our 

renewed commitment at this Conference to a more efficient 

implementation of the law would change this situation in a 

meaningful way. 

It is true, war is a fact of life. Since we cannot eliminate it, at least 

we ought to protect its victims. But, this assessment is based on the 

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supposition that the Parties to the conflict are responsible actors, not 

self-righteous bandits or terrorist gangs. It is now too late to 

disseminate the law and educate them. Moreover, once the 

disintegration process sets on, the previously educated ones regress 

so much that they abandon the minimum restraint and scruple. 

Recently, we talk about preventive diplomacy. To be serious and to 

be taken seriously, we have to see to it that the present conflicts be 

justly resolved in the first place. If an aggression which trampled upon 

every possible rule of international humanitarian law is crowned with 

success at internationally organized peace negotiations, how could we 

expect future aggressors to be deterred by our preventive diplomacy 

This is the case in point in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this is what is 

unfolding in Karabagh region of Azerbaijan. 

What do we want to prevent exactly Aren’t we or our human 

rights circles supporting all over the world ethnic struggles in the 

name of defending ethnic rights What do we expect from ethnic 

terrorists: respect for human rights and humanitarian law 

Today, most of the armed conflicts, international or national, are 

increasingly fought with resort to prohibited methods which amount 

to terrorism, regardless of the size and structure of the forces. 

Terrorism came to be condoned, if not justified, for influential 

human rights circles think that terrorism is a response, a painful but 

inevitable is quite active in countries with democratic regimes and 

developed economies. As a result, we grew accustomed to seeing 

atrocious scenes created by a prohibited warfare. We turn blind eye 

on countries which fuel ethnic conflicts, provide arms, training 

ground and sanctuaries to terrorists be they called guerrilla, militia 

or armed force. 

I am afraid that, with this frame of mind which does not favour 

multi-ethnic solutions to problems, we may exacerbate tensions 

rather than prevent them from getting out of hand. 

Therefore, I humbly suggest that we seize of this opportunity 

which has been so generously offered to us by the Swiss Government 

to initiate an introspective analysis as much as we try to restore 

order to the outside world. Luckily we may discover that we are also 

part of the problem, and that we have to change ourselves before we 

change others. 

Thank you. 


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Executive Committee of the Programme of the United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 

Forty-fourth session, 485th Meeting, 

6 October 1993, Geneva 

Mr. AKTAN (Turkey) said that, as a country situated at the very 

centre of a region where refugee-generating conflicts were taking 

place and having historical and cultural ties with most of the 

peoples affected, Turkey was greatly concerned with the problem of 

prevention. The first questions that arose were what to prevent and 

how to set about doing so. A systemic or holistic approach, rather 

than the analytical one usually adopted in the modern world, was 

called for when attempting to assess the refugee problem. The High 

Commissioner had appeared to feel the same need when she had 

advocated a comprehensive strategy; the United Nations pursued 

the same objective when it stressed the coordinating role of the 

Department of Humanitarian Affairs in complex emergencies. A 

thorough debate on the problem was called for if an international 

consensus was to be achieved. 

Although the international community had been aware for 

decades that the population explosion was bound to cause grave 

harm to the environment and that the situation, especially in the 

least developed countries, would be exacerbated by slowdowns in 

economic growth, it had failed to prevent the situation from 

occurring. Today, it could hardly hope to solve the resulting 

refugee problems by re-establishing order or restoring development 

in the countries of origin before the refugees’ repatriation, but had 

to be content with encouraging voluntary repatriation and hoping 

that the refugees would remain in their countries once they had 

returned there. 

While it was true that democratic countries did not create 

refugees or displaced persons in times of peace, he doubted 


99


whether that was so exclusively because they recognized human 

rights and freedoms. History showed that most democratic 

countries had achieved their territorial integrity and political unity 

through a blend of persuasion and force. Their high level of 

development produced a wealth of goods sufficient either to meet 

or to curb the demands of ethnic groups which themselves were 

largely assimilated in homogenized cultures. Yet even democratic 

countries were not altogether free from problems. 

The refugee problems created by totalitarian regimes had not 

been of unmanageable proportions. Refugees were the product of 

disintegrating States or, paradoxical as that might seem, of 

countries in the process of democratization: the former through 

loss of political authority, the latter through loss of an allembracing 

ideology. In addition to endangering the precarious 

process of economic reform excessively rapid democratization 

could encourage virulent ethno-nationalism, which, short of 

equally vicious repression, was bound to create refugee flows. That 

dilemma of disintegrating empires was one with which his country 

was all too familiar. 

It had to be recognized that democracy was not a guarantee for 

the promotion of ethnic rights in the short run, but, rather, a 

political and legal framework within which ethnic groups could 

strive to promote their rights, provided that they remained within 

legitimate bounds - a long and difficult political struggle which, if 

peacefully pursued, stood some chance of leading towards a 

balanced and civilized outcome. To believe that transplanting 

democracy and respect for human rights would necessarily and 

immediately eliminate the root causes of refugee flows was both 

idealistic and simplistic. 

Among the causes of the refugee problem, no mention was ever 

made of the implications of the foreign policies of developed 

countries or of their societies’ attitudes towards ethnic problems in 

the rest of the world. In many developed democratic societies, there 

was an undeniable bias in favour of the collective rights of ethnic 

groups in other countries. That was particularly true of the attitude 

of non-governmental organizations, whose sense of identity with 

ethnic groups outside their own countries sometimes went so far 

as to lead them to support ethnic terrorism. Yet the same nongovernmental 

organizations were sometimes prone to overlook the 

situation of ethnic groups in their own countries such as 

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foreigners, asylum seekers or migrant workers exposed to racist 

violence. It was difficult to avoid the impression that such 

attitudes, rather than representing the conscience of the societies 

in question, let alone mankind as a whole, served purely 

therapeutic ends. Nevertheless, non-governmental organizations 

exercised a strong influence over the media which shaped public 

opinion and, in that way, contributed to the shaping of foreign 

policy. 

Of course, foreign policy was not simply a matter of 

transforming popular sympathies or dislikes into attainable 

objectives; it had its own aims which had little to do with morality. 

Gaining a competitive political and economic edge in a predatory 

international environment sometimes called for destabilizing the 

competitors by exploiting their ethnic differences. Under such 

circumstances, democracy and respect for human rights appeared 

irrelevant and an explosive potential for refugee creation was 

considered to be of secondary importance. 

According to a theory which had recently gained currency in the 

international media, the West was the Empire, while all other 

States were barbarians. A second theory divided the world into a 

zone of peace and a zone of turmoil; according to a third, the clash 

of civilizations was imminent and inescapable. 

Under the first theory, Turkey, located as it was in the 

intermediary region between the Empire and the barbarians, had 

the mission of blocking the migratory movements of the new 

barbarians towards the Empire. The third theory saw Turkey as 

being torn between its Muslim religion and its Western vocation 

and thus caught up in the clash of the two irreconcilable 

civilizations. While he was inclined to consider all three theories to 

be mere fantasies, he wished to make it clear that Turkey should 

not be counted on to provide a barrier to marching barbarians, 

whoever they might be. 

Turning to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and having 

paid a tribute to the staff of UNHCR and ICRC and members of 

non-governmental organizations working there and thanked the 

European Community and other donors for their generous 

contributions, he said that the main lesson of the tragedy was that 

peace-keeping could not be carried out in tandem with an ongoing 

war. To provide food and relief, but not protection, to those who 


101


were targets of war was in itself a blatant contradiction. In Bosnia 

as well as in the Caucasus region, refugees were not a by-product 

of the conflict, but its main aim. Every resolution of the 

international community that was left unheeded and was not 

enforced cost UNHCR money. 

Many other potential areas of ethnic conflict with far larger 

populations than Bosnia and Herzegovina were likely to generate 

wars that would also aim at ethnic cleansing. Unless the 

international community was determined to stop the aggression 

and enforce peace, UNHCR’s presence would not suffice to prevent 

those situations from getting out of control. The international 

community, had, however, lost all its credibility in Bosnia by giving 

the green light to forces which wanted to dump their undesirable 

ethnic elements on the international community as refugees. 

Under those circumstances, it was safe to guess that UNHCR’s 

growth would continue to be exponential. 

What was needed was not only a comprehensive strategy geared 

to a culture of cooperation, but foreign policy consensus on an 

intergovernmental strategy based on sanity more than on 

compassion. The international community had to do some soul 

searching before it lost its soul for good. 

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Mr. AKTAN (Observer for Turkey) congratulated Mr. Eide on his 

statement with which he was virtually in total agreement. His 

Government was endeavouring to promote the rights of ethnic 

minorities along the lines indicated by Mr. Eide. International peace 

and security were regarded by the United Nations human rights 

system as an essential condition for the enjoyment of human rights 

and freedoms. That statement gave the deceptive impression that, at 

times when international peace and security broke down, although 

their fundamental rights were impaired the peoples who were 

affected went on living as usual. The situation in Bosnia and 

Herzegovina was a case in point and the Sub-Commission had an 

obligation to consider it. He did not think it necessary to dwell on the 

human suffering occurring in that region and on those who were 

responsible for it, since everyone knew all too well who they were. 

Instead, he would concentrate on the implications in the short or 

long term of those events on the new international economic order. 

He wished to stress, in particular, that without a domestic and 

international political order there could be no justice, no 

development and no human rights. No political order was perfect, 

since every order reflected the imperfections of the life of society, and 

the human condition. But the breakdown of order is more terrible 

still since it engendered anarchy. 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the fate of the international order was 

at stake. One kind of international order had died with the collapse 

of communism; the new order, scarcely emergent, already seemed to 

be condemned. It was important that it should be established and 

that the international community should mobilize itself, which it 


103


seemed to find difficult when principles conflicted with particular 

interests. Everyone was aware that the aggression in Bosnia must be 

stopped without, however, managing to do so. Such a situation 

meant a victory for aggression and a defeat for the international 

community. He considered the maintenance of the order to be of 

primary importance and impotence to be more deadly, than excesses 

of power. If one refrained from intervening, on the pretext of the 

difficulty of the enterprise, the aggressor would always have his own 

way. After Croatia, it would be the turn of Kosovo and Macedonia, 

where intervention would be as complicated as in Bosnia. 

Referring to the destiny of Europe, he said that it was paralysed 

by the tensions created within it by the juxtaposition of immense 

power and extreme weakness. It was unaware that a second-best 

scenario was suicidal. The concern shown by Europe in the 

problems of other continents was, in his view, a way of avoiding 

confronting the emblematic question of Bosnia, while cease-fire after 

cease-fire was violated. To refrain from taking action or to seek to 

limit intervention to humanitarian aid to the victims was to confer 

legitimacy on the aggressor. It amounted to that when one asked his 

permission to enter the camps to see that the inmates were well 

treated instead of challenging his right to open those camps and 

demanding that he should close them immediately. 

The Security Council envisaged the use of force only to be able to 

distribute humanitarian aid. However, the situation called for very 

different solutions and the use of force only in order to distribute 

humanitarian aid amounted to acquiescing in the dismemberment of 

Bosnia and Herzegovina in the name of ethnic purity with all its 

disastrous consequences. It was not just the new international order 

that was in peril but also the universal character of Western 

civilization. The ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was paving the way for 

religious cleansing throughout Europe, starting in Macedonia and 

Kosovo. It was not power nor influence that made for a universal 

civilization, but true pluralism which accommodated ethnic and 

religious diversity. An increasingly parochial civilization would 

merely establish an order, but an order in which democracy and 

human rights would be concepts devoid of meaning could only be 

maintained by force. Amid the sound and fury, a lament arose from 

the ruins of Sarajevo while the new international order agonized and 

the values of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment faded from the 

memory of those who were free but lacking in courage. 

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Racism 

Irkçılık

106


Racism 

Gündüz Aktan made detailed and in-depth studies of racism. 

These speeches, delivered in 1993 and 1994, tackle the issues 

of the roots of racism, its manifestations, the conditions that 

give rise to racism, the struggle against racism and the relations 

between racism and other Western-born concepts. Aktan 

criticized the failure to place adequate importance on racism as 

a Western-born concept within the human rights debates of the 

time. 

Aktan argued that the criticism concerning human rights 

violations targeted at Turkey in the early ‘90s was far from 

being objective, and analyzed the reemergence of racist attacks 

and the rise of a racist movement in the West, particularly in 

Europe, during the same period as an example. Aktan 

emphasized that racism was born in Western Europe, and did 

not require a conflict or dispute to emerge. Aktan claimed that 

economic downturns and an increase in the number of resident 

aliens were not factors in the emergence of racism, and proved 

that racism in Western Europe must not be confused with other 

facts such as anti-Semitism, xenophobia, heterophobia or 

ethnocentricism. 

Gündüz Aktan underlined that racism was a mechanism to 

find a scapegoat from a psychological perspective. In this 

respect, he argued that racism was utilized to overcome crises 

of identity inherent in societies by placing the burden of all 

wrongdoings, inadequacies and guilt on a specific group of 

people, casting them off as the other. He also emphasized that 

the manifestation of such otherness as racism was directly 

correlated with the Protestant Ethics. Aktan claimed that 

faithbased conflict would be an inevitable part of the new 

international system. 


107


Gündüz Aktan criticized the negligence of the international 

human rights systems towards the victims of racism and racism 

as a manifest fact. He argued that the socalled struggle against 

racism in Western countries were limited to cosmetic changes. 

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Gündüz Aktan


Irkçılık 

Gündüz Aktan Irkçılık konusunda ayrıntılı ve derinliği 

bulunan çalışmalar yapmıştır. 1993-1994 yılları arasında yaptığı 

konuşmalarda, Irkçılığın kökenleri, ortaya çıkma biçimi, ona 

zemin hazırlayan etkenler, Irkçılık ile mücadele ve Irkçılık ile 

diğer Batı kökenli kavramlar arasındaki ilişkileri incelemiştir. 

Batı kökenli bir mefhum olarak ırkçılığa, günümüzde insan 

hakları tartışmaları içerisinde gereken önemin atfedilmemesi 

eleştirilmiştir. 

Doksanlı yılların başında Türkiye’ye yöneltilen insan hakları 

temelindeki eleştirilerin objektif olmadığına dikkat çeken Aktan, 

örnek olarak Batı’da ve özelde Avrupa’da yakın zamanda yeniden 

patlak veren ırkçı saldırılar ve yükselen bir akım olarak Irkçılığı 

incelemiştir. Irkçılığın Batı Avrupa temelli bir olgu olduğunu 

vurgulamış, ayrıca ırkçılığın ortaya çıkmasında herhangi bir 

çatışma veya anlaşmazlık gerekliliği olmadığının altını çizmiştir. 

Ekonomik buhran veya artan yabancı varlığının,ırkçılığın ortaya 

çıkmasına sebep teşkil eden faktörler olmadığını ifade eden 

Aktan, Batı Avrupa’da ırkçılığın anti-semitizm, yabancı 

düşmanlığı, farklılık düşmanlığı (heterophobia) veya etnikmerkezcilik 

gibi olgular ile karıştırılmaması gerektiğini, kanıtları 

ile ortaya koymuştur. 

Gündüz Aktan psikolojik açıdan ırkçılığın, bir günah keçisi 

bulma mekanizması olduğunu vurgulamıştır. Bu şekilde 

ırkçılığın etkinlik kazandığı toplumlarda var olan kimlik krizinin 

giderilmeye çalışıldığı, tüm günah, suçluluk ve eksikliklerin bir 

kişi veya gruba yönlendirilerek ötekileştirildiğini belirtmektedir. 

Ancak söz konusu ötekileştirmenin ırkçılık olarak cereyan 

etmesinin, Protestan Etik ile doğrudan alakalı olduğunun altını 

çizmektedir. Aktan bu noktada din temelli çatışmaların, yeni 

uluslararası sistemin kaçınılmaz bir unsuru olacağını da 

bildirmektedir. 


109


Gündüz Aktan doksanlı yılların başında Türkiye aleyhine 

uluslararası alanda yürütülen bu propagandanın tüm 

uluslararası insan hakları sistemi açısından sakıncalarını ve 

objektiflikten uzak eleştiriler sebebiyle ortaya çıkabilecek 

tehlikeleri etkin bir biçimde dile getirmektedir. 

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Gündüz Aktan






Mr. AKTAN (Observer for Turkey) said that over the previous 

year the number of racist incidents in Western Europe had 

increased sharply. The international community had responded to 

that challenge at the forty-ninth session of the Commission on 

Human Rights and at the 1993 World Conference on Human 

Rights and Turkey had played an active role in those deliberations. 

While his country's immediate concern was the fate of Turkish 

workers in Europe who were exposed to racist attacks, in a broader 

sense it regarded racism as potentially dangerous to friendly 

relations between States. It also surmised that, although seemingly 

unrelated, racist undercurrents might be, at least partially, 

responsible for human rights violations beyond their proper 

context, for instance, in the form of ethnic terrorism in other 

countries. 

Turkey had commissioned two independent studies on the 

subject. Their findings and conclusions might help clarify the 

conceptual confusion in that area. They stated that racism, in the 

sense of the biological superiority of a “race” over others was 

historically a recent phenomenon and geographically it developed 

in Western Europe and its white-race-dominated colonies in other 

continents. In other words, the temporal and spatial boundaries of 

racism were fairly narrow and quite distinct. 

Despite their frequent confusion, race and ethnicity were not 

identical categories. Racial distinctions were based on the 

assumption that human beings could be divided into different subspecies 

according to their genetic characteristics, whereas ethnic 


111


discrimination was based on language, religion or cultural 

differences. Those distinctions had been confused after the Second 

World War, since neo-racism had chosen to conceal itself behind a 

perverse interpretation of cultural relativism thereby creating 

confusion between racism per se and ethnic discrimination. 

Unfortunately, the International Convention on the Elimination of 

All Forms of Racial Discrimination had also contributed to that 

confusion by considering all sorts of discrimination under the 

heading of racial discrimination and giving the impression that 

racism was a worldwide phenomenon. 

Racial discrimination and ethnic discrimination drew on 

different sources and were the product of different social, cultural 

and political settings. Confusing the two might give the impression 

that racism existed in all societies and was not an exceptional 

phenomenon plaguing only some cultures. That did not mean that 

ethnic discrimination was less important or its consequences less 

serious; the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina had shown that ethnic 

conflict could be catastrophic, even genocidal. It was nevertheless 

not the same as racial discrimination. 

In an ethnic conflict there were normally two conflicting sides, 

usually fighting for a piece of land, whereas in a political and 

ideological conflict two or more sides fought for political power or 

domination. In an armed ethnic conflict the two sides eventually 

came to hate each other. 

In racism, however, there was no conflict or conflicting sides. 

One group victimized another group with an inexplicable hatred 

and violence, although it did attempt to rationalize its motives. The 

victims of racism were not demanding land or political power, it 

was their very presence that seemed sufficient to prompt racial 

hatred and violence in the racist group. 

The arguments used to justify racism were easily refuted. For 

instance, it was claimed that economic crisis and the resultant 

unemployment, together with an increasing number of foreigners 

were causes of racist incidents. Nevertheless, in many developing 

countries suffering a more severe economic crisis and a greater 

influx of foreigners; there were no racist incidents. Moreover, in 

countries where racism was rampant, unemployed host workers 

were rarely involved in racist violence. Even if sectors of society 

were against the increase in the number of immigrants and asylum 

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seekers, they could and should find far more civilized ways of 

expressing their protest than by killing, beating or burning 

foreigners. Restricting or even halting immigration would not 

reduce or eliminate racism since new target groups would be 

found. Unless a quick remedy was found, the seeds that racism 

had already sown would bear the fruit to durable enmity between 

nations and States, eventually endangering regional and 

international peace and stability. 

An unexpected but dangerous result of racism was its indirect 

contribution to human rights violations and seemingly unrelated 

areas such as ethnic terrorism in other countries. It was 

interesting to note that, with few exceptions, human rights circles 

were not really interested in the lot of foreigners subjected to racist 

violence in their own countries. It would be simple-minded to think 

that NGOs consciously tried to deflect attention from the ills of 

their own societies. It might also be unfair to accuse the NGOs of 

outright racism since there was probably a more subtle mechanism 

at work preventing them from identifying with and defending the 

human rights of victims of racism. 

There were similarities between racism and ethnic terrorism. 

The racist resorted to terrorism against a minority group, whereas 

the terrorist attacked the majority. Both racists and terrorists 

aimed at purifying their “land” from target groups, dehumanizing 

them and perceiving them as the source of all evil. Both racists and 

terrorists try to solve their identity crisis by killing members of the 

target group and did not attempt to solve their “problems” through 

other more civilized means. Both racists and terrorists believe that 

the groups in whose name they acted supported them in their 

despicable actions. 

In view of the above, the overt support given by the terrorist 

leader in his country to the racist violence against Turkish workers 

in another country was perhaps more easily understandable. 

Perhaps the only way to explain the attitude of the human rights 

circles was that a highly sophisticated, even sublimated form of 

racism, was operating and that even they did not comprehend its 

mechanism. As long as those circles played that unconscious 

game, there would be no solution to racism in their countries and 

to ethnic terrorism in other countries. 


113

114


Commission on Human Rights, 49th Session, 17th 

Meeting, Violation of human rights in southern Africa: 

report of the ad-hoc Group of Experts 

(E/CN.4/1993/SR.17) 11 February 1993 

Mr. AKTAN (Observer for Turkey) welcomed the Secretary- 

General's report on measures to combat racism and racial 

discrimination (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/11) and said he hoped that 

the Secretariat would be able to collect further data on racist 

incidents and to deepen its analysis of new forms of racism. The 

problem went far beyond racial discrimination and covered racial 

violence and harassment. The targets were vulnerable groups such 

as indigenous peoples, migrant workers and minorities. It would be 

counterproductive, however, to confuse the traditional forms of 

racism with ethnic, religious and linguistic discrimination, or with 

the vague concept of intolerance. It was no exaggeration to say that 

the way in which the Commission handled the problem would 

affect the future of international efforts in relation to human rights 

in general. 

A non-governmental organization which had been studying the 

question of racism in Western Europe had estimated that at least 

20,000 racist incidents occurred in the region every year. While the 

problem was not confined to Europe, the nature and frequency of 

such incidents there was not such that they could be attributed 

solely to an innate antipathy to outsiders. Turkish people abroad 

were frequently the victims of racist attacks, and his Government 

followed developments in the countries concerned with more than 

a purely humanitarian interest. It welcomed the efforts made by 

the authorities in those countries to combat racism and the many 

expressions of public sympathy with the anti-racist cause. 

The approach adopted by the United Nations to the problem was 


115


based on international control and monitoring of the policies and 

practices of Governments, which were expected to mend their ways 

when subjected to international censure. That approach, however, 

had its limitations, since racial hostility was often expressed in the 

individual and in society at large in forms which Governments 

found difficult to control. There was an inverse relationship 

between racist violence and ethnic terrorism: the former was 

directed by a majority, or in the name of a majority, against a 

supposedly undesirable minority, whereas in the latter case ethnic 

terrorists attacked a majority in the name of a minority. 

It was interesting to see from recent publications of Amnesty 

International on the subject of racism, that the organization had 

extended its coverage beyond the human rights of terrorist 

suspects to include the phenomenon of racism itself a problem 

which should not be addressed solely in the context of the 

behaviour of the police, however, important a factor that might be 

in safeguarding human rights. 

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Psychological Mechanisms of Anti-Semitism and Racism 

(Conference given at the Maison Juive of Geneva) 

17 January 1995 

Mr. President of the Israelite Community of Geneva, 

Mr. President of the Jewish Study Center to the University 

Geneva. 

Ladies and Gentlemen, 

Racism and antisemitism constitute an enormous subject. 

Perhaps it is the only subject which is more complicated than life. 

Indeed it is a major factor which makes life complicated. I will 

explain what I mean: life can be defined as a relationship between 

‘me’ and others. These others are all difterent from me. Racism is 

a form of relationship with the different ones which goes sour. As 

human beings, we cannot escape others. The question is whether 

we can escape racism in our relations with others. 

The subject matter of this conference defined as such is 

obviously more suitable for a philosopher or social scientist than 

a diplomat. Admittedly, there are not many diplomats who take 

particular interest in racism. The only notable exception is 

Gobineau. He was a great literary figure of his time. What is more, 

he was a racist himself. Being racist is somewhat easier than 

being antiracist. Racism of the XIXth century was an article of 

faith rather than a rational endeavour. It was based on a crude 

science and its diverse pseudo-theories. Conversely, antiracism 

requires a vigorous multi-disciplinary analysis to understand the 

mechanism underlying a very complex and irrational attitude of 

the racist. In this respect, the subject goes well beyond the scope 

of diplomacy. 


117


Diplomats for centuries have been entrusted with the task of 

maximizing their countries national interests, without causing 

war. This was already a difficult and serious task by itself. One 

day, we woke up to see at our doorstep a new task, that of human 

rights. We are now asked practically to solve all the riddles of 

humanity, namely, eliminate violence and violations within and 

between our societies, help establish democracy together with 

socioeconomic rights etc. Since what is expected of us is extremely 

immodest. I thought, as a diplomat I could deal with an equally 

immodest subject. 

Let me make it clear at the outset that racism as a concept and 

mechanism should logically cover antisemitism. But antisemitism 

has been for almost two millennia the only extremely dangereous 

from of racism. As such, antisemitism can be conceived as the 

fountain-head of racism. Therefore, it is not wise to merge 

antisemitism into racism. 

As I have said, the subject is vast. We have to reduce it to 

manageable proportions in order to deal with it effectively within 

the time-span of the conference. 

Consequently, I depart from the assumption that you already 

know various aspects of racism and antisemitism, perhaps much 

better than I do. 

For instance, antisemitism goes back to pre-Christian, 

Hellenistic and Roman era, although the term is a recent invention 

that early Christianity, having been born out of judaism had a 

ferocious identity struggle with the mother religion; that since St- 

Augustine, the wandering Jew without homeland was not 

considered only as a sing of an enternal punishment but used also 

as a scapegoat in Christian societies; that the first Crusade has 

started by massacring Jews; that in the late Middle Ages the 

expulsion of Jews from England in 1290, from France in 1394 and 

from Spain in 1492 coincided wtih the beginning of the nationbuilding 

processes in these countries; that neither the Westphalia 

system, nor the following Enlightenment, nor the emancipating 

French Revolution solved or alleviated the problem that the racial 

and linguistic theories of the XIXth century together with its ‘Aryan 

myth’, ‘master race’, ‘racial hygiene’ ended up in the Shoah. 

Antisemitism has proved extremely resilient and protean. It has 

adapted itself to changing conditions by always developing new 

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arguments. Jews were considered an exclusionary community, 

misanthropic, sterile in culture and barbarous in their religious 

practices throughout the antiquity; accused of deicide, desecrating 

host, ritually murdering Christian children and poisoning wells in 

the late Middle Ages. A return to pre-Christian accusations took 

place in the Enlightenment. Biological racism despised the Jews 

and Judaism as racially and culturally inferior in the second half 

of the XIXth century. And in the first decades of the XXth century 

new accusations have been added up to the catalogue, such as the 

world domination of the Jewish financial power, corrupting effect 

of the Jewish money, as well as communism and Bolshevism as 

Jewish plots to destroy western Christian societies etc. But you 

know all this, and I will not dwell on them. 

I will also put aside racism perpetrated against the indigenous 

peoples, blacks or Asians by the discoverers of the New 

Hemisphere or colonisers of the South or white slave traders or the 

apartheid regime in South Africa. 

In explaining racism, I will allocate as short time as possible to 

methodological and theoretical aspects, assuming once again that 

you know something about Freudian psychoanalysis, Jungian 

depth psychology and Girardian concept of violence, as far as they 

are concerned with racism. 

I will not try either to refute racial theories which the UNESCO 

project on the subject has done exceptionally successfully. 

Finally, I will not expound on the resurfacing racism and 

antisemitism in Europe, since the report of the UN Center for 

Human Rights in 1992 the recent report of the UN Special 

Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, the Oakley report of 

the Council of Europe and the Glyn Ford report of the European 

Parliament have provided us with ample evidence in this respect. 

Dear Guests, 

I will try to focus on the psychological mechanism underpinning 

antisemitism and racism. My hypothesis is that, no matter how 

changeable racism or antisemitism is, this mechanism never 

changes and is common to all their forms and manifestations. 


119


Firstly we have to limit the problem in terms of time, space and 

nature. 

Unlike antisemitism, racism is a relatively recent phenomenon 

in history. It is true, we witness pervasive racial attitudes and 

prejudices in the past. But they have not developed into 

ideological and institutional racism until the XIXth and XXth 

centuries. As you see, I mean by racism only biological racism. 

This has taken the form of virulent antisemitism in the first half 

of this century. 

In order to determine the geographical space of racism, I consult 

Encyclopaedia Britannica (Macropaedia. V. 15, pp 359-366). It 

states that racism has developed in western Europe mostly in 

regions where Protestantism has spread and in the white colonies 

of western Europe, namely North America, South Africa and 

Australia. I will not discuss to what extent this is true, though, I 

think, we can assume that it is reasonably true. The UN Sub- 

Commission and Commission on Human Rights also indicate in 

their resolutions these regions and countries as particularly 

susceptible to racism. 

Racism encompasses racially oriented prejudice, attitude, 

discrimination, harassment, violence, segregation, persecution as 

well as expulsion and extermination. Some western circles try to 

make racism dissappear by breaking it down into xenophobia, 

heterophobia, ethnocentrism etc. They claim that in some 

European countries there is no racism but xenophobia with some 

racial violence, that in every country there is ethnocentrism, that 

heterophobia is common to mankind. Thus there is not much to 

worry about. 

We also observe some efforts to present racism as a conflict 

situation. These circles say that outrageous ethnic cleansing 

perpetrated by the Serbs against the Bosniacs is the worst form of 

racism. Thus, all conflicts and wars in history also become 

examples of racism. 

Let me briefly clarify these concepts. Xenophobia cannot be 

applied to Jews or migrant workers, for they are not aliens to 

Europeans, having been living there for years. Heterophobia is not 

supposed to turn into violence or discrimination. Ethnocentrism is 

universal. It is a feeling of superiority of ones’ nation or country. 

Normally, ethnocentrism is not geared to despising or 

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dehumanizing others. The statement “I am greater” implies that 

others can also be great. If, however, the superiority of the one is 

conditional on the inferiority of the other, that will be a malignant 

form of ethnocentrism which is not other than racism. 

Racism is not a conflict between two competing or fighting 

parties. Rather it is a unilateral violence by the racist against his 

victim. In its purest form, the victim does not even defend himself. 

Conflict, in turn, presupposes a clash of interest over a piece of 

land, economic resources, political power or a strategic point. Such 

goals do not play a part in racism. The racist hatred for the target 

group is not a product of the conflict. 

One realizes easily that the racist always tries to rationalize his 

violence against the victim. He explains his aggression by economic 

crisis and unemployment or by the rapidly increasing foreigners. 

The disproportionate nature of his response which takes the shape 

of burning and killing his victim at random flies in the face of these 

arguments. Moreover, in many third world countries with 

backward economies, starvation (never mind unemployment), and 

high number of refugees from neighbouring countries, there occurs 

no racist incident. 

Therefore, I conclude that the very existence of the target group 

in the society is enough to arouse racist feelings in some 

individuals and groups. 

Presently, racism manifests in the guise of cultural relativisim. 

The tragedy of the Second World War thoroughly discredited racist 

theories and doctrines. No one can openly defend racial superiority 

except some small marginal groups. Instead, it can be a 

respectable idea to express that cultures are hermetic categories 

hence incompatible between themselves, and the peoples belonging 

in different cultures are incapable of living together. 

If we push our analysis further, we can realize that cultural 

differences boil down to religious differences. In other words, 

people of different religion are considered not conducive to a 

common life or integration and can be subjected to exclusion and 

racist violence. Nevertheless, this cultural cloak helps racism to 

permeate large segments of the population, as we see racist 

assaults openly applauded by crowds. 


121


Evidently, cultural relativism is racism with religions overtones. 

As we will see, the mechanism underlying racism and cultural 

relativism is one and the same. 

Dear Guests, 

Keeping in mind the assumptions that I have made, I now turn 

to the core issue of the conference. I am of the view that racism is 

nothing more than a specific psychological mechanism. Real life 

issues such as economic crisis, unemployment, increase in the 

number of foreigners or historical traumas such as wars, defeats 

and invasions, or evolution in belief and ideology systems such as 

religious bigotry, humanism, the Enlightenment, romanticism, 

secularism, recent emphasis on respect for human rights and 

freedom etc. have their own effects on racism. But, they cannot 

change this psychological mechanism. 

This mechanism is also called scapegoating. It is as old as 

humanity. Human beings project their sins, guilty feelings and 

other unwanted parts of their character onto a person or a group, 

chosen for their different features. Then they punish the victim or 

victims for their own sins. They redeem themselves at the expense 

of the victim. Since projection is an unconscious process, we are 

not cognitively aware of it. 

This statement raises a set of guestions. Why are the people in 

the Protestant areas of western Europe more prone to projections 

What are the characteristics of the victim What is special with 

racist projection, since projection is a universal mechanism 

Before I embark on elaborating responses to questions, I wish to 

make one point clear. I am neither atheist nor agnostic. But I belive 

that we, the ordinary mortals, can feel God only imperfectly due to 

our still somewhat primitive psychic organisation. Those who were 

able to overcome their existential limits and perceived God in His 

wholeness are prophets whom my analysis does not concern. 

I am sure, you have already guessed the purpose of this 

disclaimer. I will try to focus my analysis on religions as the main 

component, indeed the very basis and the source, of culture, and 

see as to whether a misuse of religion leads to antisemitism and 

racism. What I mean is that, because of our deficient psychic 

organisation, we transform, or degenerate religion in such a way 

that racism, this demon of history, arises as a by-product. 

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Until the advent of the first monotheist religion, humanity had 

undergone various forms of unorganized, mostly mythological 

‘religious experiences. The most representative version of it was 

related to some female dieties such as Rhea, Kybele, Lato, Artemis, 

Isis etc. who constitute the cult of Mother Goddess under different 

names The discovery of the transcendental, immanent and 

omnipotent God by the patriarchs or His descending upon the 

Jewish people has gradually repressed these maternal religions 

into the unconscious. They did not disappear, but remain there 

dormant. Sometimes reactivated, they pass through the psychic 

censures in disguised forms and recapture the soul. This 

phenomenon happens when human beings, individually or as a 

group regress under stress. Psychoanalytically, regression means a 

flight backward to the earlier stages of our life cycle from the 

dangers and difficulties of life. The earliest stage is called ‘primitive 

narcissism’ in which human beings feel that they are at one with 

the surrounding universe, and each individual feels himself to be 

organically the whole as though he was God in a pantheistic sense. 

Thus the childish paradise of total happines is in the final analysis 

that of the preconscious life in the womb, before the “fall” into the 

world. The term fusion with pre-oedipal mother mostly represents 

the negative aspects of the so-called paradise. 

This regression may also happen without stress when people 

abandon the God of monotheism, as in the case of the crude 

scientism of the Enlightenment. Attempting to break the shackles 

of the medieval religious fanaticism, humanity has ended up 

regressed to older, more archaic and primitive levels of psychic 

organisation corresponding to maternal religions with all 

impending violence, instead of becoming freer, more mature and 

rational. Regression to a fusion with pre-oedipal mother for adult 

is deeply guilt-ridden, because it unconsciously entails incest with 

mother. Projection mechanism is then massively resorted to in 

order to attribute this grave sin to the target group which is then 

burned, killed etc. 

After this brief theoretical reference, I will dwell on Christianity 

in order to see why racism is mainly encountered in Christian 

societies. In the Bible and in Christian faith and doctrine there is 

no trace of racism. On the contrary, racism is an anathema to a 

religion based on a profound love of God and on love between 

human beings. Indeed, from the religious point of view, it is an 

enigma that racism has developed in Christian societies. 


123


In the opinion of Mr. Turgut Özal, the late President of Turkey, 

antisemitism is the key for understanding the role of religion in 

racism. In his book ‘Turkey in Europe’ he says: 

“The Christian perceives himself in the image of God. 

Historically, this identification with God through Christ crucified 

for the sins of mankind requires an exceptionally strict ethic which 

renders it very difficult to house in the soul some vital natural 

instincts and impulses together with God. Is it because of the need 

to tackle the evil which is embodied in everything negated by this 

ethic that Jewry, together with other groups, was unconsciously 

used as a target of projection and hence subjected to segregation, 

inquisition, and genocide Let me point out in this context that 

Islam, on the other hand, sanctifies natural instincts provided that 

their activities be regulated and their abuse prohibited. Historically 

this aspect of Islam has been sarcastically criticized. Nevertheless, 

Muslims had little need for a projection mechanism.” 

During the era of the Enlightenment, which is characterized 

together with Christianity as the basis of Western civilization, the 

outburst of reason did not only destroy the irrational elements in 

the religion, but partly the religion itself. Deism, even atheism as 

by-products implied a return to pre-Christian conditions with an 

emphasis on Mother Nature. Is it because of this excessive 

“desacralization” that the sacrifical cycle of primitive (maternal) 

religion (violence cycle of rebirth) has been revived, as a result of 

which hostility was generated towards target groups in the form of 

persecution and ultimately genocide along with the increase in 

wars between nations-states 

Christianity does not have some of the constraints imposed on 

believers by the other monotheist religions. For instance, law based 

on the rigorous ten commandments gave way to love in 

Christianity. Love of the Father replaced fear of the Father, for the 

Father loved us as He loved His Son, Whom He sent to the world 

to save us. Therefore, to appease the wrath of God there is no need 

for animal sacrifice, for the greatest sacrifice was already made by 

the Crucifixion. There is no need for symbolic castration or fasting 

since the soul is protected from lust by Christian baptism, which 

achieves a rebirth in spirit. Nevertheless, any failure in spirituality 

carries the risk of abrupt and profound regression along with 

feelings of sin (guilt), for there are no religious safety nets except in 

monasteries. 

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Unlike God the Father and the son of God in the divine person 

of Christ, the Holy Spirit seems to be a greatly sublimated form of 

the maternal deity, as Jung also points out. The cult of Virgin Mary 

which bridged this gap left by this sublimation, reached the point 

of Mariolatry under some circumstances. Mariolatry, as the 

extension of the Great Mother cult, practically amounted to a 

fusion with pre-oedipal mother which aroused incest anxiety and 

triggered the projection and violence cycle. This was the way how 

Christians have slided back into (or regressing to) the previous 

religious levels of humanity. 

In this context, one can venture another speculation. At a time 

when Christianity spread in Anatolia, the then religious mind-set 

of Anatolia which was based on Kybele and his son Attis or Adonis 

might have influenced it. According to this mythology, Attis having 

incestual intercourse with Kybele dies and falls to earth which he 

fertilizes with his blood. In Mariolatry, was this the pattern which 

has re-emerged though in a radically spiritualized form, and served 

as a model for regressed Christians who disinvested their faith 

from God the Father and reinvested in Mother Goddess, nature, 

universe, humanity etc Perhaps, one can understand the strict 

sexual abstinence of St. Paul and Church fathers as a defence 

mechanism against this mythology. 

But this general assessment does not explain why Protestants 

are more pre-disposed to racism than Catholics. 

Protestantism has flourished mainly among Germanic peoples. 

German humanists believed that the German tribes had been 

living in their homeland from time immemorial, that they had not 

immigrated there. This implied that Germans have been selfbegotten 

in the bosom of the land-mother, without father. The 

observation of Tacitus in ‘Germania’ which was discovered at that 

time confirmed this regressive incestuous belief (that ‘Germans 

were natives, neither the settlement of other peoples, nor their 

hospitability has brought about a mixture in them’). 

Luther, in one of his books, identified the Pope, with whom he 

has engaged in a deadly struggle, with Antichrist and repeated the 

same views in his ‘The Papacy at Rome, instituted by Satan’. He 

also praised the noble nature of Germans while despising Romans. 

These invincible Germans who had knocked out the Roman Giant 

could not accept now their religious rule. As a result, historical 


125


filiation has been severed and cultural progeny denied between 

Germans and the ancients or the Fathers. 

The patricide in the form of the denouncement of the Pope as 

Antichrist and breaking away from the Church of Rome as an 

institution of Satan; an emphasis on the self-generated people in 

maternal land as symbolic incest, have created a psychic situation 

condicive to regression to a fusion with pre-oedipal mother and the 

consequent increase in the feelings of sin. In this light one can 

perhaps assess the editorial of Le Monde (26 December 1992) 

which says that ‘these demonstrations (against racism) reflected in 

(Germany) impregnated with Lutheranism, the need of public 

redemption of a nation which feels sinful.’ 

The harsh doctrine of the absolute transcendental nature of 

God, the belief that everything pertaining to the flesh is corrupt 

and pre-destination in the Reformation seem to be a reaction to or 

a compensation for this ‘sinfulness’. Therefore, in Protestantism, 

there was little room for the very human Catholic cycle of sin, 

repentance, atonement, release followed by renewed sin. The 

projection mechanism must have developed as the only means of 

the relief for the protestant who has projected every sin-generating 

instinct and desire onto the victim. 

Rigour of Protestantism must have influenced child-rearing 

practices, putting heavy emphasis on bodily cleanliness, 

orderliness, submission to authority etc. As a result, compulsive, 

rigid, perfectionist, and intolerant character structures have 

become prominent. Accordingly, foreigners who are not as 

compulsive as Germans are accused of being dirty, disorderly, 

noisy, untidy etc. But these are natural tendencies and desires of 

the child which are repressively denied by parents who are moved 

by their guilty feelings. Once these unwanted parts of the character 

are projected onto foreigners, they are despised and hated in the 

same way as these parents have despised and hated their 

“naughty” children. 

Dear Guest, 

The reason why this overdeveloped projection mechanism in the 

Protestant has acquired racist features can be explained by the 

particularities of German nationalism. 

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Nationalism has regressive roots in all great European nations 

it has started with regicide i.e. killing the king, which was 

unconsciously perceived as patricide. As I have said, the symbolic 

Pope-killing can be conceived as the beginning of German 

nationalism. At the same time, Germany has been somewhat 

unlucky in her nation-building. In contrast with Britain and 

France, German nationalism has developed as a reaction to a 

humiliating defeat and invasion by the Napoleonic France. The 

hatred this has aroused led to the projection of all negative 

elements in German character onto France and French people. 

Therefore, an intense projection lies at the foundations of German 

nationalism. 

Nation-state has been built upon three pillars, namely a 

homeland, a State structure and a nation. German had no welldefined 

borders or well-established state structure contrary to 

other western countries. Instead, German nationalists made an 

excessive motional investment in German people as a race, nation, 

language and culture. 

In this sense, German concept of nationalism has already come 

closer to racism. This has made Germany more vulnerable than 

others to racist theories of superiority which prevailed with the rise 

of romanticism, crude science of biology and Darwininian 

evolution. Christianity was rejected by enlightened ones as a 

semitic religion. The nature religion came back with all its 

maternal character sometimes in the form of deism or pantheism 

sometimes in ‘the great return to the past, by maternal and 

nocturne idea of the past’ of romanticism as in the words of 

Thomas Mann. An obsessive search for origins ended up in 

Himalayas to fantasy a superior Aryan race. Norse mythology reemerged 

in the operas of anti-semitic Wagner. The abysmal depth 

of regression has triggered massive projections of racial content. 

The target of these projections was naturally the Jews who were of 

semitic race. 

This is now and why the Germans are more prone than other 

Protestants to regression and projection. 

Now I turn to the second question, namely why Jews have been 

chosen for the target of these projections. 

Throughout the history of European Jewry, they have always 

been subjected to projections by the Christians. We know the 


127


religious reasons for this situation. The power relationship between 

the two sides also contributed to the majority’s ability to mistreat 

them at will. But in periods of particular stress such as Crusades, 

Hundred Year Wars, Reconquista in the Iberian peninsula, 

German nation-building process, Second republic in France and 

interwar period in this century, west European peoples have 

regressed deeper, projections onto Jews intensified proportionately 

and the content of these projections become more dehumanizing. 

But Jews were not alone as target for projections. Cathars, 

Lepers, Witches, Africans, indigenous peoples of North and Latin 

Americans, Muslims and Turks have also been used as receptacle 

for projections. The question is why these projections have 

concentrated incomparably more on Jews and led to their 

expulsion in 1492 from Spain or to the Holocaust between 1933- 

45. 

The short answer to this question is that each time the Jews 

opted for assimilation in order to save themselves, they had to face 

not only persecution, but, unexpectedly, expulsion and 

annihilation. Let me try to explain why this paradox has come 

about. 

The purpose of the projection mechanism is to dump all the 

unwanted parts of the character on the victim. The underlying 

assumption is that this material will never return to the projecting 

side. If the target is black, the skin colour constitutes such an 

unalterable and immutable barrier that whatever projected is 

contained by the black, even if he lives amids the society. 

Therefore, racism in the United States is relatively stable. But, 

Jews or migrant Turks, being white, cannot contain projected 

material. Therefore, their religion, language, culture and traditions 

are overemphasised by the racist as structurally distinctive marks 

which distinguish them from the majority in place of skin color. 

When the Jews in Spain started converting to Christianity in 

order to escape persecution, in psychoanalytic terms, the projected 

material has boomeranged. The return of his unwanted and denied 

aspects deeply destabilized the Christian who felt it as a 

psychological annihilation of his character. Christians have been 

accusing Jews of the deicide, ritual murder and poisoning wells. 

These were silly accusations. But Christians who have identified 

themselves with Christ or regressed to the level of children must 

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have paranoically felt that the Jews were to kill them as they killed 

Christ. Originally, they had wanted to kill the Jews and together 

with them their sins projected onto the Jews. Once their 

murderous instincts were also attributed to the Jews, they were 

afraid to be killed by the Jews. In reaction, they established the 

Inquisition to check whether the conversos contained these 

projected material which included Christians’ murderous instincts. 

The Inquisition which, by deliberate choice judged mostly the 

conversos, not the Jews who kept Judaic faith, proved that they 

were not real Christian. Hence, conversos paid the terrible price 

with their lives. Other Jews loaded with the unwanted parts of the 

Christians were expelled. Thus the boomerang possibility of the 

projected material was eliminated. 

A similar fate befell the Jews of Western Europe in this century. 

They were emancipated formally in 1791, practically in 1871. With 

the euphoria the emancipation has created, a large group of Jews 

opted for dejudaisation. They considered Judaism as the obstacle 

to their assimilation. Since in their view religion lost its 

importance, most of them did not convert to Christianity. These 

mainly Haskala Jews have richly contributed to their societies 

economically and culturally. But, the container effect of Judaism 

has been destroyed through assimilation and the boomeranged 

projected material once again. This has further enhanced the 

regression in the Christians of the Protestant Germany who have 

been already unusually regressed under the conditions described 

above. They massively reprojected the returned material on the 

Jews. This time, the Jews who abandoned the bastion of their 

identity namely Yahweh, could not resist these projection. Their 

psychic resistance having broken down they started introjecting 

the projected unwanted aspects of Christians. Their self-esteem 

was incurably wounded and self-hatred set in. Theodor Lessing, 

among others, tells the story of suiciding brilliant Jewish 

intellectuals in this situation. Thus the Jews have become 

potential victims for the Holocaust. 

Freud was one of these Jews who made this fatal mistake. He 

must have tought that Judaism was the main obstacle to the 

togetherness with the Enlightened Christians. He applied 

psychoanalytical techniques to Judaism in his book ‘Moses and 

Monotheism’ in order to demolish it. Strangely enough, it never 

occurred to him to apply psychoanalysis to Christianity so as to 

understand that, not the true Christian faith, but its regressed 


129


form was the cause of racism. On one occasion, he expressed his 

astonishment at the fact that the Catholic Church in Vienna, in 

other words real Christians, helped Jews to escape Nazi 

persecution. 

Dear Guests, 

I think, one essential question remains still unanswered: 

Presently, we do not face a serious stress situation such as war, 

internal disturbance or economic depression which could cause a 

deep regression, hence racism in Europe. So what is the cause of 

racism today 

European Union is a success story. In the post-world war period 

it achieved almost uninterrupted economic growth. It is the largest 

and most affluent entity in the world. There is unemployment but 

also social security. It has its utopia, namely monetary, political 

and security union which is not out of its reach. Its deadly enemy, 

communism was defeated ideologically, economically and 

politically without firing a shot in the air. When one expects that 

Europe should savour her victory, the specter of racism loomed 

large on the horizon. Unless we find a satisfactory explanation for 

racism under these conditions, we risk losing a minimum certainty 

in life. 

I think, there are two reasons of different order which led to this 

situation. 

First one is European integration itself. The real or 

psychological possibility that the nation-state will dissolve in 

integration process causes a kind of vague but deep malaise in 

member countries. Borders in which there has been enormous 

emotional investment in history in terms of endless wars and 

blood-shed are becoming more and more porous. The State which 

symbolized “protecting father” and “caring mother” is losing its 

prerogatives or transferring them to Brussels. Mutual hatred 

created in history between nations is being released and left 

aimless as a result of constant cooperation within the Union. 

This profound transformation inevitably brings about an 

identity crisis and consequent regression. 

Right at this moment, Europe has lost its enemy onto whom she 

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has been projecting all its unwanted parts. The Soviet Union 

collapsed and the new Russian Federation adopted the Western 

value system i.e. democracy, respect for human rights and free 

market economy. In this regard, Germany had an additional 

problem i .e. reunification. For almost half a century, this country 

was accustomed to projecting large part of its denied and rejected 

past, namely Nazi regime, genocide, war etc. onto the east. Now all 

this material bounced back, causing deeper regression which is not 

perceptible at first sight. This happens at a time when Germany 

comes to terms with its past which is bound to come back with 

painful memories and ethnocentric nationalism. 

At hand, there are migrant workers who have replaced the 

Jews All of a sudden, this released material has been reprojected 

onto them after 25 years of togetherness. Islam has been 

rediscovered as the new enemy image. Human rights circles of 

these countries have taken to the task of targeting the countries of 

these migrant workers as the source of human rights violations. 

They want to give the message “Not that we, but that they are the 

racists for they oppress their ethnic groups”. 

So the story goes on. 

The remedy for this situation, you murmur. I would say prayer 

to the true God. 

Thank you. 


131

132


Commission on Human Rights, 51st Session, 

11th Meeting 

Implementation of the Programme of Action for 

the Third Decade to Combat Racism and 

Racial Discrimination 

E/CN.4/1994/SR.11 9 February 1995 

Summary Record of the meeting hold on 6 February 1995 

Mr. AKTAN (Observer for Turkey) said it was unfortunate that 

the report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of 

racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance 

(E/CN.4/I995/78 and Add.I) had only just been made available to 

the Commission, giving members very little time to consider the 

information it contained. The Special Rapporteur had previously 

recommended that an interdisciplinary seminar should be 

organized on the theoretical aspects of contemporary forms of 

racism. Such a seminar had been held at Istanbul in January 

1995, but neither the Special Rapporteur nor representatives from 

the Centre for Human Rights had attended, although they had 

been invited. 

Racism appeared to have permeated almost all segments of 

some societies. Racists had their own political parties and media, 

with an array of experts and historians to support their views. 

Racist attitudes were widespread and acts of discrimination were a 

daily occurrence, to which people barely paid attention. 

Governments had so far been unable to achieve substantial results 

in combating racism. The main problem was that they were chiefly 

interested in cosmetic changes rather than in taking the patient 

steps necessary to achieve real progress. 


133


Racism, as currently practised, was sometimes cloaked in the 

guise of cultural relativism. It was also erroneously grouped 

together with ethno-nationalism and religious fundamentalism. It 

was true that all three were exclusionary movements which 

directed feelings of hatred towards a target group and encouraged 

attacks on members of that group. However, unlike the other two 

movements, racism did not arise from a conflict between opposing 

parties; it was based on irrational rather than material reasons. 

Nor did racism arise from demographic changes and economic 

crises: those might be aggravating factors but were not root causes. 

It was difficult to understand why the human rights system had 

turned a blind eye to the suffering of the innocent victims of 

racism. Apparently, their very innocence made them less worthy of 

consideration and less threatening. Innocent victims did not rise 

up in armed rebellion. Thus, the human rights system was closely 

monitoring the alleged violations of the human rights of terrorist 

suspects while it virtually condoned the murder of civilians by 

ethnic terrorists. 

By classifying human beings into a hierarchy, racism was 

incompatible with the very concept of humanity. A racist individual 

was not in a position to promote the human rights of those whom 

he had designated as being on the lower end of the scale. Moreover, 

the first priority of a racist was not to promote the human rights of 

others but to prove that he was not a racist. Criticizing the human 

rights records of others led to ranking countries in a hierarchy and 

blaming those at the lower end of the scale for oppressing their own 

ethnic groups, which only paved the way for racist attacks against 

their own citizens abroad. 

Unless racism was dealt with appropriately, racist attacks and 

ethnic violence would continue. Racism was a test case for the 

United Nations system. His Government would review its 

cooperation with that system on the basis of its response to that 

challenge. 

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12th Meeting, Implementation of the Programme of 

Action for the Second Decade to Combat Racism 

and Racial Discrimination, 

Summary Record of the meeting of 8 February 1994 

E/CN. 4/1994/SR.12 of 11 February 1994 

Mr. AKTAN (Observer for Turkey) said that racism, racial 

discrimination and racial violence were perhaps the most frequent 

form of human rights violations. They were to be found in some 

parts of the world and not in others and did not occur everywhere 

in varying degrees. The recent new manifestations of racism had 

emerged mainly in developed countries. 

There were fundamental differences between racial 

discrimination and ethnic discrimination. Turkey did not wish to 

become a party to the International Convention on the Elimination 

of All Forms of Racial Discrimination precisely because it confused 

different types of discrimination. Ethnic cleansing, for instance, 

had nothing to do with racism. It was an attempt to seize land by 

killing or deporting its occupiers, an inhuman and genocidal action 

but not a motiveless one. The most important criterion of racism 

was the innocence of the victim, who was targeted because of his 

or her physical traits. Racism was motiveless, whatever the 

specious arguments to the contrary. Economic problems 

contributed to a resurgence of racism, but only if a racist 

mechanism already existed. 

The fact that there were fewer racist incidents if there was a 

decline in the number of foreigners or asylum seekers was not a 

real cure. The racists would simply look for new targets which 

might be the peoples of neighbouring countries, members of a 

different religion or civilization. 


135


Racism was a mechanism of projecting one's own evil on to a 

target in order to relieve oneself of a deep sense of guilt. The return 

of his own guilt was felt as extremely dangerous by the racist who 

then tried to exterminate or expel the target group. Racist acts were 

committed mainly by individuals and groups, not by States, so 

racism as such did not conform to the traditional definition of the 

violation of human rights. However, it adversely affected friendly 

relations between peoples and countries. General Assembly 

resolutions on racism regarded racist acts as grave violations of 

human rights, regardless of their source. 

What was important to the victim was the violation of his or her 

human rights, rather than the source of the violation, and the 

international community increasingly condemned the authors of 

such violations whoever they might be. That was particularly 

important in racism, where it was usually a section of the majority 

that committed racist acts against a minority. The eradication of 

racism was imperative for other than human rights reasons also, 

since racially tainted attitudes might lead to undesirable 

consequences in other fields. There was also a danger of the 

extension of tit-for-tat racism to the countries of the victims. 

It was no coincidence that religious fundamentalism, ethnonationalist 

terrorism and racism were experiencing a simultaneous 

revival. All were based on an exclusive approach to identity. 

Nevertheless, many human rights circles and public opinion under 

their influence supported ethno-nationalists while making 

fundamentalists a new enemy image totally unaware that they 

were involved in a more subtle form of racism. 

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Commission on Human Rights 50th Session, 

8 February 1994, Geneva Statement made under item 14 

Mr. Cha ir man, 

We are happy that despite unfortunate delays in assigning the 

thematic rapporteur, Mr. Glélé-Ahanhanzo was able to present his 

preliminary report on racism at this session. We congratulate him 

on his assignment, and wish him success. 

In terms of numbers, if not gravity, incidents of racism, racial 

discrimination, and racial violence are perhaps the most frequent 

form of human rights violations. Although some tough measures 

were taken in 1993 by the countries concerned, the number of 

racist incidents declined only modestly. Moreover, there is a widespread 

practice of underreporting by victims and underrecording 

by relevant authorities. 

It may be timely to highlight some salient features of racism, for 

there is much confusion on this, as on many other human rights 

issues. Unless we clarify this confusion and narrow our focus on 

racism proper, it would be very difficult for the rapporteur to 

effectively deal with the problem. 

Racism is seen historically in some parts of the world and not in 

others. It is the product of a certain cultural setting. Therefore, the 

claim that racism occurs everywhere to varying degrees is not 

tenable. As the special rapporteur indicates in his report, new 

forms of racism emerged mainly in developed countries. Those who 

are interested to get more information about where racism occurs 

or recurs may consult Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia 

Volume 15, pp 359-366. 

There are fundamental differences between racial 

discrimination on the one hand, and ethnic discrimination on the 


137


other. The International Convention on the Elimination of All 

Forms of Racial Discrimination has complicated the fight against 

racial discrimination by confusing it with other types of 

discrimination. This is why Turkey does not wish to become a party 

to it. 

Some tend to treat other forms of discrimination under the 

heading of racial discrimination in order to propagate the view that 

racist incidents happen everywhere. They give as an example the 

ongoing ethnic cleansing in the ex-Yugoslavia. Although ethnic 

cleansing is extremely painful even genocidal, it has nothing to do 

with racism. In ethnic cleansing the aggressor tries to grab land by 

killing or deporting the victim. In other words, there is a cause, no 

matter how inhuman or illegitimate this may be. 

In racism, there is no real cause, although the racist raises 

many arguments to that effect. He may complain about the 

increasing number of foreigners who are allegedly disorderly, dirty, 

smelly, lustful, ugly, parasitical etc. Others who try to explain the 

increase in racist incidents refer to economic recession, 

unemployment, and the number of asylum seekers. 

But these are not real causes of racism. It is true, economic 

problems contribute to racist resurgence, but only if there already 

exists a racist mechanism at work. Look at many other countries 

with equal or worse economic problems, but no racist incidents. 

Moreover, it must be very rare, if ever, to see jobless persons 

involved in racist violence against foreigners. 

In a sense, the victim does nothing particular to deserve the 

hatred of the racist. His or her very presence seems enough to 

provoke racism. It is not a coincidence that the racist always 

evokes in contempt biological characteristic of the victims. 

Therefore, the most important criterion of racism is the innocence 

of the person victimized because of his or her physical traits. 

Obviously, the number of racist incidents declines in line with a 

decrease in the number of foreigners or asylum seekers. But this is 

not a real cure. The danger is that the racists may shift their racial 

hatred towards new enemy targets which happen to be the peoples 

of neighbouring countries, members of a different religion or 

civilization. 

Racism is based on the mechanism of projecting one's own evil 

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Gündüz Aktan


onto the target in order to relieve oneself of a deep sense of guilt. 

Historically, racism within the same racial group was paradoxically 

the most virulent and malignant as in the case of anti-Semitism. 

For the unwanted character parts projected by the white onto 

another white may easily boomerang, especially with the 

assimilation of the victim. The return of his own guilt is felt as 

extremely dangerous by the racist who then tries either to 

exterminate or to expel the target group. By contrast, the skin 

colour which constitutes a barrier contains the projected material, 

hence stable, though very painful, racism against the black. 

Some countries consider human rights central to their foreign 

policy. In our age this is understandable. It is a well-known fact, 

however, that racism particularly adversely affects friendly 

relations between peoples and countries. If other countries which 

are affected by racism also conducted their foreign policies in the 

light of racists' violations of human rights, there could be a 

dislocation in international relations. 

In this context, one can object and say that racist acts are 

committed mostly by individuals and groups, not by States, hence 

racism as such does not conform to the traditional definition of 

human rights violation. Nevertheless, all UN General Assembly 

resolutions on racism including the one on the special rapporteur 

consider racist acts as grave violations of human rights, regardless 

of their source. Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Elimination 

of Racial Discrimination refers to racial discrimination as violation 

in the same way. Article 30 of the Universal Declaration does not 

distinguish individuals, groups and States with respect to the 

destruction of human rights and freedoms. The UN General 

Assembly Resolution 48/122 condemns terrorism as human rights 

violation, although terrorism is committed by individuals and 

groups as well. 

What is really important to the victim is the fact that his or her 

human rights are violated. Who has violated these rights is 

gradually losing its relevance. The international community 

increasingly condemns the authors of the violation, whoever they 

may be, States, individuals or groups in the broad sense of the 

word. 

This is particularly important in racism, because, usually, a 

group of the majority commits racist acts against a minority. One 


139


should not wait until this racist group acquires State 

responsibility, before one starts criticizing. 

I think what I've just said can be equally valid for societies 

which persecute their ethnic groups or for ethnic groups which 

wage terrorist wars against others. 

We would improve human rights the world over, if we could 

stand up to all violations regardless of their authors or origins. On 

the other hand, this approach would be quite commensurate to the 

preamble of the Universal Declaration which gives the 

responsibility of promoting and securing respect for human rights 

to every individual and every society together with all its organs, 

but not to the State. 

The society-wide struggle against human rights violations in 

general, against racism in particular is imperative for other 

reasons as well. In addition to outright racist acts, racially tainted 

attitudes may lead to some unexpected and undesirable 

consequences in fields other than that of human rights. 

Is it a coincidence that we see religious fundamentalism, ethnonationalist 

terrorism and racism at the same time in the world 

Can we deny interactions, even interdependence between them 

They have at least one common essential point. They all are 

exclusive. 

The racist who takes as target a Muslim in his own country may 

not realize that a fundamentalist in the country of this Muslim may 

attack foreigners or a similar ground. 

Human rights circles in countries where there is racism support 

perhaps unconsciously, the exclusive identity of the ethnonationalist 

terrorist which is obviously inspired by racism. 

Exclusive identity is almost always criminal, for it does not only 

conceptually rejects but also kills or expels the other. Nevertheless, 

many human rights circles and public opinions under their 

influence support ethno-nationalists while making out of 

fundamentalists a new enemy image, most needed after the breakup 

of the Soviet Union. They are, however, unaware that what they 

have been doing is a little more subtle form of racism. 

And the question remains who is going to improve whose 

human rights performance. 

140 

Gündüz Aktan

Terörizm ve İnsan Hakları 

Terrorism and Human Rights


Terrorism and Human Rights 

Following are retired Ambassador Gündüz Aktan’s 

observations on PKK terrorism in meetings on human rights and 

self-determination: 

Gündüz Aktan argued that international law and norms were 

not applied to right of self-determination and a contradictory, 

subjective perspective ensued instead. Particularly in the early 

‘90s, the international community and Western nations, within 

the uncertainty left in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union, 

went as far as to sympathize with PKK terrorism at a time when 

terrorist acts were at their most violent. Aktan claimed that at the 

root of the sympathy lied the instability caused by a wrongful 

conception of the issue of terrorism in terms of international law. 

He further argued that the inclusion of the term “guerrilla” in the 

international human rights system in the postcolonial era 

contributed to this perspective. 

The lack of sanctions in international law regarding internal 

conflicts gives rise to a legal situation where the rights of 

terrorists are protected under human rights law. However, Aktan 

claims that to defend the right of self-determination for a people 

that lives under the roof of a “sovereign state” and does not have 

issues of “lack of self-determination” and of “an unlawfully 

occupied land” is wrong. He emphasizes that such a conception 

makes violence against the state acceptable, while causes 

legitimate defense against terrorists that are responsible for the 

deaths of innocent civilians to be considered state violence. 

Gündüz Aktan asserts that the efforts of international NGOs at 

the time served, without proof, a purpose of wrongfully depicting 

the PKK as a guerilla force and a victim of torture. 


143


Terörizm ve İnsan Hakları 

Emekli Büyükelçi Gündüz Aktan’ın insan hakları, kendi 

kaderini tayin hakkı vb. konulu toplantılarda PKK terörizmi 

üzerine değerlendirmeleri: 

Gündüz Aktan kendi kaderini tayin hakkı konusunda 

uluslararası hukuk ve normların uygulanmadığını, aksine çelişkili 

ve subjektif bir anlayışın hâkim olduğunu bildirmektedir. Nitekim 

özellikle doksanlı yılların başında PKK terörizminin en şiddetli 

biçimde yaşandığı dönemde, uluslararası kamuoyu ve Batılı 

devletler arasında, Sovyetlerin dağılmasının ardından yaşanan 

belirsizliğin de etkisi ile PKK terörüne sempati duymaya varacak 

bir anlayışın öne çıktığı görülmektedir. Ancak Aktan bu 

sempatinin temelinde terörizmin uluslararası hukuk açısından 

kusur bir biçimde ele alınması sonucunda ortaya çıkan 

belirsizliğin yer aldığını belirtmektedir. Ayrıca sömürgecilik sonrası 

dönemde gerilla tanımının uluslararası insan hakları sistemine 

girişinin de bu bakış açısına katkı sağladığını ifade etmektedir. 

İç çatışmalara yönelik uluslararası hukukta herhangi bir 

yaptırımın bulunmayışı, teröristin haklarının insan hakları 

hukuk çerçevesinde koruma altına alındığı bir hukuki zeminin 

ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Ancak “egemen bir devlet” 

çatısı altında yaşayan, ne “kendi kendini yönetememe” ne de 

“hukuksuz işgal edilmiş” topraklarda yaşıyor olma sorunu 

bulunmayan etnik gruplar için kendi kaderini tayin hakkını 

savunmanın yanlış olduğunu ifade etmektedir. Devlete yönelik 

şiddetin bu çerçevede kabul edilebilir hale geldiğini, ancak 

masum sivillerin katledilmesinden sorumlu teröristlere yönelik 

meşru müdafaanın ise devlet şiddeti olarak ele alınmaya 

başlandığına vurgu yapmaktadır. Gündüz Aktan, PKK sorunu 

temelinde uluslararası STK’ların o dönemde yaptığı çalışmaların 

kanıtsız, dayanaksız bir biçimde PKK’yı işkence mağduru gerilla 

gibi göstermeye hizmet ettiğini belirtmektedir. 

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Minorities, 46th Session, 11th meeting, 


Mr. AKTAN (Observer for Turkey) said that attempts were still 

being made to abuse the principle of self-determination by 

condoning terrorist violence. Some non-governmental 

organizations defended self-determination for ethnic groups 

which were living neither in "non-self-governing territories" nor 

"illegally occupied territories" but "in a Sovereign State". That 

attitude was legally wrong and politically dangerous. The recent 

pronouncements in two resolutions on Turkey, under the 

heading of self-determination, made by the Parliamentary 

Assembly of such an important organization as the Conference on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were thus most 

distressing. 

Mr. Eide's working paper (E/CN.4/Sub.2/l994/36 and Corr.1) 

rightly made allowance for a "handful of ethnic or religious 

entrepreneurs who would mobilize for violence”. Violence caused 

by “ambitious entrepreneurs” led to bloodshed and human rights 

violations in countries, especially when they were materially 

backed by neighbouring countries trying to promote their own 

interests and morally supported by those trying to redeem their 

own personal and societal wrongs at the expense of others. 

Frustration was not, in fact, confined to ethnic groups. General 

frustration caused by poverty could be easily exploited by 

"ambitious entrepreneurs to mobilize a minority against its 

Government. The frustration would not necessarily be connected 

with "belonging to a group". An influential segment of the 

international community which was predisposed, for reasons of its 


145


own, always to see the fault of the Government or of the majority 

in any "minority situation" encouraged the proliferation of such 

situations. 

The causes of ethnic violence were much more deeply rooted 

and the relationship between social factors and ethno-nationalism 

was far from direct or obvious. Multi-ethnicity and 

multireligiousness were traditional characteristics of the non- 

Western world, the nation State being a Western invention which 

had badly affected ethnic harmony. 

It was not always true that ethnic terrorism resulted from the 

suppression of ethnic identity. The PKK leader was, quite 

naturally, an enemy of the tribal structures in south-eastern 

Turkey; he was also opposed to the family structure of the Kurds. 

As part of his self-hatred, he despised the Kurdish people and, 

consequently, had a very narrow sociocultural base on which to 

build a stable and healthy ethnic identity. Violence was apparently 

the only solution to his identity crisis. The Government of Turkey 

should not be expected to recognize the criminal ethnic identity 

which the PKK was fighting for; it was socio-pathological and 

represented a return to tribalism. 

There was no ready-made solution to ethnic conflicts. Efforts of 

the international community in the name of preventive diplomacy 

might encourage ethnic groups to revise their claims excessively 

upwards, dangerously destabilizing political regimes and the peace 

and security of entire regions. 

146 

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Statement made under item 10, 16 February 1994 

Mr. Chairman, 

In my previous statements, I talked about confusion in the UN 

human rights system. This confusion arises from the outmoded 

approach and some fundamental errors inherent to it. The Vienna 

Conference succeeded in correcting some of them. Unless we 

reform our ways, however, human rights violations will continue to 

grow as in the past. 

My criticism of the UN system should not be considered as an 

excuse on our part of human rights violations in any country. We 

believe that violations such as torture or extra-judicial executions 

cannot be justified under any circumstances. 

Diplomats rarely go back to the source in order to understand 

the subsequent developments, but accept the present framework 

as given. We, for a change, initiated a study on the evolution of the 

UN human rights system. Here are some of our findings: 

1. In the co1d-war period, the emphasis of the UN system has 

never been on the nature of domestic régimes. The existence of 

totalitarian régimes prevented this more effective approach. 

Instead, the system was geared to monitoring violations committed 

in internal armed conflicts initiated mostly in the process of 

decolonization. 

Although decolonization came to a successful end and the 

totalitarian ideology collapsed, our focus was not sufficiently 

shifted to the democratization of domestic régimes. Rather it got 

stuck in internal conflicts. This is wrong, but not the only one. 

2. In the 1960's and 1970's it was easier to understand and 

sympathize with the so-called guerrilla wars waged by colonized 


147


peoples against their colonizers. The international community 

wished to incorporate this most frequent and cruel form of conflict 

in international humanitarian law in order to protect civilians and 

combatants as well as curb the breaches of the laws of war by the 

guerrilla. However, we made two major mistakes which contributed 

to the spread of terrorism in the world. 

2.1. Firstly, we gave combatant status to guerrilla in Additional 

Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Thus the terrorist found his 

way into law in the guise of guerrilla. 

In this context, I now speak from our experience. 

The PKK has been waging a terrorist warfare in south-east 

Turkey for the last ten years. The claim that the guerrilla resorts to 

terrorism at the beginning; later, however, develops normal 

guerrilla warfare was proven wrong. In 1993 alone, the PKK 

indiscriminately killed more than 1200 civilians, children, women 

and elderly, almost twice as high as the casualty figure of security 

forces. PKK's victims were overwhelmingly Kurdish. These Kurds 

were treated as traitors by the PKK, because they wished to live 

with the rest of the population. 

Now it is clearly understood that the PKK cannot fight without 

massacring innocent civilians or without constantly resorting to 

perfidy. This is not a matter of choice for it but of nature. To call 

this method of warfare 'guerrilla' and try to legitimize it is wrong 

and unacceptable to Turkey. 

Some delegations tend to classify terrorism only as a low 

intensity warfare and to consider higher intensity one as 

insurgency which is presumed outside the sphere of terrorism. 

Terrorism is not related to the intensity and scope of the conflict, 

but to the nature of it. To call terrorism insurgency and try to 

legitimize it is also wrong and unacceptable. 

2.2. The second mistake was to break down terrorism into 

terrorist acts and place these acts as crimes under their subsections 

in international humanitarian law or the laws of war. As a 

result, terrorism magically disappeared from law. 

The acts of genocide taken individually are also separate crimes 

under international law. The reason why we gather them under 

genocide is to see the magnitude of the phenomenon and 

148 

Gündüz Aktan


consequently deal with it as such. Therefore, we cannot agree with 

the breakdown of terrorism. We consider terrorist warfare as falling 

in the category of "crimes against humanity" in accordance with 

Nuremberg Principles number VI, sub-paragraph C. 

If ICRC wishes to offer its services in this respect, it should 

fundamentally and unequivocally revise its approach with respect 

to guerrilla-terrorist relationship and terrorist warfare. 

3. Now, I turn to the legal system that we apply to internal 

conflicts. 

3.1. The application of human rights law to internal conflict is a 

recent development. It started in 1968 (UNGA resolution 2444). It 

has not acquired the status of positive law. The concept of public 

emergency in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is not 

intended to cover internal conflict in its entirety. 

Except article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions which has 

a limited scope and effect, no international law instrument existed 

for internal conflicts. The international community decided to 

apply human rights standards to internal conflicts, while 

developing international law in this respect. This had been 

considered as a temporary solution. Meanwhile, the General 

Assembly emphasized (resolution 2853) that human rights in 

situations of armed conflict were the ones embodied in 

international humanitarian law. The international community, 

however, failed in elaborating instruments which could command 

universal acceptance. Thus, the application of human rights 

turned into de facto law for internal conflicts. 

3.2. Contrary to international law, the human rights approach 

to internal conflict puts emphasis only on human rights of terrorist 

suspects, while not protecting innocent civilians from the ravages 

of terrorist war and not prohibiting terrorism as a method of 

combat. This is the major flaw in our approach from which 

disastrous problems arise. 

According to international law, terrorists/guerrillas and those 

who assist them can be detained until the end of hostilities. They 

can also be judged for crimes against humanity, while combatant 

or any other status being denied them. The point here is not 

whether to condone torture of terrorists or other violations. But, 

the human rights standard for shorter detention period is simply 


149


not possible from the point of view of protecting innocent civilians 

and preventing terrorist way of combat. Those who criticize 

government acts by human rights standards should take into 

account these aspects and think twice before pushing governments 

towards the application of international law. 

4. In resolutions 2674 and 2852 entitled "respect for human 

rights in armed conflict", the General Assembly urges that "in order 

effectively to guarantee human rights, all States should devote 

their efforts to averting... armed conflicts....", and talk about "the 

earliest termination of such conflicts". 

Now I ask what this commission or NGO's or the international 

community has done to date to help avert or terminate armed 

conflicts in order to guarantee respect for human rights. I submit, 

what we wittingly or unwittingly do usually contributes to internal 

conflicts. 

4.1. Amnesty International in its recent publication entitled 

"Getting away with Murder" says “(It) never comments on the 

legitimacy or illegitimacy of rebellion. It does not oppose the use of 

force per se by opposition groups, only the abuse of human rights. 

It does not say that political goals can never justify violence." (p.46) 

I submit, not only Amnesty International, but many other NGO's 

and some governments not only are not opposed to violence, but 

also support violence, assuming that this violence, a product of 

government repression, is defensive. 

4.2. Nevertheless, our rapporteur on torture Mr. Rodley explains 

everything in an article. 1 He says, “…. it was noted that civil wars... 

have largely replaced aggression between States as the principal 

outlet for the war urge. Furthermore, civil wars are no longer 

merely conflicts between domestic forces within a State; instead 

they have become limited wars between outside powers, usually 

the superpowers, using domestic surrogates." (page 724) “... (E)ach 

major power is free to extend help to forces within another 

sovereign state, regardless whether those forces are characterized 

as ethnic or linguistic rebels, freedom fighters, military officers 

1 Tho mas M. Franc, Ni gel S. Rod ley, Le gi ti macy and Le gal Rights of Re vo lu tio nary Mo ve ments 

with Spe ci al Re fe ren ce to the Pe op le's Re vo lu tio nary Go vern ment of So uth Vi et nam, the Vi - 

et nam War and In ter na tio nal Law The Wi de ning Con text, Ame ri can So ci ety of In ter na tio nal 

Law, edi ted by Ric hard A. Falk, Vo lu me 3, Prin ce ton Uni ver sity Press, Prin ce ton, New Jer - 

sey, 1972, pp 723-737. 

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planning a coup, or the recognized regime. ….Today, being 

recognized or represented in the General Assembly of the United 

Nations is not in the least tantamount to community protection... 

Since the practice and the political policy from which it springs is 

endemic, it is futile for the law to insist on branding it (intervention 

in civil war) as 'illegal '" (pages 727,728) “... the U.N. Charter, art. 

2, para. 4, prohibits all military hostilities between States except 

under art. 51, by way of collective self-defense. Here, again, the 

absence of any disinterested court to define “self-defense” in 

specific instances, has made the prohibition meaningless. It is best 

abandoned.” (page 733) 

You see why we have internal conflicts in so many countries. Yet 

we consider them purely in human rights terms. 

4.3. So violence is free even subsidized. Violations by so-called 

armed opposition groups are virtually condoned as mere abuses. 

But violations committed by the States should be prohibited. 

Amnesty International says that it changed its policy and now 

addresses these "abuses" also. We have communicated to it, 

among other NGO's, in 1993 alone 505 civilian killings by the 

PKK with names, places and dates. Where did it address these 

"abuses" 

In the first place, Amnesty International's legal premise is not 

clear. It says to us in a letter dated 26 April 1993 that it is guided 

by common article 3. First of all, Turkey has not requested 

Amnesty International's services according to this article. If, 

however, this article was really important to Amnesty 

International, it should nevertheless report all abuses committed 

by the PKK in breach of this article, with or without a policy 

change. For this article has an unusual meaning and purpose in 

law: 

“Insurgents are assumed to know article 3 and its application by 

them is compulsory. (For) (a)dherence to these Conventions is 

binding not only on the government, but also on the population of 

the State concerned. "(ICRC, D.S. 5 a-b, page 4) 

Amnesty International and other NGOs acted against law by not 

fully reporting the abuses of armed groups i.e. terrorists. They 

want to create an impression that these groups are victims of 

government repression. To that end they give high visibility to 


151


torture cases alleged by terrorists who apparently fight an 

outlawed irregular war, but make lawfully regular allegations. 

This Commission considers torture as the most odious violation. 

Has it ever uttered a word of consolation for the massacred 

innocent civilians which, according to law, is the gravest human 

rights violation whose prohibition is indefeasible Has it ever 

appointed a special rapporteur on this topic Apparently, the cult 

of violence overwhelms the respect for the right of life of innocent 

civilians. 

And the drama goes on. 

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Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention Against 

Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 

Treatment or Punishment, Committee Against Torture, 

5th Meeting, Geneva, 24 November 1993, Geneva 

Mr. AKTAN (Turkey) recalled that the Committee against 

Torture had concluded its confidential procedure on Turkey by 

circulating the summary account of its confidential report, which 

contained the grave accusation of the existence of systematic 

torture. 

Since Turkey was the first country to which the Committee had 

applied the confidential procedure, the lessons to be drawn could 

be useful both for the Committee and for the States parties to the 


Turkey was naturally disappointed at the outcome of the 

procedure, but had nevertheless done its best to cooperate with the 

two members of the Committee designated to make the inquiry. 

He would refer to the confidential report rather than to the 

summary account, since it concealed the mistakes embodied in the 

report. Those mistakes were by no means trivial, however; indeed, 

they were so important that they had determined the outcome of 

the procedure. Although the summary account had conjured away 

those mistakes, it had, illogically, preserved the conclusion of the 

confidential report. 

In the confidential report, the two members of the Committee 

had described a general context within which torture was 

perpetrated. It contained several mistakes and made absolutely no 

mention of terrorism. For example, according to the two members 

of the Committee, the Turkish security forces were fighting the 


153


"Kurdish population", estimated at 12 million, in the south-eastern 

region of Turkey, which they called "Kurdistan"; and, in that 

struggle, PKK "combatants" and "activists", who were identified 

with the "Kurdish population", were imprisoned by Turkey for 

political crimes. The outcome of the inquiry had been 

predetermined by placing the practice of torture within that 

context. Turkish security forces were presented as systematically 

torturing the "Kurdish population" or "PKK combatants" as part of 

their broader repression. 

The context described in the confidential report did not 

correspond to the facts. The entire population of the south-eastern 

region of Turkey was not 12 million persons, but 2.9 million, and 

they were not all Kurds. Moreover, most of the violent incidents 

took place in certain parts of that region. The Kurdish population 

probably numbered about 10 million in all; more than 3 million of 

them spoke an altogether different dialect and did not consider 

themselves Kurds. Most of the Kurds lived in western Turkey in 

peace and tranquillity. 

Historically, there had never been a region called "Kurdistan". 

Within the United Nations, the use of geographical denominations 

not accepted by Member States was inadmissible, in accordance 

with a resolution of the third United Nations Conference on the 

Standardization of Geographical Names, held in Athens in 

September 1977. The members of the Committee should therefore 

avoid using the loose terminology of certain irresponsible nongovernmental 

organizations. 

PKK had started its campaign on 15 August 1984 by murdering 

54 Kurdish civilians, mostly women and children, in the village of 

Pinarcik. Since then, they had killed more than 2,000 people, 

mostly Kurds. Turkish security forces tried to stop the killing of 

innocent Kurds by the few PKK terrorists and their supporters, 

who were trained or indoctrinated in some of Turkey's 

neighbouring countries and in Europe. 

In view of the number of innocent Kurdish victims, it was 

therefore correct to say that there was a terrorist organization in 

the south-eastern region. Calling it anything but terrorist would be 

an attempt to legitimize it, and that was not befitting in a United 

Nations legal body. 

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Gündüz Aktan


Contrary to what the two members of the Committee had 

suggested, Turkey had no punishment for political crimes in its 

legislation and there were no political prisoners or political prisons 

in Turkey. 

To perceive the conflict in the south-eastern region of Turkey as 

taking place between Turkish security forces and the Kurdish 

population was therefore illusory. 

In paragraph 5 of their report, the two members of the 

Committee said that the information forwarded by nongovernmental 

organizations was "credible" and contained wellfounded 

indications that torture was systematically practised in 

Turkey. In fact, the two members had never tried to verify the 

allegations with the Turkish authorities. It was safe to guess that 

none of those allegations, most of which had been sent by Amnesty 

International, was supported by "clear evidence". In a letter to that 

organization dated 5 March 1992, the Turkish Government had 

asked how it justified allegations when domestic as well as 

international judicial means were available to the victims; and how 

Amnesty International interpreted the concept of "clear evidence". 

No communication by or on behalf of any individual subject to 

Turkish jurisdiction had ever been submitted to the Committee 

under article 22 of the Convention. Moreover, Turkey was one of 

the members of the Council of Europe against which the fewest 

individual communications of torture had been filed. 

In its reply of 26 April 1993, Amnesty International had stated 

that the allegations were supported by a wide range of evidence: 

court judgements, official documents, medical certificates and 

photographs. 

None the less, all of Amnesty International's reports, 

presumably including the one submitted to the Committee, were 

full of unsubstantiated allegations. Amnesty International always 

criticized the courts and forensic medicine departments of the 

countries in question. It was impossible to understand what it 

meant by "official documents". Moreover, photographs were not 

recognized as evidence by most judicial systems. 

It appeared that Amnesty International was politically motivated 

against Turkey, as shown by the enormous increase in the size of 

its reports soon after Turkey's application to the European 


155


Community for full membership. Yet the political motivation of the 

allegations as another criterion for inadmissibility had not been 

taken into account by the two members of the Committee. 

A terrorist group could easily use the communication system for 

the purpose of its struggle. The consistent allegations regarding 

techniques and places of torture might well be a sign of a smear 

campaign launched by individuals and associations connected 

with the terrorist organization. By repeating identical allegations, 

they might wish to exploit the sensitivity of public opinion to 

torture and gain sympathy and legitimacy for their terrorist 

activities. That tactic could be used with impunity in a democratic 

country like Turkey. 

The associations in Turkey to which the report referred were not 

human rights organizations in the real sense of the word, but had 

been founded with the help of Amnesty International by individuals 

close to PKK or operated under the threat of that terrorist group. 

Those associations served as intermediaries for the organization of 

campaigns of allegations. 

An approach that omitted the existence of PKK's terrorism and 

portrayed the Turkish security forces' action to combat terrorism 

as repression, together with allegations unsupported by clear 

evidence, had led the two members of the Committee to see things 

as they had wished. Such an inappropriate approach had naturally 

caused them to detect elements during their visit to Turkey that 

could at best be qualified as "circumstantial evidence" indicating 

the alleged existence and systematic character of torture. It was 

therefore quite understandable that the Committee had conceded 

that only a small number of torture cases could be proved with 

absolute certainty. However, it was an obvious contradiction that 

the Committee had reached the conclusion of "the existence and 

systematic character of the practice of torture" in paragraph 58 of 

the summary account. 

The Turkish Government had never denied that sporadic cases 

of torture might occur in Turkey. Moreover, it was almost 

impossible to eliminate torture completely in the struggle against 

savage terrorism. The Turkish Government had taken pains to 

improve its legislation and to control the anti-terrorist activities of 

its security forces. Killing innocent persons was, however, the 

gravest violation of human rights. No allegation, accusation or 

156 

Gündüz Aktan


prejudice could divert the Government's attention from its basic 

objective of protecting the right to life. 

The report contained familiar recommendations, the core of 

which was that the detention period should be reduced. The 

existence of a relatively long detention period in areas subject to a 

state of emergency had wrongly been taken as a priori evidence of 

the existence of torture. The length of detention was of crucial 

importance in action to combat terrorism, and that was why the 

practice of precautionary detention had existed until recently even 

in some European countries. At the present time, the Turkish 

Government was not prepared to reduce the detention period in 

order to satisfy the authors of the allegations of organized torture, 

whose main objective was to curb the efficiency of the fight against 

terrorism. Meanwhile, his Government hoped that, in cases where 

there was no "absolute certainty" of systematic torture, the 

Committee would remain within the bounds of the evidence 

available and act with the sense of dignity and responsibility called 

for by time-honoured legal tradition. 

He wished to make the following recommendations to the States 

parties to the Convention: 

- Before taking a decision on the confidential procedure, the 

Committee should forward all allegations to the State party 

concerned and elicit its views. 

- The general context to be described in the confidential report 

in which allegations of torture were examined should be prepared 

in full cooperation with the State party concerned in order to avoid 

factual mistakes and crucial errors of approach. 

- The Committee should be extremely careful in designating 

members to make an inquiry. For a case with ethnic overtones, the 

Committee should not designate a member from a country which, 

because of its own ethnic particularities, readily embraced the 

causes of ethnic groups in other countries, sometimes to the extent 

of tolerating, on its own territory, their terrorist organizations. That 

situation called for special care if the member designated 

happened to belong to an ethnic group already engaged in an 

ethnic cause of its own. Members in that category should withdraw 

of their own free will from the inquiry so as not to endanger the 

credibility of the Committee. 


157


- The Committee should comply with the United Nations rules 

on geographical denominations. 

- In no way should the conclusions of an inquiry be conducive 

to interpretations against the territorial integrity and political unity 

of States parties. 

- In no way should the conclusions of the inquiry be conducive 

to condoning the killing of the innocent on the pretext of 

eliminating torture. 

- The reply of the State party to the confidential report should 

be annexed to the summary account if the latter was to be 

published. 

Unless those conditions were met, his delegation would 

discourage States parties from cooperating with the Committee. 

As a general recommendation, he proposed that the Meeting of 

States parties should discuss the work programme of the 

Committee against Torture. A new item to that effect should be 

included in the agenda of the next Meeting of States parties to the 


158 

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Minorities, 46th Session, 19th meeting, 


Mr. AKTAN (Observer for Turkey) said that he wished to address 

the subject of internal conflicts of ethnic origin and the disarray 

that could arise from the overlapping of the two law systems 

applied to them, if the human rights bodies did not make a correct 

assessment of their nature. Such conflicts were initially organized 

by a very small number of individuals usually motivated by 

Marxist-Leninist ideology, with an overdose of ethno-nationalism 

and some traits of national socialism, who used a guerrilla combat 

method, not the traditional one but a much more efficient and 

cruel version that had been developed since the Second World War. 

A segment of the population, a small fraction of the ethnic group in 

question, supported the guerrillas as sympathizers and embarked 

on "civilian" protests, giving an impression of popular support. 

Their declared aim was not cultural rights, but secession and 

independence. 

Theoretically, guerrilla warfare was supposed to resort to 

"selective terrorism" aimed at the political authority and the 

majority in order to bend them to its will. In practice, however, 

having failed to obtain support from “their” ethnic group, the 

guerrillas increasingly resorted to indiscriminate terrorism against 

it, thus becoming terrorists in an ethnic struggle in a sovereign 

State. 

Human rights circles, especially Western non-governmental 

organizations, had apparently developed a strategy geared to 

supporting guerrillas rather than promoting compliance with 

human rights in internal conflicts. They tried to legitimize such 


159


campaigns by constantly referring to self-determination, 

presenting the guerrillas as representatives of the ethnic group and 

the conflict as one between State forces and civilians. 

Endeavouring to curtail the Governments's efforts to deal with the 

militia, they ignored or condoned the killing of innocent civilians by 

the guerrillas, thereby inciting them to terrorism. 

The contemporary internal conflicts did not come within the 

purview of Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 

because of its narrow scope and high threshold. Those conflicts 

were of much lower intensity than civil wars. Protocol I did not 

apply to them either, for they could not be treated under selfdetermination. 

No State was prepared to grant terrorists an 

effective and objective status of "party to conflict". 

Internal conflicts were none the less included in the scope of 

human rights law through the concept of public emergency, with 

all sorts of concomitant distortions and shortcomings. Neither the 

killings of innocent civilians nor the nature of terrorist warfare 

were taken into account by the international community, only 

Governments being held accountable for human rights violations 

against terrorist suspects. That was a scandalous and untenable 

situation. 

General Assembly resolutions did not distinguish between 

conflicts on the basis of their intensity, so even an inter-State war 

could be terroristic, if terrorism was consistently resorted to as the 

main means of combat. Therefore, guerrilla actions could also be 

equated with terrorism. Terrorist guerrilla warfare was based on 

feigning civilian non-combatant status, a treacherous and 

dishonourable form of combat. 

While not opposed to the accountability of the State for human 

rights violations in internal conflicts in accordance with human 

rights law, his Government felt strongly that human rights 

instances should take up the massacres of innocent civilians by 

terrorists and urged the entire human rights system to consider 

terrorist methods of warfare as a crime against humanity. 

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Commission on Human Rights, 51st Session, “Human 

Rights Violations around the World” (Agenda item 12), 

Reply of 1 March 1995 to the statement made on behalf 

of the European Union by France on 28 February 1995 

Mr. Chairman, 

I listened with some consternation to what the French delegate 

had to say about my country on behalf of the European Union. 

I was expecting him to stress in line with the recent fashion that 

the South-east question was an internal affairs of Turkey. But he 

did not. 

He could not spell out the word PKK, call it a terrorist 

organisation and condemn it. 

He did not point out either that in a democratic country which 

has nothing to do with tyranny and oppression, nobody had any 

right to resort to violence, or fight for self-determination. 

But he asked for a peaceful and political solution presumably 

through concessions to be made by Turkey to the perpetrators of 

unlawful violence and terrorism, thus implying that terrorist 

violence, even if not backed by people, is accepted by EU as a 

means of promoting human rights. 

In the late 1993, two EU countries prohibited the activities of 

the PKK and its front organisations in their territories on the 

ground of terrorism. We are grateful to them, although they have 

taken this decision after nine years of PKK killings. Nevertheless, 

their decision raises the question as to why other thirteen member 

countries of EU tolerate and acquiesce in the activities of the PKK 


161


against Turkey in violation with their obligations under 

international law. 

The French statement on Turkey highlights the tragedy in which 

the human rights systems are stumbling. The broad allegation that 

the human rights situation did not improve in Turkey is exclusively 

related to the rights of terrorist suspects. Apparently terrorists who 

killed 4000 innocent civilians represent humanity to them. Since 

uncondemned, unlawful violence is encouraged while legitimate 

struggle against terrorism being misrepresented as violations. 

Lapidation is a Biblical punishment. But it has a slightly 

disturbing pre-condition. Those who cast the first stone should be 

sinless themselves. May I suggest to the French delegate and 

through him to EU to establish a flagellation brotherhood among 

themselves so that first atone for their sins. 

Thank you. 

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Gündüz Aktan



6th Meeting, The right of peoples to self-determination 

and its application to peoples under colonial or alien 

domination or foreign occupation 

Mr. AKTAN (Observer for Turkey) said that the Israeli- 

Palestinian agreement of 13 September 1993 was an historic step 

towards achieving a lasting solution to the conflict in the region. 

The determination of the parties and the progress achieved in the 

talks between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 

with a view to giving effect to the interim agreement gave every 

reason to be hopeful about the outcome. As a country belonging 

to the same region, Turkey followed the peace process closely 

and would not fail to contribute to it if necessary. 

The recent emergence of ethno-nationalism and tribalism made 

it even more necessary to clarify the content of the concept of selfdetermination 

and its relationship to the territorial integrity and 

political unity of sovereign States, which were equally important 

principles of the Charter. The provisions of the Vienna Declaration 

of 25 June 1993 were thus both welcome and timely. Paragraph 2 

of the Declaration reaffirmed the principle of self-determination 

and stated that denial of the right of self-determination was a 

violation of human rights. The paragraph made a distinction, 

however, between the right of self-determination of peoples under 

colonial or other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, 

on the one hand, and countries which encompassed people of 

different ethnic origins, on the other. 

Such a distinction was well-founded as peoples under colonial 

domination or foreign occupation had never had the opportunity to 

express freely their views about their own future. By contrast, 

people of different ethnic origins living in a democratic sovereign 


163


State had freely opted to live within the boundaries of that State. 

For peoples under colonial domination or foreign occupation, selfdetermination 

was an inalienable right but, as paragraph 2 of the 

Declaration also stated, those peoples could exercise their right of 

self-determination only through legitimate action. In other words, 

terrorism was not admissible even for the purpose of selfdetermination. 

That was in keeping with General Assembly 

resolution 48/122 of 20 December 1993. 

With regard to the people in the second category, the Vienna 

Declaration was also clear. It stated that the right of selfdetermination 

should not be construed as authorizing or 

encouraging any action that would dismember or impair, totally or 

in part, the territorial integrity and political unity of sovereign and 

independent States. 

That provision harmonized the principles of territorial integrity 

and self-determination. By adopting the Declaration unanimously, 

the international community had safeguarded peace and security 

in the post-cold-war era. It had realized that, at a time when ethnonationalism 

and tribalism were on the rise, recognition of the right 

of self-determination to every community with different ethnic, 

cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics would have 

detrimental effects for the new international order. 

Despite those provisions, the international community had 

witnessed widespread abuse of the right to self-determination. In 

the absence of a universally recognized definition of "people", some 

splinter groups had claimed self-determination for their "peoples". 

Some human rights circles almost automatically sympathized with 

them and gave them full moral and even material support. 

Encouraged by such support, those groups had gradually begun 

campaigns of violence in their countries and had caused internal 

disturbances. Almost forgetting who had started the violence, 

human rights circles had then stepped in to denounce violations 

committed by security forces. 

Recalling that, under the Charter of the United Nations, the act 

of aggression was prohibited in inter-State relations, he said that 

the concept of a “just war” had thus been reintroduced into 

international law. A State could legitimately fight only within the 

framework of Articles 39 and 51 of the Charter. Internal conflicts 

were not prohibited, but were considered to come within the 

sovereignty of States in accordance with Article 2, paragraph 7. 

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Gündüz Aktan


Nevertheless, the concept of human rights did not address the 

initiator of violence i.e. the aggressor, nor its nature, objectives, 

mode of struggle or domestic context. Those elements were, 

however, of crucial importance in determining the source of 

violations. The view underlying that approach was that violence 

was inherent in the process of change in human society, that to 

curb violence might stiffen social forces and that what third parties 

could best do was to humanize strife, namely, to reduce violations 

without eliminating violence, an impossible task. 

The fact that the ethnic groups, as smaller parties to a conflict, 

resorted to terrorism compounded the complexity of the 

situation. In that context, human rights supporters of those 

groups began to accuse security forces of human rights 

violations, conveniently forgetting that those groups themselves 

had initiated the terrorist warfare which in law constituted a 

crime against humanity. The objective was to brand States as 

violators of human rights and to represent the terrorism of those 

groups as a “just war”. 

The concept of human rights upheld by the non-governmental 

organizations was very narrow and concerned the judicial rights 

of ethnic terrorists. They accused States of committing human 

rights violations in excessively general terms, a situation which 

created conceptual confusion in the United Nations human rights 

system. 

That confusion was further compounded if a third party was 

involved in the conflict. In the context of nuclear deterrence, 

externally instigated internal conflicts had replaced inter-State 

wars. As the Charter contained no provision that dealt directly with 

war of that kind, many countries had exploited the loophole. 

Ethnic groups had become instruments of that warfare and armed 

bands trained, indoctrinated, financed and commanded from 

neighbouring countries had infiltrated other countries to create 

ostensibly internal conflicts. There had always been a political 

interest in fomenting that kind of indirect aggression, which could 

never be regarded as a human rights issue. 

At a time when decolonization had been completed and peace 

negotiations regarding occupation were under way, most of the 

remaining internal disturbances fell within the category of indirect 

aggression, the case of Turkey being one. 


165

166




Minorities, 46th Session, 19th meeting, 3 February 1994, 

Geneva, Statement on agenda item 9 

Mr. Chairman, 

We are pleased to note that the Palestinian issue is being 

discussed in the present session of the Commission in a 

remarkably different environment. The Israeli-Palestinian 

agreement of 13 September 1993 marks a historic step towards 

bringing a lasting solution to the region. The determination of the 

parties and the progress achieved in the talks between Israel and 

the PLO to carry into effect the interim agreement gives us every 

reason to be hopeful about the outcome. Turkey, as a country 

belonging to the same region follows the peace process very 

closely and will not fail to contribute to it when it is required. 

Mr. Chairman, 

Turkey has always supported the right of self-determination of 

the Palestinian people as embodied in numerous General Assembly 

and Security Council resolutions and will continue to do so in the 

future. 

Particularly after the Cold War, the term “self-determination” 

has become rather an elusive concept. The emerging ethnonationalism 

and tribalism in present time render it even more 

crucial to clarify the content of this concept and its relationship 

with territorial integrity and political unity of the sovereign states 

which are equally important principles of the UN Charter. 

The provisions of the Vienna Declaration of 25 June 1993 serves 

to this purpose. 


167


Paragraph 2 of the Vienna Declaration reaffirms the principle of 

self-determination. It states that "all peoples have the right of selfdetermination" 

and that "the denial of the right of selfdetermination 

(is) a violation of human rights” and the Conference 

“underlines the importance of the effective realization of this right”. 

The significance of paragraph 2 also lies in the fact that it 

provides us with clear elements regarding the exercise of the right 

of self-determination. In doing so, it makes distinction between the 

right of self-determination of peoples under colonial or other forms 

of alien domination or foreign occupation on the one hand, and 

countries which encompass people of different ethnic origins on 

the other. 

Such a distinction is well founded, since peoples under colonial 

domination or foreign occupation have never had the opportunity 

to express their free will about their own future. By contrast, 

people of different ethnic origin living in a democratic sovereign 

State have freely opted to live within the present boundaries during 

the establishment of the State. 

The Vienna Declaration in its Paragraph 2, envisages that for 

the peoples falling in first category i.e. peoples under colonial 

domination or foreign occupation, self-determination is an 

inalienable right. However, it is also stated in the same paragraph 

that these peoples can exercise their right of self-determination 

only through "legitimate action". In other words, terrorism can not 

be admissible even for the cause of self-determination. This is in 

compliance with General Assembly resolution 48/122 of 20 

December 1993 which states that "terrorism can not be justified 

under any circumstances". 

For the people falling in the second category the Vienna 

Declaration is also clear; it states that the right of selfdetermination 

"shall not be construed as authorizing or 

encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally 

or in part, the territorial integrity and political unity of sovereign 

and independent States… possessed of a government representing 

the whole people… without distinction of any kind". 

The implication of this statement is obvious. Right of selfdetermination 

does not imply secession in countries with a 

democratic regime. 

168 

Gündüz Aktan


This provision of Vienna Declaration harmonizes the principles 

of territorial integrity and self-determination. By adopting the 

Declaration unanimously, the international community has 

safeguarded peace and stability in the post cold war era. It has 

realized that at a time when ethno-nationalism and tribalism are 

on the rise, recognition of the right of self-determination to every 

community with different ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic 

characteristics would cause detrimental effects on the new 

international order. 

Mr. Chairman, 

Despite these provisions of the Declaration of the Vienna 

Conference which highlight and strengthen the Declaration on 

International Law (Resolution 2625), we observe a wide-spread 

abuse of the right to self-determination. 

In the absence of a universally recognized definition of 'people', 

some splinter groups came to the forefront to claim selfdetermination 

for their 'peoples'. Some human rights circles almost 

automatically sympathized with them. These groups have been 

given full moral even material support. A mythology of past 

oppression has been created. They became favorite subjects of the 

press and object of "charity" campaigns. 

Encouraged and emboldened by this external support these 

groups gradually began campaigns of violence in their countries. 

They caused internal tensions and disturbances. At this point, 

human rights circles stepped in to denounce violations committed 

by security forces. These circles have almost always forgotten who 

started the violence and what the introduction of violence into a 

political order meant. 

In the UN Charter, adopted after a catastrophic world war, the 

act of aggression was prohibited in inter-state relations. In this 

way, the concept of jus bellum or "just war" was reintroduced into 

international law. A State could legitimately fight only within the 

framework of Articles 39 and 51. Although States were the building 

blocks of the order, internal conflicts were not prohibited. These 

conflicts were considered within the sovereignty of the States in 

accordance with Article 2 (7). Later, however, sovereignty became 

nominal in the face of the expanding domaine of human rights 

which came to concern only with violations. 


169


Nevertheless. the concept of human rights does not address the 

initiator of violence i.e. the aggressor, nor its nature, its objectives, 

its mode of struggle, consequentiality of its actions, domestic 

context etc. But, these elements are crucially important in 

determining the source of violations. 

The view underlying this approach is that violence is inherent to 

the process of change in human society, that to curb violence may 

stiffen social forces, and that what the third parties could do most 

is to humanize the strife, namely to reduce violations without 

eliminating violence, an impossible task which explains the mess 

human rights are presently in. 

Democracy is not upheld by these human rights circles as a 

legal framework within which a gradual peaceful change is 

possible. 

The fact that ethnic groups, as smaller parties to the conflict 

resort to terrorism compounds the complexity of the situation. 

What is euphemistically called "guerrilla", developed as a combat 

method by Marxist ideology, is fundamentally incompatible with 

regular war, the security forces are used to. The latter is thus 

compelled to develop its capacity of irregular warfare in order to 

deal with terrorists who are civilian themselves but kill mostly the 

civilians, disappear into and emerge out of the civilian population 

during the fight, and violate all laws of war. 

In this context, human rights supporters of these terrorist 

groups start accusing security forces of human rights violations, 

conveniently forgetting that these groups themselves initiated the 

terrorist warfare which in law constitutes crime against humanity. 

Their objective is to brandish States as violators of human rights 

and to present terrorism of these groups as 'just war'. 

The concept of human rights the NGO's mostly talk about is a 

very narrow one. It concerns the judicial rights of the ethnic 

terrorists. They are not interested in the vast categories of 

democratic and socio-economic rights and freedoms. They 

practically use human rights in place of humanitarian law which 

is not applied in internal conflicts. Yet, they accuse the States of 

committing human rights violations in excessively general terms. 

This situation creates a conceptual confusion in the UN human 

rights system. 

170 

Gündüz Aktan


This confusion is further compounded, if a third party is 

involved in the conflict. Right from the founding of the UN system, 

indirect aggression of third parties bedeviled the member 

countries. In the context of nuclear deterrence, externally 

instigated internal conflicts replaced interstate wars. Since the UN 

Charter did not have any provision directly dealing with this kind 

of war, many countries exploited the loopholes of the Charter. 

Some of them are excelled at it. Ethnic groups have become 

instruments of this warfare. Armed bands trained, indoctrinated, 

financed and commanded from neighbouring countries have 

infiltrated other countries creating ostensibly internal conflicts. 

Human rights circles rallied by their governments raised their voice 

on violations allegedly committed by defending states. Yet, there 

has always existed a political interest in fomenting this kind of 

indirect aggression which can never be considered as an issue of 

human rights. 

At a time when decolonisation is completed, ideological 

revolutionary movements became obsolete and peace negotiations 

regarding occupations are underway, most of the remaining 

internal disturbances fall within the category of indirect 

aggression, the case of Turkey being one. 

Thank you. 


171

172

The Armenian Issue 

Ermeni Sorunu


The Armenian Issue 

Gündüz Aktan conducted important work on the Armenian 

issue. His contributions to the tackling of the issue from the 

perspective of international law are particularly noteworthy. His 

work on racism and human rights provided the grounds for a 

legal approach to the Armenian issue. 

Gündüz Aktan asserted that research and publications that 

approach the Armenian issue from a legal perspective are limited 

in number, while adequate historical research is being made. He 

further argued that the act of genocide as claimed by Armenians 

was the biggest international crime defined, and a legal issue 

from this perspective. And when tackled from a legal perspective, 

Aktan provided legal and historical proof that the acts of genocide 

or crimes against humanity did not occur. 

Gündüz Aktan argues that the Armenian deportation was a 

legitimate act by the Ottoman state. Aktan mentions that the 

Armenians at the time were a political group with political 

agendas who were not under the protection of Article 2 of the 

Genocide Convention. He explains that there was no motive or 

deliberate action to commit genocide against the Armenians, but 

that the act in question was a forced exile with defense and 

military reasons. Aktan also asserts that the deportation did not 

extend to all Ottoman Armenians, and that far more Turks had 

lost their lives than Armenians during the incidents. 


175


Ermeni Sorunu 

Gündüz Aktan’ın Ermeni Sorunu üzerine önemli çalışmaları 

olmuştur. Özellikle Ermeni Sorunu’nun uluslararası hukuk 

açısından ele alınması yönünde sağladığı katkılar dikkat 

çekicidir. Irkçılık, insan hakları gibi alanlarda yaptığı çalışmalar, 

Ermeni Sorunu’na hukuki yaklaşımın temelini sağlamıştır. 

Gündüz Aktan, Ermeni Sorunu konusunda uluslararası 

alanda hukuk temelli araştırma ve yayınların sınırlı olduğunu, 

ancak yeterince tarihsel araştırmanın yapılmakta olduğunu 

göstermektedir. Hâlbuki Ermenilerin iddia ettiği soykırım 

suçunun en ciddi uluslararası suç ve bu sebeple de hukuki bir 

sorun olduğunu açıkça ortaya koymuştur. Hukuki açıdan ele 

alındığında ise soykırım suçu veya insanlığa karşı suçun vuku 

bulmadığını tarihsel ve hukuki dayanakları ile sunmaktadır. 

Gündüz Aktan Ermeni Tehciri’nin Osmanlı Devleti’nin meşru 

bir eylemi olduğunu ifade etmektedir. Aktan o dönemde 

Ermenilerin siyasi hedefleri bulunan ve Soykırım Sözleşmesi’nin 

2. maddesi kapsamında korunma altına alınmayan siyasi bir 

grup olduğunu belirtmektedir. Ermenilerin soykırıma uğratılması 

yönünde bir saik veya kasıt bulunmadığını, aksine savunma ve 

askeri sebepler ile yapılan bir tehcir vuku bulduğunu ifade 

etmiştir. Ayrıca Aktan, tüm Osmanlı Ermenilerine yönelik bir 

tehcirin söz konusu olmadığını, vuku bulan Ermeni ölümlerinden 

çok daha fazla sayıda Türk’ün hayatını kaybettiğini ortaya 

koymaktadır. 

176 

Gündüz Aktan


The Legal Approach to the Armenian Issue and the 

Armenian Allegations in the light of International Law 

(Speech made during the seminar entitled “Turkey and 

the South Caucasus”, held at the Turkish Embassy in 

London, October 2001) 

Thank you, Chairman. You see, we Turks do not like legalities, 

law, or the legal approach. Interestingly, Armenians have written 

perhaps around 25,000 books, articles, pieces, but not a single one 

on the legal aspect of this question. 

Genocide is a key issue between Turkey on the one hand and 

Armenia and Armenians on the other. That is really the main 

obstacle of the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation on the 

development of our relations. I am a member of the Turkish- 

Armenian Reconciliation Commission and this is the real issue. 

Several times, we discussed the legal aspect of this question, and 

it might sound bizarre that the Armenians are not interested in the 

legal aspect of this question. Yet genocide is a crime and it is the 

highest crime in the hierarchy of crimes. Therefore, it should be 

addressed from the legal point of view. Again, at the outset, I see 

no other solution to this problem other than a kind of adjudication 

- an international adjudication of this problem - because I know 

from my experience, though short one, in this Commission that we 

cannot really convince the Armenians that this was not a genocide 

and the Armenians cannot convince us that this was a genocide. 

Now, let me briefly touch upon the development of the concept 

of genocide. As you know, this concept has been coined by 

Professor Rafael Lemkin, a Polish scholar, during the Second World 

War -well after the 1915-16 events. His concept of genocide was a 

very broad one. According to Lemkin, genocide was the 

annihilation of a minority, politically, economically, socially, 


177


culturally, physically and biologically. So, a partial or total 

annihilation can be genocide. Therefore, any systematic killing of a 

group can be classified as genocide. Later, this concept of genocide 

was drastically narrowed down during the negotiations on the 

Convention within the UN system, though the first resolution 

adopted on genocide by the first session of the General Assembly 

was very close in respect of the definition of genocide invented by 

Lemkin himself. Later, however, the Convention was adopted, 

signed and ratified from 1948 until 1950 and entered into force. 

Here we have a precise definition of genocide in Article 2 of the 

Convention. Let me read it out to you because it is a very short 

article. 

"In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following 

acts committed with intent to destroy... (This is very important, 

"with intent to destroy")...in whole or in part, 1) a national, 2) 

ethnical, 3) racial or 4) religious group as such: (I underline, "as 

such".) 

(a) Killing members of a group. 

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 

group. 

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 


part. (Very important for our topic) 

Then there are two other acts, (d) and (e), which are not really 

related to our topic, therefore I skip them. 

Now the first factor here in this definition is the "protected 

groups", of which there are four. What is important is not the 

enumeration of these groups, but what is omitted by this 

definition. Political groups are omitted, and I do not want to 

venture into the definition of this political group, but you can 

imagine what it means if you would later take it up. 

"Intent to destroy" is the second and perhaps most important 

part of this definition, and it cannot be general intent, but specific 

intent. Legally-speaking, therefore, there should be first a long preplanning 

period, organisation and organised implementation of 

genocide. This is very important if there are oral or written 

statements by those who are responsible for genocidal acts to 

178 

Gündüz Aktan


provoke and encourage others to commit genocidal acts. If Talat 

Pasha, for instance, as the Minister of Interior had said the things 

attributed to him by the Armenians, then legally-speaking, it could 

have been very difficult for the Turkish side to prove that that was 

not genocide. So oral and written statements plus planning, 

organisation and implementation in an organised fashion are very 

important. 

The third one is motive. Motive is usually neglected in the 

analysis of this definition. Why should one destroy a whole nation, 

a whole religious group This "why", some people say, is not really 

important. What is " really important is the intent to destroy, as 

long as it is there. But motive is also very important, and if you go 

into the verbatims of the meetings, of negotiations in the Ad Hoc 

Committee and in the sixth Commission of the General Assembly, 

you see that the Lebanese delegate proposed this famous "as 

such", "destroying a group as such". "As such" means this motive 

of killing somebody not because that person is doing something, 

but because what he or she is. This is the motive of genocide. Acts 

of genocide, I leave aside. 

I now pass on to our subject and try to apply these somewhat 

cursory conclusions to the events of 1915 and 1916. Was the group 

called Armenians a political group or a group which is protected by 

this Convention As Professor Sonyel very ably explained, the 

Ottoman Armenians made up a political group par excellence 

because they fought for reforms, then for autonomy, and then for 

their independence. They had their irregular forces, terrorist 

groups and committees which fought for that purpose. They killed 

and they got killed. This was a political struggle throughout. 

Therefore, Armenians are a political group, and political groups are 

not protected by this Convention. 

Second, was there intent to destroy on the part of the Ottoman 

government Everybody knows that there was no plan, there was 

no organisation even. According to archived documents, Enver 

Pasha, who was then in charge of the Eastern front, sent a 

telegram to Talat Pasha saying that the Russian armies were 

advancing and that before the Russian armies there were Muslim 

populations in a terrible situation. They were driven into Anatolia. 

Enver Pasha then proposes two alternatives. One is that we can do 

the same to the Armenians. We can push the Armenians and drive 

them towards the Eastern border with Russia. Alternatively, we 


179


can relocate the Armenians somewhere far from the war zone. The 

date was the 2nd May 1915, right at the beginning of the entry of 

the Russian armies into Anatolia, and Talat Pasha, without seeking 

the backing of the Council of Ministers, opted for the second option 

and started the relocation process. However, in the next two weeks 

I think, the cabinet endorsed his decision. 

To most of the Ottoman ruling class, that was the right decision 

because relocation would be much less costly from human and 

material perspectives. If you go through all these archives, you can 

see hundreds, perhaps thousands of examples of how to protect 

the Armenians in transit from eastern then central-eastern parts of 

Anatolia towards Syria. You can see the hundreds of instructions 

to that effect, detailing the sort of measures to be taken to protect 

them. But at the end of the day there were many, many casualties. 

Perhaps, to a certain extent, neglect by the Ottoman armies to 

organise the relocation or the lack of personnel on their part 

because the Ottomans were fighting on three fronts. At the same 

time there were war-induced casualties. During relocation, many 

started dying after three or four days because of dehydration. The 

children and the elderly, especially, become quite vulnerable to 

epidemics. Let us not forget about the epidemics in those times. Of 

the 60 million people that died in the First World War, one fourth 

-that is to say 15 million- died of epidemics. Quite obviously, this 

percentage was higher for the Ottoman Empire because there was 

one bed for 8,000 people and one doctor for 150,000. Imagine the 

conditions ! We do not know exactly how many Armenians were 

killed during the relocation. But we know one thing for certain: 

most of the Armenians that lost their lives during the First World 

War died of causes other than relocation. Some of them might have 

died because of forced migrations during the wartime. The Russian 

armies advanced and Muslims and Turks, 900,000 of them, left 

their houses, uprooted by the Russian armies and by the Armenian 

guerrilla forces. After a while, they died in migrations because of a 

number of reasons such as the terrain, climate, epidemics and 

famine. Therefore, the figures should be treated cautiously. There 

might be reasons other than relocation as I said. 

Now here "in whole or in part" is an important indication to 

understand the situation. Ottomans relocated mostly the Orthodox 

Gregorian Armenians, who were usually living in the eastern part 

of Turkey and who were also religiously close to Russia. Whereas 

many Protestant and Catholic Armenians have not been subjected 

180 

Gündüz Aktan


to relocation, plus in western Turkey, in İstanbul, Edirne, İzmir, 

Aydın and Kütahya, Armenians have not been relocated. Again, 

because of the lack of transportation in those days, perhaps 

hundreds of Armenians living in villages were not subjected to 

relocation. Therefore, it was a partial relocation and one cannot 

really say that Ottomans committed genocide against one set of 

Armenians but protected the others. This does not logically fit the 

definition of genocide. 

Here, motive is also important. The Lebanese delegation, which 

introduced "as such", said that Jews had been killed on racial 

grounds during the Second World War. A virulent antisemitism 

really led to the Holocaust and this is what is really meant by "as 

such", killing a group of people not because of what they do but 

because of what they are. This is pure racism. It is racial hatred. 

There has never been anti-Armenianism in the Ottoman Empire. 

There has never been such a thing. As Professor Sonyel said, they 

were the loyal "millet", the loyal community. There has never been 

racism in the Ottoman Empire. Empires do not have racism. 

Nation-states, not empires, nourish racism. So there has been no 

motive for the Ottomans to destroy the entire community. What 

was important for them was to move these Armenians that 

constituted a military threat to the existence of the Empire. So the 

military imperative according to international law was the key to 

our understanding of relocation. Even now, according to Protocol II 

of the four Geneva Conventions, article 17 envisages "forced, if 

necessary, relocation or evacuation ... settled areas for imperative 

military reasons." That was the motive for the Ottomans to relocate 

the Armenians. 

There are some major differences between ethnic cleansing and 

relocation. We have seen the first example of ethnic cleansing in 

the Balkan Peninsula against the Turks and Muslims of the 

Balkans. Ethnic cleansing presupposes firstly a frontal attack on 

the community to be expelled. Frontal attack means with your 

armies you kill, wound and uproot them, you drive them towards 

the frontier. On the way you do all sorts of awful things. We know 

it from our recent experiences from Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this 

ruthless enterprise, those responsible have been sentenced so far 

by the International Penal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for 

crimes against humanity, not genocide. If you compare ethnic 

cleansing with the Armenian relocation, you can see that ethnic 

cleansing is much worse than relocation. We have another example 


181


of the relocation of Japanese Americans. In this case, the court 

ruling says that presumption of disloyalty is not enough to relocate 

people. Presumption of manifest disloyalty is obvious in the case of 

Armenians. They collaborated with Russian armies, they killed 

many Turks, many Muslims. They fought in the Russian armies. 

From the point of view of the State, they were traitors. 

I will finish here because Dr. Hale is becoming restless with the 

press release by the British government in July this year, which 

you may imagine I loved. "Massacres of 1915 and 1916 is an 

appalling tragedy" and I agree with it, "but we do not believe the 

events should be classified as genocide, which has a specific 

meaning under the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide." The second 

part of this press release says, "Baroness Ashtal of Scotland told 

the House of Lords" and I continue to quote "...the government and 

in line with previous British governments have judged the evidence 

not to be sufficiently unequivocal to persuade us that these events 

should be categorised as genocide as defined by the 1948 UN 

convention on genocide, a convention, which is in any event, not 

restrospective in application." Thank you very much. 

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Gündüz Aktan


DEVLETLER HUKUKUNA GÖRE ERMENİ MESELESİ 

GİRİŞ 

1915-1916 yıllarında yani I. Dünya Savaşı sırasında, Osmanlı 

İmparatorluğu’nda vuku bulan Ermeni olayları konusunda çok 

yazıldı. Bu konuda yazılanların 26 binden fazla olduğu 

hesaplanıyor. Büyük çoğunluğu Ermeni olan yazarların daha 

ziyade tarihçi oldukları ve Ermeni olaylarını soykırım olarak 

niteledikleri görülüyor. Türk yazarların hemen tümü de konuya 

tarih açısından yaklaşmış ve tehcirin soykırım olmadığını 

savunmuşlar. 

Konunun duygu yüklü oluşu, yayınlara tarafsız bir tarih 

görüşünün hakim olmasını güçleştirmekle birlikte, dikkatli bir 

okuyucunun olayların tarihi hakkında yeterli bilgi edinmesi için 

ortada yeterli yayın bulunduğuna kuşku yok. Türkiye’deki ve 

Ermenistan’daki arşivlerin açık olmadığı ya da bunlara erişimin 

tam olmadığı yolundaki iddialara rağmen, olayların niteliğini 

değerlendirmek için yeterli arşiv çalışmasının yapılmış ve 

yayımlanmış olduğu da söylenebilir. 

Doksan üç yıl önce cereyan etmiş olayların anlaşılması için 

tarihi çalışmalar olmazsa olmaz nitelikte. Ancak uluslararası 

hukuk alanında eğitim ve tecrübesi yoksa, tarihçi bu olayların 

soykırım olup olmadığı konusunda yargıda bulunamaz. Görülen o 

ki, tarihçiler başta olmak üzere, bu konular üzerinde çalışan 

sosyolog ve siyaset bilimci gibi akademisyenlerle düşünürler, 

önemli sayıda ölümle sonuçlanan olayları soykırım olarak 

nitelemek eğilimindeler. 1 Oysa soykırımın, uluslararası bir suç 

olarak, ancak hukukçular tarafından değerlendirilmesi mümkün. 

1 William A. Shabas, Genocide in International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University 

Press, 2000, s. 7. 


183


Konuya ilişkin hukuki çalışmalar yok denecek kadar az. Bu 

durumun çeşitli nedenleri var. Türklerin hukuka fazla ilgi 

duymadıkları biliniyor. Ermenilerin hukuku kasten ihmal 

etmelerinin nedeni, hukuki değerlendirmelerin, soykırım 

iddialarını güçlendirmekten ziyade zayıflatma olasılığının daha 

yüksek olması. Ermeni taraftarı yazarlar olayların trajik niteliğini 

vurgulamak ve soykırım suçlamasını kolayca yapabilmek için 

tarihi yaklaşımı yeğlemişler. 1948’de oluşturulan ve 1951’de 

yürürlüğe giren “Soykırım Suçunun Önlenmesi ve 

Cezalandırılmasına Dair Sözleşme”nin (bundan böyle Sözleşme) 

1990’ların ortasına kadar ciddi biçimde kullanılmaması veya 

kullanma fırsatının çıkmamış olması nedeniyle gelişmiş bir 

içtihadın da bulunmaması, hukuki yolun tercih edilmemesinin bir 

nedeni olabilir. Nihayet, Sözleşme’nin kabulünden yaklaşık 40 yıl 

öncesinin olaylarına uygulanmasındaki güçlükler de ortada. 

Sözleşme öncesi dönemde mevcut olmayan ve Sözleşme 

tarafından oluşturulan “soykırım” dâhil birçok kavramın, geriye 

dönük uygulanması hukukla bağdaşmadığından konu 

hukukçuların ilgisini çekmemiş olabilir. 

Buna rağmen bazıları geçmiş olayları soykırımla 

tanımlayabildiğine göre, sanki bu olaylar bugün oluyormuş ya da 

soykırım hukuku o günlerde de geçerliymiş gibi bir tür spekülatif 

yaklaşım yine de yararlı görülebilir. Bu makalede böyle bir 

yaklaşım benimseniyor. 

Konunun hukuk yönüne yeterince ağırlık verebilmek için, 

okuyucunun konuya ilişkin tarihi belli ölçüde bildiği varsayılıyor 

ve tarihi verilere hukuki değerlendirmelerin gerektirdiği kadar 

değiniliyor. 

Sözleşme’ye Kadar Hukuk 

1648 Westphalia devletler sistemine göre devlet egemenliği 

mutlak ilkeydi. İç işlerine karışılamazdı. Azınlıklar devletlerin iç 

işiydi. Devletler ülke içinde vuku bulan olaylarda iç mevzuatı 

uyguluyorlardı. Uluslararası suç kavramı yoktu. 1839 Tanzimat 

Fermanı’nı takiben Osmanlı azınlıkları uluslararası anlaşma ve 

antlaşmalara konu olmuştu. Bu istisnai bir durumdu. Bir yandan 

çok kültürlü ve çok milletli Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Batı 

Avrupa ulus-devletleriyle mücadelesinde zayıf düşmesinin, öte 

184 

Gündüz Aktan


yandan da Batı’nın Balkanlar’daki Hristiyan azınlıkları 

desteklemeyi dış politikasının bir unsuru haline getirmesinin 

sonucuydu. 

Ermeni tehciri 1915 yılının Mayıs ayında başladığında, 

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’na karşı savaşmakta olan İngiliz, Fransız 

ve Rus Hükümetleri’ni 24 Mayıs 1915’te yayınladıkları ortak 

bildiride “...Türkiye’nin insanlığa ve uygarlığa karşı bu yeni 

suçları karşısında, müttefik hükümetler, Osmanlı hükümeti 

mensuplarını ve katliama katılan memurlarını şahsen sorumlu 

tutacaklarını Bab-ı Ali’ye alenen bildirirler.” denmekteydi. Buna 

karşılık, Türk sempatizanı olmadığı bilinen Amerikan Dışişleri 

Bakanı Robert Lansing’in “askeri harekât bölgesinde olması 

halinde” Türk Hükümeti’nin Ermenileri tehcire (deport) “az veya 

çok hakkı olduğu”nu söylediği de biliniyor. Öte yandan 1912-13 

Balkan savaşları sırasında 1907 Lahey kurallarını ihlal suretiyle 

işlenen savaş suçlarını araştıran bir raporda, özellikle Türklerin 

başına gelen facialar karşısında insanlığa karşı suçlardan söz 

edilmemesi manidar olmalı. 2 

1907 Lahey kuralları bir ülkenin savaşta işlediği suçlarla 

ilgiliydi. Kendi ülkesinde işlediği iddia edilen suçlara uygulanması 

öngörülmüyordu. Barış Konferansı’nda Yunan Dışişleri 

Bakanı’nın yeni bir insanlığa karşı suç ihdas edilerek Ermeni 

katliamının yargılanması önerisine, Başkan W. Wilson’un ex post 

facto hukuk olacağı gerekçesiyle önceleri itiraz ettiği biliniyor. 

Amerika böyle bir suç oluşturulmasına karşıydı. Almanya ile ilgili 

Versailles Antlaşması’nda bir uluslararası mahkeme kurulacağı 

belirtildi. Bu, tarihte ilk kez vuku buluyordu. Ama Hollanda 

kendisine sığınan Kayser II. Wilhelm’i iade etmediğinden 

yargılama gerçekleşemedi. 

10 Ağustos 1920’de imzalanan Sevr Antlaşması’nda Osmanlı 

İmparatorluğu, söz konusu suçlarla ilgili olarak, Türkiye’de 

yapılacak bir mahkemeye razı oldu (m. 226). Mahkemeyi 

oluşturmak galiplere bırakılıyor; istenen kişilerin yakalanıp 

mahkemeye teslimi taahhüt ediliyordu. Savaş sonunda işgal 

altındaki İstanbul’da kurulan Nemrut Mustafa Divan-ı Harbi, 

Malta’ya götürülen sanıkların, İngiliz Kraliyet savcısının kanıtları 

yetersiz bulması sonucunda salıverilmeleri, hep tarihçiler 

2 Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the 

Balkan Wars, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914, “Katliam, 

Göç, Asimilasyon” Bölümü, ss. 148-158. 


185


tarafından bilinen hususlar. Sevr yerine 24 Temmuz 1923’te 

Lozan Antlaşması geçti. Bunda 1 Ağustos 1914 ile 20 Kasım 1922 

arasında işlenen tüm suçların affı için bir bildiri yer aldı. 

Bilindiği gibi, soykırım II. Dünya Savaşı sırasında Nazi 

Almanyası’nın “nihai çözüm” adı altında Yahudileri yok etmesiyle 

gerçek boyutlarına kavuştu. “Genocide” sözcüğü bir Polonya 

Yahudisi olan Raphael Lemkin tarafından icat edildi. Lemkin daha 

öğrenciyken, bir soykırım saydığı Ermeni olaylarına ilişkin 

sanıkların yargılanmasını yakından izlemişti. Lemkin’in soykırım 

anlayışı çok genişti. Azınlıkların siyasi, ekonomik, sosyal, 

kültürel, moral, fizik ve biyolojik olarak yok edilmesini kapsıyordu. 

Sonradan gelişen hukuk, her grubun değil, sadece bazı grupların 

ve sadece fizik ve biyolojik olarak yok edilmesi amacıyla işlenen 

fiilleri soykırım saydı. Yani Lemkin’in tanımını çok daralttı. 

1940’ların başında Nazilerin Yahudilere yaptıkları henüz tam 

açıklığıyla bilinmediğinden, özellikle İngiltere ve Amerika, Almanya 

sınırları içinde işlenen suçların bir uluslararası mahkemede ele 

alınmasından yana değildiler. Buna karşılık Almanya’nın ülke 

dışında, işgal ettiği ülkelerde işlediği fiillerden dolayı sorumluların 

yargılanmasını savunuyorlardı. Böylece ulus-devlet egemenliğine 

saygı devam edecekti. Zira savaş hukuku sadece savaş sırasında 

ülke dışındaki sivillere karşı işlenen suçlardan dolayı bir ülke 

sorumlularının uluslararası yargıya tabi olmasını öngörüyordu. 

İnsanlığa karşı suç kavramı doktrinde tartışılmakla birlikte, ülke 

içinde işlenen suçları kapsayacak şekilde henüz devletler 

hukukuna girmemişti. 

Almanların Yahudilere yaptıkları yavaş yavaş ortaya çıktıkça, 

ülke içinde işlenen suçlar için de sorumluların yargılanması 

görüşü ağırlık kazanmaya başladı. 1941’de başlayan çalışmalar 

1945’te Amerika’nın Londra Konferansı’na sunduğu bir öneriyle 

yeni bir aşamaya ulaştı. Bunda Lahey sözleşmelerinde yer alan 

“Martens Hükmü”nden yararlanıldı. Böylece, bir suç önceden 

açıkça tanımlanmamışsa, “uygar halkların teamülü, insanlık 

hukuku ve kamu vicdanının emirlerinden çıkan milletlerin hukuk 

ilkeleri”nin uygulanması öngörüldü. Ancak “Martens Hükmü” bir 

savaş hukuku kavramı olduğundan, ülke içinde işlenen suçların 

yargılanması, saldırı kavramıyla yani savaşı başlatmayla 

ilişkilendirildi. Böylece savaşa atıf, iç işlerine karışmanın mazereti 

oluyordu. Londra Konferansı’nın tutanakları incelendiğinde, 

Almanya’nın iç işlerine karışmanın ilerde kendi iç işlerine de 

186 

Gündüz Aktan


karışmaya emsal oluşturmasına karşı, özellikle Amerika’nın ne 

denli hassas olduğu görülüyor. 

Alman savaş suçlularını, bu arada Yahudi soykırımından 

sorumlu olanları yargılayacak Nuremberg Mahkemesi’nin aynı 

adla anılan ilkeleri bu anlayış çerçevesinde oluşturuldu. İlkelerin 

VI olanına göre: 

a. Barışa Karşı Suçlar: 

(i) Uluslararası anlaşmaları, antlaşmaları ve teminatları ihlal 

ederek, bir saldırı savaşı yapmak veya planlamak, 

hazırlamak ve başlatmak; 

(ii) (i)’de sözü edilen fiilleri gerçekleştirmek için ortak bir 

plana veya entrikaya katılmak. 

b. Savaş Suçları: 

İşgal edilen arazinin sivil nüfusunun veya bu arazide 

yaşayan sivil nüfusun katli, kötü muameleye tabi tutulması, 

köleleştirilmesi veya herhangi bir nedenden dolayı sınır dışı 

edilmesi, savaş esirlerinin veya denizde bulunan insanların 

katli veya kötü muameleye tabi tutulması, rehinelerin 

öldürülmesi, özel veya kamu mülkünün yağma edilmesi, 

şehirlerin, kasabaların veya köylerin nedensiz yere yıkıma 

uğratılması veya askeri gerekçelerle haklı gösterilemeyecek 

şekilde zarar verilmesini içeren fakat bunlarla sınırlı 

kalmayan savaş hukuku ve teamüllerinin ihlalleri. 

c. İnsanlığa Karşı Suçlar: 

Barışa karşı suçlar veya savaş suçları ile ilişkili olarak 

işlenmesi kaydıyla, katil, yok etme, köleleştirme, göçe 

zorlama ve sivil bir topluma karşı işlenen diğer insanlık dışı 

fiillerle, siyasi, ırki veya dini nedenlerle yapılan mezalim. 

İnsanlığa karşı suç tanımından da görüleceği üzere, Yahudilere 

karşı işlenen suçlar Almanya’nın içinde işlenmiş olsa dahi, yargı 

konusu olabilecekti. Tek şart bu suçların savaşla ilişkili olarak 

savaş sırasında işlenmiş olmasıydı (nexus). Böylece galipler bir 

ülkenin iç işlerine karışmak için, o ülkeyle bir savaş olması 


187


gerekçesini aramaktan vazgeçemediler. Yahudilerin ve 

diğerlerinin, tarihin görmediği bir vahşetle yok edilmesi dahi, bir 

ülkenin içinde işlenen suçların, kendi başına uluslararası yargıya 

konu olmasına yetmemişti. O sırada sözcük olarak bilinmesine 

rağmen soykırım kavramı Nuremberg İlkeleri (bkz. Ekler, Belge 

65) arasında sayılmadı; insanlığa karşı suçlar kavramı soykırımı 

da içerdi. Soykırım henüz bağımsız bir suç kategorisi olacak kadar 

açıklık ve kesinlik kazanmamıştı. 

Nuremberg Mahkemesi Ekim 1945’te 24 Nazi sanık hakkında 

iddianamenin okunmasıyla başladı. Bir yıl sonra on dokuz sanığın 

hüküm giymesi ve on ikisinin idamıyla sonuçlandı. Savcı 

yargılama sırasında zaman zaman soykırım sözcüğünü kullandı; 

ama mahkeme kararında bu suça atıf yoktu. 

Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) Genel Kurulu 96 (I) Sayılı Kararı 

Soykırımın yer aldığı ilk hukuki nitelik taşıyan belge, BM Genel 

Kurulu’nun 1946 Aralık ayında, Nuremberg Mahkemesi 

sonuçlandıktan kısa bir süre sonra, yaptığı ilk toplantısında aldığı 

96 (I) sayılı karardı (bkz. Ekler, Belge 66). 

Bu kararın amacı, sonuncu işlem paragrafında belirtildiği gibi, 

soykırım konusunda ECOSOC’un bir yıl içinde bir sözleşme 

taslağı hazırlamasının istenmesiydi. Ancak bu arada, Genel Kurul 

soykırımdan ne anladığını da açıkladı. 

Soykırım, insan gruplarının, grup olarak tümüne yaşama 

hakkı tanımamaktı. Bu, kişiye yaşama hakkı tanımamaya 

benzetildi. Yaşama hakkına yapılan bu atıf, bilahare insan 

haklarıyla soykırım arasında bir bağ oluşturdu. Zira soykırımda 

esas olan kişilerin katledilmesiydi. 

Soykırımın, bu insan gruplarının insanlığa yaptığı kültürel ve 

diğer katkılarının kaybına yol açtığı belirtildi. Böylece Lemkin’in 

önem verdiği kültürel soykırım kavramı kısmen metne girmiş 

oldu. 

Soykırıma tabi tutulan gruplar, ırki, dini, siyasi ve diğer 

gruplar olarak sayıldı. Böylece tüm insan gruplarının soykırıma 

uğrayabilecekleri kabul edilmiş oldu. Soykırım, bir grubun 

tümünün olduğu gibi, bir kısmının yok edilmesini de kapsadı. 

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Gündüz Aktan


Kararın belki de en önemli yanı, soykırımın devletler hukukuna 

göre bir suç sayılmasıydı. Bu soykırım suçunun, bir ülke içinde 

işlenmiş olmasının, devlet egemenliği ilkesi çerçevesinde iç işleri 

olarak sayılmasına ve uluslararası kovuşturmadan kurtulmasına 

imkân vermemeyi amaçlıyordu. Soykırım suçunu işleyenlerin, özel 

veya kamu memuru ya da devlet adamı olmasına bakılmadan 

cezalandırılması kabul edildi. 

Soykırım hukuku henüz gelişmemiş olduğundan, kaynak 

olarak “ahlaki hukuka” (moral laws) aykırılığı vurgulandı ve uygar 

devletlerin soykırımı kınadığı bildirildi. 

Soykırımın gerekçesi ya da soykırım yapanın amacı olarak, 

soykırıma maruz gruplarla örtüşmek üzere, “dinî, ırkî, siyasi ve 

diğer nedenler” sayıldı. Bu açıdan Nuremberg İlkeleri arasındaki 

insanlığa karşı suç çerçevesinde yer alan VI (c)’deki tanım “diğer 

nedenler”in ilavesiyle daha da genişletilmiş oldu. 

Bu kararda, siyasi grupların soykırıma uğrayabileceği hükmü, 

siyasi mücadele yapan, örneğin sol ideolojik amaçla silaha 

başvuran veya bağımsızlık için mücadele eden grupların içindeki 

sivillerin, kısmen dahi olsa, önemli sayıda katledilmesi halinde 

soykırım işlenmiş olacağını gösteriyordu. Bu haliyle Nuremberg 

İlkeleri içindeki insanlığa karşı suç kavramı hemen tümüyle 

soykırım sayılmış olmaktaydı. Ancak, bu karar soykırımla savaş 

arasındaki bağı ortadan kaldırıyordu. Yani soykırımın savaş 

sırasında olduğu gibi barış döneminde de işlenebileceği kabul 

ediliyordu. Öte yandan, soykırım, savaşan ülkenin işgal ettiği 

yerlerde işlenebileceği gibi, o ülkenin kendi sınırları içinde de 

işlenebiliyordu. 

Böylece hangi nedenle, zamanda ve yerde olursa olsun, ciddi 

sayıda insan ölümü soykırım suçu sayıldı. 

Sözleşme 

Soykırım Sözleşmesi 9 Aralık 1948’de kabul edildi, 12 Ocak 

1951’de de yürürlüğe girdi. Soykırım suçu Sözleşme’nin 2. 

maddesinde tanımlanıyor. 3 Maddenin uzman olmayan bir 

çevirisini aşağıya kaydediyorum: 

3 In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent 

to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) 

Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 

group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 

physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births 

within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 


189


Madde 2. Bu Sözleşmeye göre, soykırım, bir milli, etnik, ırki 

veya dini grubu, grup olarak, kısmen veya tümüyle, yok 

etmek kastıyla, aşağıdaki fiillerin işlenmesidir: 

(a) Grubun mensuplarını katletmek; 

(b) Grubun mensuplarına ciddi bedensel ve psikolojik zarar 

vermek; 

(c) Grubun bedeni varlığının kısmen veya tamamen yok 

olmasına yol açacak hayat şartlarına kasten tabi tutmak; 

(d) Grup içinde doğumları önlemek kastıyla önlemler 

dayatmak; 

(e) Grubun çocuklarını bir başka gruba zorla nakletmek. 

Sözleşmeyi BM Sekretaryası’nın sunduğu taslak metin 

üzerinden Ad hoc komite ile BM Genel Kurulu’nun hukuk 

işlerinden sorumlu VI. Komitesi müzakere etti. İleride bu 

Sözleşme’nin hükümlerini Ermeni olaylarına uygulayıp 

yorumlarken, müzakerelere atıflar yapılacağından, bu aşamada 

genelde Sözleşme metninin, özelde 2. maddenin kısa bir 

değerlendirmesiyle yetineceğim. 

Korunan Gruplar 

2. maddede zikredilen, Sözleşme ile korunacak grupların 

dörtle, yani milli, etnik, ırki ve dini gruplarla sınırlı olduğu 

görülüyor. Soykırım Sözleşmesi’nin hazırlık aşamasında, soykırım 

sözcüğünün mucidi ve aslen siyasi grupların soykırım kapsamı 

içinde ele alınmasını savunmuş olan Lemkin, esasında “siyasi 

gruplar”ın Sözleşme kapsamı dışında tutulmasını kendisi önerdi. 

96 (I) sayılı karardan farklı olarak hem siyasi gruplar hem de 

“diğer gruplar” Sözleşme kapsamı dışında tutuldu. Bu, çok önemli 

bir fark oluşturuyor. Zira tarihte en sık görülen ve en çok sivil 

ölümüne neden olan mücadeleler siyasi amaçlar güden gruplar 

arasında cereyan ediyor. Örneğin, Kamboçya’da Pol Pot rejiminin 

yaptığı ve 2 milyona yakın sivilin hayatına mal olan katliamlar 

Sözleşme’deki soykırım tanımının dışında kalıyor. Aynı şekilde 

Sovyetler Birliği’nde Ekim Devrimi çerçevesindeki ölümler de 

soykırım sayılmıyor. Eski Yugoslavya Uluslararası Ceza 

Mahkemesi’nin birçok kararına göre, bazı istisnai fiiller hariç, 

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Gündüz Aktan


Bosna-Hersek’te Sırpların etnik temizliği bile soykırım suçu dışına 

çıkıyor. 

Siyasi grup tanımı içine, o grubun siyasetle uğraşan ya da silahlı 

mücadele veren unsurlarının yanında siviller de giriyor. Bu ilk 

bakışta karışıklığa yol açıyor. Grubun siyasi grup olarak nitelenip 

sivillerin yok edilmesinin neden soykırım olmayacağı sorgulanıyor. 

Oysa bir gruba, siyasi amaçlarla yok edilmeye kalkışılması halinde, 

siyasi grup deniyor. Yani iki grup arasında siyasi bir mücadele 

varsa, bu mücadelede bir grup diğeri aleyhine öldürme, yaralama, 

katliam, tehcir gibi fiiller işliyorsa, zarar gören gruba siyasi grup 

deniyor. Sorun bir tanımlama sorunu. Yoksa siyasi mücadelede 

sivil öldürme yine suç. Ancak bu suç soykırım değil. 

96 (I) sayılı karardaki grupların insanlığa yaptığı kültürel 

katkılara Sözleşme’de değinilmemesi, kültürel soykırım 

kavramının da Sözleşme dışında kaldığını gösteriyor. 

Sözleşme’de siyasi gruplara karşı yapılan eylemlerin ve 

azınlıkların kültürünün zorla yapılan asimilasyon sonucu yok 

edilmesinin soykırım suçu sayılmaması, Sözleşme’nin uygulama 

alanını iyice daralttı. Bu nedenle Sözleşme’nin kabul edildiği 

1951’den 1992’ye kadar geçen süre içinde, birkaç fazla önemli 

olmayan istisna dışında uygulanamaması sert tepkilere yol açtı. 

Sözleşme’nin hiçbir işe yaramadığı söylendi. Buna karşılık, 

çoğunluğu tarihçi, sosyolog veya düşünürler, Sözleşme 

metnindeki soykırım tanımını geniş olarak yorumlama yoluna 

gittiler. Araştırdıkları olaylarda önemli sayıda sivil nüfusun 

ölmüş olması halinde soykırım işlendiğini iddia ettiler. İkinci bir 

grup bilim adamıysa, Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesini genişletmek 

için yeni tanımlar önerdi. Her iki taraf da Sözleşme ile soykırıma 

karşı korunan dört grubun dışında kalan gruplara dönük 

katliamların zaten insanlığa karşı suç kavramı çerçevesinde 

korunmakta olduğunu görmezden geldiler. Zira uluslararası 

toplum, soykırımdan farklı olarak insanlığa karşı işlenen 

suçlara karşı aynı duyarlılığı göstermiyordu. Onların korunması 

için Nuremberg türü uluslararası mahkemeler kurmaya hazır 

değildi. Özetle, bu grupların barışta insan hakları hukuku, 

savaşta da insani hukuk ya da savaş hukuku çerçevesinde etkin 

koruması sağlanamıyordu. Sonuç olarak, soykırım tanımı bazı 

yorumcular tarafından savaş hukuku ve insan hakları konuları 

altında işlenen tüm ciddi suçları da kapsayacak şekilde 

genişletilmişti. 


191


Bu durum Bosna-Hersek ve Ruanda’da cereyan eden 

olaylardan sonra kurulan iki uluslararası ceza mahkemesinin 

çalışmalarıyla büyük ölçüde değişti. İnsanlığa karşı suçlarla savaş 

suçları işleyenler cezalandırılmaya başladı. Uluslararası Ceza 

Mahkemesi’ne ilişkin Roma Statüsü ise hukuktaki tüm boşlukları 

kapattı. İnsanlığa karşı suçların barış zamanında işlenebileceğine 

ilave olarak, bu suçların ve savaş suçlarının sadece devletlerarası 

savaşlarda değil, iç çatışmalarda da işlenebileceği kabul edildi. 

Roma Statüsü soykırıma ilişkin Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesini aynen 

alıp kendisinin 6. maddesi yaptı. Buna karşılık yeniden yazımdan 

geçen insanlığa karşı suçlara ilişkin Roma Statüsü’nün 7. 

maddesiyle, eski Yugoslavya ve Ruanda için kurulan uluslararası 

mahkemelerin statülerindeki ilgili maddeler, Sözleşme’nin 

kapsamadığı diğer gruplara karşı işlenen katliam, mezalim ve 

tehcir vb. suçlarını da içerdi. 

Kasıt 

Suç iki kısımdan oluşuyor. Birincisi zihni veya sübjektif unsur 

ya da mens rea. Bu, suç fiilini işlemek niyeti, amacı ve iradesi 

anlamına geliyor. Diğeri suç fiilin bizzat kendisi, maddi veya 

objektif unsur ya da actus reus. Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesinde zihni 

unsuru “yok etmek kastıyla” ibaresi temsil ediyor. Bu iradeyle 

işlenen fiiller ise (a)’dan (e)’ye kadar sayılıyor. 

Sözleşme’nin en önemli özelliklerinden biri, soykırım suçunun 

oluşması için soykırım fiillerinin ancak dört gruptan birini yok 

etme iradesiyle işlenmesi gereği. Grup olarak yok etme iradesi “özel 

kasıt” şeklinde olmak zorunda. Yani kuşkuya meydan 

bırakmayacak, son derece belirgin biçimde ortaya çıkmalı. Yok 

etme niyeti soykırım fiillerini işleyen veya işlenmesini 

sağlayanlarca açıkça beyan edilirse mesele kalmıyor. Şayet böyle 

açık bir sözlü ve yazılı beyan yoksa soykırımın varlığı tartışmalı 

hale geliyor. Bazı hukukçular bu noktada fiillerin sonucuna 

bakmak gerektiğini vurgularken, bu fiiller sonucunda söz konusu 

gruba ilişkin ciddi sayıda ölümün vuku bulmuş olmasını yeterli 

sayıyorlar. 

Ancak, adi suçlar için geçerli olan “genel kasıt” yani fiilin 

sonucunu görüp, bu fiilin işlenmesinde fiilin sonucuna uygun bir 

kasıt güdüldüğü yolundaki basit yorum, soykırım fiilinin 

tanımlanması için yetersiz kalıyor. Öte yandan, soykırım yapanlar 

192 

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yok etme iradesini genellikle açıklamıyorlar. Soykırımı kanıtlamak 

için yok etme iradesine ilişkin yazılı ve sözlü açık kanıtlar 

bulunmaması halinde, ciddi sayıdaki ölümün dışındaki bazı 

unsurları da göze almak gerekiyor. Soykırım suçu çoğunlukla 

devletlerin ya da devlet gibi yaygın örgütlerin iradesiyle 

işlendiğinden, “özel kasıt” şartının yerine gelmesi için suçun 

örgütlü bir güç tarafından işlenmiş olup olmadığına bakılıyor. 

Soykırım bir grup gibi çok sayıda kişinin yok edilmesi olduğundan, 

bu örgütlü gücün çok önceden bir plan hazırlayıp hazırlamadığı 

önemli. Ayrıca bu örgütlü gücün planını örgütleyerek, eşgüdüm 

içinde, sistematik ve kitlesel biçimde uygulaması lazım. 

Örgütlenmesi, uygulanması ve sonuçları açısından Yahudi 

soykırımı belki istisnai bir örnek olarak diğer durumlara 

uygulanamayabilir. Yahudi soykırımı için “nihai çözüm” kararı, 

1942 Wannsee toplantısında alındı ve suç Nuremberg 

Mahkemesi’nde ikrar edildi. Ancak yok etme iradesi böyle açıkça 

ortaya çıkmasaydı bile, Yahudilere karşı çıkarılan ayırımcı yasalar, 

1938’deki “Kristal Gecesi” dâhil düzenlenen “pogrom” türü 

saldırılar, Yahudileri toplum dışına çıkarıp normal insani 

ihtiyaçlarının karşılanamadığı gettolarda yaşamaya zorlamalar, 

soykırımın öncüleri olarak görülebilirdi. Kaldı ki soykırımdan en az 

on beş yıl önce başlamış olan militan anti-semitizm akımı 

çerçevesinde Hitler’in ve Nazi ideologların söz ve yazılarında 

Yahudileri yok etme niyeti açıklıkla ortaya konuluyordu. Sırplarda 

ise, 1981 yılından itibaren etnik bakımdan homojen bir vatan 

toprağına sahip olma söylemi yaygındı. Nitekim etnik temizlik 

kavramı Sırp paramiliter liderlerden biri olan Seselj tarafından icat 

edilmişti. 

Soykırım için gerekli yok etme iradesinin varlığını ispat için, 

soykırım fiillerinin uygulanmasından önceki döneme bakıp, bu 

iradenin oluşmaya başlayıp başlamadığını araştırmak gerekiyor. 

Örgüt, plan ve örgütlü uygulamanın mevcudiyeti, yok etme 

kastının mevcudiyetine karine sayılıyor. 

Saik (Motif) 

Suçun amacı yanında bu amacın nedeni de hayati önemi haiz. 

Buna motif ya da saik deniyor. Nuremberg İlkeleri VI (c)’de 

tanımlanan insanlığa karşı suçların “sivil halklara karşı siyasi, 

ırkî ve dinî nedenlerle” işlenmesi öngörülüyordu. 4 96 (I) sayılı 


193


kararda ise soykırımın “dinî, ırkî, siyasi ve diğer herhangi bir 

nedenle” işlenebileceği kaydediliyordu. 5 Bu haliyle soykırımın 

saiki insanlığa karşı suçun saikinden bile geniş tutulmuştu. Bir 

başka ifadeyle, bir grupla mevcut dinî veya siyasi ya da akla 

gelebilecek herhangi bir ihtilaf nedeniyle (saik) çıkabilecek bir 

silahlı mücadelede önemli sayıda sivilin öldürülmesi hem 

soykırım hem insanlığa karşı suç olabiliyordu. 

Sözleşmedeki durum ise çok farklı. 2. madde, soykırımdaki yok 

etme kastını, belirtilen dört gruba inhisar ettirmekle kalmıyor, yok 

etmenin nedenini de yukarıda işaret edilen iki belgedeki nedenlere 

oranla, son derece daraltıyor. Sözleşme müzakerelerinde yok 

etmenin nedeni konusu uzun tartışmalara yol açtı. Birçok ülke 

temsilcisi saikin kanıtlanmasının çok zor olduğunu; böyle bir şart 

aranması halinde mahkemelerin soykırım suçuna karar 

vermelerinin imkânsızlaşacağını; önemli olanın yok etme 

iradesiyle fiillerin işlenmesi olduğunu ileri sürdüler. Ancak Ad hoc 

komitede Lübnan temsilcisi saikin önemini vurguladı ve 

soykırımın “ırkçı nefretle” bir grubu yok etme olduğunu söyledi. 

Ardından VI. Komitede yapılan müzakerelerde İngiliz ve Amerikan 

delegelerinin itirazlarına karşılık, “anti-faşist cephe”nin liderliğini 

yapan Sovyetler Birliği’nin ısrarı, çoğunluğun desteği ve 

Venezuela’nın aracılığıyla, dört gruptan birini, başkaca bir neden 

olmadan, sadece o grup olması nedeniyle yok etme amacına 

dönük fiillerin soykırım olması anlamına gelen “as such” ibaresi 

Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesine eklendi. 6 İlk bakışta gözden kaçabilen 

ve Türkçe karşılığı olmadığından açıklayıcı biçimde tercüme etme 

zorunluluğu yaratan bir ibare bu. Belki de bu nedenle tarihçiler 

tarafından hep ihmale uğruyor. 

Soykırım suçunu işlerken saikin kolektif veya bireysel olma 

niteliğini göz önüne almak gerekiyor. Bir birey suç işlerken hedef 

grubun bir mensubunu sadece o gruba ait olduğu için 

öldürmeyebilir. Parasını ve malını almak, haset duymak, siyasi 

ihtirası olmak gibi saiklerle de hareket edebilir. Ancak soykırım 

4 c. Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other 

inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecution on political, racial or 

religious grounds... Buradaki “grounds” sözcüğünün Türkçe hukuk dilinde “gerekçe” 

anlamına geldiği ve yasa gerekçesinin İngilizce karşılığı olduğunu; Fransızca’sının ise 

“neden” anlamına gelen “raison” olduğunu belirtmek gerekir (yazarın notu). 

5 … the crime (genocide) is committed on religious, racial, political or any other grounds… 

6 Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed 

with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, 

as such:.. Buradaki “as such” veya Fransızca’daki “comme telle” grubun grup olması 

nedeniyle yok edilmesi anlamına geliyor. 

194 

Gündüz Aktan


kolektif bir suç. Soykırımın örgütleyicileri ve plancılarının ırkçı 

motifle hareket etmeleri, yani soykırım motifine sahip olmaları 

gerekli. Eğer bunlar gruba karşı ırkçı nefretle değil de başka 

saiklerle hareket ediyorlarsa, işledikleri suça soykırım denemiyor. 

Sonuç olarak, soykırım suçunun başarıyla kovuşturulabilmesi 

için sanıkların bir grubu grup olarak yok etmek nedeniyle nefret 

duyduklarının kanıtlanması gerekiyor. Soykırımın 

cezalandırılması bu tür suçları kapsıyor. Başka saiklerle işlenen 

kolektif suçlar bunun dışında kalıyor. Bu bağlamda klasik 

soykırımlar Nazilerin Yahudi soykırımı ile Hutuların Ruanda’da 

yaptıkları soykırım oluyor. 7 

Sosyolojik ve psikolojik olarak, bir grubu grup niteliği 

dolayısıyla yok etme iradesi zaten sadece ırkçılıkta, daha doğrusu 

ırkçılığın en yoğun, en son aşamasında, ortaya çıkıyor. 

Irkçı nefret duygusu, somut bir ihtilafta tarafların birbirlerine 

karşı duydukları kızgınlıkla karışık doğal nefretten çok farklı. Bu, 

anti-semitizm gibi Batı Avrupa’daki ırkçı akımların 2 bin yıldır, 

ama aktif olarak da son bin yıldır Yahudilere duydukları, 

nedenleri kolay açıklanamayan yoğun ve marazi bir duygu 

kompleksi. Önyargıların hastalıklı biçimi. Naziler bu kültürün 

ürünü. Bu duyguyu anlayabilmek için kütüphaneler dolusu 

yayımlardan bir kaçını okumak yeterli. 8 Öte yandan Ruanda 

Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi’nin Akayesu davasına ilişkin 

belgelerinde Bantu kabilesi çiftçi Hutular ile kıtanın kuzeyinden 

gelen çoban Nilo-Hamitik Tutsiler arasındaki ırkçı ilişkilerin 

tarihine dair bilgiler de göz önüne alınabilir. 

Dünyanın her yerinde ırksal duygular var. Bunlar hedef 

grupları derece derece rahatsız edebiliyor. Ancak grubun yok 

edilmesine varan, yani ırkçılık düzeyine çıkan ırkçılığa yalnızca 

Batı Avrupa ve onun Kuzey Amerika, Güney Afrika ve 

Avustralya’daki beyaz sömürgelerinde rastlanıyor. 9 Bu çerçevede 

1206-1248’lerde Katarlar’ın Fransa’da, 1492’de Yahudilerin 

İspanya’da, 16 ve 17. yüzyılda İnka, Aztek ve Maya uygarlıklarının 

mirasçısı yerlilerin İspanyollarca, 18. ve 19. yüzyılda 

7 Schabas, a.g.e., s. 255; kitabı boyunca Ermenilerin soykırıma uğradıklarını sadece Ermeni 

yazar Vahakn N. Dadrian’ın yazılarına atfen belirten Schabas, klasik soykırımlar içinde 

Ermeni “soykırımı”nı zikretmiyor. 

8 Léon Poliakov, Le Mythe Aryen, Paris: Editions Complexe, 1971 başta olmak üzere aynı 

yazarın eserleri. 

9 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Macropaedia, Volume 15, 1985, ss. 360-366. 


195


Kızılderililer’in Amerikalılarca, 19. ve 20. yüzyılda Hollandalı 

Boerlerin “apartheid” rejiminin hüküm sürdüğü Güney Afrika’da, 

aynı dönemde Avustralya yerlilerinin İngiliz kökenlilerce, 

soykırıma tabi tutulması sayılabilir. 

Diğer uygarlıkları oluşturan toplumların da düşman saydıkları 

sivil nüfuslara mezalim yaptıkları görülüyor. Ancak bunlarda bir 

grubu grup olarak yok etme iradesine yol açan ırkçı nefret 

bulunduğu saptanamıyor. Özellikle İslam ve Türk uygarlıklarında 

soykırım uygulaması bulunmuyor. Aksi halde bu uygarlıkların 

yüzyıllarca yaşayan imparatorluklar kurmaları mümkün 

olamazdı. Unutulmaması gereken husus, Batı uygarlığına ait 

güçlü ülkelerin büyük teknolojik üstünlüğüne rağmen, kurduğu 

sömürge imparatorlukları bir yüzyıldan biraz fazla yaşayabildi. 

Sözleşme’de soykırımın bir grubu grup olarak yok etmek 

amacıyla sınırlandırılması, başka amaçlarla sivil toplumlara dönük 

mezalimi dışarıda bırakıyor. Bu boşluk Nuremberg İlkeleri VI (c) 

maddesinde yer alan insanlığa karşı suçların tanımının bu tür 

suçları kapsamasıyla gideriliyor. Bir yandan eski Yugoslavya 

Uluslararası Mahkemesi diğer yandan Ruanda Uluslararası 

Mahkemesi statüleri, nihayet Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi’nin 

Roma Statüsü’nde bulunan insanlığa karşı suçlar maddeleri bu 

işlevi görüyor. 10 Böylece soykırım suçu, insanlığa karşı suçların 

mezalim kategorisinin içinden çıkmakla birlikte, onlardan ayrılıyor 

ve suçlar hiyerarşisi içinde en yüksek veya en aşağı yeri alıyor. 

10 Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi Roma Statüsü Madde 7: İnsanlığa Karşı Suçlar 

7/1: Bu statünün amaçları için “insanlığa karşı suç” herhangi bir sivil nüfusa karşı 

gerçekleştirilen yaygın ve sistematik saldırının parçası olarak ve saldırının amacını bilerek, 

aşağıdaki fiilleri işlemektir: 

(a) Katl; 

(b) Yok etme; 

(c) Köleleştirme; 

(d) Tehcir ve zorla yapılan nüfus nakilleri; 

(e) Kanun dışı tutuklama…; 

(f) İşkence; 

(g) Irza geçme...; 

(h) Bir gruba veya topluluğa, siyasi, ırki, milli, etnik, kültürel, dini, cinsi, ve diğer 

nedenlerle yapılan mezalim...; 

(i) Zorla kaybolmalar; 

(j) Apartheid suçu 

(k) Diğer insanlık dışı fiiller… 

7/2 (a): Herhangi bir sivil nüfusa karşı girişilen yaygın ve sistematik saldırı: Yukarıdaki 

fiillerin (a-k) herhangi bir sivil nüfusa karşı bir devlet veya örgüt politikasının sonucu 

olarak çok sayıda işlenmesidir. 

196 

Gündüz Aktan


Kısmen veya Tamamen 

Sözleşmenin 2. maddesinde bir grubun, kısmen veya tamamen, 

yok edilmesi amacıyla işlenen fiillere soykırım deniyor. Yani bu 

fiillerin soykırımı oluşturması için, bir grubun tümünü yok etmek 

gerekmiyor. Oysa bir grubu grup olarak yok etme iradesini 

doğuran ırkçı nefretin, grubun bir kısmını yok etmekle yetinmesi 

çelişkili görünüyor. 

Ancak, Naziler bile tüm Yahudileri yok edemediler. Savaşın 

başladığı yıla kadar Yahudilerin yaşam şartlarını olağanüstü 

zorlaştırarak Almanya’yı terk etmelerini sağladılar. Savaş 

başladıktan sonra kaçmak isteyenlere dahi izin vermediler ve 

Almanya içindeki tüm Yahudileri yok ettiler. İşgal ettikleri 

yerlerdeki Yahudileri de sınır dışına atmak yerine soykırıma tabi 

tuttular. 

Buradan iki çıkarsama yapılabilir: Naziler için bile bir grubu 

grup olarak yok etme saikinin kritik yoğunluğa ulaşması ancak 

savaş şartlarında gerçekleşti veya Almanların Yahudilere erişme 

imkânı her şeye rağmen sınırlıydı. Erişebildiklerinin kaçmasına 

izin vermeden yok ettiler. 

Sözleşme’nin yapıcıları, bu hükümle, muhtemelen, bir grubun 

tümünün yok edilmesini beklemeden, uluslararası toplumun 

soykırım yapıldığı sonucuna varmasını ve 1. maddede öngörülen 

soykırımın engellemesi ve cezalandırmasını zamanında sağlamayı 

amaçladılar. 

Hukukun Ermeni Olaylarına Uygulanması 

21 Eylül 2000’de Amerikan Temsilciler Meclisi'nin bir alt 

komisyonunda yapılan sunuşta (hearing) Ermeni yanlısı tarihçiler 

Türk arşivlerinin açılmasına artık ihtiyaçları olmadığını, mevcut 

bilgilerle Ermenilere soykırım yapılmış olduğu konusunda bir 

mutabakat hasıl olduğunu söylediler (the verdict is in). İddiaları 

bir bakıma doğruydu. Ama gerçek onların söylediklerinin tam 

tersiydi. Mevcut arşiv bilgileri soykırım yapılmadığını kanıtlamak 

açısından yeterliydi. Yeni arşiv bilgilerinin de mevcut bilgilerle 

çelişkili olması mümkün değildi. 

Aşağıdaki değerlendirme Ermeni olaylarının tarihi hakkında 

yeterli bilgiye sahip olunduğu varsayımıyla yapılıyor. Yine de 


197


olayların cereyan ettiği tarihi bağlama kısaca bakmakta yarar 

olabilir. 19. yüzyılda Rusya’nın Kırım ve Kafkaslara doğru 

genişlemesi bölgede yaşayan çoğunluğu Türk kökenli Müslüman 

nüfusu birbiri ardına gelen göç dalgaları ile Anadolu’ya sürdü. 

Göç edenlerin pek çoğu da yollarda öldü. Kafkaslarda Ermeniler, 

Rus ordularının ilerlemesine yardım ettiler ve bunun karşılığında 

etnik olarak Türklerden temizlenmiş bölgelere yerleştirildiler. Bu 

sürgünler ve yeniden yerleştirmeler 20. yüzyılda bölgede bir 

Ermeni Devleti’nin doğuşuna yol açtı. Ruslar güneye doğru 

genişlemeleri sırasında 1827-29, 1854-56 ve 1877-78 savaşları ile 

Doğu Anadolu’ya girdiler ve her defasında Ermeniler Rus 

ordularının ilerlemesine yardımcı oldular. Böylelikle gelecekte 

meydana gelebilecek etnik bir çatışmanın da tohumlarını ektiler. 

Balkan Savaşları 1912-13 yıllarında oldu. Osmanlılar Doğu 

Trakya hariç, tüm Avrupa topraklarını kaybettiler. Bu toprakların 

büyük bölümünde çoğunluktaydılar. Çok büyük sayıda Türk, 

Arnavut ve Pomak sivil nüfus hayatını kaybetti. Büyük bir grup da 

yerlerinden yurtlarından sökülüp Anadolu’ya doğru atıldı. Bir yıl 

sonra da imparatorluğun bekasını tayin edecek I. Dünya Savaşı 

başladı. Osmanlılar doğuda Çarlık Rusyası’nın orduları, 

Çanakkale’de İngiliz ve Fransız donanmaları, güneyde Mısır, 

Suriye ve Irak cephelerinde de bunların ordularıyla savaşıyordu. 

I. Dünya Savaşı’nın başlarında Anadolu’nun nüfusunun 17,5 

milyon civarında olduğu hesaplanıyor. Bunun 1,3 milyonunun 

Ermenilerden, 1,4 milyonun Rumlardan, geri kalanın da Türk ve 

Müslümanlardan oluştuğu tahmin ediliyor. 11 Ermeni kilisesinin, 

Avrupa Katolik ve Protestan kiliseleri gibi, nüfus kayıtları 

tutmadığı biliniyor. Bu nedenle Ermenilerin verdiği abartılı 

istatistikler sağlıklı bir kaynağa dayanmıyor. Osmanlı istatistikleri 

11 Ermeni nüfusu hakkında tahminler şöyle: 

1. Ermeni Patrikhanesi’nin rakamlarını esas alan Marcel Leart’a göre 2.560.000 

2. Ermeni tarihçi K.J. Basmaciyan’a gore 2.380.000 

3. Paris Barış Konferansı’na katılan Ermeni Heyeti’ne göre 2.250.000 

4. Ermeni tarihçi Kevork Aslan’a göre 1.800.000 

5. Fransız Sarı Kitap’a göre 1.555.000 

6. Encyclopedia Britannica’ya göre 1.500.000 

7. Ludovic de Constenson’a göre 1.400.000 

8. H.F.B. Lynch’e göre 1.345.000 

9. Revue de Paris’e göre 1.300.000 

10. 1893 Osmanlı istatistiklerine göre 1.001.465 

11. 1906 Osmanlı istatistiklerine göre 1.120.748 

12. I. Dünya Savaşı'ndan hemen önceki Osmanlı istatistiklerine göre 1.295.000 

13. İngiliz Yıllığı’na göre 1.056.000 

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doğruya en yakın olarak kabul ediliyor. Avrupa kaynaklı 

istatistikler de Osmanlı istatistiklerine çok yakın. İstanbul’da 

1892’de kurulan, nüfus sayımından sorumlu idarenin ilk müdürü 

bir Türk olmakla birlikte, idare daha sonra Fethi Franco adlı bir 

Yahudi, 1893-1903 arasında Mıgırdıç Şınabyan adlı bir Ermeni ve 

1908’den itibaren de bir Amerikalı tarafından yürütülmüş. 

Ermenilerin Siyasi Hedef ve Mücadeleleri 

Çoğu Ermeni ve tarihçilerin büyük bölümü, 1915-16 

olaylarının bir soykırım olduğunu; yani Ermenilerin bir siyasi 

grup olarak değil de, bir etnik ya da dini grup olarak, soykırım gibi 

bir tehcire tabi tutulduklarını kanıtlamak için, Ermenilerin 

terörizm de dahil siyasi amaçlı faaliyetlerinden ya hiç söz 

etmiyorlar ya da çok kısa geçiştiriyorlar. Bir kısmı da Osmanlı 

yönetiminin baskıcı olduğunu, buna karşı Ermenilerin kendilerini 

savunmak ve haklarına sahip olmak amacıyla siyasi faaliyetlerde 

bulunduklarını bildiriyor. Ermenilerin terör türü şiddete 

başvurması, Balkanlar’daki Hristiyan halkların komitacıları, 

hajduk, klepsos ya da çetnikleri gibi, büyük ve zalim bir güce 

karşı, meşru savunma olarak hoş görülüyor. 12 

Tarihsel olarak devletler hedef gruplara ırkçı saldırılar olmadığı 

sürece etnik çatışma başlatmazlar. Ancak, daha önce de 

açıklandığı üzere, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda ırkçılık yoktur. 

Etnik grupların imparatorlukları parçalamak suretiyle 

bağımsızlıklarını kazanmak üzere mücadele başlattıkları daha 

mantıklı bir varsayımdır. İşte Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda 19. 

yüzyılın sonlarında görülen de budur. 

Ermeniler de, bu Balkan kurtuluş mücadelesi modelini 

benimsiyorlar. Hristiyan Balkan halkları gibi örgütlenip siyasi 

faaliyette bulunuyorlar. Aslında bunu fazla yadırgamamak da 

gerek. Zira Fransız Devrimi’nden sonra ortaya çıkan ulus-devletin 

hakim olmaya başladığı bir çağda, çok dinli ve uluslu bir 

imparatorluğa karşı bağımsızlık mücadelesi meşru sayılıyor. 

12 Başlıca Ermeni isyanları şunlar: 1862 ve 1895 Zeytun; 20.6.1890 Erzurum; 15.7.1890 

Kumkapı; 1892 Merzifon, Kayseri, Yozgat olayları; Ağustos 1894 1. Sassun isyanı; Eylül 

1895 Bab-ı Ali gösterileri; 1895-96 Van isyanı; 1895’de Ermenilerin silahlı saldırılar 

gerçekleştirdikleri şehirler: Trabzon, Erzincan, Bitlis, Maraş, Erzurum, Diyarbakır, 

Malatya, Harput; 26.8.1896 Osmanlı Bankası baskını; 1904 2. Sassun isyanı; 21.7.1905 

Sultan Abdülhamit’e bombalı suikast saldırısı; 1909 Adana İsyanı; Nisan 1915 Van İsyanı 

vb. 


199


Ermenilerin de bu faaliyetlere giriştikleri açıkça görülüyor. Bu 

mücadelenin şiddete başvurmadan başarıya ulaşması da 

imkânsız. Tabiatıyla şiddetin savaş hukuku kurallarına uyması 

gerekiyor. Ancak imparatorluktaki Hristiyan halkların silahlı 

faaliyetleri birçok ahvalde açıkça hukuku çiğniyor. Balkan modeli 

şiddet genelde komitacı denen terör gruplarının sivil Müslüman 

halka saldırarak Müslümanları misillemeye tahrik etmesi; 

Müslüman halkın misilleme yapması ya da yönetimin askeri 

önlem alması halinde de, Batı Avrupa’yı mezalim çığlıklarıyla 

müdahaleye davet etmesi şeklinde işliyor. Büyük Hristiyan güçler 

ya da Düvel-i Muazzama Osmanlı’nın Hristiyan ahali lehine 

reformlar yapmasını dayatıyor. Bu reformlar yerel yönetim 

haklarından giderek otonomiye uzanıyor. Bir süre sonra belli 

bölgelerde Osmanlı egemenliği nominal hale geliyor ve ilk silahlı 

ihtilafta, dış müdahale ve yardımla bağımsızlığa 

kavuşuluyor. 13,14,15,16 

1880’lerde Hınçaklar siyasi ve silahlı mücadelelerinin amacı 

olarak Anadolu’nun doğusunda altı vilayeti kapsayan ve 

“Vilayat-ı Sitte” denen Erzurum, Van, Elaziz, Diyarbakır, Bitlis ve 

Sivas’ı kapsayan bölgede bir hayali Ermenistan kurduklarını 

açıkladılar. Bu, bugünün idari taksimatına göre Erzincan, Ağrı, 

13 Lo ui se Nal ban di an, Ar me ni an Re vo lu tio nary Mo ve ment, Ber ke ley: Uni ver sity of Ca li for ni a 

Press, 1963, ss. 110-111. Hın çak par ti prog ra mı hak kın da aşa ğı da ki bil gi le ri ve ri yor: “Aji - 

tas yon ve te rör hal kın mo ra li ni yük sek tut mak için ge rek liy di. Halk düş man la ra kar şı tah - 

rik edil me li, ay nı düş man la rın mi sil le me ey lem le rin den de ya rar la nı la bil me liy di. Te rör hal - 

kı ko ru mak ve hal kın gü ve ni ni ka zan mak için bir yön tem ola rak kul la nıl ma lıy dı. Par ti, Os - 

man lı Hü kü me ti’ni te rö ri ze ede rek re ji min iti ba rı nı sars ma lı ve tü müy le yı kıl ma sı için ça - 

lış ma lıy dı. Hü kü met te rö rün tek he de fi ol ma ya cak tı. Hın çak, muh bir ler ve ca sus lar la, o sı - 

ra da hü kü met için ça lı şan en teh li ke li Türk ve Er me ni ki şi le ri yok et mek is ti yor du. Bu açı - 

dan ken di si ne yar dım cı ol ma sı için par ti, te rö rist ey lem ler ya pa cak özel bir ör güt kur muş - 

tu. Ge nel is yan çı kar mak için en uy gun za man Tür ki ye’nin bir sa va şa gir me siy di.” 

14 K. S. Pa pa zi an, Pat rio tism Per ver ted, Bos ton: Ba ker Press, 1934, ss. 14-15, Taş nak Der - 

ne ği hak kın da şun la rı söy lü yor: “A. R. Fe de ras yo nu [Taş nak] ayak lan ma yo luy la Türk Er - 

me ni le ri nin eko no mik ve si ya si ba ğım sız lı ğı nı sağ la ma yı amaç lı yor du. ...te rö rizm ba şın dan 

iti ba ren Kaf kas Taş nak Ko mi te si ta ra fın dan bu ama ca ulaş mak için bir yön tem ve po li ti ka 

ola rak ka bul edil miş ti. ‘İm kan lar’ baş lı ğı al tın da 1892 yı lın da ka bul et tik le ri prog ram da 

aşa ğı da ki hu sus la rı oku yo ruz: Er me ni Dev rim Fe de ras yo nu [Taş nak] ayak lan may la ama - 

cı na ulaş mak için dev rim ci grup lar oluş tu rur. Yön tem 8 aşa ğı da ki gi bi dir: Sa vaş mak ve 

hü kü met men sup la rı nı ve ha in le ri te rö re ma ruz bı rak mak... Yön tem 11 ise: Hü kü met ku - 

rum la rı nı yık mak ve yağ ma la mak...” 

15 Je an Lo ris-Me li koff, La Révo lu ti on Rus se et les Nou vel les Répub li qu es Trans ca ucas ìen nes, 

Pa ris: Fe lix Al can, 1920, s. 81. Taş nak’ın ku ru cu la rın dan ve ide olog la rın dan olan ya zar 

şöy le di yor: “Ger çek şu ki, par ti (Taş nak Ko mi te si), çı kar la rı halk ve mil le tin önün de tu tan 

bir oli gar şi ta ra fın dan yö ne ti li yor du. Bun lar bur ju va zi ve bü yük tüc car lar dan olu şu yor lar - 

dı. So nun da bu im kan lar tü ke nin ce, Rus dev ri mi nin öğ re ti si olan ‘amaç lar araç la rı meş ru 

kı lar’ il ke si ne uy gun ola rak te rö re baş vur du lar.” 

16 28.3.1894’te İs tan bul’da ki İn gi liz Bü yü kel çi si Cur ri e “Fo re ign Of fi ce”e şun la rı ya zı yor du: 

“Er me ni dev rim ci le rin ama cı ka rı şık lık çı kar mak, Os man lı la rı şid det le kar şı lık ver me ye 

zor la mak ve böy le ce dış güç le rin mü da ha le et me si ni sağ la mak tır.” 

200 

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Muş, Siirt, Hakkari, Bingöl, Malatya, Mardin, Amasya, Tokat, 

Giresun, Ordu ve Trabzon’u da kapsıyordu. 

Ermeniler bu mücadelelerinde başarılı olamadılar. Bu nedenle 

kendilerini daha şanslı olan Balkan Hristiyan halklarıyla 

kıyaslayıp, mazlum ve mağdur hissedebilirler. Ancak soykırım 

tezini savunabilmek için, siyasi ve silahlı faaliyette bulunduklarını 

inkar ederek, Türklerin kendilerini durup dururken tehcire tabi 

tuttuğunu, aslında kendilerinin siyasi emelleri dahi olmayacak 

kadar masum oldukların, bu nedenlerle Sözleşme’nin 2. 

maddesine göre, Türklerin kendilerine etnik-dinî-ırkî grup olarak 

tehcir yoluyla soykırım yaptığını iddia edemezler. 

Tarih, Ermenilerin bağımsızlık için silahlı siyasi faaliyette 

bulunan bir siyasi grup olduğunu açıkça gösteriyor. Düşmanla 

birleşip hedeflerini gerçekleştirmek için silaha ve bu arada savaş 

hukukunun ihlali olan sistematik terörist eylemlere başvuran bir 

siyasi gruba karşı mücadelede, askeri nedenlerle tehcire 

başvurulması hukuken soykırım tanımına girmediği gibi, bu 

süreçte işlenen suçlar da, ayrıca işlendikleri kanıtlanmış olsa 

dahi, soykırım değildir. 

Saik 

Bir grubun siyasi emelleri nedeniyle siyasi grup olması, aynı 

zamanda milli, dini, ırki veya etnik grup olmasını etkilemez. Zira 

siyasi gruplar da diğer özellikleriyle, Ermeniler gibi, etnik, dinî 

grup veya diğer bir grup olarak da nitelendirilebilirler. Ancak 

siyasi grup olmak, o grubun maruz kaldığı olayların, grup 

olmasından değil de siyasi nedenlerden kaynaklandığını 

gösterir. 

Bir grubun siyasi ve silahlı faaliyette bulunduğu kanıtlandığı 

andan itibaren Sözleşme tarafından soykırıma karşı korunması 

gereken gruplar içinde bulunmasına imkân kalmıyor. Ermeniler 

adına hareket eden parti ya da benzeri kuruluşların, ilk adımda 

kolektif haklarının genişletilmesi anlamına reformlarla başlayıp, 

oradan otonomiye geçmek, sonra da bağımsızlığını 

gerçekleştirmek istediğini ve bu amaçla siyaset yaptığı ve terörizm 

de dâhil silaha başvurduğunu yukarıda kısaca anlatmaya 

çalıştım. Söylediğim gibi, bu yönleriyle Ermeniler tehcir 

başlamadan önce siyasi bir grup oluşturuyorlardı. 


201


Kaldı ki bir grubu grup olarak yok etme iradesinin ancak o grup 

mensuplarına karşı duyulan ırkçı nefretin yoğunlaşması sonunda 

ortaya çıktığını yukarıda soykırıma ilişkin hukuku anlatırken 

gördük. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Ermenilere karşı ırkçı nefretin 

duyulmadığı biliniyor. Aslında, Batı’daki anti-semitizm türü bir 

ırkçı nefrete İslam ve Türk toplumlarının tarihinde hiç 

rastlanmıyor. Örneğin; Almanya’da Yahudiler bağımsızlık için 

mücadele etmediler, teröre başvurmadılar, toprak istemediler, 

Almanya’nın savaş düşmanlarıyla işbirliği yapmadılar, Alman 

ordularını arkadan vurmadılar, lojistik yollarını kesmediler, 

nihayet terör örgütleriyle Alman sivilleri katletmediler. Alman 

toplumuna tümüyle entegre olmuş, 40 Nobel ödülünün 11’ini 

kazanmış, barışçı, uygar ve başarılı bir grup, başka hiçbir neden 

yokken, sadece grup olması nedeniyle, önceden planlanarak, 

büyük bir örgütlenme sonucu sistematik ve kitlesel biçimde yok 

edildi. 

Hitler başta, sayısız yazar derin bir Yahudi düşmanlığını yıllarca 

dile getirdiler. Anti-semitizm, Holokost’un on beş yıl öncesinden 

itibaren tehlikeli biçimde yükselmiş olmakla birlikte, ikinci binin 

başından bu yana aktif biçimde devam eden bir akımdı. Genelde 

Batı Avrupa, özelde Almanya’da veba gibi epidemiler, sel ve deprem 

gibi doğal afetler ve savaşlarda yenilgilerden sonra toplumların 

içindeki Yahudilere saldırıldığı, mensuplarının öldürüldüğü, 

mallarının yağmalandığı görülüyordu. Yani Hristiyan toplumlar 

başlarına gelen felaketlerden Yahudileri sorumlu tutuyorlardı. 

Yahudileri, Tanrı sayılan İsa’nın öldürülmesi nedeniyle, tanrı-katili 

(deicide) olarak suçluyorlardı. Bu nedenle onları Deccal olarak 

görüyorlardı. Anti-semitizmin birçok yönünü açıkça gösteren 

binlerce belge ve yayın mevcut. Akılcı olması beklenen Rönesans 

yazarları içinde bile Yahudi düşmanları vardı. Aydınlık çağında 

romantik yazarlar arasında anti-semitizme sık sık rastlanıyor. 

Geçen yüzyılın en büyük filozoflarından Heidegger’in ve ünlü 

psikiyatrist Jung’un bile anti-semitist olduğu biliniyor. 

Buna karşılık Osmanlı’da böyle bir anti-Ermenizm hiç olmadı. 

Onları aşağılayan, insan altı ırk olduklarını ileri süren bir 

biyolojik akım ve bunun tamamlayıcısı sosyal Darwinizm 

bulunmuyordu. İslam’da Hristiyanlar “ehli kitap” sayıldığından, 

Hristiyanların Yahudilere yönelttikleri suçlamaların benzeri 

Müslümanlarca Hristiyanlara karşı hiç yapılmadı. Doğa ve insan 

kaynaklı felaketlerde Ermeniler veya diğer Hristiyan gruplar 

günah keçisi olarak hiç kullanılmadılar. Tersine, Ermeniler 

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“millet-i sadıka” diye vasıflandırıldılar. Kamu alanında da 

aktiftiler. İçlerinde merkezi idarenin yüksek kademelerinde yer 

alan memurların yanında, kaymakam, paşa, vali, büyükelçi, hatta 

dışişleri bakanı olarak Türkiye’yi temsil eden çok sayıda insan 

vardı. Misyonerler tarafından 19. yüzyılın başından itibaren açılan 

okullarda eğitildiklerinden, kısa zamanda zenginleştiler ve 

imparatorluğun ekonomisine hakim oldular. Yahudiler gibi bazı 

mesleklerden men edilmediler. Gettolarda yaşamaya mahkum 

edilmediler. En müreffeh sınıfı oluşturdukları halde, haset ve 

kıskançlıktan “pogrom”lara maruz kalmadılar. 

Bu şartlar altında Ermenilerin grup olduklarından dolayı ırkçı 

nefretle yok edildikleri söylenemez. Bu durumda tehcirin 

ardındaki saikin saptanması önem kazanıyor. Bu saik 

Ermenilerin, Ermeni olmalarının dışında bir başka nedene, 

örneğin askeri ve siyasi bir nedene dayanıyorsa, bu soykırım 

kavramına girmez. 

Olanları anlayabilmek için yakın tarihe kısa bir göz atmakta 

yarar olabilir. 1877-78 Osmanlı-Rus savaşının sonunda 

Yeşilköy’de imzalanan San Stefano Antlaşması’na göre 

Balkanlar’da, Ege ve Karadeniz’e sahildar olan ve Makedonya’yı da 

içine alan büyük Bulgaristan bağımsız bir devlet oluyordu. Bu 

ülke, savaş sırasında 260.000 sivil Türkün ölmesi ve 515.000’in 

de ülkeden atılması sonucu nispeten daha homojen bir nüfusa 

kavuşuyordu. Aynı şekilde savaş sırasında Erzurum’a kadar 

ilerleyen Rus ordularından kaçan 70.000 Türk Doğu Anadolu’ya 

sığınmıştı. Bu bölgede ölen sivil halkın sayısı ise bilinmiyordu 17 . 

Antlaşmada ayrıca Osmanlı topraklarındaki Ermeniler için 

“reform” yapılması öngörülüyordu. Yeşilköy’e gelmiş olan 

Grandük Nikola’yı ziyaret eden Ermeni patriği Narses’in talebi 

üzerine reforma ilişkin bir madde antlaşmaya ilave edildi. 

Ermeniler böylece Rusya’nın himayesine girdiler. O güne kadar 

Tanzimat ve Islahat Fermanları ile yapılması istenen reformlar, 

tüm Hristiyan tebaayı hedef alıyordu. Bu kez bir grubun tek 

başına reform konusu olması ve bunun Rusya tarafından 

denetlenmesi söz konusuydu. 

Diğer büyük devletlerin Rusya’nın tek başına sağladığı bu 

ödünleri kabul etmemesi üzerine yapılan Berlin Kongresi’nde 

17 Justin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims. 1821-1922, 

Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 1995, s. 339. 


203


Bulgaristan’ın boyutları küçültüldü. Ama yurtlarını terk eden 

Türklerin geri dönmesi sağlanmadı. Ermeni konusunda öngörülen 

reformlar ise teyit edildi. Ancak uygulamanın denetlenmesini 

büyük ülkeler birlikte üstlendiler. Anadolu’da Ermeni nüfusun 

bulunduğu yerlerde konsolosluklar açtılar. Tehcire kadar geçen 

30 yıllık süre içinde Ermenilerin siyasi ve silahlı faaliyetleri, 

büyük devletlerin bu himayesinin yarattığı Ermeni yanlısı 

şartlarda gelişti. 

1912-13 yıllarında bir yanda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, öte 

yanda Yunanistan, Bulgaristan ve Sırbistan arasında Balkan 

Savaşları oldu. Bu savaşlarda 1.450.000 Türk, Arnavut ve Pomak 

Müslüman öldü; 410.000’i ise saldırgan orduların önünden 

kaçarak, yakılan yıkılan yerleşim birimlerini geride bırakarak, 

bombardımanlar altında Anadolu’ya doğru sürgün edildi. Böylece 

Türklerin 500 yıldır vatanı olan, çoğunlukta oldukları birçok yerde 

Türk ve Müslüman varlığı sona erdi. Yılların biriktirdiği kültür 

varlıkları tahrip edildi. I. Dünya Savaşı patladığında yüz binlerce 

mültecinin gelişinden henüz bir yıl geçmişti. 

Osmanlılar Taşnak liderleriyle Ağustos 1914’te bir toplantı 

yaptılar. Ermenilerden sadık Osmanlı vatandaşları olarak hareket 

edeceklerine dair söz aldılar. Ancak iki ay önce Erzurum’da yapılan 

gizli bir Taşnak toplantısında, savaştan yararlanarak Ermenilerin 

Osmanlı Devleti’ne karşı geniş bir ayaklanma yapması 

kararlaştırılmıştı. Papazyan’ın da bilahare teyit ettiği gibi, 

Ermeniler sözlerinde durmadılar ve Rus çıkarlarına hizmet ettiler. 

Rus Ermenileri de Osmanlı’ya saldıracak Rus ordularında 

yerlerini aldılar. Eçmiadzin Katogigosu Rusların Kafkasya genel 

valisini, “Rusların Osmanlıların Ermeniler için reform yapmasını 

sağlamalarına karşılık, Ermenilerin Rus savaş çabalarını kayıtsız 

şartsız destekleyeceği”ni temin ediyordu. 18 Daha sonra, Rus çarı 

tarafından Tiflis’te kabulünde Katogigos Çar’a “Ermenilerin 

kurtuluşu Anadolu’da Türk hâkimiyetinin dışında otonom bir 

Ermenistan’la sonuçlanacak ve bu Rusya’nın yardımıyla 

gerçekleşecek” dedi. 19 Mart 1915’te Rus kuvvetleri Van’a doğru 

harekete geçtiler. 11 Nisan günü Van Ermenileri isyan etti ve 

Müslüman halka saldırdı. 21 Nisan günü Çar II. Nikola Van 

Ermeni Devrimci Komitesi'ne bir telgraf çekerek, “Ruslara 

18 Gr. Tchalkouchian, Le Livre Rouge, Paris: Imp. Veradzenount, 1919, s. 12. 

19 A.y. 

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hizmetlerinden dolayı” teşekkür etti. Amerika’daki Ermeni gazetesi 

Gochnak 24 Mayıs tarihli sayısında “Van’da sadece 1.500 Türk 

kaldığı” müjdesini veriyordu. 

Osmanlı sınırını aşan Rus ordusu içindeki Ermeni güçlerine, 

devrimci ismi Armen Garo olan eski Osmanlı milletvekili Karekin 

Pastırmacıyan kumanda ediyordu. Diğer bir eski milletvekili 

Hamparsum Boyacıyan, Murat kod adıyla, Türk köylerine saldıran 

ve sivil nüfusu katleden gerilla gücünün başındaydı. Yine bir eski 

milletvekili Papazyan Van, Bitlis ve Muş bölgesinde çarpışan 

gerillaların lideriydi. 

Osmanlı yönetimi Ermeni Patriği nezdinde sonuçsuz kalan bir 

uyarıda daha bulunduktan sonra 24 Nisan günü Ermenilerin 

entelektüeller dediği, komitacı liderleri tutuklamaya başladı. 

Bu gelişmelerden tehcir kararının nedeni açıkça görülüyor. 

Ermenilerin Rus ordusuyla işbirliğine başlaması, Van’da isyan 

çıkarması, Ermeni gerillaların civar illerde etnik temizliğe 

girişmesi, Osmanlılar için bilinen eski bir hikâyenin tekrarı 

niteliğindeydi. Balkanlar’da Ruslarla birlikte Balkan 

Hristiyanlarının yaptığı gibi, bu kez Rus ordularıyla birlikte 

hareket eden Ermeniler, bölgedeki Türk ve Müslümanları etnik 

temizliğe tabi tutmaya, katletmeye, yerlerini yurtlarını yıkmaya 

başlamıştı. Ermenilerin önce bu askeri faaliyetlerine, sonra da 

siyasi emellerini gerçekleştirmelerine imkân vermemek amacıyla 

imparatorluğun doğu cephesinden uzak bir bölgesine taşınması 

kararlaştırıldı. 

Yok Etme Kastı ve İradesi 

Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesine göre yok etme amacıyla sayılan beş 

fiilden birinin işlenmesi, soykırım sayılabiliyor. Bunun için bir 

grubu grup niteliğiyle yok etme kastının mevcut bulunması gerek. 

Bu nedenle, Ermeni tarihçiler Osmanlı yöneticilerin Ermenileri 

grup olarak yok etme amacı taşıdıklarını kanıtlamaya çalıştılar. 

Böyle bir kanıta rastlamayınca da yalan söylemekten 

çekinmediler. 20 Aram Andonian adlı bir Ermeni Talat Paşa’ya 

atfen yok etme emrinin verildiği telgrafları yayımladı. Bunların 

20 Aram Andonian, Documents Officiels concenants les Massacres Arméniens, Paris: 

Armenian National Delegation, 1920. 


205


sahte olduğu kısa zamanda ortaya çıktığı halde, propaganda 

malzemesi olarak kullanılmaya devam edildi. 

Mamafih bir süre sonra yok etme amacını kanıtlayacak 

belgelerin bulunamaması, Ermeni yanlılarını farklı bir stratejiye 

itti. Önemli olan sonuçtu. 1,5 milyon Ermeni’nin tehcir 

sırasında öldüğünü iddia etmeye başladılar. Rakamın yüksek 

tutulmasının bir nedeni propaganda etkisi iken, diğeri de 

tehcirle yok etme kastının varlığını dolaylı yoldan ispat ederek 

soykırımı kanıtlamaktı. Bu amaçla tehcir öncesi Ermeni 

nüfusunun da yüksek gösterilmesi gerekiyordu. Bir yalan bir 

başka yalana yol açıyordu. Tarih, hukukun gereklerine göre 

tahrif ediliyordu. 

Bizim açımızdan, Ermenilerin otonomi veya bağımsızlık için 

siyasi ve silahlı mücadele yapması, grup mensuplarının gruba ait 

olduğu için öldürüldüğü tezini boşa çıkarıp, tehcirin soykırım 

olmadığını kanıtlamaya yeterli. Ancak siyasi amaçla dahi olsa bir 

sivil halkın sistematik ve kitlesel biçimde öldürülmesi insanlığa 

karşı suç oluşturuyor. 21 Kaldı ki, Ermeni soykırım tezi artık 

Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesi (c) fıkrasına dayandırılıyor. Buna göre, 

Osmanlılar’ın Ermenileri açıkça yok etmekten çekindikleri için, 

tehcirden yararlanıp, Ermenilerin yok olmalarını sağlayacak 

yaşam şartlarını onlara dayattıkları; tehcir sırasında saldırılardan 

koruma, güvenli ulaşım sağlama, gıda ve ilaç tedarik etme, 

tedavilerini yapma, barınak ihtiyaçlarını karşılama gibi görevlerini 

yerine getirmeyerek (omission) ölümleri hızlandırdıkları; hatta 

Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa’nın ve hapishanelerden serbest bırakılan 

canilerin katliamlarını bizzat örgütledikleri ileri sürülüyor. 

Unutmamak gerekir ki, doğrudan etkisi olan öldürme gibi fiillerin 

yanında, devletin görevini ihmal ederek ölümlere bilerek neden 

olması da soykırım fiili sayılabiliyor. 

Tehcirin amacının Rus ordularıyla birleşip, Hınçakların 

haritasındaki Türklerin, Balkanlar’daki Türkler gibi etnik 

temizliğe maruz kalmasını önlemek olduğunu yukarıda 

anlatmıştım. Ermeniler, bir yandan Rus ordusu içinde kendi 

birliklerini kurup Osmanlı ordusuna karşı doğu cephesinde 

savaşırken, diğer cephelerde savaşan Osmanlı ordularından da 

kaçarak ülke içinde gerilla grupları oluşturmaya, Türk ve 

21 Roma Statüsü madde 7 ve Eski Yugoslavya ile Ruanda Uluslararası Mahkemeleri’nin 

statülerindeki ilgili maddeler. 

206 

Gündüz Aktan


Müslüman yerleşim yerlerine saldırmaya, Osmanlı kuvvetlerini 

arkadan vurmaya, lojistik hatlarını kesmeye başladılar. Bu 

faaliyetlerin ilk adımını Van isyanı oluşturdu. 

Hükümet Ermenilerle anlaşma imkânlarının kaybolduğunu, 

Patrik aracılığıyla yaptığı uyarıların dikkate alınmadığını 

gördükten sonra bölge Ermenilerini, yine Osmanlı topraklarının bir 

bölümü olan Suriye ve Kuzey Irak’a tehcir etme kararını aldı. 

Başkumandan vekili Enver Paşa İçişleri Bakanı Talat Paşa’ya 2 

Mayıs 1915’te gönderdiği bir telgrafta, Rusların 20 Nisan günü, 

kendi sınırları içindeki Müslümanları perişan şekilde sınırlarımıza 

sürdüğünü bildiriyor; Van civarındaki Ermenilerin isyanına da 

atıfta bulunarak, Ermenilerin ya Rus sınırına sürülmesini ya da 

başka yerlere dağıtılmasını öneriyordu. Bunun üzerine Talat Paşa 

sorumluluğu bizzat yüklenerek, Ermeni tehcirini başlattı. Bir süre 

sonra da sorumluluğu paylaşmak için 30 Mayıs günü konuya 

ilişkin bir geçici yasa çıkarılmasını sağladı. Böylece komutanlara, 

asayişi bozan, silahlı saldırgan ve direnişçileri, tecavüz ve 

direnişleri sırasında imha etme; casusluk ve vatana ihanet eden 

köy ve kasaba halkını tek tek veya toplu halde başka yerlere sevk 

ve iskan etme yetkileri verilmekle, tehcir işi orduya devredilmiş 

oldu. 22 

Buradan da görüleceği üzere Ermeni tehciri için çok önceden 

karar verilmiş olması, bu karara uygun olarak planlar yapılması, 

gerekli teşkilatlanmanın oluşturulması ve nihayet hazırlıkların 

tamamlanarak tehcire başlanması söz konusu olmadı. Ortada, 

doğu cephesindeki gelişmelerden endişelenen bir komutanın acilen 

önlem alınması talebi var. Hükümet bu talebe derhal cevap vermek 

istiyor. Önceden hazırlık yapılmadığı öylesine açık ki, İçişleri 

Bakanı Talat Paşa daha fazla gecikme olmasın diye, gerekli yasayı 

bile çıkarmadan göç hareketini başlatıyor. Yasa arkadan geliyor. Bu 

durumda yok etme kastıyla plan ve örgütlenme yapılması söz 

konusu değil. 

Yasanın metninde, sevk sırasında istirahatlerinin, can ve mal 

güvenliklerinin temini; “göç ödeneği”nden gıdalarının sağlanması; 

iskan için gerekli arazi tahsisi, ihtiyaç sahiplerine hükümetçe 

konut inşası; çiftçilere tohumluk, alet-edevat dağıtılması; geride 

bıraktıkları değerlerin bedelinin kendilerine ödenmesi; terk 

22 Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermeniler: 1915-1920, Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel 

Müdürlüğü Yayınları, 1994, s. 8. 


207


ettikleri gayrı menkullere başkalarının yerleştirilmesi halinde 

bunların değerinin saptanıp sahiplerine verilmesi gibi hususlar yer 

alıyor. 23 

Ayrıca 10 Haziran 1915 tarihinde yayınlanan talimatname ile de 

tehcire tabi tutulan Ermenilerin malları koruma altına alındı. 

Gittikleri yerlere yerleşmelerini kolaylaştırmak içinde nakdi ve ayni 

yardımda bulunuldu. Sevk edilen Ermenilerin geride kalan 

taşınmaz malları hükümetçe kendileri namına müzayede ile satıldı 

ve kurulan komisyonca kendilerine ödendi. 24 25 Kasım 1915 

tarihinde Anadolu’daki vilayetlere gönderilen bir emirle tehcir 

geçici olarak durduruldu. Daha sonra yapılan tehcir mevzii kaldı. 

Nihayet 1916 sonunda da tehcire fiilen son verildi. Savaştan sonra 

Ermenilerin istediklere yerlere dönmeleri için izin çıktı. 

Komisyonlarca hıfzedilen veya satılan gayrı menkullerini geriye 

almaları için kolaylık gösterildi. 25 Tüm bu düzenlemeler bir 

soykırım girişimine tezat teşkil etmektedir. 

Tehcir uygulamasıyla ilgili olarak başkentle taşra teşkilatı 

arasında cereyan eden yazışmalarda da Ermenileri yok etme kastı 

kuşkusu yaratan hiçbir atfa rastlanmıyor. Tersine güvenlikli 

biçimde sevk edilmelerini sağlamak amacıyla karşılıklı taleplerde 

bulunulduğu görülüyor. Bunlar arasında en ilginç olan 

yazışmalardan bir bölümü Erzurum Valiliği’yle Talat Paşa 

arasında geçiyor. Rus sınırında olduğu için öncelik verilen bu 

bölge Ermenilerinin tüm şahsi eşyalarını birlikte götürebilecekleri 

bildiriliyor. Diyarbakır, Harput, Sivas Ermenilerinin ihracına 

gerek olmadığı belirtiliyor ki, Rus tehlikesi Orta Anadolu’ya 

yönelince bu karar değiştiriliyor. Erzurum’dan sevk edilen 500 

kişilik bir gruba Erzincan ile Erzurum arasında “Kürtlerce” 

saldırılması üzerine, yol boyunca mevcut köy ve kasabalardan 

yapılacak saldırıların şiddetle cezalandırılması Diyarbakır, Elaziz 

ve Bitlis’ten isteniyor. Dersim eşkıyasının Erzurum’dan gelen 

Ermenilere saldırmaları üzerine Elaziz Valiliği’ne acil tedbir alması 

emrediliyor. Tehcir sırasında Ermenilerin güvenliğinin tam olarak 

korunamadığını görüp sevki durdurduğu anlaşılan Erzurum 

valisine ertelemenin askeri nedenlerle mümkün olmadığı 

anlatılıyor. Buna rağmen zaman zaman Erzurum’dan göçün 

durdurulduğu görülüyor. 26 

23 A.y., ss. 31-32. 

24 A.y., s. 11. 

25 A.y., s. 12. 

26 A.y., ss. 35, 43, 44, 51. 

208 

Gündüz Aktan


Tüm bu tedbirlere rağmen sivil Ermenilerin tehcir sırasında 

öldüğüne kuşku yok. Bu ölümlerin, devletin asli görevini bilerek 

ihmal etmesinden kaynaklanmadığı açık. Doğu cephesindeki 

90.000 kişilik Osmanlı ordusu da Sarıkamış’ta donarak öldü. İklim 

ve coğrafya şartları, Ermeni konvoylarını korumakla görevli askeri 

birliklerin yetersizliği, ihtiyacı karşılayacak gıda ve ilaç 

bulunmaması ve salgın hastalıklar ölümlerin doğal nedenlerini 

oluşturuyor. Son günlerini yaşamakta olan bir devletin güçsüzlüğü 

görev ihmali olarak nitelenemez. 

Britanya arşivlerinde bulunan orijinal bir Osmanlı belgesinde 

(Dosya no: 371, Belge 9518 E. 5523) “Bu talimatın amacı 

münhasıran [terörle uğraşan] komitelerin kapatılmasıyla ilgili 

olduğundan, Türklerle Ermenilerin birbirlerini öldürmelerine yol 

açacak hiçbir uygulama yapılmaması gerekmektedir.” deniyor. Bu 

belgenin üzerine dış işleri memuru D.G. Osborn, “Her ne pahasına 

olursa olsun katliamı önlemeyi amaçlıyor” diye not düşüyor. 27 

Bütün bunlar tehcirin Ermenileri yok etmek amacıyla düzenlenmiş 

olmadığını gösteriyor. 

Bazı Ermeni yanlısı yazarlar, arşivlerin tasnifi nedeniyle 

gecikerek açılmasını, hükümetin yok etme kararını kanıtlayacak 

belgelerin ortadan kaldırılmasını amaçladığını ileri sürüyorlar. 

Bunlar savaş sonunda İttihatçıların kendilerini ilzam eden 

belgeleri toplayıp imha ettiklerini iddia ediyorlar. Oysa Osmanlı 

arşiv sisteminde gelen ve giden evrak kayıt defterlerine işleniyor. 

Bir kez buna kaydedilen bir belgenin yok edilmesi mümkün 

değil. Kaldı ki Bab-ı Ali’nin gönderdiği çok büyük sayıya varan 

belgeler çok çeşitli taşra merkezlerine dağılıyor. Büyük bir 

bölümü de birden çok merkeze gönderilen genelgelerden 

oluşuyor. Hükümet merkezindeki müsveddelerin imha edildiği 

varsayılsa dahi, taşradaki asıllarının yok edilmesi pratik olarak 

imkânsız. 

Dönemin hükümetinde Ermenileri yok etme kastının 

bulunmadığının açık bir kanıtı da sevk sırasında Ermenilere 

saldıran çetelerle, Ermenilerin durumundan yararlanan, 

görevlerini yapmayan ve yetkilerini kötüye kullananların Divan-ı 

Harbe sevk edilerek cezalandırılmaları oluyor. 1918 yılına, yani 

Mondros Mütarekesi’ne kadar bu çerçevede 1397 kişi çeşitli 

27 Kamuran Gürün, Le Dossier Armenien, Société Turque D’Histoire, Paris: Triangle, 1983, s. 

284. 


209


cezalara çarptırılıyor ve yarısından çoğu idam ediliyor. 28 Yahudi 

soykırımından sorumlu Nazi SS'lerinin böyle nedenlerden değil de, 

soykırımı etkin biçimde uygulamamalarından dolayı 

cezalandırıldıkları biliniyor. 

Soykırım Fiilleri 

Nazilerin Yahudilere yaptığı soykırımda büyük çoğunlukla 

Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesi (a) fıkrasında kayıtlı olan “gruba mensup 

kişileri öldürme” fiilini işledikleri görülüyor. Bilindiği gibi bu 

katliamlar temerküz kamplarına taşınan, yani “deporte” edilen 

Yahudilerin bu kamplarda uzun süre yaşanması mümkün 

olmayan şartlarda tutulmaları, sonra da gazla öldürülmeleri 

şeklinde oluyor. Bir başka ifadeyle “deportasyon” ölümlere neden 

olan bir soykırım fiili değil. Buna karşılık kamplardaki yaşam 

şartları Sözleşme 2. madde (c)’ye, gaz odalarındaki ölümler de aynı 

madde (a)’ya uygun fiiller. Bu fiiller, Naziler tarafından önceden 

planlanarak, örgütlenerek ve sistematik ve kitlesel biçimde 

uygulanarak gerçekleştiriliyor. 

Tehcir sırasında Ermeni nüfusa ve yerleşim birimlerine Osmanlı 

güçlerince silahlı saldırılar olmaması 2. madde (a) ve (b)’de 

öngörülen fiillerin işlenmediğini gösteriyor. Ermeni taraftarı 

yazarlar, etnik temizliğin bu temel unsurunun tehcirde 

bulunmamasını telafi etmek ve tehciri soykırım gibi göstermek için, 

tehcirin 2. madde (c)’ye göre Ermenilerin fiziksel olarak yok 

edilmelerini dolaylı yoldan sağlamak için, “grup yaşam şartlarının 

bilerek ya da kasten bozulmuş” olduğunu ileri sürüyorlar. Kısaca 

Osmanlılar, Ermenileri açıkça katletmemişler; tehcirin şartlarını 

Ermenilerin kendilerinden ölmelerini sağlayacak şekilde 

ayarlamışlar. Ermeni soykırım tezi tümüyle bu zemine oturuyor. 

Açıkça soykırım fiilleri işlemekten farklı olarak, tehcirin dolaylı 

soykırım olduğunu kanıtlamak çok daha zor. Zira soykırım için 

gerekli yok etme kastının varlığını gösterecek beyan ve talimatlara 

28 A.y., s. 259: Cezalandırılan kişilerin illere göre dağılımı şöyle: Sivas 648, Mamuretilaziz 

223, Diyarbekir 70, Bitlis 25, Eskişehir 29, Şebinkarahisar 6, Niğde 8, İzmit 33, Ankara 

32, Kayseri 69, Suriye 27, Hüdavendigar 12, Konya 12, Urfa 189, Canik 14. 

Son dönemde yayınlanan bir kitapta sayılar şu şekilde verilmiştir: Amasya 2, Ankara 148, 

Bitlis 29, Canik 89, Diyarbakır 70, Eskişehir 29, Halep 56, Hüdavendigar 21, İzmit 28, 

Kayseri 146, Konya 16, Mamuretülaziz 249, Niğde 8, Sivas 579, Suriye 27, Urfa 170, 

toplam 1,673. Yusuf Sarınay, “Sevk ve İskan.” Prof. Dr. Hikmet Özdemir (Der.), Türk- 

Ermeni İhtilafı Makaleler, Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları, No:122, 

2007, s. 222. 

210 

Gündüz Aktan


rastlamak imkânsız. Aksine tüm arşiv belgeleri tehcirin imkân 

ölçüsünde az kayıpla uygulanmasıyla ilgili. 

Bu gerçeği saptırmak için Ermeni yazarlar iki izah yoluna 

başvuruyor. Tehcir sonucunda ölenlerin sayısı olağanüstü yüksek 

gösteriliyor. Bu amaçla önce toplam nüfus rakamları yükseltiliyor, 

sonra da buna oranla ölenler çok yüksek saptanıyor ve böylece 

amacın göç değil öldürme olduğu kanıtlanmak isteniyor. Bu 

yaklaşımı destekleyen diğer yol ise, sözlü tarih denen ve tehciri 

yaşamış olanların başlarından geçenlerin derlenmesi suretiyle 

kastın yok etme olduğunu ispatlamaktan oluşuyor. Denebilir ki, 

Ermeni tarihçilerin yazdıkları kitapların hemen tümünde soykırım 

bu yöntemlerle kanıtlanıyor. 

Tehcir sırasında çok sayıda aile ve bireyin kişisel trajediler 

yaşamış olduklarına kuşku yok. Mübadele bile daha hafif ama 

benzer trajediler yaratıyor. Ancak, bu durum grubun soykırıma 

uğramış olduğunu göstermez. Bu açıdan sözlü tarih yaklaşımı, 

hukuki değeri olmamak bir yana, tarih yazımı bakımından da 

sorunlu, tarihle hatırat arası bir alan. 

Yukarıda da belirtildiği üzere tehcir kararı, 20 Nisan 1915 

tarihinde Rusların bir Müslüman sivil topluluğu perişan halde 

sınırlarımıza sokması olayını Enver Paşa’nın Talat Paşa'ya 2 

Mayıs’ta yazılı olarak bildirmesi üzerine resmen alındı. Daha önce 

Ermenilerin Van’da isyan çıkarmalarını takiben 24 Nisan’da silahlı 

Ermeni gruplara karşı bazı küçük harekâtlar başlamıştı. Tehcirin 

soykırım olduğunu kanıtlama sadedinde, aynı gün tutuklanan 235 

Ermeni komitacı liderin, Ermeni toplumunun ileri gelen 

entelektüelleri olduğu iddiasının geçerli olmadığı biliniyor. 

Osmanlı Hükümeti, Enver Paşa’nın iki önerisinden diğerini, 

yani Rusların Müslümanlara yaptığı gibi, Ermenileri Rus sınırına 

sürmeyi yeğleyebilirdi. Bu, Balkan ülkelerinin Ermenilerden çok 

daha büyük Türk ve Müslüman nüfusa yaptığı şeydi. İngiliz ve 

Fransızlara karşı bir ölüm kalım savaşına girmiş olan 

imparatorluğun, bunların kamuoyundan çekinmesi ve tehcirin 

arkasına saklanması için fazla bir neden yoktu. Bir başka deyişle, 

İttihatçılar için, Türklere ve Müslümanlara yapılanın aynısını 

Ermenilere yapmak sanıldığı kadar zor değildi. Tehcirin seçilmiş 

olması, bu nedenle, dolaylı öldürme değil, Ermenileri ülkenin savaş 

güvenliği açısından daha az sakıncalı bir bölgesine taşımaktan 

ibaretti. 


211


Ermeni toplam nüfusuna gelince, I. Dünya Savaşı öncesi Batı 

kaynaklarına göre 1.056.000 (İngiliz Yıllığı) ile 1.555.000 (Fransız 

Sarı Kitabı) arasında değişiyor. Bu rakam zaman ilerledikçe 3 

milyona kadar çıkıyor. Fransız Milli Meclisi’nin kabul ettiği 

soykırım yasasına esas olan raportör François Rochebloine’ın 15 

Ocak 2001 tarihli raporunda, Ermeni nüfusu 1,8 milyon olarak 

veriliyor. Ölümlere ilişkin rakamlarda da sürekli artış trendi 

izleniyor. Encyclopaedia Britannica’nın 1918 tarihli nüshasında 

600.000 olarak gösterilen Ermeni ölümlerinin, 1968 nüshasında 

1,5 milyona çıktığı görülüyor. Rochebloine raporunda, başka hiçbir 

yerde rastlanmayan biçimde, 600.000’in bulundukları yerde, diğer 

bir 600.000’in tehcir sırasında olmak üzere 1,2 milyon Ermeni’nin 

öldüğü; 200.000’in Kafkaslara (Rus ordularıyla birlikte) kaçtığı; 

100.000 kişinin kaçırıldığı; 150.000’in tehcirden ölmeden 

kurtulduğu; 150.000’in de tehcire uğramadan kaçtığı belirtiliyor. 

Ermeni nüfusu olarak, döneminde Batılı iki kaynağın 

ortalaması olan Osmanlı istatistiklerindeki 1,295 milyonun esas 

alınması doğru olacak. Zira Osmanlılar vergilendirme ve askere 

alma gibi işlemleri düzenli bir biçimde gerçekleştirebilmek için 

nüfus kayıtlarını doğru tutmak zorundaydılar. 

Ölenleri hesaplamak için önce tehcirle sağ salim Suriye ve Irak’a 

ulaşanların sayısını bulmak lazım. Osmanlı İçişleri Bakanlığı’nın 7 

Aralık 1916 tarihli raporunda 702.900 kişinin nakledildiği, bu 

amaçla harcanan para ile birlikte bildiriliyor. 29 Milletler 

Cemiyeti’nin Göçler Komisyonu, I. Dünya Savaşı boyunca 

Türkiye’den Rusya’ya geçen Ermenilerin sayısını 400.000-420.000 

olarak veriyor. 30 Tehcire tabi tutulmayan İstanbul, Kütahya, 

Edirne ve Aydın’da (İzmir dâhil) yaşayan Ermenilerin 200.000 

civarında olduğu hesaba katıldığında, tehcir dolayısıyla ölen 

Ermenilerin ciddi bir rakama ulaşmadığı sonucu çıkıyor. 

Sevr müzakerelerinden önce İstanbul Ermeni Patrikhanesi’nin 

İngilizlere verdiği bilgiye göre, 1920’de Mondros Mütarekesi sonrası 

Osmanlı sınırları içinde kalan Ermeni nüfus 625.000. Buna 

Kafkaslara gidenler eklendiğinde 1,045 milyon ediyor. Savaş öncesi 

toplam nüfus 1,3 milyon olduğuna göre, ölenler 265.000’de 

kalıyor. 

29 Genelkurmay, 1/2, KLS 361, Dosya 1445, F. 15-22. 

30 Gürün, a.g.e., s. 263. 

212 

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Ermeni Milli Komitesi başkanı olarak Paris Barış Konferansı’na 

katılan Bogos Nubar Paşa, 700.000 Ermeni’nin başka ülkelere 

göçtüğünü; 280.000 Ermeni’nin Türkiye sınırları içinde yaşadığını 

ilan ediyor. Bunların toplamı 1,3 milyondan çıkarıldığında, 

320.000 Ermeni’nin öldüğü anlaşılıyor. Ama kendisi 1 milyondan 

fazla Ermeni’nin öldürüldüğünü iddia edebiliyor ki bunun doğru 

olabilmesi için savaş öncesi Ermeni nüfusunun 2 milyonu geçmesi 

gerekiyor. Adı geçen savaş öncesi Osmanlı Ermenileri’nin 4,5 

milyonluk bir nüfusa sahip olduğunu vurguluyor ve gelecek 

kuşaklara açık arttırma konusunda ilk örneği oluşturuyor. 

Savaş sırasında propaganda işlerinden sorumlu Arnold 

Toynbee, yazdığı Mavi Kitap’ta ölen Ermenilerin 600.000 olduğunu 

bildiriyor. 31 Bu rakam bilahare Encyclopaedia Britannica’ya 

geçiyor. Buna karşılık Toynbee’nin 38 nolu notunda, 5 Nisan 

1916’ya kadar tehcirle Zor, Şam ve Halep’e ulaşan Ermenilerin 

sayısı 500.000 olarak veriliyor. Tehcire tabi olmayan 200.000 ve 

Kafkaslara giden 400.000 ile birlikte Ermeni nüfusu 1,7 milyona 

çıkıyor. Nüfus 1,3 milyon olarak alınırsa, ölenlerin 600.000’den 

200.000’e inmesi gerekiyor. 

Yukarıdaki rakamlardan, Ermeni nüfusuna ilişkin değişik 

tahminlere göre, Ermeni kayıplarının birkaç binden 600.000’e 

kadar uzandığı anlaşılıyor. Ölümlerin 300.000’i aştığını gösteren 

tüm istatistiklerin savaş öncesi Ermeni nüfusunu aşırı derece 

yükselttiği görülüyor. Şurası unutulmamalıdır ki, tüm olumsuz 

koşullara rağmen Toynbee’ye göre bile yaklaşık 500.000 kişi 

varacakları bölgeye varmışlardı. Bu da olayın bir soykırım 

olmadığını gösteriyor, zira eğer soykırım gerçekten düşünülseydi, 

kimse hayatta bırakılmazdı. 

Her şeye rağmen ciddi boyutlarda ölümlerin vuku bulmuş 

olması muhtemel. Ancak tüm ölümlerin tehcir sırasında olmadığını 

da akılda tutmak gerekiyor. Dönemin savaşlarında düşman 

ordularının önünden kaçanlar da göç halinde bulunuyorlar. Rus 

ordusunun 1915 Mayıs ayında Van civarında başlayan 

harekâtından sonra, Osmanlı ordusu kaybettiği yerleri geri alıyor. 

Ondan sonra başlayan çok daha büyük Rus saldırısı Elaziz’e kadar 

ulaşıyor. 1917 Ekim Devrimi’nin hemen ardından Rus orduları bu 

kez çekiliyorlar ve Osmanlılar tekrar ilerliyor. Bu ileri geri askeri 

hareketlerin önünde Türkler de Ermeniler de göçe zorlanıyorlar. 

31 FO. Hc. 1/8008, XC/A-018055, s. 651. 


213


Örneğin Doğu Anadolu’da ülke içi göç etmek zorunda kalan 

Müslüman nüfusun 900.000 civarında olduğu hesaplanıyor. 32 Son 

derece zor bir coğrafyada, çoğu kez Müslüman-Hristiyan ayırımı 

yapmayan çetelerin saldırı ve soygunlarına da maruz kalarak, ilkel 

ulaşım şartlarında soğukta yürüyerek veya araba ve atla yapılan 

göçlerde 3-4 gün içinde yiyeceklerin bitmesi, su sıkıntısı ve 

yorgunluktan, özellikle çocuk ve yaşlıların zayıf düşmesi üzerine, 

tifo ve tifüs hastalıklarının ölümleri süratle arttırdığı görülüyor. 

Aynı coğrafi ve fiziki şartlarda yapılan tehcirin, birçok bakımdan 

bu tür göçlerden çok daha güvenli ve sağlıklı olduğu söylenebilir. 

Kaldı ki, Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasında Maraş’ı boşaltan 

Fransızlarla birlikte çekilen 5000 Ermeni’nin, 10-24 Şubat 1920’de 

yaptıkları yolculuğun zor şartları dolayısıyla, dış saldırılara 

uğramadıkları halde, 2.000-3.000’i ölüyor. 33 

Bu nedenlerle, Barış Konferansı sırasında bir Alman raporuna 

atfen, Bogos Nubar Paşa, Türklerin Ermenilerden daha fazla kayıp 

verdiğini; Türklerin savaş sırasındaki tüm kayıplarının 2,5 milyon 

olduğunu; bunun “savaş, epidemi ve kıtlıkla, ilaç ve hastane 

personeli yetersizliği” dolayısıyla vuku bulduğunu; bu kayıpların 

en az yarısının “Rus ve Ermeni ordularınca işgal edilen Ermeni 

vilayetlerinde yaşayan Türkler arasında” gerçekleştiğini bildiriyor. 

Bu, Doğu Anadolu’da 1,25 milyon Müslümanın ölmüş olması 

demek. 

Gerçekten de bilahare yapılan nüfus çalışmaları bu rakamın 

doğruluğunu büyük ölçüde kanıtlıyor. Osmanlı’nın I. Dünya 

Savaşı sırasında savaş alanı kayıpları 500.000-550.000 civarında. 

Sivil nüfus kaybıysa 2 milyon. Savaş alanı Anadolu’nun doğusu 

olduğundan, kuşkusuz, toplam sivil kayıpların yarısından 

fazlasının bu bölgede olması doğal. Nitekim McCarthy’nin 1914- 

1921 yılları arasında bölgedeki sivil Müslüman kayıplara ilişkin 

tahmini de 1,19 milyon. 

Nihayet Türk ve Ermeni sivil nüfuslarının “mukatele” denen 

karşılıklı çatışmalardaki ölümleri de, kesin rakamlar bilinmemekle 

birlikte, bu toplamların içinde yer alıyor. 1980’lerin başında 

başlatılan ve toplu mezarların incelenmesini amaçlayan Şüheda 

32 McCarthy, a.g.e., s. 339. 

33 Georges Boudiere, “Notes sur la campagne de Syrie-Cillicie: L’affaire de Maras (Janvier- 

Fevrier 1920)”, Turcica, IX/ 2-X, 1978, s. 160. 

214 

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Projesi’nin bulgularına göre, Doğu Anadolu’da çok sayıda toplu 

mezar mevcut. Antropolojik çalışmalar bu mezarların kimlere ait 

olduğunu bilimsel şekilde ortaya çıkarıyor. Henüz genel bir 

değerlendirme için erken olmakla birlikte, Türklere ait mezarların 

daha çok olduğu görülüyor. Bu mezarlardan, halkın Ermeni 

mezalimi hakkında söylediklerinin bir mitoloji olmadığı da 

anlaşılıyor. Savaşa katılan Müslümanlar savaş sonuna kadar 

orduları terk etmiyorlar. Buna karşılık Ermeni kökenli askerlerin 

yoğun olarak kaçtıkları görülüyor. Bunların oluşturduğu silahlı 

grupların Müslüman köylerine yaptıkları saldırılara karşı eli silah 

tutan kimse bulunmadığından, etkin savunma yapma imkânı 

bulunamıyor. Müslüman ölümleri bu nedenle Ermeni 

ölümlerinden bu denli daha büyük oluyor. 

Anadolu’nun doğusuyla batısından tehcir edilenlerin akıbeti 

arasında fark var. Batıdan yapılan kısmi tehcir demiryollarının 

bulunması dolayısıyla çok daha az ölümlere yol açıyor ve savaş 

sonunda geri dönenlerin sayısı da yüksek oluyor. Buna karşılık 

doğuda arazinin sarp olması, demiryolu bulunmaması ve çetelerin 

faaliyetlerine karşı, cephelerde savaşmayan çok az sayıda 

jandarmanın Ermenileri korumakla görevlendirilebilmesi, Ermeni 

ölümlerinin batıdan daha fazla olmasına neden oluyor. 

Yine de Ermeni ölümlerinin iddia edilenin çok altında kalan 

sayısı ve bu ölümlerin çoğunluğunun tehcir dışı vuku bulmuş 

olduğu gerçeği, tehcirin yok etme kastını gizleyen bir soykırım fiili 

olmadığını gösteriyor. Aksi halde, “soykırımcı” Türklerin “soykırım 

kurbanı” Ermenilerden çok daha fazla kayıp verdiği, garip ve izahı 

zor bir soykırımla karşı karşıya kalmış olacaktık. 

Kısmen veya Tamamen 

Soykırımda bir grubun tümünü veya bir bölümünü yok etme 

iradesiyle bazı fiillerin işlenmesi gerekiyor. Soykırımda, bir grubun 

mensuplarının o gruba ait olduklarından dolayı, ırkçı nefretle yok 

edilmesi söz konusu olduğundan, yok etme iradesinin mantıken 

grubun tümüne dönük olması lazım. Soykırım sonunda grubun bir 

kısmının kurtulması, hepsini yok etme kastının bulunmamış 

olmasından ziyade, geriye kalanların soykırım yapan 

örgütlenmenin erişiminin dışında kaldığını ya da soykırım yapanın 

gücünün işi bitirmeye yetmediğini gösteriyor. Bu, Nazilerin 

Yahudileri soykırıma uğratmasında böyle olmuştu. 


215


Ermeni tehciri sadece Gregoryan Ermenilerin sevkini öngördü. 

Katolik ve Protestan Ermeniler tehcir dışı kaldılar. Üç dine 

mensup Ermenilerin sadece bir dine mensup olanlarının tehcir 

edilmesi, Osmanlılarda Ermenilerin tümüne dönük bir ırkçı 

nefretin bulunmadığını gösteriyor. Kaldı ki esasen Katolik ve 

Protestan gruplara mensup olanlara karşı bir ırkçı nefretin 

bulunmaması, İslam açısından üç dinin de Hristiyanlığın sadece 

farklı mezhepleri olarak algılandığı göz önüne alındığında, 

Osmanlılarda Gregoryanlara karşı da ırkçı nefretin bulunmadığını 

kanıtlıyor. İmparatorlukta Müslümanlarla Hristiyanlar arasında 

din konusunda, tehcirle sonuçlanacak bir ihtilafın bulunmadığı 

da biliniyor. Ortodoks Ruslarla dindaş olan Gregoryan 

Ermenilerin, Rus ordularının yardımıyla, bölgede etnik temizliğe 

girişip bağımsızlık kazanması ihtimalini bertaraf etmenin tehcirde 

payı olduğu aşikar. Rus ordusunun ilerleme hattı üzerinde 

bulunan bu en büyük Ermeni grubun içinden çıkan terörist ve 

gerillaların Osmanlı ordusunu arkadan vurması, lojistik yollarını 

kesmesi, Müslüman yerleşim birimlerinde katliamlara girişmesi 

tehciri askeri açıdan kaçınılmaz kılıyor. Bu nokta tehcir kararının 

altında yatan nedenin, ülke savunması, güvenliği ve toprak 

bütünlüğü ile Türklerin can güvenliğini koruma olduğunu 

gösteriyor. 

Öte yandan bazı kentlerdeki Ermeniler, dini aidiyetlerine 

bakılmaksızın tehcirin dışında bırakılıyor; İstanbul, Edirne, 

Kütahya ve Aydın – ki İzmir’i de kapsıyor – Ermenileri bunların 

arasında bulunuyor. İzmit, Bursa Kastamonu, Ankara ve 

Konya’dan tehcir edilen Ermeniler hemen tümüyle geri dönüyorlar. 

Kayseri, Sivas, Harput, Diyarbakır Ermenileri büyük kısmıyla geri 

döndükleri halde, köylerine gidemiyorlar. Erzurum ve Bitlis’ten 

tehcir edilenler ise Kilikya’ya geçiyorlar 34 ve Kurtuluş Savaşı 

sırasında Fransızlarla birlikte Türklere saldırıyorlar. 

Tehcir yapılmayan illerdeki Ermenilerin sayısı 200.000 

civarında. Ama bunun sembolik anlamı önemli. Irkçı nefretin yol 

açtığı Yahudi soykırımında, Berlin veya Münih Yahudilerinin 

soykırım dışında bırakılabileceğini düşünmek bile mümkün değil. 

Sadece bu örnek bile Ermenilere soykırım yapılmadığını ortaya 

koyuyor. 

34 Ermeni Patriğinin İngilizlere verdiği bilgiler, FO. 371/6556/E.2730/800/44. 

216 

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Mahkemeler 

Savaştan sonra İstanbul’un işgaliyle birlikte Sevr 

Antlaşması’na göre Ermeni olaylarını kovuşturmak amacıyla 

mahkemeler kuruldu. Bunların en ünlüsü Nemrut Mustafa 

mahkemesiydi. Amiral Calthorpe 24 Ocak 1919 günü Londra’ya 

gönderdiği bir telgrafta, Vezir-i Azam’ın kendisine 160-200 kişinin 

tutuklandığını söylediğini bildiriyor. Mahkemenin bir özelliği, 

İttihat Terakki düşmanı Hürriyet ve İtilaf Hükümeti’nce kurulmuş 

olmasıysa, diğeri de sanıklara savunma hakkının tanınmaması 

oldu. Bir süre sonra mahkemenin adil yargı yapamayacağını, belki 

de etkin yargıda bulunamayacağını anlayan İngiliz işgal kuvvetleri 

144 sanığı Malta adasına taşıdı. Günün hukuk kurallarına aykırı 

olmasına rağmen, İngiliz mahkemesinin bu sanıkları 

yargılamasını istedi. Savaşa gecikerek girmesi dolayısıyla 1916 

yılına kadar açık olan Amerikan Büyükelçiliği ve Anadolu’daki 

konsolosluklarının elindeki kanıtların İngiltere’ye verilmesi talep 

edildi. İngiltere’nin Vaşington Büyükelçiliği’nden bir uzman 

Amerikan arşivlerini inceledikten sonra, Londra’ya çekilen 13 

Temmuz 1921 tarihli bir telgrafta Amerika’nın elinde Malta’daki 

sanıkları suçlamada kullanılabilecek herhangi bir kanıt olmadığı 

bildirildi. 35 İngiliz Kraliyet Başsavcısı, 29 Temmuz 1921 tarihli 

raporunda, “...Şu ana kadar sağlanan yazılı tanıklıklarda, 

sanıklara yöneltilen suçları belli bir kesinlikle ortaya koyan 

bilgiler elde edilmediğinden, bana sunulan davaların başarısı 

hakkında herhangi bir beyanda bulunamayacağımı bildiririm” 

demekteydi. 36 

Bundan sonra hala Ermenilere karşı soykırım suçunun 

işlendiği iddiası, sadece bir sözleşmenin geriye işletilmesi gibi 

hukuka aykırı bir istek olmayacak, hakkındaki suçlamalardan 

dolayı yargılanması dahi mümkün olmadığı karara bağlanan 

kişilerin, yeni kanıtlar yokken, yargılanmalarını istemek anlamına 

gelecektir. Eğer Ermeni soykırım iddiaları, Sözleşme’nin 9. 

maddesindeki devlet sorumluluğu ilkesine dayandırılıyorsa, 

hukuktaki gelişmenin soykırım fiillerini işleyen kişilere münhasır 

olduğunu ya da o hale geldiğini de unutmamak gerekir. 

35 Vaşington’daki İngiliz Büyükelçiliği’nin 13 Temmuz 1921 tarihinde Londra’ya çektiği 

telgraf, No.722, FO 371/6504. 

36 Gürün, a.g.e., s. 236. 


217


Ermeni Tehciri İnsanlığa Karşı Suç muydu 

Yukarıda ayrıntılarıyla anlatıldığı üzere, tehcir, Ermenilerin 

grup nitelikleriyle, yaşam şartlarını yok olmalarına yol açacak 

şekilde “kasten” zorlaştırmayı amaçlamadığından, bir soykırım 

değil. 37 Buna karşılık tehcir edilen bir grubun verdiği kayıpları, 

insanlığa karşı suç kavramı içine sokmaya imkân var mı 

Yukarıda da belirtildiği üzere, Ermeni tehciri başladığında 

İngiliz, Fransız ve Rus hükümetleri “Türkiye’nin insanlığa ve 

uygarlığa karşı suçları”ndan söz ederek, ilgilileri sorumlu 

tutacaklarını 24 Mayıs 1915’te bir ortak bildiriyle ilan etmişlerdi. O 

tarihlerde insanlığa karşı suç kavramı bir deyişten ibaretti ve 

henüz hukuki bir kavram olarak kabul edilmemişti. Bu nedenle 

Ermeni tehciri ile insanlığa karşı suç arasında bu bildiri vasıtasıyla 

bir ilişki kurmak mümkün olamaz. 

Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, insanlığa karşı suç kavramı 

uluslararası düzeyde ilk kez (1946) Nuremberg İlkeleri VI (c)’de yer 

aldı. Bu suçun savaş sırasında işlenmesi öngörülüyordu. Herhangi 

bir sivil toplumun, siyasi, ırkî veya dinî nedenlerle mezalime tabi 

tutulması, (mensuplarının) katledilmesi, yok edilmesi, göçe 

zorlanması vb. fiilleri içeriyordu. 

1948 yılında kabul edilen soykırıma ilişkin Sözleşme’nin 2. 

maddesindeki soykırım suçu tanımı, Nuremberg İlkeleri içinde yer 

alan bu insanlığa karşı suç kavramından üretildi. Böylece 

soykırım, insanlığa karşı suçların dışına çıkarılınca, geriye 

Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi (Roma) Statüsü’nün 7. 

maddesindeki insanlığa karşı modern suç tanımı kaldı. Buna göre; 

insanlığa karşı suçların Nuremberg İlkeleri’nde öngörülen savaş 

sırasında işlenmesi şartı terk edildi. Bu suçların işleneceği gruplar 

sayılmadı. Herhangi bir sivil topluluğa karşı işlenebileceği kabul 

edildi. 

7. maddenin girişinde insanlığa karşı suçların “siyasi, ırkî veya 

dinî” gibi nedenlerle işlenmesine ise değinilmedi. Bu suçun 

oluşması için nedenlerin zikredilmemesi, hangi nedenle olursa 

olsun, öngörülen fiillerin işlenmiş olmasının yeterli olduğunu 

gösteriyor. 

37 International Law Commission, Draft Code of Crimes Against Peace and Security of 

Mankind, 48 th session, 6 May-26 July 1996, s. 92. 

218 

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Buna karşılık, 7. maddede, öngörülen fiilin insanlığa karşı suç 

sayılabilmesi için aranan tek şart, söz konusu fiillerin bir sivil 

topluluğa karşı yapılan "yaygın ve sistematik bir saldırının parçası 

olarak ve saldırı amacını bilerek” işlenmesine bağlandı. Yani 7. 

maddede (a)’dan (k)’ya kadar sayılan 11 fiilin tek başına işlenmesi 

halinde insanlığa karşı suç oluşturmayacağı benimsendi. Bir 

topluluğa karşı siyasi, ırkî, milli, etnik, kültürel, dinî ve cinsi 

nedenlerle yapılan mezalim, insanlığa karşı suçun genel saiki 

olarak değil de, 11 fiilden biri olarak sayıldı. 

Bu açıklamadan, her ikisi de uluslararası suç olan ve 

dolayısıyla uluslararası yargıya tabi tutulan soykırım ile insanlığa 

karşı suç arasındaki farklar kendiliğinden ortaya çıkıyor. 

Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesinin giriş bölümündeki soykırım tanımıyla 

kıyaslandığında, soykırımın milli, ırkî, etnik ve dinî olmak üzere 

sadece dört gruba karşı işlenmesi mümkün. Siyasi gruplara karşı 

işlenen fiiller soykırım içine girmiyor. Buna karşılık insanlığa karşı 

suçlar her gruba karşı işlenebiliyor. Soykırımda bir grubu yok etme 

kastıyla bazı fiillerin işlenmesi gerekiyor. İnsanlığa karşı suçun 

oluşması için yok etme iradesi aranmıyor. Gruba karşı “yaygın ve 

sistematik saldırı” yeterli görülüyor. Soykırımda fiillerin saiki, bir 

grubu, grup niteliğiyle, yok etme şeklinde ortaya çıkıyorken ve bu 

ancak o gruba karşı ırkçı nefretin varlığı halinde geçerliyken, Roma 

Statüsü 7. maddesinin girifl bölümünde, insanlığa karşı suç için 

herhangi bir genel saik aranmıyor. 

Bu şartlar altında, bir siyasi grup da olsa, Ermenilere karşı, 

ırkçı nefretle yok etme kastı olmadan yapılan tehcir sonunda 

önemli sayıda Ermeninin ölmüş olmasını, insanlığa karşı suç 

kavramına sokmak için 7. maddede sayılan öldürme (a), katliam 

(b), tehcir (d), mezalim (h) gibi fiilleri kullanmaya kalkışanlar 

olabilir. 

Yukarıdan da görüldüğü üzere, insanlığa karşı suçun 

oluşmasının temel şartı, belli fiillerin, bir sivil nüfusa karşı “yaygın 

ve sistematik bir saldırının parçası” olarak işlenmesidir. Bu 

nedenle böyle bir saldırının niteliğini iyi tanımlamak gerekiyor. 

fiayet bir sivil nüfusa karşı açık bir askeri saldırı varsa ayrıca bir 

kanıta ihtiyaç yok. Ama saldırı şartının yerine gelmesi için askeri 

nitelikte bir saldırı olması icap etmiyor. Bir sivil topluluğa karşı, 7. 

maddede sayılan fiillerin çoğunun, birlikte ve yoğun biçimde 

işlenmesi gerekiyor. Böyle bir saldırının, devlet veya yaygın bir 

örgütlenme tarafından aktif biçimde geliştirilmesi, sevk ve teşvik 


219


edilmesi şartı da aranıyor. 38 1915-16 Ermeni tehcirini, 7. madde 

(1) fıkrasında sayılan ve tehcirle ilişkili olan fiillerin ışığında 

incelemek yararlı olabilir. 

7. madde (1)(a) fıkrasında belirtilen öldürme veya ölüme neden 

olma fiillerinin, böyle yaygın ve sistematik bir saldırının parçası 

olması ve suçu işleyence böyle “bilinmesi” gerekiyor. 

7. madde (1)(b) fıkrasında yer alan yok etme ya da katliam, yine 

topluluğa karşı yaygın ve sistematik bir saldırının parçası olarak, 

bir grubun kısmen yok olmasına yol açacak hayat şartlarının 

önceden hesap edilerek o topluluğa dayatılmasını da içeriyor. 

Örneğin o topluluğu gıda ve ilaç kaynaklarından kasıtlı olarak 

mahrum bırakmak da bu çerçeveye giriyor. 

7. madde (1)(d) fıkrasında yer alan tehcir veya diğer zorla 

nakillerin de yaygın ve sistematik saldırının parçası olarak vuku 

bulmasının yanında, devletler hukukunun izin verdiği askeri 

gereklilik gibi nedenlerin dışındaki nedenlerle yapılmış olması icap 

ediyor. Öte yandan tehcir için, topluluğa mensup insanların 

şiddete başvurularak evlerinden atılmış olmaları gerekmiyor. 

Şiddet dışı zorlamalarla gerçekleştirilen tehcir de, saldırıya ilişkin 

şartların yerine gelmesi halinde, insanlığa karşı suç içine giriyor. 

7. madde (1)(h) fıkrasında yer alan mezalim, devletler hukukuna 

aykırı olarak, topluluk mensuplarının temel haklarından mahrum 

bırakılmasını kapsıyor. Mezalim temel hakların hemen tümünün 

yoğun biçimde ihlali niteliğindeki çok sayıda fiilden oluşuyor. Bir 

sivil toplumun kimliğini hedef alıyor. Bu suçu işleyenler, devletler 

hukukunda yasaklanan siyasi, ırki, milli, etnik, kültürel, dini, 

cinsi ve diğer nedenlerden hareket ediyorlar. 39 

1915-16 Ermeni olaylarına, vukuundan 85 yıl sonra yani 2000 

yılında oluşan insanlığa karşı suç kavramını uygulamak, değil 

hukukla, akıl ve sağduyuyla dahi bağdaşmıyor. Bununla birlikte 

böyle bir incelemeden şu hususlar ortaya çıkıyor: 

7. madde (1) paragrafında sayılan fiillerin insanlığa karşı suç 

oluşturması için bir topluluğa karşı yaygın ve sistematik bir 

saldırının parçası olması gerekiyor. Oysa tehcirin bizzat kendisi bir 

yana bırakılırsa, Ermenilere karşı Osmanlı güvenlik güçleri böyle 

38 PCNICC/2000/INF/3/Add.2, s. 9. 

39 A.y., s. 15. 

220 

Gündüz Aktan


bir saldırıya girişmiyor. Bir başka ifadeyle Ermeniler “saldırı”yı 

oluşturan fiillere birlikte ve yoğun biçimde tabi tutulmuyorlar. 

Ermenilerin, çeşitli nedenlerle, grup olarak kimliklerini hedef 

alan bir mezalim yok. I. Dünya Savaşı başlayınca ve doğu 

cephesinde tehlikeli durum ortaya çıkıncaya kadar, temel 

haklardan herkes gibi yararlanmaya devam ettikleri gibi, tehcire 

kadar da bu haklardan mahrumiyetleri söz konusu olmuyor. 

Tehcir sırasında temel haklara elden geldiğince riayet ediliyor. 

Yaygın ve sistematik saldırıların mevcut olmadığı bir ortamda 

grup mensuplarının ölümleri böyle bir saldırının ne unsuru ne de 

parçası niteliği taşıyor. Çetelerin tehcir halindeki Ermenilere 

saldırıları tamamen bir asayiş olayı niteliğinde. 

Yukarıda soykırım iddialarını incelerken, yok etme kastının 

bulunmadığı belirtilmişti. Ermeniler, Osmanlıların tehciri 

kullanarak “hayat şartlarının yok olmalarını sağlayacak şekilde 

dayattığı”nı iddia ediyorlar. Bu nedenle katliam ithamıyla 

birleştirilen tehcir konusunu ele almak doğru olacak. Tehcir, 

Ermenilere yaygın ve sistematik bir saldırının parçası olarak 

yapılmadı. Tehcirin kendisi de böyle bir saldırı oluşturmuyor. Bu 

gerçek, tehcirin insanlığa karşı suç olmadığını açıkça gösteriyor. 

Tehcir sürecinde Ermenilere hayat şartlarının yok olmalarına 

yol açacak şekilde dayatılmasının söz konusu olmadığı, yukarıda 

soykırıma ilişkin bölümde de açıklanmıştı. Tehcir, Enver Paşa’nın 

doğu cephesindeki gelişmeler karşısında yaptığı talep üzerine 

başlatıldı. Ermeni nüfus içindeki silahlı elemanların Osmanlı 

ordusunun güvenliği açısından yarattığı tehlikeleri bertaraf etmeyi 

amaçlıyordu. Bu, bir nüfusun başka yere taşıması için devletler 

hukukuna uygun bir gerekçe oluşturuyor. Öte yandan tehcir 

sırasında dönemin hükümetinin Ermenilere gıda ve ilaç 

sınırlaması getirmediği, aynı bölgede göç halinde bulunan Türk- 

Müslüman nüfusta da gıdasızlık ve ilaçsızlık nedeniyle çok daha 

fazla ölümlerin vuku bulması, Bogos Nubar Paşanın Paris Barış 

Konferansı’ndaki beyanlarından da anlaşılıyor. 

Balkan Savaşları’nın sonuçları ışığında, Ermenilerin işgalci Rus 

ordularıyla birleşerek, Türk ve Müslümanların büyük çoğunlukta 

olduğu doğu bölgesinde soykırım boyutlarında bir etnik temizlik 

yaparak kendi devletlerini kurma gayretlerini önlemek için tehcir 

yapıldı. Bu, özellikle günün şartlarında, devletler hukuku 


221


bakımından güvenlik gerekçesinden de önemli bir gerekçe 

oluşturuyor. 

Bu şartlar altında Ermeni tehciri meşru oluyor ve tehcir 

sırasında vuku bulan ölümler de ceza hukuku açısından adi 

suçları oluşturuyor. Nitekim 1914-18 arasında bu tür suçları 

işleyen 1397 kişinin çok ağır cezalara çarptırıldığı da biliniyor. 

Olayı daha iyi anlamak için, hepsi zorla nüfus nakli olan etnik 

temizlik, tehcir ve mübadele konularını kısaca gözden geçirmekte 

yarar olabilir. Etnik temizlik de tehcir de ilk bakışta, bir etnik 

grubu belli bir toprak parçasından uzaklaştırarak, o toprakta 

homojen bir nüfus yaratmak amacı taşıyor gibi gözüküyor. Biraz 

ayrıntıya girildiğinde saiki, yöntemi ve coğrafyası arasında önemli 

farklar bulunduğu ortaya çıkıyor. Hukuki nitelikte olmayan etnik 

temizlik kavramı, 1980’lerde eski Yugoslavya’nın Sırbistan 

bölümünde kullanılmaya başladı. Hatta deyimi Seslj adlı bir Sırp 

gerilla liderinin bulduğu söyleniyor. Bu nedenle Bosna-Hersek’teki 

etnik temizliği esas alıp, bunu önce Balkan Savaşları sırasında 

Türk ve Müslümanlara yapılanlarla ve sonra da Ermeni tehciriyle 

kıyaslamak lazım. 

Etnik temizlik bir tarafın silahlı güçlerinin karşı taraftaki sivil 

nüfusa saldırmasıyla başlıyor. Doğal olarak, kendilerini savunma 

imkânına sahip olmayan siviller öldürülüyor, yaralanıyor. Evleri ve 

yerleşim birimleri yakılıyor. Gıda ve ilaç gibi yardım getirebilecek 

insani konvoylara izin verilmiyor. Eli silah tutabilecek erkekler 

tutuklanıyor, yaşama şartları çok bozuk kamplara hapsediliyor 

veya doğrudan öldürülüyor. Kadınların sistematik ve kitlesel 

biçimde ırzına geçiliyor. Hedef grubun yaşadığı bölgedeki kültürel 

değerleri, bu arada dini mabetleri, binaları, kitaplıkları yıkılıyor. 

Yerlerini terk etmedikleri takdirde, sürekli ateş ya da 

bombardıman altında tutuluyorlar. Katliam sürüyor. Bir süre 

sonra bu saldırılar semeresini veriyor ve kitleler sürülmek istenen 

istikamete doğru kaçıyorlar. Etnik bakımdan temizlenmesi 

öngörülen bölgenin dışına, daha doğrusu kurulacak devletin olası 

sınırlarının dışına atılıyorlar. Bunların geriye dönmesi her ne 

pahasına olursa olsun engelleniyor. Etnik temizliğin belli bir 

aşamasında saldırgan grupta hedef gruba karşı ırkçı nefrete benzer 

bir duygu hakim olmaya başlıyor. Örneğin; Boşnaklara “Türk 

tohumu” deniyor. Geçmiş Osmanlı hakimiyetinin tüm faturası 

bunlara çıkarılıyor. Irza geçmeler yeni hakim ırka ait bir nesil 

yaratma amacını taşımaya başlıyor. Bir bölge etnik açıdan 

222 

Gündüz Aktan


homojen hale getirildikten sonra bile erkekler, örneğin 

Srebrenica’da olduğu gibi, büyük gruplar halinde katlediliyor ve 

toplu mezarlara gömülüyor. Bugünkü hukuka göre insanlığa karşı 

suç kavramı içine giren etnik temizlik böylece, bir grubun grup 

olduğu için yok edilmesini amaçlayan soykırım fiilleri de içeriyor. 

Eski Yugoslavya Uluslararası Mahkemesi Savcısı, Karaciç ve 

General Mladiç için hazırladığı iddianamede bu nedenlerle 9 kez 

soykırım işlendiğini bildirdi. 

1877-78 Rus-Türk Savaşı ve 1912-13 Balkan Savaşları 

sırasında Türk ve Müslüman nüfusa yapılanlar, Bosna-Hersek’te 

Sırpların gerçekleştirdiği etnik temizlikle özde uyuşuyor. Tek farkı 

vüsatinin çok daha büyük olması. Balkanlarda Türklere 

uygulanan etnik temizliğin etkilediği nüfus çok daha büyük. İki 

savaşta ölen Türk ve Müslümanların 2 milyona vardığı, ülke dışına 

yani Anadolu’ya göçe zorlananların ise 1 milyona çok yaklaştığı 

görülüyor. 

Ermeni tehcirinde yine zorla göç ettirme var. Ancak göçe 

zorlama sivil nüfusa saldırı şeklinde olmadığından, yerleşim 

birimlerinden sökülüp atılmaları için öldürülenler, yaralananlar, 

ırzına geçilenler, katledilenler, ateş altında tutulanlar, aç 

bırakılanlar hemen hiç yok. İkinci olarak, tehcire tabi tutulanlar, 

ülke dışına atılmıyorlar. Ülkenin bir başka yerine götürülüyorlar. 

Bu nedenle yeni yerleşim yerlerinde yeni hayatlarına uyum 

sağlamak için bazı nakdi ve ayni imkânlardan yararlanıyorlar. 

Denebilir ki tehcir başladıktan sonra, günün şartları dolayısıyla 

yine de ölümler vuku buluyor. Bu doğru. Buna rağmen tehcir, 

birçok önlem alındığından, etnik temizliğe oranla çok daha az 

ölümle sonuçlanıyor. Tehcirle göçenler yanlarına çok daha fazla 

kişisel eşya ve menkul değerler alabiliyorlar. At ve araba gibi taşıt 

vasıtalarından yararlanabiliyorlar. Geriye bıraktıkları büyük 

ölçüde yağmadan kurtuluyor. Kültürel değerleri tahrip edilmiyor. 

Bu şartlar altında, tehcir, soykırım fiillerinin de işlendiği bir 

insanlığa karşı suç olan etnik temizlikten çok farklı. 

Eğer 20. yüzyılın ilk soykırımı aranıyorsa, bunun 1915-16 

tehciri değil, 1912-13 Balkan Savaşları sırasında yapılan etnik 

temizlik olduğuna kuşku yok. Bir bakıma tehcir, Rus ordusuyla 

Ermeni gerilla ve teröristlerin, Balkanlar’dakine benzer bir etnik 

temizlik ve soykırımı Doğu Anadolu’da yapmalarını önlemek için 

yapıldı. Osmanlı istatistiklerine göre tehcire tabi bölgedeki toplam 

nüfus olan 5.061.857’nin 811.085’i Ermeni idi. Yani Ermeniler 


223


nüfusun %16’sına tekabül ediyordu. Şayet tehcir olmasaydı veya 

Rusya 1917 sonunda savaşı durdurup, Brest-Litovsk 

Antlaşması’yla çekilmeseydi, bölgedeki nüfus yapısının ışığında, 

esasen başlamış olan etnik temizlik potansiyelinin boyutlarını 

tasavvur etmek mümkün. 40 

Tehciri diğer zorla göç hareketleriyle de kıyaslamak mümkün. II. 

Dünya Savaşı sırasında Amerika, ülkenin batısında yaşayan 

Japonları doğuya taşıdı. Bu tehcire “üç küçük bombalama olayı ile, 

saptanamayan bazı radyo sinyalleri” neden olmuştu. Pearl Harbor 

baskınından dört ay geçmişti. Japonya’nın Pasifik’i aşıp batı 

Amerika’yı işgale başlayamayacağı anlaşılmıştı. Buna ne niyetleri 

ne de güçleri vardı. Yani Amerikan Japonlarının Japon ordusuyla 

birleşip Amerika’ya karşı silahlı harekâta girişmeleri söz konusu 

değildi. İlgili Amerikan Temyiz Mahkemesi’nin 18 Aralık 1942’de 

Korematsu davası hakkında verdiği kararda, 112.000 Japon asıllı 

kadın, erkek, yaşlı ve çocuğun tehcirinin, “günün kritik 

şartlarında”, “sadık vatandaşların sadık olmayanlardan 

ayrılmasının mümkün olmaması karşısında” “casusluk ve 

sabotajları önlemek” gibi “askeri gerekçelerle” başka yere 

taşınmasının gayri hukuki olmadığı hükme bağlandı. “Savaş 

zamanında tüm Amerikalıların zorluklarla karşılaşmış” olması 

mazeret olarak gösterildi. Amerika’ya sadakat yemini etmeyen 5000 

civarında Japon bulunduğu hatırlatıldı. Tümgeneral J. L. DeWitt’in 

raporlarında Japonlar aleyhine ırkçılık sayılabilecek ibareler yer 

alıyordu. Japonların doğuya taşınması lehine lobi faaliyetinde 

bulunan yerel grupların da ırkçı argümanlar kullandıkları görüldü. 

II. Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra çoğu Batı Polonya’daki 15 milyon 

kadar Alman da, 1945 Potsdam Protokolü’nün XIII. maddesi 

gereğince Almanya’ya göçe zorlandı. 41 

Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan sonra yapılan nüfus mübadelesiyle 

Türkiye’den Yunanistan’a 900.000 Rum giderken, Yunanistan’dan 

Türkiye’ye 430.000 Türk daha geldi. 

40 Vilayetin İsmi Toplam Nüfus Ermeni Nüfus 

Erzurum 645.702 134.967 

Bitlis 398.625 131.390 

Van 430.000 80.798 

Elaziz 578.814 69.718 

Diyarbakır 471.462 79.129 

Sivas 1.086.015 170.433 

Adana 403.539 97.450 

Trabzon 1.047.700 47.200 

41 Schabas, a.g.e., s. 195. 

224 

Gündüz Aktan


Bu kişilerin onayı alınmadan zorla yapılan nüfus hareketleri 

sonunda az sayıda insan öldüğüne kuşku yok. 1914-1945 yılları 

arasında böyle yirmi mübadele anlaşması yapıldı. Barış zamanında 

yapılan bu göçlerin çok daha düzenli olması ve ulaşım gibi fizik 

şartların da elverişli bulunması nedeniyle kayıpların düşük 

düzeyde kalması, göçlerin zorla yapılmış olduğu gerçeğini 

değiştirmez. 

Kısaca, tehcir bir grubu, ne grup niteliğiyle ne de başka bir 

nedenle yok etmek amacıyla değil; Rus işgal ordularıyla işbirliğine 

girmiş olan, bu çerçevede kılavuzluk ve casusluk yapan, isyanlar 

çıkaran, birlikleriyle Osmanlı ordusuna saldıran, lojistik hatlarını 

kesen, terörist gerillalarıyla Türk-Müslüman yerleşim birimlerine 

saldırıp katliamlara ve etnik temizliğe girişen Ermenileri doğu 

cephesinden ülkenin güneyine, savaş dışında kalan bir bölgeye 

taşımak amacıyla yapıldı. Tehcirin bu askeri gereklilik yönü, 

bugün geçerli olan hukuka da uygun. 42 

Kaldı ki tehcir yapılmasaydı, tüm işaretler Rus ordusuyla 

birleşen Ermeni güçlerin, Balkanlar’daki gibi, çoğunluktaki Türk- 

Müslüman nüfusu soykırım boyutlarında bir etnik temizlikle 

bertaraf ederek, kendi devletlerini kuracaklarını gösteriyordu. 

Tehcirin nedeni açık ve kesin biçimde askeriydi ve Türk-Müslüman 

nüfusun varlığı ve güvenliğini sağlamakla ilgiliydi. Bu haliyle 

Ermeni tehcirinin insanlığa karşı suç oluşturması söz konusu 

olamaz. 

Sonuç Olarak 

Bu çalışmanın sonuçlarını şöyle özetlemek mümkün: 

1. Ermeniler, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun toprakları üzerinde 

önce otonomi, sonra bağımsız devlet kurmak için siyasi ve silahlı 

faaliyetlerde bulunduklarından siyasi grup niteliğindedir. Bu 

nedenle Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesi tarafından korunan dört grup 

arasına girmemektedirler. 

2. Osmanlılarda Nazilerin Yahudilere karşı duyduğu antisemitizme 

benzer bir anti- Ermenizm, bir başka deyişle Ermenilere 

karşı ırkçı bir nefret bulunmadığından tehcir, Ermenileri grup 

olarak yok etme saikiyle yapılmamıştır. Tehcir kararı Ermenilerin 

42 Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Article 17. 


225


Rusya ile tarihi anlaşmalarla teyit edilen dostluk ve işbirliği 

çerçevesinde Rus işgal ordularıyla birleşip Osmanlı ordularına 

karşı başlattıkları harekâtı önlemek ve “Vilayat-ı Sitte” denen doğu 

bölgesindeki nüfusun %84'ünü oluşturan Türk ve Müslümanları, 

Balkanlar’daki gibi soykırım boyutlarında bir etnik temizlikle yok 

etmesine engel olmak için alınmıştır. Tehcirin nedeni bir yandan 

askeri gereklere, öte yandan da Türk-Müslüman nüfusun varlığını 

savunmaya dönüktür. 

3. Osmanlı Hükümeti’nde, Sözleşme’nin 2. maddesinde aranan 

Ermenileri yok etme kastı bulunmamaktadır. Yok etme niyetini 

kanıtlayacak yazılı ve sözlü belgeler olmadığı gibi, tüm belgeler tam 

tersine Ermenilerin korunmasını ve rahatça iskan edilmelerini 

öngörmektedir. Ölen Ermenilerin sayısı, soykırımın mevcudiyetini 

ispattan çok uzaktır. Ermeni ölümlerinin önemli bir bölümü tehcir 

dışı nedenlerden kaynaklanmıştır. Aynı nedenlerle bölgede vuku 

bulan Türk sivil ölümleri çok daha yüksektir. Bu açıdan tehcir, 

Sözleşme’nin 2 (c) maddesi anlamında, gizli ya da dolaylı bir 

soykırım değildir. 

4. Katolik ve Protestan Ermenilerle, İstanbul, Aydın (İzmir 

dâhil), Edirne ve Kütahya Ermenilerinin tehcire tabi tutulmaması, 

Osmanlıların gücünün yetersizliğinden ziyade, diğer bölgelerdeki 

Gregoryan Ermenilerin Rusların dindaşı olarak ve Rus ordularının 

ilerleme hattı üzerinde bulunmaları dolayısıyla tehcir edildiğini 

göstermekle, olayın askeri nedenini teyit etmektedir. 

5. Bu koşullarda Sözleşme’ye göre soykırım olmayan tehcirin 

ardındaki askeri gerekler de göz önüne alındığında, hukuken 

insanlığa karşı suç kategorisine girdiği de savunulamaz. Zira tehcir 

sırasında, Roma Statüsü 7. maddede aranan şartlar yerine 

gelmemiştir. Yani Ermeni nüfusa karşı, devletin bir planı 

çerçevesinde “yaygın ve sistematik bir saldırının parçası olarak”, 

insanlığa karşı suç oluşturan fiillerin çoğunun birlikte işlendiği bir 

durum ortaya çıkmamıştır. Tehcir, etnik temizlikten farklı olarak, 

Ermenilerin şiddetle yerinden atılmasını amaçlamamıştır. 

Ermenilere karşı dini veya başka bir nedenle mezalim yapılması 

söz konusu olmamıştır. Tehcir askeri güvenlik nedenleriyle 

yapılmıştır. 

6. Bunun da ötesinde, Ermenilerin işgalci Rus ordularıyla 

birleşerek, Balkan Savaşları’ndaki gibi bölgede çoğunlukta olan 

Türk ve Müslümanlara karşı soykırım boyutunda bir etnik temizlik 

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yapmalarını engellemeyi amaçlamıştır. Bölgedeki çeteler, devletin 

olmayan saldırı kastını bilmelerine de imkân bulunmadığından, 

kendi özel amaçlarıyla göç halindeki Ermenilere saldırmış, 

öldürmüş ve mallarını yağmalamışlardır. Üç cephede çarpışan 

Osmanlı elindeki sınırlı jandarma güçleriyle bazen Ermenilerin 

hepsini etkin biçimde koruyamamıştır. Benzer iklim, coğrafya, 

gıdasızlık, ilaçsızlık ve hastalık şartları nedenleriyle, göçe zorlanan 

sivil Türklerin ölümlerinin Ermenilerden fazla olması da, tehcirde 

dolaylı yoldan yok etme amacı bulunmadığını göstermektedir. 

7. Nihayet göç ettirilenlere karşı göç ettirenlerde bir acıma 

duygusu, istenmeyen olaylara karşı bir pişmanlık ve saldırganlara 

karşı kızgınlık doğmuştur. Adi suç kategorisine giren soygun ve 

öldürme sanıkları savaş sonundan önce yargılanmış ve çoğu idam 

edilmiştir. 


227

228


THE ARMENIAN PROBLEM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 

Introduction 

A lot was written on the Armenian incidents that had occurred in 

the Ottoman Empire in the years 1915-1916, that is, during the 

early part of World War One. Thousands of works tackling this 

issue were published, mainly by Armenians. These authors, mostly 

historians, were inclined to describe the incidents as genocide. 

Turkish authors too, almost without exception, and a number of 

foreign writers, held in high esteem, approached the issue from a 

historical standpoint, maintaining in turn that resettlement is not 

the same as genocide. 

Although the strong emotional context of this issue makes a 

neutral view of history difficult to prevail, there are undoubtedly 

ample publications available to give adequate information about 

the history of the incidents. Despite the claims that the archives in 

Turkey and in Armenia are not fully accessible, one can safely say 

that enough archival work has been done and published to permit 

an assessment of the nature of the incidents. 

Historical studies are essential to render understandable the 

incidents that took place in the second decade of the 20th century. 

However, if a historian lacks education and/or experience in 

international law, that person cannot judge whether or not these 

incidents amounted to genocide. Like historians, academics such 

as sociologists and political scientists who laboured on these 

issues, tend to describe as genocide almost any incident, which 

involves an important number of dead. However, genocide, as an 

international crime, can be determined only by jurists on the basis 

of the prescribed legal criteria. 

Nevertheless, there are very few works of legal nature on this 

issue. This outcome is due to a variety of reasons. For one thing, 

the Turks are not known to be legalists, first and foremost. But the 


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Armenians have deliberately set aside the legal aspect of the issue 

apparently because that would weaken their genocide claims. Pro- 

Armenian writers chose to adopt the historical approach to 

underline the tragic nature of the incidents so that they could 

make genocide claims more easily. Probably, one of the reasons 

why the legal approach has not been preferred is the fact that the 

“Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 

Genocide” (henceforth to be referred to as the Convention), which 

had been concluded in 1948 and had taken force in 1951, was not 

used frequently enough until the mid 1990s. As a result, the 

jurisprudence in this area was not developed sufficiently. Finally, 

the difficulties involved in retroactively applying the Convention to 

incidents that occurred some three or more decades ago, before it 

entered into force, are all too obvious. The jurists may have failed 

to display an interest in this issue because it would not be 

compatible with law to apply legal concepts, “genocide” among 

them, which did not exist in the pre-Convention period. 

This article adopts, on the other hand, a legal approach. To be 

able to focus adequately on the legality of the issue, it will assume 

that the reader possesses already an adequate knowledge of the 

historical background. Chronological data will be referred to only 

to the extent that jurisdictional assessments require it. 

Law Prior to the Convention 

According to the 1648 Westphalian system, state sovereignty 

was an absolute principle-essential and supreme. The matter of 

minorities was an internal affair for the states, which applied 

domestic laws to the incidents that occurred within the country. 

The concept of “international crime” did not exist. Coming to the 

Ottoman scene, however, the minorities in the Ottoman Empire 

became, immediately after the 1839 Tanzimat Edict, the subject of 

treaties between nations. That was an exceptional situation. It 

resulted, on the one hand, from the fact that the Ottoman Empire, 

a multi-cultural and a multi-national country, found itself in a 

weaker position in its competition with the predominantly nation 

states of the West, and, on the other hand, from another fact, 

namely that the European governments turned their support of the 

Christian minorities in the Balkans into an essential element of 

their foreign policies towards the Ottoman Empire. 

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When the Armenian relocation began in the fifth month of 1915, 

the British, French and Russian Governments, namely the 

belligerents and the enemies of the Turks in the current war, 

issued immediately on 24 May 1915, a joint declaration in which 

they said the following: “... In the presence of these new crimes of 

Turkey against humanity and civilization, the allied Governments 

publicly inform the Sublime Porte that they will hold personally 

responsible for the said crimes all members of the Ottoman 

Government as well as those of its agents who are found to be 

involved in such massacres”. However, the U.S. Secretary of State 

Robert Lansing, who was clearly not a Turkish sympathizer, is 

known to have admitted that the Turkish Government had “more 

or less justifiable” right to deport the Armenians, provided that 

they lived “within zone of military operations”. In an obvious 

contradiction, a report resulting from an investigation of the war 

crimes committed by the Christians during the 1912-13 Balkan 

wars, in violation of the Hague rules (1907), failed to talk about the 

‘crime against humanity’ in the face of the worse tragedies that the 

Turks had suffered. 

The Hague rules highlighted the crimes a country would commit 

in war. Those rules had not been envisaged to be applied to the 

crimes a country would be accused of having committed in its own 

territories. It is no secret that when, at the Paris Peace Conference 

(1919), the Greek foreign minister suggested that a new kind of 

crime against humanity be created and there be a trial for the 

‘Armenian massacres’, President Woodrow Wilson initially objected 

to that, saying that this would have been an ex post facto law. The 

United States was against the creation of such a crime. The 

Versailles Treaty with Germany stated that an international 

tribunal be set up. That suggestion was unprecedented in history. 

However, the trial could not take place, since the Netherlands 

refused to extradite Kaiser Wilhelm II who had sought refuge there. 

With the Sevres Treaty signed on 10 August 1920, the 

Ottoman Empire agreed to a trial to be held in Turkey for the 

crimes in question (Article 226). Creation of the tribunal was a 

task left to the victors and the Ottoman side pledged to arrest and 

deliver to the tribunal the persons wanted. Historians know 

about the ‘Nemrut Mustafa’ Martial Court set up in occupied 

Istanbul at the end of the war, and about the defendants, who 

were taken to Malta-only to be released by the British crown 

prosecutor due to lack of evidence. The Sevres Treaty was later 


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replaced by another international agreement, the Lausanne 

Treaty that was signed on 24 July 1923. The latter included a 

declaration of amnesty for all crimes committed between 1 

August 1914 and 20 November 1922. 

It is common knowledge that genocide reached its full 

dimensions during World War II when Nazi Germany exterminated 

the Jews, describing it as the “Final Solution”. The word ‘genocide’ 

was coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish Jewish scholar. When 

Lemkin was a student, he followed closely the trial of the 

defendants implicated in the Armenian incidents, which he 

considered genocide. Lemkin’s concept of that crime was a very 

comprehensive one. His definition embraced the political, 

economic, social, cultural, moral, physical or biological destruction 

of the minorities. The law, which evolved in more recent times, 

came to consider ‘genocide’ not any act committed with the aim of 

destroying just any group but only certain groups; and only if those 

groups were destroyed physically or biologically. In other words, 

the latter greatly narrowed down the scope of the description 

originally made by Lemkin, simply by excluding from the 

interpretation of genocide political, economic, social, cultural and 

moral destruction of groups. 

Since, at the time, what the Nazis did to the Jews in the early 

1940s had not been fully known, Britain and the United States 

especially did not favor of having an international tribunal deal 

with the crimes committed within the borders of Germany. They 

were, on the other hand, maintaining that for the crimes 

committed by that state outside its national borders, that is, in the 

countries it occupied, the persons responsible should be put on 

trial. Thus, the respect in the Westphalian system for the 

sovereignty of the nation-state would continue. The law of war 

envisaged the officials of a given country to be subject to 

international adjudication only for crimes committed, inter alia, 

against civilians in another country in times of war. The concept of 

crime against humanity, though discussed in doctrine, had not yet 

become actually part of international law, in a way that would 

apply to the crimes committed inside the country as weft. 

As the wide scope of the offences that the Germans had 

committed against the Jews gradually emerged, the idea that the 

persons responsible for the crimes committed within the country 

too should be put on trial, started gaining ground. This step, 

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initiated in 1941, reached a new stage with a proposal the United 

States presented to the London Conference four years later. It 

invoked the “Martens Clause” of the Hague Conventions. Thus, it 

envisaged that if a crime had not been clearly defined in advance, 

“the principles of law of the nations as they result from the usages 

established among the civilized peoples, from the law of humanity 

and from the dictates of the public conscience” would be applied to 

it. However, since the “Martens Clause” is a concept of the law of 

war, adjudication of the crimes committed within the country itself 

has been linked to the concept of starting the war. Thus, the 

reference to war was creating an excuse for intervention in 

domestic affairs. The minutes of the London Conference indicate 

how adamant especially the United States was to ensure that the 

intervention in Germany’s domestic affairs would not constitute a 

precedent, which would allow other countries to intervene in 

American domestic affairs in the future. This understanding 

eventually helped to formulate the principles of the Nuremberg 

Court (which came to be known by the same name) that was to try 

the German war criminals, including those responsible for the 

Jewish genocide. The principle, specified as “VI”, is as follows: 

a. Crimes against peace: 

(i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 

aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, 

agreements or assurances; 

(ii) Participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 

accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i). 

b. War crimes: 

Violations of the laws or customs of war which include, but are 

not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour 

or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied 

territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war persons on the 

seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, 

wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not 

justified by military necessity. 

c. Crimes against humanity 

Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other in- 


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human acts done against any civilian population, or persecutions 

on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are done 

or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connexion 

with any crime against peace or any war crime. 

As can be seen from the definition of the crimes against 

humanity, the crimes committed against the Jews would be a 

subject for international adjudication even if these were committed 

inside Germany. The only stipulations were that there should be a 

link (nexus) between these crimes and the war, and that they 

should be committed during such hostilities. Thus, the victors 

could not abandon the principle that in order to be able to 

intervene in the domestic affairs of a country, one had to be in a 

state of war with that country. Even the extermination of the Jews 

and others with a brutality unprecedented in history did not suffice 

to ensure that the crimes committed in a given country would be 

automatically subjected to international adjudication. Although 

the term genocide had been coined by then, the genocide concept 

was not elaborated among the Nuremberg Principles. The concept 

of crimes against humanity embodied the crime of genocide. The 

latter had not gained, at that time, enough clarity and precision to 

constitute an independent crime category. The Nuremberg trials 

began in October 1945 with the reading out of the indictment 

against 22 Nazi defendants, and it ended a year later. Of the 

defendants, 19 were convicted, 12 of whom were executed. During 

the trials, the prosecutor used the term genocide from time to time 

but the verdict did not refer to that crime. 

The U.N. General Assembly Resolution No. 96 (1) 

The first document of a legal nature containing the term 

genocide was Resolution No. 96 adopted by the United Nations 

General Assembly in December 1946 soon after the Nuremberg 

trials ended-in fact, during the first session it held in the wake of 

the trials. The purpose of that resolution was, as specified in the 

last paragraph, to demand that the ECOSOC prepare a draft 

convention on genocide in a year. But, on this occasion, the 

General Assembly explained what it understood from the word 

genocide. It was “a denial of the right of existence of entire human 

groups”. That was likened to homicide as it was “the denial of the 

right to live of individual human beings”. The reference made to the 

right to life, later, caused a link to be formed between human rights 

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and genocide. After all, genocide was, basically, the killing of 

individuals. Genocide caused the loss of the cultural and other 

kinds of contributions these groups of people would be making to 

humanity. Thus, the cultural genocide concept, to which Lemkin 

attached importance, came to be indirectly included in the 

resolution. The groups that could be subjected to genocide were 

cited as “racial, religious, political and other” groups. That was an 

admission of the possibility that virtually any group of people could 

become genocide victims. The term also meant, not only 

extermination of a group as a whole, but also in part. 

Probably the most important aspect of the resolution is that 

genocide was considered a crime according to international law. This 

deliberation aimed at preventing genocide in a country from being 

considered that country’s domestic affairs on account of the principle 

of state sovereignty and also to prevent the culprits from evading 

international penal procedures. The principle thus introduced was 

that those who committed the crime of genocide should be punished, 

regardless of their being private citizens or public servants or 

statesmen. Since the genocide law had not yet developed, adequately 

as a source, however, the sponsors stressed instead its violation of 

the ‘moral laws’. In this vein, civilized states were denouncing 

genocide. The resolution listed “religious, racial, political or any other” 

reasons as grounds on which genocide could be committed, in 

association with the groups of people subjected to genocide. In this 

respect, with the addition of the words “other reasons”, it expanded 

further the scope of the definition given in the Nuremberg principles 

(6/c), which pertains to the crimes against humanity. 

The preamble of the resolution stated that ‘political groups’ 

could be the victim of genocide. If the civilians who were part of 

groups engaged in political struggle (for example, resorting to arms 

with leftist revolutionary ideological aims or waging a struggle for 

independence) came to be massacred even in part (not as the entire 

group but in significant numbers) that alternative would still be 

considered genocide. The concept of genocide embodied in this 

resolution became almost totally identical with the concept of 

crimes against humanity, as defined in the Nuremberg Principles 

while severing the link between genocide and war. In other words, 

it admitted that genocide could take place in times of peace as weft. 

It acknowledged also that genocide could be committed, not only in 

the territories a given country occupies in war, but also within the 

national borders of that country itself. 


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Thus, this resolution recognized any killing of a large number of 

people, i.e., en masse, as genocide regardless of the kind of the 

group, grounds, time or place. 

The Convention 

The Genocide Convention was adopted on 9 December 1948, 

and it took effect on 12 December 1951. The crime of genocide is 

described in Article 2 of the Convention as follows: 

“In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following 

acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 

national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 

(a) Killing members of the group; 

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 

group; 

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 


part; 

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 

group; 

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”. 

The Convention was debated -on the basis of a draft presented 

by the U.N. Secretariat- by the Ad hoc Committee and the General 

Assembly’s Sixth Committee dealing with legal affairs. Since the 

Armenian incidents will be reviewed later in this paper within the 

framework of the Convention, it will be useful to make a brief 

assessment at this stage of the Convention in general and of Article 

2 in particular. 

Protected Groups 

The groups to be protected under the Convention mentioned in 

Article 2 are limited to four types, that is, national, ethnical, racial 

and religious groups. Lemkin, who had defended the inclusion of 

the political groups, suggested himself during the deliberations on 

the draft text that the political groups be left outside the scope of 

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the Convention. Unlike Resolution No. 96 (1), neither the ‘political 

groups’ nor the ‘other groups’ found their way into the Convention 

text. This modification constitutes a highly important difference 

because history shows that the most frequently seen struggles-and 

the ones that claim the largest number of civilian lives- take place 

between groups with political aims. Accordingly, for example, the 

massacres committed in Cambodia by the Pol Pot regime causing 

the deaths of nearly two million civilians did not fall within the 

scope of the genocide definition given by the Convention. Similarly, 

the deaths that occurred in the framework of the October 

Revolution (1917) cannot be considered genocide. In line with 

many verdicts of the International Criminal Tribunal for former 

Yugoslavia, save perhaps some exceptional acts which will be 

judged in the future trials as genocidal, even the extensive Serbian 

ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not correspond to the 

definition of the crime of genocide. 

The term ‘political group’ covers civilians along with the 

members of the group engaging in politics or waging an armed 

struggle. At first glance, this inevitably causes confusion. There are 

those who question why destruction of civilians affiliated with a 

group described as political should not be considered genocide. 

But this is a semantic problem that arises from the ‘definition’. A 

group comes to be called a ‘political group’ when an attempt is 

made to destroy it with political aims. In other words, if there is a 

political struggle between two groups and if, in the course of that 

struggle, one of these groups commits against the other group acts 

such as murder, injury, massacre or deportations the injured party 

comes to be called a political group. Killing civilians in the course 

of a political struggle continues to be a crime. But that crime is not 

genocide. 

The phrase about a group’s cultural contribution to humanity 

as embodied in Resolution 96 (1) is not included in the Convention. 

This indicates that the concept of ‘cultural genocide’ has also been 

left outside the scope of the Convention. 

The fact that the Convention does not consider genocide the 

acts perpetrated against political groups and the obliteration of the 

minority cultures through forced assimilation has significantly 

narrowed down the scope of the Convention when it came to 

implementation. For this reason, from 1951, when the Convention 

was adopted, to 1992 it could not be implemented with a few not 


237


so-significant exceptions. This has drawn strong criticism. Some 

say that the Convention has not served any useful purpose. On the 

other hand, many historians, sociologists and thinkers tended to 

interpret genocide in a broader manner than the definition in the 

Convention allows. If and when they found out that a significant 

number of civilians had died in a case they studied, they claimed 

that this was genocide. Another group of academics, meanwhile, 

suggested new definitions of genocide in order to expand the scope 

of Article 2 of the Convention. Both sides ignored the fact that 

extermination of those groups, which remain outside the four 

groups protected by the Convention, was already punishable 

within the framework of “crimes against humanity”. Attempts to 

expand the concept of genocide to cover also crimes against 

humanity, seemingly, result from the fact that the international 

community, which was so sensitive to genocide, failed to display as 

much awareness toward the crimes against humanity. Indeed, for 

a long time, the international community was not prepared to set 

up Nuremberg-type international tribunals to protect the victims of 

the crimes against humanity. Moreover, these groups could not be 

protected effectively under human rights law in times of peace or 

under humanitarian law or the law of war in times of war. 

Consequently, the definition of genocide was broadened by some 

commentators to embrace all serious crimes committed under the 

laws of war and human rights. 

That situation changed to a great extent, thanks to the activities 

of the two international criminal tribunals set up following the 

incidents in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda. Those who commit 

crimes against humanity and war crimes began to be punished. 

Further, the Statute of Rome related to the International Criminal 

Court has eliminated all the loopholes in the law. In addition to 

inter-state wars, ‘crimes against humanity’ can now be committed 

in times of peace, and together with other war crimes they can be 

committed in internal conflicts as well. The Statute of Rome took 

Article 2 of the Convention without any change and made it its 

Article 6. On the other hand, Article 7 of the Statute of Rome, 

which is the reformulated version of the Nuremberg Principles 

paragraph 6(c) on crimes against humanity, as well as the relevant 

articles of the statutes of the international tribunals set up for 

former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, covered the crimes of 

extermination, persecution, deportation and the like committed 

against “other groups” not protected by the Convention. 

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Intent 

A crime consists of two parts. One is the mental or subjective 

element (mens rea). This component refers to the intention, aim 

and will to commit a crime. The other is the act of crime itself, the 

material or objective element (actus reus). In Article 2 of the 

Convention the phrase “with intent to destroy” represents the 

mental element. The acts committed with such an intent are listed 

from (a) to (e). 

One of the most important characteristics of the Convention is 

that for the crime of genocide to exist, acts must have been 

committed only with the intent to destroy one of the four aforementioned 

groups. The intent to destroy a group must be in the 

form of ‘special intent’. In other words, it must be fully evident, i.e., 

beyond any doubt. If the intent to destroy gets declared openly by 

those who commit the act of genocide or by those who ensure its 

commission, then there is no controversy. If there is no such oral 

or written statement, then the presence of genocide becomes 

debatable. Some jurists stress that at this point one has to look at 

the consequences of the actions, and they consider it enough, if a 

significant number of deaths occurred, as a result of these actions. 

However, the concept of ‘general intent’ is valid for ordinary 

crimes, that is, the short-cut interpretation that the person who 

committed the act is considered of having an intention 

commensurate with the consequence of the act. The same concept 

is simply inadequate in the identification of the acts of genocide. 

On the other hand, those who commit genocide generally do not 

declare their intent to destroy. If no clear evidence of an oral or 

written kind can be found in order to prove genocide, some other 

elements must be taken into consideration along with the 

‘significant number of deaths’. As the crime of genocide mostly gets 

committed by the states or other large-scale organizations of a 

similar kind, one tries to determine whether the crime was 

committed by an “organized force” to find out whether there was 

‘special intent’. Since genocide is destruction of a large number of 

people, that is, members of a group, it is important to determine 

whether that organization had prepared a ‘plan’ well in advance. 

Also, that organization must have organized a force to implement 

its plan and carried it out in a coordinated, systematical and 

massive manner. . 


239


From the standpoint of its organization, its implementation and 

its consequences, the Jewish genocide may be, as an exceptional 

example, incomparable with the other cases. The decision to 

introduce a “final solution” for the Jewish genocide was taken at 

the Wannsee meeting in 1942, and the crime was confessed during 

the Nuremberg trials. But even if the intent to destroy had not been 

revealed clearly like that, one could take into account the 

discriminatory laws passed against the Jews, the “pogrom” type 

attacks including the “Crystal Night” of 1938, and the way the 

Jews had been driven out of the society and forced to live in the 

ghettos where they could not meet normal human needs as the 

preliminaries heralding a genocide. Besides, the virulent anti- 

Semitism had begun as a movement no less than fifteen years prior 

to the genocide, and the words and writings of Hitler and the other 

Nazi ideologues in the framework of that movement, make it all too 

clear the intention to destroy the Jews. Similarly, among the Serbs, 

having an ethnically homogenous homeland had been a widelyused 

rhetoric since 1981. In fact, the ‘ethnic cleansing’ as a 

concept was allegedly invented by V. Seselj, one of the Serbian 

paramilitary leaders. 

To prove the presence of the intent to destroy, which must be 

ascertained to show that a given incident was genocide, one has to 

look at the period preceding the perpetration of the acts of 

genocide, and investigate whether that kind of intent had begun to 

take shape. The presence of a state-like organization, a plan and 

its implementation by an organized force are being considered as 

factors leading to a presumption of the presence of the intent to 

destroy. 

Motive 

Not only the intent with which the crime is committed, but also 

the reason or the grounds for that intent are vitally important. This 

urge is set forth as motive, described in the Nuremberg Principles 

6 (e) involving the crimes against humanity, as “murder, 

extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhuman acts 

done to any civilian population, or persecution on political, racial 

or religious grounds”. Resolution 96 (1), on the other hand, stated 

that the crime of genocide may have been committed “on religious, 

racial, political or any other grounds”. According to Resolution 96 

(1), the motive for genocide was more comprehensive than even the 

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motive for the crimes against humanity as embodied in the 

Nuremberg Principles. Expressed differently, in an armed clash 

with a group triggered by an existing religious, political or any 

other kind of dispute, leading to the deaths of a significant number 

of civilians, could be both genocide and a crime against humanity. 

The Convention created quite a different situation. Article 2, not 

only limits the “intent” to the destruction of only the four groups, 

but it also narrows down greatly, as we shall see below, the 

grounds for destruction compared to the bases cited in the two 

afore-mentioned documents. 

During the debates on the Convention, the issue of grounds to 

destroy triggered lengthy discussions. The representatives of many 

countries argued that proving the presence of motive would be very 

hard. If such a requirement were to be stipulated, that would make 

it impossible for the courts to deliver genocide verdicts. The 

important thing was to prove that the act was perpetrated with 

intent to destroy. However, during debates at the Ad hoc 

Committee, the Lebanese representative stressed the importance of 

the motive, saying that genocide was destroying a group “with 

racial hatred”. Later, during debates at the Sixth Committee, 

despite the objections of the British and American delegates, the 

phrase “as such” which meant that only acts aimed at destroying 

members of one of the four groups due to no other reason than his 

or her belonging to that specific group, was inserted in Article 2 of 

the Convention. This was achieved with the insistence of the Soviet 

Union that was leading the “Anti-Fascist Front” with the support of 

the majority. This phrase can escape attention at first glance. It 

does not have its Turkish equivalent and needs to be translated in 

an explanatory manner. Probably because of that difficulty, it has 

always been neglected by historians. 

One has to take into consideration whether, in the perpetration 

of the crime of genocide, the motive was collective or individual. 

When an individual kills a member of the target group, this may 

not necessarily stem from the fact that the victim was a member of 

that specific group. The motive may have been something else. For 

instance, it may be a matter of revenge or a desire to confiscate the 

victim’s money or other possessions or a mere act of political 

ambitions. Genocide, on the other hand, is a collective crime. The 

organizers and planners of genocide must have acted with a racial 

motive not with a political, religious or any other reason. If they 


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acted against the target group with motives other than racial 

hatred, the acts of genocide cannot possibly be perpetrated, for 

under those circumstances there would be no way to have an 

intent to destroy a group “as such”. Only could a murderously 

intensive racial hatred towards a group gives rise to such a deadly 

intent. As a result, to prosecute the crime of genocide successfully, 

one has to prove that the defendants felt racial hatred towards the 

target group to the extent that they became determined to destroy 

that group ‘as a group’. Punishment of genocide applies only to this 

kind of crime. In that context, the Jewish genocide of the Nazis and 

the Rwanda genocide of the Hutus can be considered classical 

cases of genocide. 

Sociologically and psychologically, the intent to destroy a group 

due to its group character, emerges only in racism, or, to put It 

more correctly, in the most intensive stage of racism. Racial hatred 

is quite different from the ordinary animosity laced with anger 

parties engaged in a substantial dispute may feel towards one 

another. Racial hatred is a deeply pathological feeling or a 

complicated fanaticism the causes of which cannot be explained 

easily. It is an emotional state such as the racist movements in 

Western Europe, i.e., anti-Semitism, have harboured and peaked 

on and off for two thousand years and, more actively, in the past 

millennium. It is a malignant form of prejudice. The Nazis were the 

product of that culture under exceptionally difficult socio-economic 

conditions of the inter-war period and the Great Crash of the 

1930s. To understand how different that feeling is, it would suffice 

to read a few of the publications that fill the libraries. Meanwhile, 

the Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal documents on the 

Akayesu case provide information about the history of the racial 

relations between the farmer Hutus of the Bantu race and the Nilo- 

Hamitic Tutsis, the shepherds coming from the north eastern parts 

of the continent probably in the 16th century. 

Racial feelings, which exist everywhere in the world, can disturb 

the target group to varying degrees. However, racism that reaches 

the stage of actually destroying the target group, has been seen 

predominantly, even exclusively in the western half of Europe and 

its white colonies in north America, south Africa and Australia. In 

this context, one could list the Cathars being subjected to genocide 

in France in the 1206-48 period, the Jews in Spain through the 

14th century to 1492, the genocide of the indigenous peoples who 

created the Inca, Aztec and Maya civilizations by the Spaniards in 

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the 16th and 17th centuries, and the so-called Red Indians, by the 

Americans in the 18th and 19th centuries. Also, there was the 

Dutch Boers’ apartheid regime in the Union (later, Republic) of 

South Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries and, during the same 

time, the Australian aborigines were subjected to some genocidal 

acts by the white Australians. 

Some societies that created other civilizations too persecuted 

the civilian populations they consider to be the enemy. However, in 

those cases, no presence of “racial hatred” leading to the intent to 

destroy those people as a group can be determined. In the Islamic 

and Turkish civilizations especially, genocide has never been 

committed. Otherwise, it would have been impossible for those 

civilizations to found many multi-ethnic and multi-religious 

empires that survived for centuries. It must not be forgotten that 

despite their great technological superiority, the colonial empires 

set up by the powerful countries of the Western civilization 

managed to survive only a little more than a century on the 

average. 

The fact that the definition of genocide in the Convention became 

limited to acts perpetrated with the intent of destroying a group as 

a group leaves out the persecution of civilian societies with other 

reasons. This loophole, as I stressed earlier, was eliminated with the 

definition of the crimes against humanity given in the Nuremberg 

Principles (Article 6/c), a definition, which covers those kinds of 

crimes. The articles on crimes against humanity in the statutes of 

the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and former 

Yugoslavia, and, finally, in the International Criminal Court’s 

Statute of Rome, fulfil this function. Briefly, the crime of genocide 

has been taken out of the persecution category of the crimes against 

humanity as defined in the Nuremberg Principles, confined to four 

groups, based on ‘intent to destroy’ those groups ‘as such’ and given 

the highest or the lowest rank in the hierarchy of crimes. 

In Whole or in Part 

In Article 2 of the Convention, acts perpetrated with the intent 

to destroy a group, “in whole or in part”, are called genocide. In 

other words, one does not have to destroy a given group in whole 

for those acts to constitute genocide. There seems to be a 

contradiction here. Would the kind of racial hatred that creates the 


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will to destroy a group as a group, satisfy itself with destroying only 

part of that group 

Even the Nazis could not exterminate all the Jews. Until the 

year in which the war began, they made life for the Jews extremely 

hard and thus ensured some of them to leave Germany. After the 

war began, they prevented even those who wanted to flee, from 

leaving the country, and exterminated all Jews inside Germany. 

Finally, they subjected to genocide the Jews living in the countries 

they occupied, rather than expelling them. 

Two conclusions can be deduced from all this. Either even for 

the Nazis, the motive for destroying a group as a group attained the 

critical intensity only under war conditions or, in reality, the 

German reach to the Jews was more limited than it looked, and 

they exterminated those whom they could lay hands on, without 

permitting them to escape. 

With this provision, those who made the Convention probably 

aimed to ensure that the international community should reach 

the conclusion that genocide has been committed without waiting 

for the destruction of a group in whole and to prevent the genocide 

envisaged in Article 1 and punish it on time. 

Application of the Law to the Armenian Incidents 

At a hearing of a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee 

on 21 September 2000, the Armenian apologists said that they no 

longer needed the opening up of the Turkish archives and that on 

the basis of the existing information a consensus was achieved to 

the effect that the Armenians had been subjected to genocide. Half 

of their arguments were right in a way. However, the concluding 

statement was exactly the opposite of what they argued. The 

existing archival material was adequate to prove that no genocide 

had been committed. Hence, it was not possible for the new 

archival material to contradict the existing information. 

The assessment below is made with the assumption that the 

readers have adequate historical information about the Armenian 

incidents. Still, it may be useful to take a brief look at the historical 

context in which the incidents took place. Since the beginning of 

the 19th century the Russian advance in the Crimea and the 

Caucasus uprooted the Muslim populations, mostly the Turkish, 

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and drove them towards Anatolia in successive waves of migration 

during which large numbers of them perished. The Armenians in 

the Caucasus helped the Russian armies in return for which they 

were settled in regions, which had been ethnically cleansed from 

the Turks and the other Muslim peoples of the Caucasus. This 

process of expulsion and resettlement eventually led to the 

founding of the Armenian state in the early 20th century. In the 

course of its expansion the Russian forces entered the northeastern 

corner of Anatolia during the wars of 1827-29, 1854-56 

and 1877-78. On each occasion, the Armenians sided with the 

Russians, thus sowing the seeds of future ethnic conflict. 

During the Balkan Wars (1912-13), the Ottomans lost all their 

European territories with the exception of Eastern Thrace. In most 

of those territories, they had constituted the majority, although 

sometimes slim, of the population. Turks and other Muslims such 

as Albanians and Pomaks lost their lives in great numbers. 

Consequently, large civilian groups were uprooted from their 

homes and driven towards Anatolia. World War I, which began year 

later, was to seal the fate of the empire. The Ottomans were fighting 

with the armies of Tsarist Russia in the east, with the British and 

French navies at Gallipoli, and with the latter’s armies on the 

Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi fronts in the south. At the start of World 

War I, the Armenians constituted an estimated 1,3 million and the 

Greeks about 1,4 million, with the Turks and Muslims making up 

the rest of the total 17,5 million population of Anatolia. It is known 

that unlike the Catholic and Protestant churches, the Greek 

Orthodox and the Gregorian Armenian Churches did not keep 

population records. For that reason, the exaggerated statistics put 

forth by the Armenians do not rely on a sound source. The 

Ottoman statistics are considered closest to the truth, for those 

statistics could have never been manipulated with the assumption 

that the country would one day be dismembered and the 

distribution of the land would be based on statistical data. On the 

contrary, the sound population statistics were necessary for tax 

administration and military conscription. Quite naturally, the 

statistics originating from European sources are not far from the 

Ottoman ones. Though the first director of the census 

administration, which was set up in Istanbul in 1892, was a Turk, 

the department later operated under a Jew named Fethi Franco 

between the years 1893-1903, subsequently an Armenian named 

Migirdich Shinopian, and, as of 1908, an American. 


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Armenian Aims and Their Struggle in order to prove that the 

1915-16 incidents were genocide, that is, that the Armenians were 

subjected to genocide, not as a political group but as an ethnic or 

religious group, most of the Armenian apologists either refer only 

briefly or do not refer at all to the politically-aimed Armenian 

activities including terrorism. Some of them assert that the 

Ottoman administration was oppressive, and that the Armenians 

engaged in political activities to defend themselves against it or to 

gain their rights. They condone, as legitimate defense against a ‘big 

and cruel power’, the way the Armenians resorted to terrorist 

violence, as in the cases of the ‘komitaci’, hajduk, klepsos or 

chetniks of the Christian peoples of the Balkans. Historically 

speaking, the states do not start ethnic strives except in the case 

of racist assaults on target groups. But, as I have explained earlier, 

there was no racism in the Ottoman Empire. It is all the more 

logical that the ethnic groups initiate struggles for independence in 

disintegrating empires. That is what happened in the late Ottoman 

period. 

In order to reach their political objectives, the Armenians 

embraced the Balkan liberation struggle model. Just like the 

Balkan Christian peoples, they got organized and engaged in 

political activities. This is, in fact, not so strange. In the aftermath 

of the French Revolution, the idea of nation-state prevailed, and 

independence struggles against the multi-religious and multi 

national empires were considered legitimate. The Armenians 

clearly engaged in this kind of activity with the blessing, and often 

with the material support, of the Great Powers. There was no way, 

some Armenians thought, that this kind of struggle could be 

successful without resorting to violence. The use of violence would 

have to comply with the rules of the law of war. However, the 

Christian peoples of the empire almost always violated the law in 

the course of their armed struggle. The Balkan-type use of violence 

constituted a model in that the terrorist groups would attack the 

civilian Muslim population to provoke them to retaliate. If the 

Muslims retaliated or if the administration took military action, 

there would be loud cries of persecution and calls on Europe to 

intervene. The great Christian Powers would impose on the 

Ottomans reforms favoring the Christian population. Those 

reforms started with local administration rights and extended 

towards autonomy. After some time, Ottoman sovereignty in 

certain parts of the empire became nominal. With the first armed 

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conflict, those regions gained independence with foreign 

intervention and assistance. In the 1880s, the Hinchags 

announced, as the goal of their armed struggle, that they 

established an (imaginary) Armenia in a region called Vilayat-ı Sitte 

that is the six provinces in eastern Anatolia namely Erzurum, Van, 

Elazığ, Diyarbakır, Bitlis and Sivas. According to today’s 

administrative division that region covered also the provinces now 

called Erzincan, Ağrı, Muş, Siirt, Hakkari, Bingöl, Malatya, Mardin, 

Amasya, Tokat, Giresun, Ordu and Trabzon. 

Armenians did not prove successful in that struggle. Therefore, 

they may compare their lot with that of the luckier Christian 

peoples of the Balkans and feel unfortunate or injured. However, in 

order to defend the genocide thesis they cannot simply claim that 

the Turks subjected them to ‘death marches’ out of their cruelty, 

that they were too innocent even to nourish political aspirations, 

not to mention armed struggle, and that, in view of the above, what 

they were subjected to was genocide by Turks in the sense of 

Article 2 of the Convention. 

Historical research clearly shows, on the other hand, that the 

Armenians constituted a political group par excellence that 

engaged in armed political activities for independence. Opting for 

relocation in the course of a defensive struggle against a local 

political group that joined hands with the enemy, i.e., Russian 

occupiers, and resorted to arms as well as systematic terrorist 

actions amounting to grave breaches of the law of war, does not 

constitute genocide in accordance with the definition of that crime. 

Further, the crimes committed, if any, in the course of this type of 

struggle would not amount to genocide either. 

Motive 

A political group entertaining political aspirations and pursuing 

activities to serve such purposes may also be a national, racial, 

religious or ethnic group. Some political groups too, as in the case 

of the Armenians, may well be described, on the basis of some 

other characteristics they have, as an ethnic or religious group or 

simply ‘other” group. However, being a political group indicates 

that the incidents in which group gets involved stem from political 

reasons, first and foremost. 


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When evidence points at the fact that a given group has engaged 

in political and armed activities, there is no way that a particular 

group cannot be considered as falling under the protective clauses 

of the Convention which deals only with genocide. As it is explained 

briefly in the last few paragraphs, the ‘parties’ or organizations 

such as Dashnag and Hinchak, as well as the Armenian 

Patriarchate acting in the name of and supported by the 

Armenians, aimed as a first step at reforms, which envisaged a 

broad political autonomy, and eventually, secession and 

independence. To this end, they zealously engaged themselves in 

the politics of ethnic struggle, openly advocating and resorting to 

force including terrorism. Due to these distinctive and welldocumented 

characteristics, the Armenians constituted a political 

group well before the relocation began. 

Furthermore, as already explained earlier in this article while 

elaborating on the law pertaining to genocide, the intent to destroy 

a given group emerges only when the racial hatred harboured 

against that group reaches a certain intensity. It is a weft-known 

fact that in the Ottoman Empire no racial hatred was ever nurtured 

by the Muslim majority towards the Armenians. In fact, the kind of 

racial hatred similar to anti-Semitism in the West was never 

observed in the history of the Islamic and Turkish societies. 

A brief comparison may be useful with the Holocaust at this 

point. The German Jews neither engaged in a struggle for 

independence, nor did they ever chase after territorial claims. No 

one can deny that they did not resort to terrorism massacring 

innocent German civilians. It is common knowledge that they did 

not join hands with the armies of Germany’s enemies in war. They 

did not stab the German armies on the back by blocking the 

strategic roads and logistic lines. The Jews of Germany and Europe 

constituted a totally innocent group with respect to politics. A 

peaceful, civilized and successful group, which then won eleven of 

the forty Nobel prizes, a group which had become fully integrated 

into the German society, was destroyed with a virulent racist 

hatred called anti-Semitism in an exceptionally efficient and 

systematic manner, planned in advance and implemented with a 

massive organizational drive, for no other reason than being a 

group. 

Starting with Hitler, countless authors expressed for many 

years a profound enmity towards the Jews. Anti-Semitism, which 

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rose dangerously fifteen years prior to the Holocaust, was a 

movement that had been continuing actively since the beginning of 

the second millennium. In Western Europe in general and in 

Germany in particular, there had been innumerable cases of 

attacks on the Jews in the aftermath of epidemics such as 

plaguenatural disasters such as floods or earthquakes or defeats 

suffered in wars. In the course of these attacks, members of the 

Jewish community were killed, and their assets were plundered. In 

other words, the Christian communities blamed the Jews for the 

disasters that struck them. They accused the Jews of deicide or 

killing Jesus Christ, for which they were considered to be ‘Anti 

Christ’. There exist thousands of documents and publications 

cataloging various aspects of anti-Semitism. There were anti 

Semites even among the Renaissance writers whom one should 

expect to be rational thinkers. Anti-Semitism can be discerned 

frequently also in some of the romantic writers of the age of 

Enlightenment. It is no secret that to a certain extent Heidegger 

and even Jung, a leading philosopher and a psychiatrist of the last 

century, were anti-Semites. 

In Ottoman history, on the other hand, there had never been a 

similar ‘anti-Armenianism’. There was no biologically motivated 

super-race theory for the Muslims to debase the Armenians, 

portraying them as a subhuman race, or a Social Darwinism that 

would complement this attitude. Since Islam considered the 

Christians to be a “people of the book”, that is, believers in 

monotheism, the Muslims never directed against the Christians 

the kind of accusations the Christians levelled at the Jews. In 

natural or man-made disasters, the Armenians or the other 

Christian groups were never turned into a scapegoat. On the 

contrary, the Armenians came to be called “the loyal people”. They 

were active in the realm of public service. They became civil 

servants, some of them serving at the highest ranks of the central 

administration as governors, paşas or provincial governors, 

representing their state as ambassadors—even serving as the 

country’s foreign minister. Since they had the opportunity to be 

trained at the schools opened by the missionaries in the Ottoman 

Empire as of the beginning of the 19th century, they quickly 

flourished and came to dominate the empire’s economy. Unlike the 

Jews in Europe, they were not banned from practicing certain 

professions. They were not forced to live in ghettos. Though they 

were the most affluent class, they were not subjected to pogroms 


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out of envy or grudge. Therefore, it cannot be said that the 

Armenians were destroyed out of racial hatred directed at their 

group. 

Under the circumstances, the determination of the nature of the 

motive behind the relocation gains importance. If that motive 

arises from a reason other than the Armenians being Armenians, 

that is, for example, from a military, political or some other kind of 

reason, then this cannot accommodate itself with the definition of 

genocide. 

A brief glance at recent history may prove useful to apprehend 

what has really happened with respect to the Armenians. 

According to the San Stefano Treaty, signed at the end of the 1877- 

78 Ottoman-Russian War, ‘greater Bulgaria’, which, in the 

Balkans, had coastlines bordering both the Aegean and the Black 

Seas and which included parts of Macedonia, was to become an 

independent country. That country attained a more homogeneous 

population when 260,000 Turkish civilians died during the war, 

and 515,000 others were driven out of the country. Similarly, the 

70,000 Turks amid Muslims of the Caucasus fleeing from the 

Russian armies, which had advanced all the way to Erzurum, took 

refuge in eastern Anatolia. The exact number of civilians who died 

in that region is not known. The treaty also envisaged “reforms” for 

the Armenians living in the Ottoman lands. A certain article 

involving reforms was included in the treaty in line with the 

demand made by the Armenian Patriarch Nerses II during a visit to 

the Russian Grand Duke Nicholas who had arrived in Yeşilköy, 

next door to Istanbul. Thus, the Armenians placed themselves 

under Russia’s protection in an internationally binding document. 

The reforms sought under the Tanzimat and Islahat edicts until 

then had been envisaged for all Christian subjects of the Ottoman 

Empire. But this time, reforms were being asked for only one 

particular group and Russia was going to supervise its 

implementation. 

When the other Great Powers did not endorse these concessions 

obtained by Russia on its own initative, the Berlin Congress was 

held, and it was there that the dimensions of Bulgaria were 

trimmed down. However, the return of those Turks, who had been 

forced to leave their homelands, could not even be attempted. The 

reforms envisaged for the Armenians were confirmed, on the other 

hand, but this time under the supervision of all the Great Powers. 

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During the years 1912-13, the Balkan Wars took place between 

the Ottoman Empire on one side, and Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia 

on the other. In those full-scale armed hostilities, 1,450,000 

Turkish, Albanian and Pomak civilians died. Another 410,000 were 

exiled towards Anatolia, fleeing from the attacking armies, under 

bombardment, leaving behind their destroyed or burnt homes. 

Thus, in many places that the Turks had known as their homeland 

for five centuries, including vast areas where they constituted the 

majority, the Turkish and Muslim existence was brought to an 

abrupt end. Cultural assets, the legacy of so many years, were torn 

down. World War I began only a year after hundreds of thousands 

of those refugees had arrived in the remaining parts of the Ottoman 

Empire. 

The Ottoman Government, whose leaders held a crucial meeting 

with the Dashnag representatives in August 1914, obtained a 

pledge from the Armenians to the effect that they would act like 

loyal Ottoman citizens in the Great War. However, at a secret 

Dashnag meeting held in Erzurum two months prior to that, a 

decision had been taken to start a wide-scale Armenian rebellion 

against the Ottomans to benefit from the opportunity provided by 

the war. The Armenians failed to honour their promise. And they 

saw their interests served better in serving the Russian interests. 

The Russian Armenians too took their places in the Russian 

armies, which prepared to attack the Ottomans. Etchmiadzin 

Catholicos (the highest Armenian religious figure in Russia) 

assured the Russian Governor General for the Caucasus that ‘the 

Armenians would unconditionally support the Russian war efforts 

in return for Russia’s ensuring that reforms be made for the 

Ottoman Armenians”. Later, when he was received by the Russian 

Tsar Nicholas II in Tbilisi, the Catholicos told the autocrat: 

“Armenian liberation will result in an autonomous Armenia in 

Anatolia outside the realm of Turkish sovereignty, and this will be 

achieved with Russia’s help”. 

In March 1915, the Russian forces moved towards Van. 

Armenian insurgency, which started in Van, turned into a fullscale 

rebellion on April 11, during which the Armenian armed 

groups attacked the Muslim population killing and expelling many. 

Ten days later, the Tsar sent a telegram to the Van Armenian 

Revolutionary Committee and thanked them “for their services to 

the Russians”. Gochnak, an Armenian newspaper published in the 


251


United States, gave in its 24 May 1915 issue the ‘good news’ that 

“only 1,500 Turks” had been left in Van. The Armenian forces 

inside the Russian army that crossed the Ottoman border were 

under the command of a former Ottoman deputy named Gareguine 

Pasdermadjian who had adopted the revolutionary name of ‘Armen 

Garo’. Another former deputy, Hambartsum Boyajian, code-named 

‘Murat’, was at the head of the guerrilla force attacking the Turkish 

villages and massacring the civilian population. Yet another former 

deputy from Van, Y. Papazian was the leader of the guerrillas 

fighting in the Van, Bitlis and Muş region. 

After issuing yet another warning, though in vain, to the 

Armenian Patriarch, the Ottoman administration started on April 

24 arresting the leaders of the komitacis’ in Istanbul whom the 

Armenians chose to portray as their ‘intellectuals’. One can clearly 

see from these developments the reason for the relocation 

decision. The Armenian cooperation with the Russian army, their 

rebellion in Van, and their guerrilla activity in ethnic cleansing in 

the neighbouring provinces were, for the Ottomans, a re 

enactment of an old story with which they were all too familiar. 

Just as the Balkan Christians had done in the Balkans in 

cooperation with the Russians, now the Armenians, moving 

together with the Russian armies, were starting to subject the 

Turks and Muslims in eastern Anatolia to ethnic cleansing, killing 

them and burning their houses. A decision was taken to transfer 

the Armenians to another part of the empire mainly far from the 

eastern and also the southern fronts to prevent the Armenians 

from continuing with these military activities and from attaining 

their political goals. 

The Intent to Destroy 

According to Article 2 of the Convention, perpetration of one of 

the five cited acts was a necessary condition for genocide, provided 

that it be committed with the intent to destroy one of the four 

groups ‘as a group’. However, the Armenian apologists focused 

their efforts to prove that the Ottoman administration had the 

intent to destroy the Armenians since no evidence of the existence 

of the intent to destroy could be found they did not refrain from 

what should be called falsification. An Armenian named Aram 

Andonian published so-called “telegrams” in which Talat Paşa was 

supposedly “ordering the extermination”. Though soon enough 

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these were foiled as fakes, they continued to use them as 

propaganda material. 

Nevertheless, after some time, the failure to find any official 

documents, which could corroborate the intent to destroy’, pushed 

the pro-Armenian circles to adopt a new strategy. Obviously, what 

mattered was to achieve pre-determined results. They started 

claiming that 1,5 million Armenians had died during the 

‘deportation’. Such an unduly high figure was being cited beside its 

propaganda effect, to prove indirectly the presence of the intent to 

destroy by way of deporting and thus to prove that genocide had 

been committed. For that reason, the pre-transfer Armenian 

population had to be revised upwards. One falsification led to 

another. History was being distorted to make it coincide with the 

requirements of the law. 

From the Turkish standpoint, Armenian engagement in political 

and armed struggle for the sake of independence suffices to refute 

the thesis that members of the group were killed because they were 

affiliated with that group, and to prove that relocation was not 

genocide. However, systematic and massive killing of a civilian 

population, even with political aims, may constitute a crime 

against humanity. Furthermore, the Armenian genocide claim is 

now being based on Paragraph (e) of Article 2 of the Convention, 

namely “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 


part”. 

This claim is presented along the following lines: Since the 

Ottomans were wary of openly destroying the Armenians, they 

used the ‘deportation’ as an opportunity to impose on the 

Armenians the kind of living conditions that would cause them to 

perish. Through an ‘omission’ of their duty to protect the 

Armenians from attacks during the ‘deportation’, to ensure safe 

transportation, no less than to provide food, medicine, medical 

treatment and shelter, they accelerated the deaths. The Armenian 

authors accused the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, the Ottoman intelligence 

services, of having actually organized the massacres committed by 

the criminals released from prisons. These are the claims. It must 

not be forgotten that along with acts such as murder which has a 

direct impact, causing deaths deliberately through omission, can 

also be considered genocide. Therefore, it is important to focus on 

whether the deaths resulted in the course of relocation from an 


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intent to destroy a specific group, hence whether the relocation was 

a covert genocide. I recounted earlier in this article that the 

relocation decision was aimed at preventing the Armenians from 

collaborating with the Russian armies and, at the same time, from 

saving the Turks living in the areas specified by the Hinchag’s map 

from being subjected to ethnic cleansing as in the case of the Turks 

in the Balkans. The Armenians had formed their own units inside 

the Russian military forces and were fighting the Ottoman armies 

along the eastern front. Ethnic Armenian soldiers were deserting 

the Ottoman armies fighting on other fronts, joining guerrilla 

bands inside the country, attacking the Ottomans from behind and 

cutting their logistic supply lines. The Van rebellion constituted the 

first step of these activities. 

Having seen that all hope of reaching an agreement with the 

Armenians had been lost, and that the warnings it had issued via 

the Patriarch were not being heeded, the Ottoman Government 

was left with no workable alternative but to decide to transfer the 

Armenians to a region in Syria and northern Iraq, which were then 

both Ottoman lands. In a telegram sent to Talat Paşa, the Minister 

of Interior, on 2 May 1915, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief 

Enver Paşa reported that the Russians were driving the Muslims 

in Russia towards the Ottoman border, and that these people were 

in a pitiful state. He referred to the Armenian rebellion in the 

vicinity of Van and suggested that the Armenians should either be 

driven towards the Russian border or dispersed towards some 

other areas. As a result, Talat Paşa personally assumed 

responsibility to initiate the removal of the Armenians to other 

parts of the empire instead of pushing them towards the Russian 

border, and eventually to Russia. After a while, to share the 

responsibility he ensured the passing of an interim law (30 May) 

relevant to the issue. The commanders were authorized to 

instantly deal with those persons who disrupted law and order, 

staged attacks or put up resistance, and to relocate one by one or 

en masse the population of those villages or towns that engaged in 

espionage and committed high treason. Thus, the relocation task 

was handed over to the army. 

It should be obvious that it was out of the question for a 

decision to have been made well in advance for the Armenian 

relocation. No advance planning had been made prior to that 

decision, and the organizational preparations needed had not been 

done either. A top military commander concerned about the grave 

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situation on the eastern front demanded urgent action, and the 

government wanted to respond to that demand immediately It is so 

clear that no pre-arrangements had been made in advance that 

Talat Paşa himself initiated the population transfer without even 

having a law passed to this effect. He was so anxious to ensure that 

there would be no more delay. The law came after action. Under the 

circumstances, everything points to the fact that no plan was made 

ready, and no organization set up to implement it with intent to 

destroy the Armenians. 

The text of the law in question envisages, moreover, every effort 

to ensure the security of the Armenians during the transfer, i.e., 

inter alia, the safety of their lives and their assets. It states that the 

food to be provided for them be financed from the ‘migration fund”, 

that they be allocated plots of land at their destinations and houses 

be built for the needy, that the farmers among them be supplied 

with seeds and equipment, that they receive money for the assets 

they left behind, and that if anybody were settled in the real estate 

left behind by them, the value of the real estate should be 

calculated and the sum in question be forwarded to the former 

owner. 

Furthermore, with regulations issued on 10 June 1915, the 

properties of the resettled Armenians were placed under 

protection. They were extended aid in cash and in kind to facilitate 

them to resettle at their destinations. The real estate left behind 

were sold at auctions by the government on their behalf, and a 

commission founded for this purpose made due payments to the 

Armenians who demanded them. With an order issued to the 

Anatolian provinces on 25 November 1915, relocation was 

suspended. The activity that took place beyond that date was of a 

local scope only. Finally, at the beginning of 1916, the whole 

operation was actually brought to an end. After the war the 

Armenians were permitted to return to the places of their choice as 

much as possible. Some steps were taken, not very successfully, to 

make it easier for them to get back the property held in trust for 

them by the commissions or sold at auctions. All these measures 

could not be taken to conceal a genocidal attempt. 

In the communications that took place between the capital city 

and its provincial administration on the movement of population, 

there is no reference at all that could create the suspicion that 

there was any intention to destroy the Armenians. On the contrary, 


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one sees in these documents that mutual requests were made to 

ensure that they be transferred in a safe manner. Most interesting 

communications were exchanged between the Erzurum Governor’s 

Office and Talat Paşa. Since that province was situated on the 

Russian border, the region assumed priority. The provincial 

officials were instructed that the Armenians living there be 

permitted to take along with them all of their movable personal 

belongings. In these documents, it was also stated that there was 

no need to transfer the Armenians living in Diyarbakır, Harput and 

Sivas. But after the Russian threat grew in the direction of central 

Anatolia as well, that decision was altered. When some Kurdish 

citizens attacked a 500-strong group set off from Erzurum while 

the convoy was travelling between Erzincan and Erzurum, the 

officials in Diyarbakır, Elazığ and Bitlis were told to punish, in a 

severe manner, any raiders who might attack the Armenians in the 

villages and towns situated on their path. Similarly, when Dersim 

highwaymen attacked the Armenians coming from Erzurum, the 

Elazığ Governor’s Office was ordered to take urgent measures. The 

Erzurum Governor obviously suspended the operation after seeing 

that the Armenians could not be fully protected during the 

transfer. He received a message telling him that a postponement 

was not possible, on account of military reasons. Putting aside that 

instruction, transfers from Erzurum were halted from time to time 

for the same reason. Despite all these measures, some Armenian 

civilians undoubtedly died during the relocation. But it is obvious 

that these deaths did not result from the deliberate neglect of state 

duties. The 65,000-strong Ottoman army, fighting along the 

eastern front, was also frozen to death in Sarıkamış. The harsh 

climate and the rough terrain, the inadequacy of the military units 

charged with protecting the Armenian convoys, lack of adequate 

food and medicine and epidemics caused natural deaths. The 

weaknesses of a state experiencing the final days of its dissolution 

cannot be considered a deliberate neglect of duty, i.e., omission. It 

seems that the British High Commissioner in Istanbul had access 

to the Ottoman archives. The original text of a secret order 

dispatched by Talat Paşa was found in the British archives. The 

last article of the order says: “...Because this order concerns the 

disbanding of the Committees [terrorist bodies], it is necessary that 

it be implemented in a way that would prevent the Armenian and 

Muslim elements from massacring each other”. In his 

memorandum about this order, D. G. Osborne of the British 

Foreign Office says: “...[T]he last article of the order states that one 

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must refrain from measures which might cause massacre” . The 

evidences above indicate that the relocation was not arranged with 

the aim of destroying the Armenians. 

Some pro-Armenian writers claim that the Ottoman archives 

being opened up with a delay (due to the need for classification) 

was a ploy on the part of the government to eliminate the kind of 

documents that would prove the Ottoman Government’s decision 

to exterminate. They argue that in the aftermath of the war the 

İttihatçıs (members of the Union and Progress Party) collected and 

destroyed the documents implicating them. Yet, in the Ottoman 

recording system all incoming and outgoing documents would be 

filed into logs. Once a document was filed into the records, there 

was no way to destroy it. Besides, the large numbers of 

communications sent out by the Sublime Porte (Prime Ministry) 

arrived in various provincial centers throughout the empire. A 

great part of these were the circulars sent from the capital city to 

more than one governor office. So, even if we were to assume that 

the copies kept in the capital city were destroyed, it would be 

practically impossible to cofrect and destroy the multitude of their 

originals kept at various centers. 

There is another piece of clear evidence indicating that the 

government of the time had no intention of exterminating the 

Armenians. Members of the gangs that attacked the Armenian 

convoys and those officials who exploited the Armenian plight, 

neglected their duties or abused their powers were court martialled 

and punished. Until 1918, that is, until the Mondros Armistice, 

1,397 persons received various kinds of sentences in this context, 

with more than half of them being executed during the tenure of 

the Union and Progress Government. Obviously, the Nazi SS, SA 

and the Gestapo officers, responsible for the Jewish genocide, were 

punished only for not carrying out the genocide effectively, and not 

for the kind of reasons mentioned above. 

Acts of Genocide, most of the acts perpetrated in the Jewish 

genocide committed by the Nazis were “the killing of persons 

belonging in the group”, that is, the act described in Article 2(a) of 

the Convention. These massacres took place in the gassing to 

death of the Jews after they were transported, that is, deported to 

the camps where they were kept under conditions they would not 

be able to survive for long. In other words, the deportation itself 

was not an act of genocide causing deaths. On the other hand, the 


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living conditions at the camps were acts that fit the description 

made in Article 2(c) of the Convention. The Nazis committed these 

acts after advanced planning. They got organized and then 

implemented the plan in a systematic and massive manner. 

The fact that the Ottoman forces did not stage armed attacks on 

the Armenian population or settlements during the relocation 

shows that the acts described in Article 2 (a) and (b) were not 

committed. Since the relocation lacked that basic element of ethnic 

cleansing, pro-Armenian writers who are adamant to portray the 

relocation as genocide claim that the deportation was used 

deliberately to deteriorate the group’s living conditions to ensure 

physical extermination of the Armenians in an indirect manner, 

and that Article 2(c) would apply to that situation. In other words, 

they assert that although the Ottomans did not openly and directly 

exterminate the Armenians, they adjusted the “deportation” 

conditions to ensure that the Armenians would die anyway. The 

Armenian genocide thesis came to be based almost entirely on this 

argument. 

There is no evidence to prove that relocation was planned to 

commit genocide in an indirect way. It is not possible to come 

across statements or instructions that would indicate the presence 

of the intent to destroy through relocation, which must be done to 

prove genocide. On the contrary, the entire archival material 

pertains to the implementation of the resettlement decision with as 

little harm to the Armenians as possible. 

To distort these facts, the Armenian apologists take two 

different tracks to explain the situation. They report in an 

extremely inflated manner the number of people who died as a 

result of the relocation. To that end, they first inflate the overall 

population figures and then the ratio of the casualties. Thus, they 

try to prove that the aim had been murder rather than relocation. 

The second path they try is that of “oral history”. They want to 

prove that there had been intent to destroy by gathering the 

personal accounts of the events related by the people who had 

survived the transfer or by their children. One could say that in 

almost aft of the books written by Armenian historians, genocide is 

supposedly “proven” with these methods. 

No one doubts that a great number of families and individuals 

experienced personal tragedies during the relocation. Even 

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population exchanges cause similar tragedies, albeit less dramatic. 

However, this does not show that the group in question was 

subjected to genocide. The oral history approach, not only does not 

carry any legal weight, but also is problematic when it comes to 

writing down history. It is a twilight zone between history and 

memoirs. 

As stated above, the relocation decision was taken officially after 

Enver Paşa reported in writing to Talat Paşa on 2 May 1915, that 

the Russians had sent across our borders on 20 April 1915, a 

multitude of Muslim civilians who were in a wretched state. At 

more or less the same time, the Armenians rebelled in Van, and 

operations began against armed Armenian groups. Therefore, the 

arrest of 235 Armenians on 24 April 1915, was neither the 

beginning of the relocation nor were they prominent intellectuals of 

the Armenian community, for they were “komitacıs” or terrorists, 

to use the contemporary jargon. In other words, the claim that the 

“deportation” that started with the arrest of the Armenian 

intellectuals constituted genocide is not valid. 

The Ottoman Government could have opted for the second 

alternative suggested by Enver Paşa. As the Russians had done to 

the Muslims, it could have openly driven the Armenians towards 

the Russian border, which would have caused by far the higher 

casualty figures than the relocation brought about. The Balkan 

countries had done that to Turkish and Muslim populations much 

bigger than the Armenian population. An empire that was locked 

in a life and death war with the British and the French had no 

reason to fear the potential reaction of the British or the French 

public. It had no reason to hide behind a “deportation” process. In 

other words, offering the Armenians the same treatment the 

Balkan Turks and Muslims had been given was not so difficult for 

the Young Turks, as some seem to believe. The Ottoman 

Government chose the relocation option not to get the Armenians 

killed indirectly but to have them transported to a safer part of the 

realm, a place less hazardous with respect to national security 

during the war. 

Let us come to the issue of the Armenian population at that 

time. In the pre-World War I Western sources, that figure varies 

from 1,056,000 (London, Annual Register) to 1,555,000 (The 

French Yellow Book). In recent publications, however, this figure 

sometimes rises up to 3 million. François Rochebloine, the 


259


rapporteur on whose account dated 15 January 2001, the French 

National Assembly’s genocide bill was based, gives the figure of 1,8 

million. The ‘Rochebloine report’, says in an unprecedented way, 

that 1,2 million Armenians died (600,000 of them where they were 

and another 600,000 during the deportation), and that 200,000 

others fled to the Caucasus with the Russian armies, 100,000 were 

supposedly abducted (), 150,000 survived the deportation and 

that another 150,000 fled before they could be deported. This must 

be a feat of imagination! The casualty figures too have climbed 

continually over the years. The 1918 edition of the Encyclopaedia 

Britannica says that 600,000 Armenians had died. In the 1968 

edition of the same publication, this figure rose to 1,5 million. 

It would be sounder, on the other hand, to take the Ottoman 

statistics as a basis, and accept that the Armenian population 

figure was 1,295,000, simply because the Ottomans had reasons of 

taxation and conscription to keep correct statistics. This figure is, 

in fact, also the average of the figures provided by two Western 

sources of that period as mentioned above. 

To calculate the number of the dead, we should first find out the 

number of the Armenians who reached Syria and Iraq, safe and 

sound. In its 7 December 1916 report, the Ottoman Interior 

Ministry states that 702,900 persons were transferred, and 

specifies the overaft sum spent for the relocation. The Migrations 

Commission of the League of Nations gives the number of 

Armenians passing from Turkey into Russia throughout World War 

I as somewhere in the 400,000-420,000 range. Considering that 

the number of Armenians living in İstanbul, Kütahya, Edirne, and 

Aydın (including İzmir), areas where they were not transferred, was 

around 200,000, one concludes that the number of Armenians who 

died due to relocations, could not have been high at aft, with due 

respect for the dead of the two sides. 

According to the information the İstanbul Armenian Patriarchate 

provided to the British prior to the Sevres negotiations, the Armenian 

population that remained within the Ottoman borders following the 

1920 Mondros Armistice amounted to 625,000 people. If one adds to 

that figure the number of Armenians who went to the Caucasus, the 

total would reach 1,045,000. Since the pre-war Armenian population 

amounted to 1,3 million the number of the dead, whatever the 

causes may be, turns out to be no more than 265,000. 

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Boghos Nubar Paşa, who attended the Paris Peace Conference 

as the head of the Armenian National Committee, declared that 6- 

700,000 Armenians migrated to other countries and that 280,000 

Armenians were living within the Turkish borders. If one would add 

up these two figures and then deduct the total from the 1,3 million, 

one would get 220,000-320,000 as the number of Armenian 

deaths, again caused by a number of reasons. However, he himself 

claimed that over one million Armenians had been killed. For that 

to be true, the pre-war Armenian population should have been over 

2 million. The person in question claimed that the pre-war 

Armenian population had been 4,5 million. Thus, he provided the 

first example to the subsequent generations of the practice of 

“bidding higher and higher”, as if at an auction. 

Arnold J. Toynbee, who was, among others, responsible for war 

propaganda, said in his “Blue Book” that 600,000 Armenians had 

died. Later this figure was quoted by the Encyclopaedia Britannica. 

On the other hand, Toynbee said, in footnote no. 38, that the 

number of deportees reaching Zor, Damascus and Aleppo, as of 5 

April 1916, was 500,000. Along with the 200,000 who were not 

subjected to deportation and the 400,000 that went to the 

Caucasus, that brings the Armenian population up to 1.7 million, 

which is higher than the British figures for the Armenian 

population. If, on the other hand, the population figure is put at 

1,3 million, the number of the dead has to decline from 600,000 to 

200,000. 

The figures above indicate that, depending on the various 

estimates about the overall Armenian population, the Armenian 

losses vary between a couple of hundred thousand to 600,000. 

Obviously, all the statistics that put the losses over 300,000 

happen to inflate grossly the pre-war Armenian population figure. 

One should never lose sight of the fact that, despite the deaths that 

occurred during the relocation, those who safely arrived at their 

destination, even according to Toynbee, were around half a million. 

This proves that the relocation was not genocide in disguise, for, 

had it been genocide, there would be no reason for the Ottomans 

to let them survive. 

Considerable number of people may have died. On the other 

hand, it must not be forgotten that not all (not even most) deaths 

occurred during the transfers. In the wars of the time, those fleeing 

from the enemy armies too were in a state of migration vulnerable 


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to many dangers. After the Russian army’s operation which began 

around Van in May 1915, the Ottoman army took back the places 

it had lost. Then, a much bigger Russian attack began and reached 

all the way close to Elazığ. After the 1917 October Revolution the 

Russian armies retreated, and the Ottomans advanced once again. 

While the armies thus advanced and retreated, both the Turks and 

the Armenians, who found themselves on the path of these armies, 

had to move back and forth. For example, an estimated 900,000 

Turks had to be displaced from eastern Anatolia towards the 

central parts of the country. In a region with an extremely rough 

terrain, people tried to travel in carriages, on horseback and mostly 

on foot, braving cold weather and the attacks of the gangs of 

brigands who did not discriminate between Muslims and 

Christians. In a few days, their food would finish and the children 

and the elderly especially, would be weakened by fatigue and lack 

of adequate water, and typhoid fever or typhus epidemics would 

cause the number of deaths soar aft of a sudden. 

One can even assert that an orderly relocation, which took place 

in the same region under similar physical conditions, was safer 

and caused less health hazards than the haphazard movements of 

populations mentioned above. For example, some 5,000 

Armenians left with the French who evacuated Maraş during the 

Turkish War of Independence. In the course of their 10-24 

February journey, 2-3,000 of these Armenians died on account of 

the harsh travelling conditions, though they did not come under 

any attack from outsiders. 

Due to all these reasons, Boghos Nubar Paşa, referring to a 

German report, said at the Paris Peace Conference that the Turks 

lost more people than the Armenians did, that the entire Turkish 

losses during the war amounted to 2,5 million, that this occurred 

from ‘war, epidemics, scarcity of food and inadequacy of drugs and 

hospital personnel”, that at least half of these deaths occurred 

among those Turks who were “in the Armenian provinces occupied 

by the Russian and Armenian armies”. This means that a minimum 

of 1,25 million Muslims must have perished in eastern Anatolia. 

Indeed, population research done later confirmed the validity of 

this figure to a great extent. The Ottoman war zone losses in World 

War I were in the 500,000-550,000 range, and the civilian losses 

amounted to some two million. Since the war zone was eastern 

Anatolia, it is only natural that more than half of the overall civilian 

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deaths occurred in that region. Indeed, McCarthy estimates that 

1,19 million Muslim civilians perished in the region between 1914- 

1921. 

Finally, the Turkish and Armenian civilians, who died in clashes 

with one another, called ‘mukatele’ in old Turkish, that is, mutual 

killings, are included in those casualty figures, though the definite 

number is not known. According to the findings reported in the 

course of the Şüheda (Martyrs) Project launched in the early 

1980s, mass graves abound in eastern Anatolia. Anthropological 

research determines scientifically to which group each mass grave 

belongs. Although it is early to make a general assessment, one 

sees that the mass graves belonging to Turks are more numerous. 

These grave sites indicate that the people’s tales of Armenians 

persecuting Muslims are not a myth. The Muslims who took part 

in the war did not desert the army until the very end of the armed 

hostilities. Soldiers of Armenian origin, on the other hand, deserted 

in large numbers. They formed armed groups which attacked the 

Muslim towns and villages where there would hardly be men at 

fighting age able to protect them. So, these peoples could not 

defend themselves effectively. This is why the Muslim deaths were 

more numerous than the Armenian ones. 

There is a difference between the fates of those Armenians who 

were transferred from western Anatolia and those from eastern 

Anatolia. The partial relocation carried out in the west caused 

considerably fewer deaths, because of the availability of railways. 

A greater number of them returned to their homes in the western 

parts after the war ended. In the east, Armenian deaths were more 

numerous because of the rough terrain, lack of railways and the 

fact that only small gendarmerie units that were spared from the 

war front were available to protect them. 

Still, the number of Armenian deaths were a lot less than 

claimed. The fact that many of these deaths occurred outside the 

relocation process indicates that the relocation was not an act of 

genocide hiding the intent to destroy. Otherwise, we would be faced 

with a strange, hard-to-explain kind of genocide in which the 

“genocide-committing” Turks lost much more people than the 

“genocide victim” Armenians did. 


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In Whole or in Part 

For a case to be considered genocide certain acts must have 

been committed with the intent to destroy a group in whole or in 

part. Since members of a group get destroyed in genocide, because 

they belong to that group, that is, out of racial hatred, it is logical 

to say that the intent to destroy must be directed against the whole 

of the group. In genocide cases survival of some of the group 

members results, not because there was no intent to destroy the 

group in whole, but either because those group members had 

simply been inaccessible or because the organization committing 

the genocide did not have time to complete its job. That is what 

happened in the Jewish genocide committed by the Nazis. 

Only Gregorian Armenians were subjected to relocation. 

Catholic and Protestant Armenians were left outside this process. 

The fact that only one of these groups were transferred shows that 

the Ottomans did not feel racial hatred against the Armenians as a 

whole, including the Gregorian Armenians. Considering the fact 

that Islam perceives all three religions merely as different branches 

of Christianity, this is all evident enough. It is common knowledge 

that in the Ottoman Empire there was no religious dispute between 

the Muslims and Christians, a dispute which could lead to forced 

displacements. It is obvious that the desire to prevent the 

Gregorian Armenians, who embraced the similar creed as the 

Orthodox Russians, from engaging in ethnic cleansing with the 

help of the Russians of the Muslims in the region, played an 

important part in the relocation decision. This biggest group of 

Armenians were situated on the path of the advancing Russian 

army, and the terrorists and guerillas that came out of that group 

were hitting the Ottoman army from behind, cutting the logistic 

lines and staging massacres at Muslim settlements. All these 

murderous actions rendered the relocation imperative from the 

military standpoint. This shows that the reason behind the 

decision was security concern of the highest order as well as the 

need to protect the Muslims of the region. 

Meanwhile, the Armenians living in certain cities were left 

outside the resettlement process regardless of their religious 

creed. That occurred, for example, in İstanbul, Edirne, Kütahya 

and Aydın (including İzmir). Almost all of the Armenians 

transferred from İzmit, Bursa, Kastamonu, Ankara and Konya 

returned to their homes at the end of the war. The majority of the 

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Kayseri, Harput and Diyarbakır Armenians too returned, but 

most of them apparently could not go to their villages. Those from 

Erzurum and Bitlis crossed into Cilicia from northern Syria and 

fought the Turks on the side of the French during the Turkish 

War of Independence. 

In those provinces, including the capital city of İstanbul, left 

outside the relocation process, some 200,000 Armenians were 

living. This has a great symbolic significance. In the Jewish 

genocide caused by racial hatred, it would be inconceivable to have 

the Jews, for example, in Berlin or Munich, not to be subjected to 

deportation and genocide. Even that example alone makes it all 

very clear that the Ottomans did not commit genocide against the 

Armenians. 

Courts 

After İstanbul was occupied at the end of the war, courts were 

set up to investigate the Armenian incidents in line with the 

provisions of the Sevres Treaty. The most famous one of these was 

the Nemrut Mustafa Court. In a cable he sent to London on 24 

January 1919, Admiral Calthorpe referred to the Ottoman Prime 

Minister who had told him that 160-200 people had been arrested. 

The court had one significant characteristics in that it had been 

created by the members of the ‘Liberty and Agreement’ Government 

which was the deadly enemy of the Union and Progress Party. 

Another characteristics was that the defendants were denied the 

right to defend themselves. After a while, realizing that the court 

would not be able to stage a fair trial -and may be that it would not 

be able to operate effectively- the British occupation forces 

transferred the 144 defendants to Malta and asked the crown 

prosecutor to try them in a move that ran against the judicial rules 

of the time. Due to the United States’ delay in entering the war, the 

American Embassy and the consulates in Anatolia operating under 

it had remained open until 1916. The British asked the U.S. 

Department of State to hand over to them the evidence collected by 

these American missions. After an expert from the British Embassy 

in Washington examined the American archives, the following was 

stated in a cable sent to London by the British Ambassador on 13 

July 1921: “...There was nothing therein which could be used as 

evidence against the Turks who are being detained for trial at 

Malta.. .The reports in the possession of the Department do not 


265


appear in any case to contain evidence against these Turks which 

would be useful even for the purpose of corroborating information 

already in the possession of His Majesty’s Government”. 

The British Prosecutor General of the Crown said in his report 

dated 29 July 1921: “. . .Up to the present no statements have been 

taken from witnesses who can depose to the truth of the charges 

made against the prisoners. It is indeed uncertain whether any 

witnesses can be found...Until more precise information is 

available as to the nature of the evidence which will be forthcoming 

at the trials, the Attorney General does not feel that he is in a 

position to express any opinion as to the prospects of success in 

any of the cases submitted for his consideration”. Under the weight 

of such evidence, the accusation that the crime of genocide has 

been committed against the Armenians would be legally 

unsustainable, not only because it would imply the 

implementation of a convention retroactively, but also would 

amount to demanding that the people that could not even be put 

on trial in the past due to lack of evidence, be judged in the 

absence of fresh evidence after so many decades. 

Was Armenian Relocation a Crime against Humanity 

As explained above in detail, relocation was not genocide, 

because it did not “deliberately” worsen the Armenian conditions of 

life calculated to bring about their destruction. Nevertheless, can 

the losses suffered by a relocated group be covered by the concept 

of crimes against humanity 

When the Armenian relocation began, the British, French and 

Russian Governments issued in a joint communiqué on 24 May 

1915, speaking about “...crimes of Turkey against humanity and 

civilization..”, and declaring that they would hold the persons 

concerned responsible. At that time, crimes against humanity was 

merely an unbinding phrase. It had not yet been adopted as a legal 

concept. For this reason, no link can be established between the 

Armenian relocation and crimes against humanity just because of 

that communiqué. The concept of crimes against humanity was 

cited for the first time at the international level in 1946 among the 

Nuremberg Principles (6/c). That crime was envisaged to be 

committed during war time. It covered acts such as the persecution 

of any civilian society on political, racial or religious grounds, 

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murdering or exterminating its members or forcing them to 

migrate, and the like. 

The definition of genocide given in Article 2 of the Convention 

was created from the concept of crimes against humanity as 

embodied in the Nuremberg Principles. As a result of genocide 

being taken outside the category of crimes against humanity, what 

was left was incorporated as the modern concept of crime against 

humanity into Article 7 of the Statute of Rome of the International 

Criminal Court. 

Accordingly, the precondition that crimes against humanity 

would have to be committed during war as provided in the 

Nuremberg Principles was abandoned. The groups against whom 

such crimes could be committed were not listed. It was assumed 

that such crimes could be committed against any civilian 

population. In the introduction to Article 7, no reference was made 

to the perpetration of crimes against humanity on “political, racial 

or religious” grounds. The fact that the reasons for the presence of 

such a crime were not listed indicate that regardless of the 

reasons, such perpetration would suffice. On the other hand, in 

Article 7, the only condition put forth for an act to be considered a 

crime against humanity was that the acts must have been 

committed “as part of a wide-spread and systematic attack directed 

against any civilian population with knowledge of the attack”. In 

other words, the eleven acts listed in Article 7(1) from ‘a’ to ‘k’ 

would not constitute a crime against humanity, if committed in 

isolation. Unlike the Nuremberg Principles, “persecution of any 

identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, 

ethnic, cultural, religious, gender...or other grounds” came to be 

considered not the general motive for the crime. Accordingly, no 

special motive is necessary for crimes against humanity. 

Although both of them are international crimes subjected to 

international adjudication, the differences between genocide and 

crimes against humanity are obvious. Compared with the 

definition of genocide given in the introduction to Article 2 of the 

Convention these differences are as follows: Genocide can be 

committed against only four kinds of groups, namely, national, 

racial, ethnic or religious. Acts committed against ‘political groups’ 

do not come under the scope of genocide. Crimes against 

humanity, on the other hand, can be committed against any group. 

In genocide the enumerated acts must have been committed with 


267


the intent to destroy a given group. For the crime against humanity 

the presence of this intent is not necessary. A “wide-spread and 

systematic attack against the group” suffices for that. In genocide 

the motive for the acts is the intent to destroy the group ‘as a 

group’. This implies the existence of racial hatred. Paragraph 1 of 

Article 7 of the Statute of Rome, on the other hand, does not specify 

any general motive for crimes against humanity. 

Under the circumstances, some commentators may attempt to 

use or abuse the acts cited in Article 7, such as murder (a), 

extermination (b), deportation (d) and persecution (h) in order to 

define the Armenian relocation as a crime against humanity. After 

aft, they may assert that some people died as a result of the 

relocation carried out, albeit without intent to destroy. 

As can be deduced from above, the basic condition for crime 

against humanity is that certain acts must have been committed 

against a civilian population “as part of a wide-spread and 

systematic attack”. For that reason, the characteristics of such an 

attack must be properly defined. If there is an open military attack 

on a civilian population, no other proof would be necessary. But 

the ‘attack’ in the sense of Article 7 does not necessarily have to be 

of a military nature. Simultaneous and intensive (i.e., multiple 

commission of acts) perpetrations against a civilian population of 

most of the acts cited in Article 7 have to occur. Also stipulated is 

that such an attack must have been actively developed, directed 

and encouraged by a state or some other large (sub-state) 

organization. 

It may be useful to examine the 1915-16 Armenian relocation in 

the light of the acts related to ‘deportation’ listed in Article 7 

Paragraph (1). The acts of killing or causing ‘deaths’ cited in Article 

7 (1/a) have to be part of a wide-spread and systematic attack and 

must be ‘known” by the persons who commit the crime. 

According to Article 7 (2/b), the ‘extermination’ must, again, 

have to be part of a wide-spread and systematic attack directed 

against the group and include intentional infliction of conditions of 

life, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a 

population. For example, deliberately denying that group food or 

medicine would come under that heading. ‘Deportation and forced 

transfers’ cited in Article 7 (1/d) and 7 (2/d) also would have to 

occur as part of a wide-spread and systematic attack and, at the 

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same time, these must be staged without grounds permitted by 

international law. ‘Persecution’ cited in Article 7 (1/h), means in 

accordance with Article 7 (2/g) “the intentional and severe 

deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by 

reasons of the identity of the group”. Persecution consists of 

‘multiple of commission’ of acts that constitute an intensive 

violation of almost aft of the fundamental rights. Those who 

commit that crime would be motivated by the kind of political, 

racial, national, ethnic, religious, gender or other grounds not 

permitted by international law. 

Applying the concept of crimes against humanity as enshrined 

in the Statute of Rome to the 1915- 16 Armenian incidents some 

eight decades after these incidents occurred would not be 

compatible with common sense, let alone the law. Still, an 

examination of the issue from this standpoint would reveal the 

following facts. 

For the acts listed in Article 7 Paragraph (1) to constitute crimes 

against humanity, these acts must be part of a widespread and 

systematic attack on a given civil population. Yet, the Ottoman 

security forces did not stage any such attack on the Armenians in 

order to carry out their relocation. In other words, Armenians were 

not subjected to the multiple commission of the specified acts that 

make up the concept of “attack” as defined by law. 

The Armenians were not persecuted on account of their identity 

as a group on any grounds. Until World War I when a dangerous 

situation arose in the eastern front for the survival of the country, 

they continued to exercise their fundamental rights like everybody 

else. There was no policy to deprive them of these rights prior to 

their armed revolt and the relocation. During the relocation, which 

necessarily constituted a derogation to a set of rights, their 

fundamental rights were respected to the extent possible. 

The deaths of some group members in circumstances where no 

wide-spread and systematic attack was underway does not 

constitute either an element or a part of such an ‘attack’. The gang 

attacks on the Armenians in the course of relocation were basically 

and exclusively a law and order issue. 

While discussing the genocide claims earlier in this article, it was 

stated that the intent to destroy did not exist. The Armenians claim 


269


that the Ottomans used the ‘deportation’ to impose on them the 

kind of living conditions that would cause them to perish. The 

relocation was not carried out as part of a ‘wide-spread and 

systematic attack’ on the Armenians. Relocation, which does not 

constitute any such attack, was not the kind of deportation as 

defined in Article 7 (l/d) and 7 (2/d), hence not a crime against 

humanity. 

In the genocide section above, it was explained that it was out 

of the question that the relocation was imposed deliberately in 

ways that would cause the Armenians to perish. Relocation was 

initiated in response to the request Enver Paşa made as a result of 

the developments taking place on the eastern front. It was aimed 

at eliminating the threats the armed elements inside the Armenian 

population posed in collaboration with the Russian troops against 

the security of the Ottoman army. This military requirement 

constitutes, from the standpoint of international law, permissible 

grounds for a forced population transfer. 

On the other hand, the government of the time did not impose 

any limitations in food and medicine supply to the Armenians 

during the relocation. In fact, the Turkish-Muslim population 

which was also frantically migrating in the same region fleeing the 

Russian and Armenian invasion forces, suffered the loss of more 

people due, inter alia, to a lack of food and medicine, as was clearly 

stated by Boghos Nubar Paşa, the leading Armenian at the Paris 

Peace Conference. 

In the light of the outcome of the Balkan Wars, the relocation 

also aimed at preventing the Armenian attempts to unite with the 

invading. Russian armies, to conduct an ethnic cleansing of 

genocidal proportions in the eastern region which had 

predominantly Turkish and other Muslim populations, and thus to 

set up their own state. In those days especially, such a common 

action would constitute a major security concern from the 

standpoint of international law. The concept of self-preservation 

accounts for this situation. 

Under the circumstances, the Armenian relocation was 

legitimate. The crimes that occurred, much more limited than 

generally assumed, in the course of relocation constituted common 

crimes according to criminal law. Indeed, it is known that 1,397 

people who committed such crimes were punished in an extremely 

severe fashion. 

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For a better understanding of the subject at hand, it may be 

useful to take a brief look at issues such as ethnic cleansing, 

relocation and population exchange in a comparative manner. Both 

ethnic cleansing and relocation seem, at first glance, to be aimed at 

creating a more homogeneous demographic structure on a certain 

piece of land by driving a given ethnic group from that region. 

However, a closer look reveals that there are serious differences 

between the two with regard to motive, method and geography. The 

ethnic cleansing, which is not a legal concept, began to be used in 

the 1980s in former Yugoslavia. In fact, it was reportedly coined by 

a Serbian guerrilla. For this reason, one has to take as a basis the 

ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina and compare that, first, to 

the appalling conduct freely exhibited towards to the Turks and 

other Muslims during the Balkan Wars and, then, to the Armenian 

relocation. 

Ethnic cleansing starts with the armed forces of one side 

attacking the civilian population of the other warring party. 

Naturally, the civilians, who do not have the capacity to defend 

themselves, get killed or wounded. Their houses and settlements 

are destroyed and burned down. Humanitarian convoys bringing 

food and drugs are not permitted to enter the region. Men of 

fighting age get arrested, imprisoned at camps with poor living 

conditions or killed right away. Women get raped in a systematic 

and massive manner. The cultural assets of the target group, 

including temples and libraries, get burned. If they do not leave 

their homes, they face continual fire or bombardment. The 

massacre continues. After a while, these attacks bear fruit, and 

masses of people start fleeing in the direction their attackers want 

them to proceed. They get driven outside the region where the 

attackers intend to cleanse ethnically, that is, outside the potential 

borders of the state to be founded. The members of the target 

group get prevented at all costs from returning to the region. At a 

certain stage of ethnic cleansing, the attacking group comes to be 

dominated by a certain feeling similar to racial hatred when 

dealing with the target group. For example, the Muslim Bosnians 

came to be called “Turkish seed”, and in this way they were 

dehumanized. These persons get presented with the entire bill for 

Ottoman sovereignty in the past. Rape gains a new biological 

meaning, becoming an effort aimed at breeding a new generation 

dominated by the aggressive race. Even after a region is rendered 

homogeneous from the ethnic standpoint, civilian men get 


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massacred in large groups and buried into mass graves as in the 

case of Srebrenica. According to the law in force, the acts 

constituting ethnic cleansing amount to crime against humanity, 

and these acts may also be accompanied by acts of genocide that 

aim to destroy a group ‘as such’, as in Srebrenica. For these 

reasons, the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal of 

former Yugoslavia said in the indictment he prepared for Karadzic 

and General Mladic that acts of genocide were committed on nine 

counts. 

The crimes inflicted in connection with the Turkish and Muslim 

populations during the 1877-78 Russian-Turkish War and the 

1912-13 Balkan Wars are similar in essence to the ethnic 

cleansing the Serbs committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The only 

difference is that what had happened to the Turks and Muslims in 

the Balkan Wars was of a much greater magnitude. The number of 

Turks and Muslims who died in those two wars amounted to some 

two million, and nearly one million had been forced to emigrate to 

Anatolia. 

The Armenian relocation too involved a forced migration. But 

since forcing to migrate did not happen in the form of staging 

armed attacks against them, there were almost no cases of killing, 

wounding, starving or keeping under fire during the process of 

evacuation. Secondly, the relocation did not aim to sent Armenians 

outside the borders of the country and create a homogeneous 

population within. They were taken to other parts of the Ottoman 

territory. Therefore, they benefited from certain facilities in cash 

and in kind to adjust to the new conditions when they were 

resettled. One could say that after the relocation began, due to the 

conditions prevailing at that time deaths occurred anyway. This is 

correct. On the other hand, the relocation led to much fewer deaths 

than an ethnic cleansing would have caused. Unlike the victims of 

an ethnic cleansing, they could take along with them a greater 

amount of personal belongings and assets. They could use horses 

and carriages. Those assets they left behind were spared to a great 

extent from being plundered. Their cultural assets remained 

largely intact. As is obvious from the above, relocation is quite 

different from ethnic cleansing in that it is much less violent. 

If one tried to identify the first case of genocide in the 20th 

century, one would undoubtedly arrive at the conclusion that the 

ethnic cleansing committed during the 1912-13 Balkan Wars was 

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the first such instance, not the 1915-16 Armenian relocation. 

Indeed, the relocation was carried out in order to prevent the 

Armenian guerrillas or terrorists, in cooperation with the Russian 

army, from launching in eastern Anatolia an ethnic cleansing 

similar to the one done to the Turks of the Balkans. According to 

the Ottoman statistics, the overall population in the Anatolian 

regions where the transfer took place, was 5,061,857 of which only 

811,085 were Armenians. In other words, Armenians accounted for 

16% of the population. If they had not been relocated and if Russia 

had not withdrawn its forces at the end of 1917 under the Brest- 

Litovsk Treaty, one can imagine the dimensions the potential 

ethnic cleansing of the Turks and Muslims would gain in the 

region. In fact, this ethnic cleansing had already begun. 

One could compare relocation to other kinds of forced migration 

too. During World War II, the Americans transferred to the east the 

Japanese living in the western parts of the country. That relocation 

was prompted by “three minor bombing incident’s and certain 

mysterious radio signals”. Four months had passed since the raid 

on Pearl Harbor. It had been seen that Japan was not going to 

cross the Pacific and try to invade the United States. Japan had 

neither such intention nor capacity. It was not as if the American 

Japanese were going to join hands with the Japanese army and 

stage armed operations against the United States. However, the 

U.S. Supreme Court stated briefly in its decision it took on the 

Korematsu Case on 18 December 1942, that 112,000 men and 

women of Japanese origin, including children and the elderly, had 

been transferred to another place on the grounds that “it was 

impossible to bring about an immediate segregation of the disloyal 

from the loyal [citizens]”, with military considerations such as 

“preventing espionage and sabotages”. Therefore, the relocation 

had not been unlawful. It cited as an excuse that during the war 

all Americans had met with hardships. Major General J. L. 

DeWitt’s reports had contained phrases about the Japanese, which 

could be considered racist. The local groups who had “lobbied” for 

the transfer of the Japanese to the east had also used racist 

arguments. 

After World War II, some 15 million Germans were forced to 

immigrate to Germany mostly from western Poland under Article 

13 of the Potsdam Protocol. With the population exchange made in 

the wake of the Turkish War of Independence, 900,000 Greeks 

went from Turkey to Greece, and 430,000 Turks arrived in Turkey 


273


from Greece, in addition to those who had taken refuge during the 

Balkan Wars. Between the years 1914-45, a series of twenty such 

population exchange agreements were concluded. 

Population exchanges were also forced upon the people since 

their approval has never been sought. Undoubtedly, some deaths 

occurred, albeit fewer, since these migrations took place in peace 

time in a much better organized manner and physical conditions, 

with appropriate transportation. But this does not change the fact 

that they were forced migrations. 

In short, the Armenian relocation was not carried out with the 

aim of destroying a group as a group or for any other unlawful 

reason. Its aim was to transfer them to a region in the south far 

from the war zone of eastern Anatolia where they cooperated with 

the invading Russian armies, served as spies and guides for them, 

instigated rebellions, attacked the Ottoman army and cut the 

Ottoman army’s supply lines, launched terrorist guerrilla attacks 

on Turkish-Muslim settlements, committing massacres and ethnic 

cleansing, all in order to gain their independence and establish 

their own state where there was a huge Turkish and Muslim 

majority. This ground for the relocation based on ‘imperative 

military reasons’ is in line with international law even today. 

Besides, all signs were pointing to the fact that without 

relocation the Armenian forces joining with the Russian army were 

going to eradicate the Turkish and Muslim majority in the region 

with an ethnic cleansing campaign of genocidal proportions, as in 

the Balkans. In this context also, the grounds for the relocation 

were clearly and definitely military within the concept of selfpreservation. 

It aimed at protecting the non-Armenian majority 

population against destruction. 

Conclusion 

1. The Armenians constituted a political group since they 

engaged in armed political activities, first to gain autonomy and 

then to found an independent state on the Ottoman lands. For this 

reason, they were not one of the four groups protected by Article 2 

of the Convention. 

2. Since the Ottomans did not harbour towards the Armenians 

an ‘anti-Armenianism’, that is, a racial hatred akin to the anti- 

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Semitism the Nazis displayed towards the Jews, the relocation was 

not carried out with a motive which could have led to the intent to 

destroy them as a group. The relocation decision was taken to 

prevent the military operations the Armenians had initiated 

together with the invading Russian armies to exterminate the 

Turks and Muslims that made up 84% of the population in the 

eastern Anatolian region through an ethnic cleansing of genocidal 

proportions, as had been done to the Turks during the Balkans 

Wars. 

3. The Ottoman Government did not have the intent to destroy 

the Armenians, a condition stated in Article 2 of the Convention. 

Not only are there no written documents, there are no oral 

accounts either attesting to the intention to destroy on the part of 

the administration. Aft the documents available envisage the 

protection of Armenian convoys in the course of relocation and 

their safe resettlement. The number of Armenian deaths, which is 

grossly exaggerated, is far from proving the presence of genocide. A 

significant part of the Armenian deaths resulted from reasons not 

related to the relocation. The Turkish civilian deaths occurring in 

the same region due to the similar reasons were more numerous 

than the Armenian loss of life. Therefore, in the context of Article 2 

(c) of the Genocide Convention, the relocation was neither a covert 

genocide nor an indirect one. 

4. The Catholic and Protestant Armenians aft over the country 

as well as the Gregorian Armenians living in İstanbul, Aydın 

(including Izmir), Edirne and Kütahya, that is, the western part of 

Anatolia, were not subjected to relocation. This partial relocation 

did not stem from the Ottoman administration’s weakness. The 

Gregorian Armenians in other areas were transferred, because they 

were situated on the path of the advancing Russian armies and, 

having the same religious faith as the Russians, they were 

collaborating with them against the Ottoman army and the Muslim 

population. This clearly shows the military rationale for the 

relocation. 

5. Under the circumstances, the relocation, not only did not 

constitute genocide according to the Convention, but also did not 

affect a crime against humanity, considering the military 

imperative that prompted it as a permissible ground in 

international law. On the other hand, the relocation does not meet 

the conditions cited in Article 7 of the Statute of Rome. This is not 


275


a case of “multiple commission of acts” as part of a “wide-spread 

and systematic attack’ that constitute crimes against humanity in 

accordance with Article 7 (b) of the said Statute. Moreover, the 

Armenians have never been subjected to persecution on religious 

or other grounds. 

6. Along with the "imperative military reasons”, the relocation 

was aimed at foiling the efforts of the Armenians in collaboration 

with the invading Russian armies to ethnically cleanse the Turks 

and Muslims who made up the large majority of the population in 

the region, as in the case of the Balkan Wars. The Ottomans, who 

were fighting on three fronts all at the same time, could not always 

protect aft of the Armenians effectively with the limited number of 

troops available. The gangs in the region attacked the Armenian 

convoys. killing some of them and plundering their possessions for 

their private purposes. The civilian Turks who were forced to 

migrate under similar conditions of rough terrain, harsh climate, 

lack of adequate food and medicine in the face of epidemics, lost 

more people than the Armenians did. This clearly shows that the 

relocation was not the cause for aft Armenian casualties. 

7. And, finally, those who ordered the relocation came to have 

feelings of regret due to undesirable incidents, feelings of 

sympathy for the Armenian victims and a resentment towards the 

persons who had attacked them. The culprits of the robbery and 

murder cases, which came under the ordinary crimes category, 

were put on trial before the war ended, and most of them were 

executed. 

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Hearing before the Subcommittee on International 

Relations, House of Representatives, 

14 September 2000 

Mr. Chairman, 

I thank you very much for inviting me to this hearing. It is 

privilege and honor for me to address this sub-committee in my 

personal capacity as a private citizen, although the topic is not a 

pleasant one. 

The question before us is too complex to treat in five minutes. 

Therefore, I will not dwell on it’s historical aspects. 

Let me stress, however, that the Turkish people firmly believe 

that what happened to the Armenians was not genocide. 

It was relocation to other parts of the Ottoman Empire of only 

the eastern Anatolian Armenians, away from a war zone in which 

they were collaborating with invading Russian armies with the aim 

of creating an independent state of their own in areas where they 

were only a minority by ethnically ‘cleansing’ the majority Turks. 

This tragedy occurred during the war between the Ottoman 

Empire and Tsarit Russia, which was greatly aided by the 

Armenians, a long inter-communal struggle between Armenian 

irregulars and defending Muslim civilians as well as a thoroughly 

disorganized relocation of the Armenian population under the 

exceptionally difficult conditions of the day. 

As a result many Armenians were killed. But many more 

Muslims and Turks perished as well. 

The Turkish people will be deeply offended by this resolution 

which practically accuses them of being genocidal. They will also 

find it disrespectful of their unmentioned millions of dead. 


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Were it to be adopted, I am afraid, it would have two immediate 

effects: one on Turco-Armenian relations, the other on Turco- 

American relations. 

Under the tremendous pressure of public opinion, the Turkish 

government will be compelled to toughen its foreign policy towards 

Armenia. Turkey earnestly rejoiced at Armenia’s independence 

after the demise of the Soviet Union. As a token of friendship the 

Turkish government provided wheat to the Armenian people who 

were then in dire need. I feel personally gratified have played a 

part, together with Mr. G. Libaridian, in accomplishing this 

Turkish gesture of fellowship. 

Turkey integrated Armenia into the Black Sea Cooperation 

Council, although it is not a littoral state. 

Despite the so-called embargo, Turkish governments have 

deliberately turned a blind eye to the porous nature of the common 

border through which vital provisions reach the Armenians. 

Armenia, however, maintains its occupation of 20% of 

Azerbaijani territory, creating one million refugees with the help of 

Russian protection purchased at the cost of its newly gained 

independence. 

Now, by insisting on the recognition of the genocide, the 

Armenian leadership and the diaspora will finally silence the few 

remaining voices favorable to them in Turkey. This will effectively 

result in sealing the border. Given the situation in Armenia this 

attitude of the Armenian goverment is akin to suicide. 

However, I am personally more worried about Turkey’s relations 

with the U.S. A strategic cooperation has been developed over the 

decades with great care and patience on the basis of mutual 

interest. 

The first casualty of this resolution would be Cyprus, for the 

U.S. will immediately lose its honest broker status in the eyes of 

Turkish public opinion. Mr. Moses, the President’s special, 

representative, may no longer find any interlocutor. 

Turkey and the U.S. closely cooperate in the Caucasus 

especially in the field of energy, which has recently acquired great 

importance due to the rapidly increasing oil prices. In the region 

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Gündüz Aktan


where Armenia is situated, the potential for cooperation with a 

country that considers Turks genocidal will be bound to remain 

severely limited. 

But above all our cooperation on Iraq will inevitably suffer. The 

support for the American policy in northern Iraq, already slim, will 

dwindle immediately, for the Turkish people already feel enough of 

effect of the economic embargo with Iraq, which costs them billions 

of dollars. Why to continue to make his sacrifice 

This would mean the military base at İncirlik would no longer be 

used by U.S. war planes to bomb northern Iraq. Without air power 

to deter Saddam Hussein from regaining the control of the region, 

this could very well be the end of the INC. 

The crucial question is why the Armenians, not content with the 

word ‘tragedy’ or ‘catastrophe’, insist on genocide. 

I am not a jurist. But I served as ambassador to the UN section 

in Geneva where questions related to humanitarian law (or the law 

of war) are also dealt with. In connection with the former 

Yugoslavia we thoroughly discussed the genocide convention. 

What determines genocide is not necessarily the number of the 

casualties or the cruelty of the persecution but the ‘intent to 

destroy’ a group. Historically the ‘intent to destroy a race’ has 

emerged only as the culmination of racism, as in the case of anti- 

Semitism and the Shoah. Turks have never harbored any anti- 

Armenianism. 

Killing, even of civilians, in a war waged for territory, is not 

genocide. The victims of genocide must be totally innocent. In other 

words, they must not fight for something tangible like land, but be 

killed by the victimizer simply because of their membership in a 

specific group. 

Obviously, both Turks and Armenians fought for land upon 

which to build their independent states. 

Since genocide is an imprescriptable crime, Armenia has 

recourse to the International Court of Justice at the Hague and 

may therefore ask the court to determine, according to article IX of 

the Convention, whether it was genocide. 

But I know they cannot do it. They do not have a legally 


279


sustainable case. That is why they seek legislative resolutions 

which are legally null and void. 

One last point: I would humbly suggest that all the references to 

Great Britain in the text of the resolution be dropped, for in July of 

this year the British Government declared in the House of Lords 

that ‘in the absence of unequivocal evidence to show that the 

Ottoman administration took a specific decision to eliminate the 

Armenians, the British Governments have not recognized the 

events of 1915-16 as genocide’. 

Let us not forget that Great Britain was the occupying power 

after the First World War and the Ottoman archives were at its 

disposition. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

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Gündüz Aktan

Son Söz 

Gündüz Aktan, Diplomasi ve Psikanaliz 


G 

ündüz Aktan’ı ve Türk diplomasisinde oynadığı büyük rolü anmamız 

ve onunla gurur duymaya devam etmemiz için hazırlanan bu kitaba 

bir Son Yazı ekleme görevi bana verildiği için çok mutluyum. Burada 

“bilimsel” bir yazı yazmaktansa kişisel anılarım üzerinde duracağım. 

Bu anılarım, diplomasi ve psikanaliz konularını birbirlerine tanıştırmakta 

Gündüz Aktan’ın ne kadar önemli katkıları olduğunu ortaya koyacaktır. 

Geleneksel olarak, diplomasi ile psikanalizin yakınlaşmasına karşı 

gelişen dirençler vardır ve bu dirençler bu günkü dünyada azalmış olsa da 

hala devam etmektedir (Volkan, 2001). Sigmund Freud’dan itibaren bazı 

istisnai psikanalistler (Glower, 1947 ve Fornari, 1966); etnik veya dini 

nitelikli büyük grupların psikolojilerini, insanın savaşa yönelik eğilimini, 

politik liderler ve takipçileri arasındaki ilişkilerin özelliklerini incelemek için 

çalışmışlardır. Genel olarak teorik nitelikteki bu çalışmalar, diplomatlara 

pratikte kullanabilecekleri bazı yollar göstermekten uzaktır. Üstelik 1932’de 

Freud’un başlattığı geleneği takip eden psikanalistler, diplomasi konusunda 

sessiz kalmışlardır. 1932’de Albert Einstein, Freud’a bir mektup göndermiş 

ve o zaman yeni bir bilim dalı olan psikanalizin dünyada yaşananları 

aydınlatmadaki rolünün ne olduğunu sormuştu. Freud Einstein’a yanıtında, 

psikanalizden ümit verici bir cevap beklenmemesini söyledi (Freud, 1932). 

Bence psikanalistler bu geleneği benimsediler ve diplomasi ile psikoanalizin 

yakınlaşması için katkıda bulunmadılar. 

Psikanaliz ve diplomasinin yakınlaşmasına karşı bir direnç de 

diplomatlardan gelmiştir. Genel olarak diplomaside hala daha büyük bir 

ölçüde, 1853’de Ludwig von Rochau’un isimlendirdiği, Realpolitik’in 

prensipleri kullanılır. Realpolitik kısaca, siyaset ve diplomasideki sorumlu 

kişilerin, kendi gruplarının ve karşıdaki büyük grubun durumlarını ve 

gerçeklerini mantıksal olarak anlamaya çalışmak ve ona göre bir politika 

yürütmek demektir. Bu prensipler daha sonra Amerika’da Akılcı Aktörler 

Modeli (Rational Actors Model) olarak isimlendirildi. Bu modelin, 

uluslararası ilişkilerde ve büyük grupların diğer çatışmalarında her şeyi tam 

olarak açıklamadığı görüldükten sonra 1970 ve 1980’de Amerikan 

diplomasisi, bilişsel psikolojiden (cognitive psychology) faydalanmaya 

başladı. Fakat bilinçdışı süreçleri incelemeyi de içine alan psikanalizden 

yararlanmayı denemediler (Volkan ve ark, 1998). Gerçekte psikanalizi 


281


diplomasiye takdim etme girişimi ilk kez 1920’lerin sonunda yapılmıştı 

(Lasswell,1930; Ascher ve Hirscheelder, 2004). Buna rağmen diplomasi ve 

psikanaliz, genelde birbirinden uzak tutuldu. Etnik ve dini kimlik 

meselelerinin ve terörizmin yayıldığı, teknolojinin ve elektronik iletişimin 

bildiğimiz medeniyeti değiştirmeye başladığı son senelerde, iç ve dış 

siyasete yaklaşımda akılcı çözümlerin yanında, birey ve toplum 

psikolojilerinin siyasette yarattığı olumlu ve olumsuz yöndeki etkileri 

derinden incelemenin önemi de anlaşıldı. Bu farkındalık Türkiye de yaşandı. 

Gündüz Aktan, onu ilk tanıdığım andan itibaren diplomaside böyle bir 

gelişmenin gerektiğinin farkındaydı. 

Gündüz Aktan’ı ilk defa 1992 Ocağında gördüm. Tanışmamızdan bir süre 

sonra aramızdaki arkadaşlık ilerleyince, bana Paris’te öğrenciyken baş 

ağrıları olduğunu anlattı. Bir kütüphanede Sigmund Freud’un kitaplarını 

görmüş, bu kitapları okumaya başlayıp kendi iç dünyasını anlamaya çalışmış 

ve psikolojik nedenlerle ortaya çıktığına karar verdiği baş ağrılarını kendisi 

tedavi etmişti. Bu kişisel deneyimin, toplumları anlamak için psikanalizden 

faydalanma eğiliminin gelişmesinde büyük bir rol oynadığını sanıyorum. 

Ocak 1992’de dünyanın birçok yerinden gelen 200 kişi, Atlanta şehrinde 

eski Amerika Cumhurbaşkanı Jimmy Carter’ın adını taşıyan Carter 

Merkezi’nde toplandı. 1 Türkiye’yi temsil eden kişi ise Büyükelçi Gündüz 

Aktan’dı. 

Toplantı sırasında bazı stratejiler konuşuldu. Jimmy Carter, Kıbrıs’a gidip 

orada iki tarafı yakınlaştırmak için hazır olduğunu bildirdiği halde, hem Türk 

hem de Rum tarafı onu Kıbrıs’a davet etmekten çekinmişti. Gündüz Aktan, 

Jimmy Carter’ın derin dini inançlarının farkına varmış, fakat eski Amerika 

Cumhurbaşkanının dini, politika ve diplomaside kullanmamak için gösterdiği 

başarılı gayreti takdir etmişti. 

Gündüz Aktan’ın, diplomaside sürekli çatışma içinde olan tarafların 

tarihlerini ve toplum psikolojilerini derinlemesine bir biçimde inceledikten 

sonra bir süreç başlatılmasını düşündüğünü sezdim. Ben de aynı 

fikirdeydim. O zaman Gündüz Aktan’ı iyi tanımıyor ve psikanalize olan ilgisini 

bilmiyordum. 

Carter Merkezi’nin Kıbrıs girişimi daha ileriye gitmedi. Fakat oradaki 

toplantı, Gündüz Aktan’la aramızda, onu kaybedişimize kadar sürecek çok 

yakın bir dostluğun ve bazı konular üzerinde kurduğumuz işbirliklerinin 

başlangıcı oldu. Atlanta toplantısından bir süre sonra Gündüz Aktan, 

Amerika’da benim üniversitemin bulunduğu Charlottesville şehrine gelip 

beni ziyaret etti. Onu Zihin ve İnsan İlişkilerini İnceleme Merkezi’ndeki 

1 http://www.cartercenter.org/news/publications/peace/conflict_reports.html 

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Gündüz Aktan


arkadaşlara tanıttım. Bu arada onun psikanalize duyduğu ilgiyi daha iyi 

öğrenmiştim. Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal’ın Turkey in Europe and Europe in 

Turkey (Avrupa’daki Türkiye ve Türkiye’deki Avrupa) isimli kitabının 

yazılmasında en çok Gündüz Aktan’ın fikirlerine yer verildiğini anladım (Özal, 

1991). Bu kitapta, eski İyonya ve Helen uygarlıklarından başlayarak 1990’a 

kadar, Anadolu’da ve Avrupa’da gelişen tarihi olayların imajları ve bu 

imajların Türkiye ve Avrupa arasındaki ilişkilere etkileri incelenir. Turgut Özal 

ve Gündüz Aktan’ın amacı, Türkiye’nin Avrupa’nın bir parçası olduğunu, 

bilime ve Türk diplomasisine yardım edecek bir şekilde, hem Fransızca hem 

de İngilizce olarak açıklamaktı. Türkiye’nin, Avrupa’nın bir parçası olduğunu 

anlatırken, Türkiye’nin kendine ait karakterini muhafaza ettiğini de 

belirtmişlerdi. Türkiye’de yüksek seviyede, çok yönlü ve incelikli düşünen bir 

cumhurbaşkanının ve diplomatların bulunduğunu vurgulamak o zaman için 

önemliydi. Gündüz Aktan bu kitabın yanında, bu defa yalnız Türk ve Yunan 

ilişkilerine odaklanacak ve İngilizce yazılacak ikinci kitabın da yayınlamasını 

istiyordu. Bu nedenle asırlar boyu süren Türk ve Yunan ilişkilerini 

psikopolitik bir açıdan incelemeye çalıştığımız ve hem Princeton 

Üniversitesinde tarih profesörü hem de Zihin ve İnsan İlişkilerini İnceleme 

Merkezi ekibinin bir üyesi olan Norman Itzkowitz ile benim, Turks and 

Greeks (Türkler ve Yunanlılar) (Volkan ve Itzkowitz, 1994) isimli kitabımızı 

yazmamızı destekleyen o oldu. 

O zamanlar Gündüz Aktan, Avrupa’da Türk imgesinin nasıl algılandığı 

üzerinde duruyor ve bu imgenin Avrupa-Türkiye ilişkilerinde oynadığı 

görünmez ve sessiz etkenleri inceliyordu. Bu konular üzerinde psikopolitik 

ve diplomatik teoriler geliştirmişti. Bu teoriler yalnızca Osmanlılar ile 

Avrupalılar arasındaki tarihi olayların imajlarını içermiyordu. Gündüz Aktan, 

Hıristiyanlığın Avrupa’daki toplumların bilinçlerindeki ve bilinçdışlarındaki 

etkilerini ve daha sonra Doğu Avrupa’da ortaya çıkan bazı olayların 

toplumlarda yarattığı psikolojik etkilerini inceliyordu. Avrupa’da demokrasi, 

baba figürü olan krallar öldürüldükten sonra ortaya çıkmıştı. Böyle olayların, 

tüm toplumca paylaşılan bilinçdışı suçluluk duyguları yarattığını ve bu 

duygulardan kurtulmak için yapılan dışsallaştırmaların (“ ‘Kötü’ olan ben 

değilim, ‘ötekidir’.” gibi) bazı Avrupa toplumlarında ırkçılığı desteklediği 

fikrindeydi. Avrupa toplumlarının toplumsal psikolojilerini bilmenin, onlarla 

daha olumlu diplomatik ilişkiler kurmada Türkiye için yararlı olacağına 

inanıyordu. 

Bu kitapta yayınlanan konuşma ve yazılarda, onun buluşlarını ve 

düşüncelerini okuyabiliyoruz. Ayrıca, bu konudaki fikirlerini Zihin ve İnsan 

İlişkileri Merkezi’nin dergisinde Mehmet Suphi adı altında yayınladık (Suphi, 

1996 a,b). O zamanlar Gündüz Aktan bir diplomat olduğu için bu yazılara 

kendi ismini koymaktan çekinmişti. Aklımda kaldığına göre Mehmet Suphi 

bir dedesinin ismiydi. 


283


İkimiz de, toplumların geçmişinde yaşanmış olan dini ve tarihi olayların 

oluşturduğu imajların, bugünkü dünyadaki siyasi ve politik durumlara nasıl 

yansıdığı üzerinde paralel çalışmalar yapıyorduk. Dünyanın birçok çatışmalı 

bölgesindeki gayri resmi diplomatik deneyimlerimden edindiğim bilgiler 

arttıkça, toplumların da, bireyler gibi, bazı tipik psikolojik ritüelleri olduğunu 

ve toplumlar arasındaki ilişkilerin toplumların psikolojilerini derinden 

araştırmakla daha iyi anlaşılacağını görmüştüm (Volkan, 1988, 1997, 2004, 

2006). Psikanaliz, 1990’lara ve 2000’lere kadar, toplumlara ait bilinçteki ve 

bilinçdışındaki süreçleri yakından incelememişti, ama artık bu süreçleri 

anlamamız gerektiği açıkça ortadaydı. Büyük gruplar arasında gelişen 

şiddetin ve bu durumlarda uygulanacak politik, askeri, yargısal ve ekonomik 

faaliyetlerin bir çok yönü vardır. Hiç bir akademik veya mesleki alan tek 

başına bu konuları anlamaya yeterli değildir. Savaşlar veya başka 

biçimlerdeki büyük grup çatışmaları, genel toplumun psikolojisi nedeniyle 

ortaya çıkmazlar. Fakat böyle durumlar ortaya çıktıktan ve bilhassa 

kronikleştikten sonra toplumun psikolojik tepkileri; sosyal, politik, 

ekonomik, kanuni ve askeri süreçlere bulaşır. Benim üzerinde çalıştığım 

alan, büyük grupların psikolojileridir ve bu psikolojik yaklaşımı 

geliştirmemde arkadaşım Gündüz Aktan’la yaptığım birçok sohbetin bana 

çok yardımı olmuştur. 

Seneler boyunca Gündüz Aktan’la; Ankara’da, İstanbul’da, Cenevre’de, 

Washington’da, Charlottesville’de her fırsatta buluştuk. Türkiye Dışişleri 

Bakanlığı’nda müsteşar yardımcılığı görevindeyken, birkaç defa Zihin ve 

İnsan İlişkilerini İnceleme Merkezi ekibinden ve Amerika Psikanaliz Cemiyeti 

üyelerinden arkadaşlarla, Türkiye’nin büyükelçileri ve diğer diplomatları için, 

politik psikoloji üzerine seminerler düzenledik. Ayrıca, Gündüz Aktan’ın 

desteği ile Charlottesville’deki Zihin ve İnsan İlişkilerini İnceleme 

Merkezinde, Avrupa’daki Türk göçmenlerin psikolojileri ve maruz kaldıkları 

ırkçılık üzerine toplantılar organize ettik. Bu konularda Dışişleri Bakanlığı’na 

iki dosya sunduk (Thomas, Harris ve Volkan, 1993; Volkan ve Harris, 1993). 

Gündüz Aktan İstanbul’da Toplumsal Ekonomik Siyasal Araştırma Vakfı 

(TESAV) ve daha sonra Ankara’da Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi 

(AKSAM) düşünce kuruluşlarını yönetmeye başlayınca onu bu merkezlerde 

de ziyaret ettim. 

2001’de Amerikalılar Türk Ermeni Yakınlaşma Komisyonu (Turkish 

Armenian Reconciliation Commission- TARC) olarak adlandırılan bir süreç 

başlattılar. Benim bu komisyondan haberim yoktu. Bir gün Gündüz Aktan 

bana telefon etti ve bu komisyona üye olmamı istedi. Amerika’dan ve 

Rusya’dan Ermeni asıllı kişiler bu komisyonda olduklarından, bir ABD 

vatandaşı olarak benim de Türk ekibinde yer almamı istiyordu. Gündüz 

Aktan’a olumlu cevap verdim ve iki sene boyunca Avrupa’da, Amerika’da ve 

Türkiye’de toplanan TARC toplantılarına katıldım. TARC’ın, bir Amerikalı 

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tarafından idare ediliş şeklini beğenmediğim ve sürecin gidişinden 

kuşkulandığım için TARC’dan ilk istifa eden ben oldum. Bir sene sonra 

Gündüz Aktan beni takip etti ve o da bu süreçten çekildi. Bu kitapta, Gündüz 

Aktan’ın Ermeni sorunu hakkındaki düşünceleri yazılıdır. Ben de TARC’ın 

anılarını, en son Nuriye Atabey’le yazdığımız Osmanlı’nın Yasından 

Atatürk’ün Türkiye’sine adlı kitabımızda anlattım (Volkan ve Atabey, 2010). 

Gündüz Aktan; çok alçakgönüllü, ailesine çok bağlı ve çok iyi bir insandı. 

Türkiye halkı arasında ortaya çıkan dini ve etnik ayrılıklar onu üzüyordu. 

Kafasında daima çözümler bulmak için geliştirdiği yeni düşünceler olurdu. 

Psikanalizin yanında birçok başka konuyu da merakla incelerdi. Tokyo’daki 

büyükelçilik görevini bitirip de Ankara’ya döndüğünde, onu Ankara’daki 

evinde ziyaret etmiştim. Japonya’dan aldığı bazı sanat eserlerini heyecanla 

bana gösterdi, onlar hakkında bilgiler verdi. Ansızın bana, ”Japonca’da kaç 

tane Türkçe kelime var, biliyor musun” diye bir soru sordu. Japonya’dayken 

merak etmiş ve Japonca’da 200 kadar Türkçe kelime bulmuştu. Bunları 

söylemeye ve saymaya başladı. 

İkimiz de puro içmeyi seviyorduk. Bir çok defa ikimizin bir odada, bir 

bahçede veya bir parkta, yan yana oturup puro içtiğimizi hatırlarım. Sessiz 

olduğumuz zamanlarda bile önemli şeyler düşündüğünü sezerdim. 

Bu kitabın, Gündüz Aktan’ı anmamızın yanında, genç Türk 

diplomatlarının onu tanımaları, bir model olarak görüp yeni bilgilere karşı 

açık kalmaları ve mesleki ufuklarını geliştirmeleri açısından önem taşıdığına 

eminim. 

Kaynaklar: 

Ascher, W. ve Hirscheelder, B. (2004). Revitalizing Political Psychology: The Legacy of Harold D. 

Lasswell. New York: Psychology Today. 

Fornari, F. (1966). The Psychoanalysis of War. İngilizceye tercüme: A. Pfeifer. Bloomington, IN: 

Indiana University Press, 1975. 

Freud, S. (1932). Why war Standard Edition, 22: 197–215. Londra: Hogarth Press, 1961. 

Glower, E. (1947). War, Sadism, and Pacifism: Further Essays on Group Psychology and War. 

Londra: Allen and Unwin. 

Lasswell, H.D. (1930). Psychopathology and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 

Özal, T. (1991). Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey. Lefkoşa: K. Rustem & Brother. 

Suphi, M. (Gündüz Aktan) (1996a). Etiology of racism in Europe, Part I: Historical antecedents, 

Mind and Human Interaction, 7: 2-19. 

Suphi, M. (Gündüz Aktan) (1996b). Etiology of racism in Europe, Part II: A new outbreak, Mind 

and Human Interaction, 7: 97-107. 

Thomson, J. A.; Harris, M. ve Volkan, V. D. (1993). The Psychology of Western European Neo- 

Racism. Charlottesville, VA: The Committee on Neo-Racism at the University of Virginia’s 

Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction. 


285


Volkan, V. D. (1988). The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to 

International Relationships. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. 

Volkan, V. D. (1997). Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. New York: Farrar, Straus 

& Giroux. (Kan Bağı. Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınevi, 1999). 

Volkan, V. D. (2001). Psychoanalysis and diplomacy: Potentials for and obstacles against 

collaboration. In The Psychoanalytic Century: Freud’s Legacy for the Future, ed. D. E. 

Scharff, 279-296. New York: Other Press. 

Volkan, V. D. (2004). Blind Trust: Large Groups and Their Leaders in Times of Crisis and Terror. 

Charlottesville, VA. Pitchstone Publishing. (Körükörüne İnanç. Istanbul: Okuyanus, 2005). 

Volkan, V. D. (2006). Killing in the Name of Identity: A Study of Bloody Conflicts. Charlottesville, 

VA: Pitchstone Publishing. (Kimlik Adına Katillik. Tercüme: Banu Büyükkal. Istanbul: Alfa 

Yayınevi, 2007). 

Volkan, V. D.; S. Akhtar; R. M. Dorn; J. S. Kafka; O. F. Kernberg; P. A. Olsson; R. R. Rogers; ve S. 

Shanfield (1998). Psychodynamics of leaders and decision-making, Mind and Human 

Interaction, 9: 129–181. 

Volkan, V. D. ve Atabey, N. (2010). Osmanlı’nın Yasından Atatürk’ün Türkiye’sine. Ankara: 

Kripto. 

Volkan, V. D. ve Harris, M. (1993). Shaking the tent: The Psychodynamics of Ethnic Terrorism. 

Charlottesville, VA: The Committee on Terrorism at the University of Virginia’s Center for the 

Study of Mind and Human Interaction. 

Volkan,V. D. ve Itzkowitz, N. (1994). Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict. Cambridgeshire. 

Eothen Press. 1999. (Türkler ve Yunanlılar. Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınevi. 1999). 

von Rochau, A. L. (1853). Grundsätze der Realpolitik. Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1972. 

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Epilogue 

Gündüz Aktan, Diplomacy and Psychoanalysis 


I 

t is a pleasure for me to write an epilogue to a book on Gündüz 

Aktan and his great role in Turkish diplomacy so we can continue to 

be proud of him in the future. Instead of writing a “scholarly” piece, 

I will relate my personal memories. These will show how important 

contributions Gündüz Aktan made to introducing diplomacy and 

psychoanalysis to each other. 

There is historical resistance against bringing diplomacy together with 

psychoanalysis, and this resistance continues to date, albeit reduced 

(Volkan, 2001). From Sigmund Freud onwards, some exceptional 

psychoanalysts (Glower, 1947 and Fornari, 1966) have worked on the 

psychology of large ethnic or religious groups, the tendency of humans 

towards war, and the particulars of the relationship between political 

leaders and their followers. These efforts are theoretic in general, and are 

far from being turned into practice by diplomats. What is more, 

psychoanalysts following the trend set by Freud in 1932 have generally 

remained silent on diplomacy. In 1932, Albert Einstein had sent a letter to 

Freud, asking how psychoanalysis, then a new branch of science, could help 

to shed light on what was happening in the world. In his response, Freud had 

said that no promising answer should be expected from psychoanalysis 

(Freud, 1932). I believe that psychoanalysts adopted this tradition and did 

not contribute to the convergence of diplomacy and psychoanalysis. 

Another act of resistance against the convergence of psychoanalysis and 

diplomacy is maintained by diplomats themselves. Even today, diplomacy 

mostly utilizes the principles of realpolitik christened by Ludwig von Rochau 

in 1853. Realpolitik involves a rational understanding of the realities and 

situations of political and diplomatic figures, their groups, and the large 

groups opposing them, and implementing an appropriate policy. These 

principles were later named the Rational Actors Model in the United States. 

When it was realized that this model failed to explain everything in 

international relations and conflicts between large groups, US diplomacy 

began to utilize cognitive psychology in the 1970s and ‘80s. However, they 

did not attempt to utilize psychoanalysis, which also incorporates 

unconscious processes (Volkan et al., 1998). In fact, the first attempt to 

introduce psychoanalysis to diplomacy had been made in the late 1920s 


287


(Lasswell,1930; Ascher and Hirscheelder, 2004). Nevertheless, diplomacy 

and psychoanalysis were usually kept at a distance. Recently, as ethnic and 

religious identity issues and terrorism began to expand and technology and 

electronic communications began to transform civilization as we know it, it 

was understood that it was as important to bring rational approaches to 

interior and foreign policies as to make in-depth analyses of negative and 

positive influences of individual and social psychologies on politics. This was 

realized in Turkey, too. From the day I met him, Gündüz Aktan was aware of 

the need for such a transition in diplomacy. 

I met Gündüz Aktan in January 1992. We became friends a while later; 

that is when he told me that he suffered from headaches when he was a 

student in Paris. He had come across books by Sigmund Freud at a library, 

which he began to read to gain insight into his inner self, and, deciding that 

his headaches were rooted in psychology, he had cured himself of them. I 

believe this experience of his played a large part in the development of the 

tendency to utilize psychoanalysis to understand societies. 

In January 1992, 200 people from all over the world gathered at the 

Carter Center in Atlanta, named after the former US President Jimmy 

Carter. 1 The representative from Turkey was Ambassador Gündüz Aktan. 

Some strategies were discussed. Although Jimmy Carter had declared 

that he was prepared to visit Cyprus to reconcile the sides, both the Turkish 

and the Greek sides were reluctant to invite him. Gündüz Aktan was aware 

of the devout religiousness of Jimmy Carter, but he had admired the 

successful efforts of the former President to avoid utilizing faith in politics 

and diplomacy. 

I realized that Gündüz Aktan intended to initiate a process after making 

an in-depth analysis of the histories and social psychologies of the two sides 

that were always in diplomatic conflict. I was in agreement. But then, I did 

not know Gündüz Aktan very well, and was not aware of his interest in 

psychoanalysis. 

The Carter Center initiative on Cyprus did not go any further. However, it 

was the beginning of a close friendship and collaboration with Gündüz 

Aktan that lasted until he passed away. Sometime after the Atlanta meeting, 

Gündüz Aktan visited me in Charlottesville, where my university was located. 

I introduced him to my colleagues in the CSMHI. I was better aware of his 

interest in psychoanalysis. I realized that the ideas of Gündüz Aktan were 

very prominent in the writing of President Turgut Özal’s book Turkey in 

1 http://www.cartercenter.org/news/publications/peace/conflict_reports.html 

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Europe and Europe in Turkey (Özal, 1991). This book discusses the images 

of historic events occurring in Anatolia and Europe starting from the ancient 

Ionian and Hellenic civilizations up to 1990, and the influence of these 

images on the relations between Turkey and Europe. Turgut Özal and 

Gündüz Aktan’s purpose was to clarify that Turkey was a part of Europe in a 

way to contribute to science and Turkish diplomacy, in English and in French. 

They had argued that Turkey was a part of Europe while it also preserved its 

unique character. It was important at the time to underline that Turkey had 

a president and high-level diplomats capable of thinking on many high levels 

with nuances. In addition to this book, Gündüz Aktan wished for a book in 

English, focusing only on Turkish-Greek relations. This is why he supported 

me in co-authoring the book Turks and Greeks (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1994) 

with Norman Itzkowitz, a professor of history at Princeton University and my 

colleague in the CSMHI, with whom we attempted to make a psycho-political 

analysis of Turkish-Greek affairs throughout centuries. 

Back then, Gündüz Aktan focused on how the image of the Turk was 

perceived in Europe, and its invisible and silent impact on European-Turkish 

affairs. He had devised psycho-political and diplomatic theories on the 

subject. These were not limited to the images of historical events between 

the Ottomans and Europe. Gündüz Aktan was investigating the influence of 

Christianity in the conscious and unconscious minds of the peoples of 

Europe, and the psychological impact of various subsequent events in 

Eastern Europe on the society. Democracy in Europe had emerged after the 

monarchs as father figures were overturned. He believed that the 

widespread social unconscious guilt shared after such events led to an 

externalization as a defense mechanism (for example, “I” am not evil; the 

“other” is), which in turn fueled racism in some European societies. He 

argued that knowing the social psychologies of European nations would 

benefit Turkey in developing better diplomatic relations with them. 

His thoughts and ideas may be traced in the speeches and articles in this 

book. We also published his opinions in the publication of the CSMHI under 

the pseudonym Mehmet Suphi (Suphi, 1996 a,b). Since Gündüz Aktan was 

an appointed diplomat at the time, he preferred not to use his real name. As 

far as I can remember, Mehmet Suphi was a grandfather of his. 

We were making parallel studies on how the images created by historical 

and religious events in the histories of societies were reflected on the 

political situation in the world today. As I gained more knowledge through my 

unofficial diplomatic experiences in many regions of conflict around the 

world, I had understood that societies, like individuals, had psychological 

rituals, and that the relations between societies would be better understood 

by analyzing the psychologies of those societies (Volkan, 1988, 1997, 2004, 


289


2006). Until the 1990s, psychoanalysis had not focused on the processes 

in the collective conscious and unconscious, but now it was clear that we 

had to understand these processes. The violence that erupts between large 

groups and the political, military, judicial and economic measures to be 

implemented in such cases have many aspects. No singular academic or 

professional field is adequate to fully understand these issues. Large group 

conflicts like wars and others do not emerge due to the overall psychology 

of the society. However, once they emerge and particularly become chronic, 

the psychological reactions of the society have ramifications on social, 

political, economic, legal and military processes. My field is the psychology 

of large groups, and the conversations I had with my friend Gündüz Aktan 

contributed greatly to my development of this psychological approach. 

For years, Gündüz Aktan and I came together in Ankara, Istanbul, 

Geneva, Washington and Charlottesville on many occasions. During his post 

as deputy undersecretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we held 

seminars on political psychology for Turkish ambassadors and other 

diplomats with the help of my colleagues from the CSMHI and the American 

Psychiatric Association. With the support of Gündüz Aktan, we also 

organized meetings on the psychologies and the acts of racism suffered by 

Turkish immigrants in Europe at the CSMHI in Charlottesville. We submitted 

two studies to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on these issues (Thomas, 

Harris and Volkan, 1993; Volkan and Harris, 1993). When Gündüz Aktan 

began to lead the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) 

in Istanbul and the Eurasian Strategic Research Center (ASAM) in Ankara, I 

visited him at these think tanks as well. 

In 2001, Americans initiated a process titled the Turkish Armenian 

Reconciliation Commission (TARC). I did not know of this commission. One 

day, Gündüz Aktan phoned me and asked me to join this commission. Since 

there were US and Russian nationals of Armenian descent in the 

commission, he wanted me to be a part of it as a US national of Turkish 

descent. I agreed with Gündüz Aktan and attended TARC meetings in 

Europe, America and Turkey for two years. I did not come to terms with how 

TARC was directed by an American and had doubts about the progress of the 

commission, so I was the first to resign. Gündüz Aktan followed one year 

later. This book includes the opinions of Gündüz Aktan on the Armenian 

issue. Meanwhile, I related my memories of TARC in the book Osmanlı’nın 

Yasından Atatürk’ün Türkiye’sine (From Post-Ottoman Mourning to Atatürk’s 

Turkey) which I co-authored with Nuriye Atabey (Volkan and Atabey, 2010). 

Gündüz Aktan was a great man who was equally humble and was loyal to 

his family. The religious and ethnic separation among the people of Turkey 

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Gündüz Aktan


was his greatest concern. He would always have new ideas for solutions. He 

was interested in many subjects besides psychoanalysis. I had visited him in 

his Ankara home after his return from his office as Ambassador in Tokyo. He 

was enthusiastic about the pieces of art he had bought in Japan, and 

explained them to me. Out of nowhere, he asked me, “Do you know how 

many Turkish words there are in Japanese” It turns out that he wondered 

this when he was in Japan, and looked into it. He had found approximately 

200 Turkish words in Japanese. He started counting them. 

We both enjoyed smoking cigars. I remember many times when we sat 

side by side in a room, a garden or a park, smoking cigars. I would feel that 

he had important things in mind, even when he was not talking. 

I am certain that this book not only helps us remember Gündüz Aktan, 

but also helps young diplomats of Turkey to know him better, take him as a 

role model and stay open to new ideas, expanding their perspectives. 


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